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Preface

Care: that word says so much with so little drama, works across such
a breadth of daily registers, and stirs affective ripples beneath and
beside language, that we may just take it—like many of the caregivers
of our lives—for granted. We may miss the rigors of its performativity.
Indeed we may think care too vague, soft, nice, affective, personal,
apolitical, familiar, familial and yes (unstatedly) feminine a notion to
do the serious work of ethics. Care seems to fall to the margins of the
work of social justice. So despite the feminist emergence of care ethics
in the 1980’s, the social ethics of progressive religious practice has
done little with care ethics as such. With its emphatic feminist,
LGBTQI+, antiracist, social, interreligious and ecological justice
commitments, liberal/progressive religion may be motivating vast
forceﬁelds of care. But, at least in the work of Christian social and
ecological justice, the language of social ethics seems to take the place
of care ethics. I can hear a voice in my own head say: “We want to
resist systemic injustice, we want to insist on a structural alternative.
Caring is not enough!”
Certainly. But what if there is ethical work that only the concept
of “care” can do? What if the disappointments of a half century of
impressive struggles for justice cannot just be explained in terms
of conservative reaction? What if those setbacks have something to
do with the lack of a robust language of care? Does ethics without an
explicit ampliﬁcation of care tend toward group moralism? Does inadequate care among members of a movement or a community soon
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weaken needed solidarity? Does the lack of care for those outside the
community—those just different or those opposed—undermine
the power of transformation? Does democratic agonism harden into
mere antagonism? Does lack of care for the earth and its fragile systems, human and nonhuman, render environmental crisis dangerously abstract?
The voice in my head, that of a feminist theologian situated in
a largely Christian context, might respond: those questions are valid.
But we have already the deep source for any effectual care, the true
motivation for ethical action. We call it love. Love carries the biblical imperative of respect, indeed care, for the other, not just others
within one’s circle, but strange and difﬁcult others. And again, yes,
certainly. An ethical notion of care may certainly be transcribed
as love.
But beyond circles that tend to its biblical context, its deep roots
in the Abrahamic prophetic ethos, love hardly escapes the problems
of “care”. A love-ethic summons similar doubts—as to its sentimentality, its weakness, its sub-political signiﬁcance. But it also brings
with it a problem of parochial overstatement. Indeed, any broad insistence on the vocabulary of love seems to impose a Christian vocabulary and its assumptions. And such a presumption violates, however
unintentionally, an ethics of religious multiplicity—a care for the
religious stranger. Moreover, the vocabulary of love, even of “revolutionary love,” may inhibit desired solidarity with secular publics. Care
ethics bears no such traces of Christian triumphalism. Furthermore,
it does not ﬁrst involve one in the theological tensions of agapic vs
erotic love. Care obtains across the spectrum of love. And when practiced ethically, attends to the intimacies, needs and distinctions of
sexualities as they pose their ethical questions.
There is another sense in which care entails a more persuasive,
a more practicable rhetoric than love, possibly even for addressing
Christians. To ask that you care for the stranger or for the environment does not require that you ﬁrst “love” them. This type of care
may or may not become recognizable as love. It works in freedom
from any religious, or for that matter secularist, exceptionalism. And
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in the same vein, care carries a strong practical immediacy, a concreteness that is not about just feeling care. The word itself carries
a whole assemblage of care practices and packages, care-givers in and
hugely beyond families. The vast valor of care-giving professionals
has been freshly recognized in the pandemic. Care implies an immediacy of hands-on attention, of the touching of bodies, of material
support. And planetary care, in the immediacies of daily practice, of
ecologically friendly energies, commitments, demonstrations, legislations, does not sentimentalize or over-personalize an ecological
ethic—it demands it.
Care ethics may prove key to keeping social ethics tuned to the
difﬁcult intersectionality in and as which all of our relations materialize. No one of us exists one moment outside of those relations—
which may nurture or traumatize, deaden or transform, work unconsciously or mindfully. Reigning systems of relation operate by
controlling, commodifying and concealing the relations that form us
moment by moment. So many around us and above us couldn’t care
less. Therefore, if care ethics is to resist the stereotypes that melt its
practice into charitable or interpersonal softness, it will show that,
for example, Black Lives Matter is a great exercise of collective care.
Without a perspective that tunes and reveals the width of our
interdependence and the depth of its deformations, care goes numb
to its collectives, and private in its singularities. Therefore, it is high
time to track the perspectives of embodied care across a multiplicity
of religious and spiritual publics—just as this book does. The gravitational force of this volume is perhaps beneath all carried by its root
attention to “the real needs of human beings in the blossoming
of their relational identities.” The brilliant transdisciplinary work of
Care Ethics, Religion and Spiritual Traditions unfolds a stunning multiplicity of perspectives within a remarkable coherence of vision. This
work matters—its spirit fosters the care in which we all live and
breathe and have our becoming.
Catherine Keller,
April 30, 2021

Introduction
Maurice Hamington,
Inge van Nistelrooij,
and Maureen Sander-Staudt

Religion has played a major role in organizing care;
hospitals began as religious institutions. All traditions urge
the practice of compassion, an essential attribute of care.
Secular humanism has incorporated much of this ethical
practice, but religion approaches the task of educating and
instilling ideals with repetitive reinforcement, determination and organization. Of course, religion is no guarantee of
good care, and religious institutions have demonstrated
appalling abuse of those in their care.
Madeleine Bunting, Labours of Love: The Crisis of Care

Madeleine Bunting eloquently articulates one of the fundamental
tensions that motivate this volume: religion and spirituality can be
a force for effective care as well as an impediment to care, and sometimes, both at the same time. We can recount extraordinary efforts
of kindness and compassion inspired by religious belief. For example,
although precise accounting is challenging to verify, The Church of
Latter-Day Saints has spent over $2US billion on humanitarian aid
from 1985 to 2017 and funded $180US million in humanitarian assistance during 2017 alone (Shamlian 2020). However, we can also
enumerate instances where religion spurs devastating division and
oppression of people. For example, religious organizations still support
conversion therapy to ostensibly suppress homosexuality, which has
caused suffering for over 700,000 LGBTQA+ individuals (The Trevor
Project 2020). Conversion therapy represents the antithesis of care
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in the twisted valorization of religious norms over and above the real
needs of human beings in the blossoming of their relational
identities.
There is no question that religiosity is an essential element of most
humans’ lives despite this tension. At least 84% of the world’s population identiﬁes with a religious group (Sherwood 2018). Furthermore, morality is an element of virtually every religious or spiritual
identiﬁcation, as is the idea of caring for one another. So why is it
that religious adherents do not always manifest care? The authors
who contributed to this volume address the relationship of care ethics
to religion and spiritual traditions through concrete examples and
theoretical explorations. Sometimes care ethics is viewed as providing a critique of religion; sometimes, religious experience has something to offer to the theorizing of care. Sometimes, the two are merely
in dialogue with one another. This introduction sets the analytical
foundation of the book and explicates the terms of analysis used
herein.
First, the context of the book is formed by care ethics, for which
it is essential to note that an “ethic of care” is not the same thing as
“care.” Each of the contributors to this collection was asked to frame
their chapter in dialogue with works of feminist care ethics. Because
this book is part of a series devoted to care ethics, the readers are
likely familiar with a deﬁnition of care ethics. However, given the
ubiquitous use of the word “care,” it bears repeating that not every
activity given the label “care” meets the moral standards of a caring
act, or at least effective care, under the rubrics of care ethics. Many
an atrocity has been wrought in the name of care, such as the paternalism invoked by colonial manifestations of care (Raghuram 2019,
618). Care ethics offers an ethical ideal (Noddings 1984, 48-51)
which describes a relational approach to morality that is sensitive to
the particularities and context of moral questions. Accordingly, care
describes a practice that includes inquiry, empathetic connections,
and action as essential elements in service of the ﬂourishing and
growth of beings. Care ethics entails a normative element, but
given the longer time horizon of relational thinking, care ethics is
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concerned with more than adjudicating individual actions. Instead,
it always considers these actions as embedded in institutions, structures, and a political context. Actions on all levels done in the name
of “care” that divide, oppress, or disproportionately harm others are
not compatible with the moral striving that care ethicists are describing (cf. Tronto 1993, 125-137).
Second, a tension that motivates this volume is the lack of intellectual dialogue between religious studies scholars and care ethics
scholars. Care ethics has received a great deal of scholarly attention,
particularly in business ethics, education, health care, philosophy,
and political theory. There are also emerging explorations of care in
anthropology, literature, performance studies, and social work. However, care ethics is a topic that is practically non-existent among
religious studies scholars. What is surprising about this absence is that
this lacuna is even true in the work of feminist religious studies scholars. For example, in 1996, over a decade after Carol Gilligan’s In
A Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development
(1984) ﬁrst named an ethic of care, the volume Feminist Ethics and
the Catholic Moral Tradition was published. Although it contains
25 contributed chapters from a variety of well-respected Catholic
feminist scholars in over 625 pages, there is no consideration of care
ethics, even though the many discussions of feminist ethics contain
resonances such as the valorization of contextualism. As of this writing, The Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion which was founded in
1985 and is self-described as “the oldest interdisciplinary, interreligious feminist academic journal in religious studies” (Schüssler
Fiorenza 2020), has only had a few articles on care ethics and none
during the recent burgeoning of care scholarship. By comparison,
a search of the Journal of Business Ethics, which has no explicit
feminist character to its academic aims and scope (Freemand and
Greenwood 2020), reveals well over 50 articles addressing care ethics
since the 1980s. To be fair, in the Netherlands and Belgium, care
ethics has been elaborated from theological perspectives, for instance,
by Annelies van Heijst (2008, 2011), to whose work we will return
below. The majority of feminist care theorists, however, have only
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occasionally addressed religion and spirituality themselves. Thus, there
is a notable lack of dialogue between the two ﬁelds of study. This
book is an effort to open up that dialogue and provoke further conversation regarding the relationship between care and religious studies. In the following sections, we address the historical relationship
between care, religion, and spiritual traditions and review the historical forays of feminist care theorists into the subject, as sparse as it is.

Engagements of Care Theorists with Religion and Spirituality
The dearth of writing by care ethicists on religion and spirituality has
been mentioned above. Despite this lack, there are a few care scholars whose work does engage religion, and we explore some examples
in this introduction. This volume is intended to be inclusive, and so
we address both religions and spiritual traditions. In this context,
religion is viewed as organized beliefs and practices that entail institutional development and history. In this category, we include what
is often referred to as the world’s major religions such as Hinduism,
Buddhism, Islam, Judaism, and Christianity. Although the distinction
between religion and spiritual traditions is not always clear cut, for
this project, the latter refers to beliefs and practices that are more
loosely organized in lacking large institutional hierarchies. In this
category, we include indigenous spiritualities, Confucianism, and new
spiritual movements. Of course, Confucianism is often categorized as
one of the world’s major religions, although it lacks a systematic
metaphysics. This leads to a debate about whether Confucianism and
other systems of thought are best understood as religions, spiritual
traditions, or secular humanist philosophies. This confusion is in part
because “spirit” and “spiritual” have rich and diverse meanings. Ultimately, the distinction between religion and spiritual tradition is not
an evaluative one, nor is it signiﬁcant to a care analysis. We employ
the categories of “religion” and “spiritual tradition” loosely as an
effort at an inclusive approach to the subject and remain neutral on
such metaphysical debates.
A founding mother of care ethics, Nel Noddings, has probably
offered the most volume of commentary regarding the relationship
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between care ethics and religion. Writing only two years after Carol
Gilligan coined the term “ethic of care,” Noddings was the ﬁrst philosopher to offer a book-length exploration of care ethics. In her ﬁrst
book on the subject, Caring: A Feminine Approach to Caring and Moral
Education, Noddings distinguishes between “natural caring” and “ethical caring” (1984, 79). She contends that humans naturally tend to
care for familiar others—family and friends—with whom we share
proximity and time. Such caring is not always easy, but it is so
expected and routine that it appears to be natural. Noddings gives
natural care an originary position that takes more signiﬁcant effort
and imagination to extend to unfamiliar others through what she
names ethical caring. Although social institutions often place ethical
caring as a moral ideal, they often fall short because “they demand
loyalty, insist upon the afﬁrmations of certain beliefs, and separate
members from nonmembers on principle” (1984, 117). Noddings
claims that this failure is particularly true of religions because of their
“frequent insistence on obedience to rules and adherence to ritual
contributes to the erosion of genuine caring” (1984, 117). Noddings
goes on to author Women and Evil (1989), where she demonstrates
her knowledge of feminist theology by engaging ﬁgures like Mary
Daly, Rosemary Radford Ruether, and Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza in
her interrogation of the underlying social narrative that associates
women with evil.
Women and Evil allows Noddings to develop further her theories
of care with a focus on institutions and gender oppression. Again,
religion does not fare well in this analysis. Noddings does not advocate atheism or offer a blanket critique of religion and spiritual traditions, but she ﬁnds much harm in the history of organized religion.
For example, she claims that religion contributes to a form of “othering” that can foment violence and war: “The notion that salvation
rests in our relation to God and not in our relation to other human
beings has often led to a devaluation of persons and a tendency to
place those with whom we differ outside the moral community”
(1989, 204). In 1991, Noddings delivered the annual John Dewey
Lecture on “Educating for Intelligent Belief or Unbelief” (1993). This
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work is not usually a signiﬁcant text for care theorists as it does not
address care ethics at all. Interestingly enough, Noddings recommends that all public schools should teach religion (1993, xv) and
give students the information, both positive and negative, as well as
the tools to assess the teachings of religion in an evidence-based
manner (139-144).
Noddings continues her concern about the connection between
religion and violence as she develops a social and political philosophy
of care in Starting at Home: Caring and Social Policy (2002a). In particular, she criticizes Christianity for making certain forms of suffering
acceptable: “Christianity has—in both its theological traditions and
ordinary pulpit preaching—promoted the idea that pain is deserved”
(2002a, 196). The premise of the book is that social policy should
take its cues from the ideal caring relationships associated with home
and family life. Thus, for Noddings, a concept like eternal damnation
does not make sense in the moral relationships found in the home
where, ideally, forgiveness and compassion should reside. Noddings
recognizes that many Christians have jettisoned beliefs such as hell
and damnation, but the legacy of these religious constructs remains
(2002a, 196). Noddings, a professor of philosophy and education,
renews her critique of religion in her writings about moral education.
In Educating Moral People: A Caring Alternative to Character Education
(2002b), Noddings is concerned about modern efforts at character
education in schools which she suggests is too focused on instilling
virtues. Although care ethics is often associated with virtue theory,
given that care is clearly neither deontological or utilitarian, she ﬁnds
virtue ethics too individualistic. For Noddings, care’s relational ontology distinguishes it from virtue theory. Thus any character education
that emphasizes traditional virtues is missing the signiﬁcance of the
fundamental relationality of humanity (2002b, xiii). Furthermore, she
suggests that character education of religion is ﬂawed in its implicit
endorsement of problematic masculine virtues. For example, Noddings
criticizes the valorization of a warrior model marked by individualism,
hyper-competitiveness, and hierarchical thinking (2002b, 110).
Although she ﬁnds the peace and compassion-oriented teachings of
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Jesus compatible with care, there exists an embedded warrior model:
“Jesus, while counseling his followers against violence, promised that
God would mete out justice in destruction of the wicked” (2002b,
104). Despite Noddings’ misgivings, which some care ethicists share,
other writers in this volume see potential in the ways that religion,
spirituality, and care can overlap and enhance one another.
The 1980s was a time when a coalescence of ideas helped form
what would become care ethics. Still, as with any paradigm shift,
rather than a ﬂipping of a switch, there was a groundswell of movement toward a new way of thinking about ethics and humanity. One
signiﬁcant voice in this trajectory was Catherine Keller. In From
A Broken Web: Separation, Sexism, and Self, Keller does not explicitly
name an ethic of care, but her discussion of ontological relationality
resonates strongly with the work of care theorists, especially in her
use of Carol Gilligan. Keller weaves gender, sexuality, mythology, and
religion into a lament about how the social imagination has valorized
separateness from a variety of sources, including popular conceptions
of god (1986, 35) to the patriarchal differentiation of men and women
(1986, 38). Keller’s analysis is thorough and nuanced; however, it is
not a critique of religion and spirituality per se. Instead, her concern
is with dominant institutional and theological manifestations of religion. She argues that under different conditions, religion could be
a powerful force for connectedness among people (1986, 225). However, according to Keller, religious institutions and their theologies
have more often than not reiﬁed separateness: “Religion deﬁning
holiness as separation has made itself into the bearer of barriers, of
disconnection, of exclusion” (1986, 219). This separateness runs
counter to our composite identity. Keller declares, “I am many” (1986,
228) in afﬁrming the web metaphor of self as multiplicity: “my many
selves as the fabric of other persons, plants, places—all the actual
entities that have become part of me” (1986, 227). Keller ends her
argument on a hopeful note by integrating the notion of relational
ontology with a process theology in claiming that rather than
a detached and abstract omnipotent and omnibenevolent deity, there
exists the possibility of a god that is always becoming and unfolding
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in the web of existence (1986, 248-252). Keller’s work represented
a type of proto-care ethics that recognized the signiﬁcance of spirituality in people’s lives.
Relational ontology was also at the center of a discussion in 2007
at a symposium sponsored by The St. Thomas Law Review titled,
“Workplace Restructuring to Accommodate Family Life.” One panel
of the symposium was composed of Roman Catholic feminist legal
scholars as well as Eva Feder Kittay, a proliﬁc and highly regarded
care philosopher. Kittay was invited to represent a secular feminist
position (2007, 468). During the paper presentations, care ethics was
framed as a secular approach over and against religious approaches.
In her presentation, Kittay made it clear that as much as she values
the feminist religious tradition, such as the Catholic feminists mentioned earlier, there is a distinction in how she approaches human
dignity. Care plays a central role in that distinction:
I really do welcome the writings of religious feminists who emphasize
love, care, and human vulnerability, an emphasis that stands in contrast
to an often constricting and obsessive valuing of the human capacity for
rationality. Contrast the conception of dignity that predominates in philosophy with the one dominant in religious traditions. Philosophical
treatments of human dignity tend to be based on our ability to reason.
Human dignity as conceived within religious traditions derives from the
idea that we are all created in the divine image, that we are all children
of God. While I feel an afﬁnity to attributions of dignity that are not
based on the capacity for reason, I don’t think that appeal to a personal
deity is the only alternative. In other work, I have argued for a notion of
dignity grounded in the care humans are both able to give and receive,
not, if you will, in the idea that we are all children of God, but a secular
analogue, the idea that we are all “some mother’s child” (2007, 469).

Employing Martin Luther King Jr. as an example, Kittay describes
what she shares with those of religious faith on issues of social and
political importance as an “overlapping consensus” (2007, 471) which
is possible in a pluralist society. Kittay takes issue with the presentation of Susan J. Stabile (2007), who argues that one of the primary
differences between Catholic and secular feminism is that the latter
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is committed to equality and individualism to the point of denigration of familial care (2007, 435). To support her position, Stabile
quotes the work of Elizabeth Fox Genovese in Feminism and the
Unraveling of the Social Bond (2007, 436), a historian who converted
to Catholicism and became a leading anti-feminist voice in the
United States. Stabile concludes her presentation by delineating
commonalities and differences between feminists and religious scholars. Beyond the shared commitment for better valuation of the work
done in the home between secular and religious feminists, Stabile
claims, “The primacy of the traditional family in Catholic thought,
combined with an acceptance of immutable differences between men
and women, means that there will be points along this road where
the paths of Catholic and secular feminist will part company” (2007,
468). Kittay responds with a review of some of the relational work
done in feminist psychology and philosophy. She clariﬁes that “secular feminists are united in ﬁerce commitment to equality, but not to
individualism” (2007, 475). On many fronts, Kittay found resonance
between the two positions but vigilantly criticizes the advocacy
of traditional familial structures and theological positions of exclusions rather than the moral obligations that human dependency
generates:
It is hard for this secular feminist to understand why, when religious
feminists want to emphasize relationality, the value of caring labor, equal
dignity of each individual, the importance of raising children and caring
for those who cannot care for themselves, the emphasis is not on the
units of dependency relations rather than the family as understood and
constituted by patriarchy. So here there is a real divide. Predictably,
I would urge the religious feminists to come over to our side, for in my
perspective, it is far more consistent with all their other feminist positions and attitudes towards care (2007, 484).

This panel occurred well over a decade before this publication, but it
is one of the rarely documented dialogues on care ethics and Christianity. Given the work of feminist theologians such as the Catholic
feminists mentioned earlier, it is a pressing question whether the
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criticisms of Kittay and other care ethicists are justiﬁed. Given
the rise of care ethics literature, one might speculate that Christian
feminists and religious feminists of all faiths might have more to say
about comparative moral approaches.

Care as A Lens of Analysis for Historical Religious Practices
Care scholarship is concerned with more than the theoretical intersection between religion, spirituality, and care. Care ethics is rooted
in human, embodied experiences which points to the value of phenomenological and ethnographic examinations of particular relational occurrences. Dutch feminist theologian and path-breaking care
ethicist Annelies van Heijst (2008) offers one such case example.
She sets up a dialogue between care ethical theory and historical
religious practices of care, performed by a congregation of Catholic
Sisters in the Netherlands between 1852 and 2002. The limited scope
of this case study may, according to Van Heijst, still be revealing of
broader practices performed by apostolic nuns, which had a very similar lifestyle throughout Western Europe, Scandinavia, the US, and
Canada (2008, 2). The congregation studied was the ‘Sisters of “The
Providence,”’ which served the lowest strata of society, founding and
stafﬁng ‘52 institutes for childcare and education, nursing care and
social service’, and their works spread to Indonesia, Brazil and Tanzania as well (2008, 1). Looking at their practices now, in 2021, with
knowledge of both post-colonialism and the widespread sexual abuse
in Catholic institutions, could lead to a general rejection and discarding of such caring practices, and of the book. Still, we believe that
this would be unjust to the nuanced work on care ethics and religious
practice that Van Heijst has performed, as well as to the literal lifesaving works of the Sisters, despite obvious and well-argued criticism.
Van Heijst literally raised this criticism before evidence of such practices in the Netherlands came to light. Two years after her publications, the accusations of physical and sexual abuse by church ofﬁcials,
and the structural nature of its cover-up, ﬁnally gained public attention in the Netherlands. The darkest pages of this history were ofﬁcially uncovered in a thorough investigation by an independent,
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high-proﬁle committee1 starting in 2010, with devastating results
regarding the Church’s record of misconduct. Understandably, the
tide of public opinion has shifted regarding the general image of religious care and education to one of concern and suspicion. However,
oversimpliﬁed visions were voiced as well. Van Heijst’s work can
count as an early and thorough critical analysis and one of the pioneering works that published the voices of those entrusted to this
care. This is why we believe it is justiﬁed to underscore the importance of her work.
Van Heijst’s study distinguishes itself in various respects. First, she
analyses the religious practices of care as rooted in religion. She draws
upon theology as a hermeneutical tool to understand the religious
meaning expressed in these particular practices. She describes the
theological concepts that underpinned the religious care visions as
expressed in the normative writings of the congregation (Ch. 7) as
well as in their daily practices (Ch. 8) and how they were remodelled
over time (Ch. 9). Her analysis is far too detailed to do justice to here
but shows an interesting tension between those concepts that put the
Sisters on the track of a referential worthiness of children themselves
as referring to the Divine Child (i.e. Jesus), and those that made
them detach themselves from the natural world and any ‘affectionate
bonding with human individuals’ and instead ‘strive for supernatural
love’, that is the love of God through ascetic mortiﬁcation (2008,
250). This tension reveals how theology might simultaneously propel
and hinder a caring practice. These opposite and irreconcilable meanings are expressed by both care recipients and Sisters throughout Van
Heijst’s book, as well as their consequences in practice. For instance,
the Sisters themselves expressed how they were forbidden to create
special bonds with the children in their care, which reﬂects the
1
The committee’s chair was former Minister of Education, President of the
Dutch Parliament and Mayor of The Hague, Wim Deetman. The research committee
consisted of a clinical psychiatrist, a former judge, professors in psychology, (religious) history, and philosophy of science. Further expertise was offered by a sound
board group, which served as a reading committee, with the task to warrant the
independence and quality of the conducted research.
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criticism much expressed by the care recipients that the Sisters
treated them in an emotionally detached way. Also, their own asceticism and bodily disregard often led to ambiguity regarding pain for
themselves, but also for others. This raises questions regarding care
for both themselves and the children in their care. Simultaneously,
however, both some Sisters and care recipients express how, when
nobody witnessed them, there were experiences of connection, being
seen and heard, pleasure and playfulness, which were rare, and (therefore) very special.
Second, Van Heijst presents a historical example of care practice
to care ethics, and by doing so, she contributes to the purpose of
making care theory more practice-based (2008, 27). Departing from
the analysis of the historic practices, Van Heijst offers a touchstone
of Tronto’s theory and highlights elements that are downplayed there.
One of the most relevant for the present volume is that Van Heijst’s
case study unambiguously shows that the ethics of care up to that
point had insufﬁciently recognized the importance of religion. She
argues that Tronto’s phased model of care should particularly include
the recognition that religion is often vital for what motivates people
to care for others in the ﬁrst place as well as to keep them involved
in these caring practices. Tronto’s third phase that is the phase in
which the actual carework is performed, people’s religious beliefs historically have incited them to build “an impressive praxis of care and
education for the most vulnerable groups in society and for middleclass Catholics as well. [T]hey transformed social reality […] by practicing Christian neighbourly love and committing themselves to
needy people and to God” (2008, 372). Literally, tens of thousands
of religious people were involved in these works, also in parts of the
Netherlands where, and particularly for social groups for whom such
provisions were not established by the government.
Thirdly, Van Heijst applies Joan Tronto’s theory for examining this
historical care practice. Tronto’s phased model of care is particularly
adequate, as it helps to evaluate the historical practice on various
levels, such as the political context, the institutional level (organizing, coordinating, and ﬁnancing charitable care), and the level of
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daily practice of caregiving and care receiving. Van Heijst reinterprets Tronto’s model as a standpoint epistemology, a theoretical
approach developed in ethnic and women’s studies, by connecting
the care phases with actual positions that people have (2008, 28-29).
Prompted by the ethics of care, Van Heijst gives speciﬁc weight to
the standpoint of recipients of this charity work, who are critical of
the standards of good care that were applied (2008, 361-365). Nevertheless, their evaluations are varied. Some show appreciation for
the care as it entailed an improvement of their previous condition.
For them, this care was lifesaving in situations where their next of kin
were dead, or incapable or unwilling to give care (2008, 361-362).
The negative evaluations concern the aforementioned lack of personal attention (2008, 362), but also the common practice of splitting
up brothers and sisters in various age and gender groups. The effect
was that children growing up in the orphanages of the Poor Sisters
often did not know of the existence of their siblings (2008, 362).
By including these multiple standpoints, Van Heijst also serves
another goal, that is: ﬁlling existing gaps in remarkably one-sided
literature. This onesidedness, for instance, exists in the neglect of the
Catholic tradition in the Netherlands while focusing on Protestant
or socialist care and welfare provisions; or a focus on the male Catholic tradition while neglecting the female religious who were the large
majority; or to an uncritically negative or positive bias regarding
these practices; or the representation of only one perspective (primarily that of the caregivers and especially their institutions). Another
consequence of applying Tronto’s theory is that Van Heijst’s book
includes an analysis of the social and (church-)political context in
the nineteenth and twentieth century in the Netherlands. In this
way, she elaborates care ethics in order to provide a hermeneutic,
political-ethical tool for past religious, caring practices.
In sum, Van Heijst’s book offers a rich analysis of the complex
relations between care, power, and faith in historical care practices.
She also reveals the reality of care practices in the context of religion
and spirituality: the evaluative dichotomies that we gravitate toward,
such as care/not care, are wholly inadequate. Care is sometimes
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shadowed by damage. Religion can motivate great efforts of care, and
yet it leverages power and privilege that also can inﬂict harm. That
tension is an undercurrent throughout this book.

Comparative Spiritual Studies
Interestingly enough, there have been some robust non-Western
interchanges between scholars regarding care and spirituality. Perhaps
the most mature of these has been the dialogue between care ethics
and Confucianism. Chenyang Li (1994) offers a comparative study of
care ethics and Confucian concept of jen, a term that combines both
affection and virtue (1994, 72). Li concludes that Confucianism and
care ethics share an alternative conception of human relations that
eschews a contractarian approach in favor of moral ideals (1994,
71-75), a lack of formulaic rules (1994, 75-79), and a moral partiality that originates with familiar others and extends outward to lessfamiliar others (1994, 79-81). Li acknowledges that Confucianism
lacks the gender analysis inherent in care ethics and that recent
manifestations of Confucianism have exhibited sexism and misogyny,
although this oppression is not apparent in the original accounts
(1994, 81-85). In a 2002 response to Li, Lijun Yuan disputes the
notion that Confucianism can be feminist. In particular, she cites
sexist passages in The Analects and ﬁnds that the message of jen would
have been directed toward men (2002, 113). Yuan concludes that jen
fails to meet the test of feminism because it was never employed in
“challenging traditional forms of domination in a hierarchy society”
(2002, 125). In that same issue of Hypatia, Daniel Star also critiques
Li by arguing that Confucianism is much more like a virtue ethic
than the relational ethic of care (2002). Star is not making a value
judgment, but, like Noddings’ criticisms of virtue-based character
education, he points out the more individualistic character of Confucian morality. Li is given an opportunity to reply to the rebuttals of
both Yuan and Star. He ﬁnds both critiques lacking and reiterates his
position that care ethics has more in common with Confucianism
than other Western forms of ethics. Beyond this dialogue in the pages
of Hypatia, there have been other studies that explore the
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relationship between care ethics and Confucianism (Herr 2013;
Sander-Staudt 2015). Li returned to the pages of Hypatia in 2015 to
review care ethics and Confucianism scholarly dialogue. Yuan goes
on to develop a book-length comparative study of care ethics and
Confucianism, where she reconciles care ethics with a reformed version of neo-Confucianism (2019). The study is wide-ranging and
addresses relational ontology, methodology, reciprocity, and even
offers a closing case study through an analysis of China’s population
policy. Other spiritual traditions have received far less attention
regarding their relation to care ethics than Confucianism.
Vrinda Dalmiya integrates an Indian epic associated with Hinduism, Mahaˉbhaˉrata to make a point about relational humility in
Caring to Know: Comparative Care Ethics, Feminist Epistemology, and
the Mahaˉbhaˉrata (2016). Dalmiya frames a complex epistemic conclusion by drawing from ancient stories:
The notion of care refracted through the conceptual lens of the
Mahaˉbhaˉrata can… plug some of the lacunae in virtue epistemology that
takes relational humility to be foundational. This interdependence of
caring and knowing—of need fulﬁlment and of effectively grasping the
world—makes relational humility that underlies both a truly hybrid virtue (2016, 28).

Dalmiya is not offering a spiritual or religious analysis. Still, she is
drawing from texts with spiritual signiﬁcance to argue that truthseeking is linked to caring and being cared for. Similarly, the African
concept of ubuntu, meaning “I am because you are”, describes an
ethos of humanity toward others is more a cultural term than explicitly religious or spiritual. Yet, ubuntu and its relational ontology have
had spiritual applications, as in the work of Desmond Tutu (Battle
2009). There have been many favorable comparative explorations of
care and ubuntu (Chisale 2018; Gouws and Van Zyl 2015; Hall et al.
2013; Waghid and Smeyers 2012). Given its role as a moral, social
spirit, ubuntu may provide an intriguing means for better understanding a communal ethos of care.
As care ethics grows in its international theoretical development
and application, further interaction with religion and spirituality is
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warranted, given that religion has a history of being a crucial social
harbinger of moral thinking about care and caring. We hope that this
collection is a step toward a richer dialogue.

Chapters in this Book
In what follows, we offer a brief summary of the chapters which make
up this volume.
A signiﬁcant theme of care ethics is how dominant systems of
thought exclude and marginalize “the different voice” of care. In the
ﬁrst section, the authors explore how religions and spiritual traditions
can determine who has the authority to speak in religious contexts
and why. A care ethical study of religion raises questions about epistemic authority and which religious values are most compatible with
care. Addressing the latter problem, in “Care Ethics and Forgiveness:
Lessons and Errors from the Christian tradition,” philosopher Ruth
Groenhout interrogates the theme of forgiveness in Christianity from
the standpoint of care ethics. In this investigation, Groenhout highlights a contrast between religious and philosophical ethics. Whereas
western philosophy has focused on adjudicating the morality of
actions, which gives forgiveness a minimal role, religion often privileges forgiveness by focusing on building a moral community. Given
the fundamental relationality of care, one might assume that forgiveness is a topic where some forms of religion and care ethics might
resonate strongly. As Groenhout describes, “Just as forgiveness is crucial to care ethics, it is also crucial to a Christian ethics of love.”
Indeed, while traditional treatments of ethics focus on decisionmaking moments, forgiveness is a recognition of the temporal dimension inherent in a moral relationship. According to Groenhout, “Forgiveness allows the relationship to continue, allows the one harming
to (sometimes) recognize and apologize without fearing harsh retribution, and allows the one harmed to let go of anger and pain in many
cases.” However, Groenhout details how there have been abuses of
forgiveness in religious formulations. She calls on care theorists to be
vigilant regarding the feminist origins of care ethics, whereby power
and privilege are named and held in check. Religion provides a case
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example to motivate that vigilance. Groenhout views forgiveness as
a subject that requires both personal and political elements of care to
separate punishment and accountability issues. For Groenhout, “forgiveness remains the agent’s to choose, not another’s to demand, that
forgiveness is never allocated to the powerful to control in order to
protect their power, and that forgiveness never is primarily structured
as absolving the wrongdoer from accountability.”
The incompatibility of care ethics with religious dogma is addressed
in the chapter “Against Moral Certainty and Authority: How Dogmatic Religious Ethics is Incompatible with Care Ethics” by Maurice
Hamington. Hamington focuses on the authority of sacred texts.
Religious leaders can diminish the ability to care when religion is
taken too seriously: “the critique from the standpoint of care ethics
is not with religion per se but with moral ideology and dogmatism
whereby moral authority is not questioned.” Hamington employs the
example of the events surrounding John Allen Chau’s death, a young
and charismatic fundamentalist religious missionary who attempted
to proselytize to a small isolated indigenous community, the Sentinelese. Chau believed he was doing good in the form of “God’s will”
for the Sentinelese. Still, the question remains whether he actually
cared about the Sentinelese and whether the fundamentalist religious
communities that supported Chau cared about him. Hamington suggests that care ethics is anti-authoritarian in that authentic caring is
responsive to particular individuals in particular circumstances.
According to Hamington, the certainty and authority that come with
deontological formulations of religious morality can interfere with the
responsiveness to the totality and complexity of the other. Responsiveness is an essential element of effective care. Hamington argues
that although many religions teach humility, the certainty and
authority of some religious communities belie that humility. He
claims that the openness to the other in caring responsiveness requires
humility rather than certainty.
In a similar consideration of care ethics’ compatibility with certain
religious conceptual traditions, the compatibility of care ethics with
Jewish abstraction is the focus of philosopher Sarah Zager’s “The Pain
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of Imagining Others: Caring for the Abstract and the Particular in
Jewish Thought.” This chapter makes an important theoretical argument regarding feminist care ethics, and yet is also profoundly personal. In a careful textual analysis, Zager critiques the underlying
religious assumptions in the work of Virginia Held and Nel Noddings
regarding the eschewing of abstraction in favor of particularism. Zager
opens up the imaginary of caring by addressing the care for abstract
others as revealed in Jewish feminist care ethics. She claims, “Jewish
versions of care ethics take on a distinctive shape and adopt distinctive versions of care ethics’ critique of abstraction.” To argue for more
attention to caring for abstract others, Zager shares her own challenges with premature ovarian insufﬁciency, which resulted in her
freezing her eggs as she was not ready to have children. She reﬂects
on genuinely caring for her eggs. For Zager, these eggs are mere
abstractions of fully formed humans: the people they may become.
She wonders how her care for an abstraction ﬁts into Held and
Noddings’ care theory, which tend to emphasize care for particular
others capable of caring reciprocity. For Zager, the signiﬁcance of
a frozen egg was, “less as a clump of biological material… than as an
imagined person, someone who made a kind of ethical demand of me,
but who was not yet a full-ﬂedged, embodied person with particular
features.” Zager thoughtfully problematizes the standard feminist care
dichotomy between the particular and the universal and ﬁnds balance
in recent Jewish care literature which “rejects abstract philosophical
anthropologies, while retaining a strong emphasis on moral obligation, and on ritual practices structured by rules.”
Feminist philosopher Maureen Sander-Staudt likewise draws from
her family history in the chapter “Theological Spelunking with Care
Ethics: Caring Ethical Standards for Relational Maintenance across
Religious Pluralities.” Considering the religious-relational trouble
caused by her mother’s conversion from Catholicism to Lutheranism,
Sander-Staudt raises questions about how care ethics can best reach
across religious differences and discontent. Using Plato’s allegory
of the cave to frame the epistemic hazards of such a study as one of
“theological spelunking,” Sander-Staudt establishes care ethical
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standards for religious teachings and practices, dialectically examining Nel Noddings’ claim that care and Christian ethics are “irreconcilable.” After ﬁnding cause to accept Noddings’ argument partially,
she qualiﬁes it but concurs that care ethics is incompatible with religious teachings and practices that inﬂict wanton relational damage.
She uses the resulting care ethical standards to explore how a care
ethical approach might differ from a liberal justice approach in
responding to religious difference, plurality, and dissidence. She concludes “writ large” with a case study of an ethical response to the
Fundamentalist Church of the Latter Day Saints (FDLS). FDLS communities practice extremist versions of Mormonism which are explicitly condemned by the larger Mormon Church and secular laws, but
as such, pose challenges to the basic tenets of care ethics.
Looking more carefully at the very notion of spirituality, Italian
philosopher Luigina Mortari interrogates the nature of spirituality
regarding an ethic of care in “Spiritual Care: The Spiritual Side Of
A Culture Of Care.” This sweeping analysis takes us on a journey
that includes Ancient Greek philosophy, Continental Philosophy,
ontology, epistemology, empirical research, and poet-philosopher
Maria Zambrano’s work, among others. Mortari argues that there is
an ontological call to care as an essential technique for living.
Accordingly, Mortari ﬁnds the examined life a necessity: “To conceive the technique of living means having the knowledge and wisdom of care; in other words, knowing what good care is, and how to
put it into practice.” Mortari leverages a Platonic notion of the soul
to frame a spiritual pursuit of care as a quest for the good and not just
an ethical determination of what is right. She states, “the practice of
care teaches me that it is not only necessary to search for a concrete,
immanent idea of good embodied in the daily life (about this, it is
possible to speak of a materialistic spirituality as the generative matrix
of care ethics), but also to cultivate a manner of thinking that is
congruent with both the human limits of thinking and the essence
of care.” Seldom do care theorists present care ethics in the broadbrush strokes that Mortari’s epic narrative offers. This chapter
may not be a typical philosophical analysis of care, but it suggests
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several provocative insights into the relationship between care and
spirituality.
The second grouping of chapters in this volume looks at care ethics and religion in the context of embodiment, gender, and the family. This focus considers the roles of the body, femininity and masculinity, and family relations in religions and spiritual traditions, and
how religious norms and institutions can inform sexuality in more or
less caring ways. To begin, care ethicist Inge van Nistelrooij argues
for a new turn in care ethics. After the ‘political turn’ of the 1990s,
when the majority of care ethicists abandoned the focus on mothering practices in which the works of Gilligan, Noddings, and Ruddick
were rooted, Van Nistelrooij argues for a renewed and distinct attention to the subject of maternity. She argues that the experience of
maternity – i.e., pregnancy, labor, lactation – is of a particular kind
that makes mothers (be they female, male, non-binary, trans- or
intersex, or other) still vulnerable to oppression, exploitation, and
violence. Then, taking two artworks by Louise Bourgeois as heuristic
guides, Van Nistelrooij explores the works of Ruddick (1989), Rich
(1986), and Keller (2003) to give a new impetus to thinking about
the mother’s body in care, worship, and theology. Surprisingly, religion has not only been detrimental to women’s and mothers’ experiences, but religious representations and (remnants of) texts can also
help reinvigorate the meaning of our coming into life through somebody else’s body and of the experience of giving life. Particularly, the
elements of ﬂuidity and becoming help explore maternity as politically and morally relevant today and avoid the pitfalls of the pioneering care ethics’ works on maternity. Ultimately, Van Nistelrooij concludes by suggesting a reformulation of Fisher and Tronto’s famous
deﬁnition of care, one that accounts for maternity in a new way. By
including processes of becoming, caring can be viewed as less anthropocentric and less agentic. As such, it can avoid essentializing, naturalizing, or containing maternity to one gender, the private setting,
and can gain renewed moral and political relevance.
As the next chapter demonstrates, masculinity, religion, and spirituality are worth equal scrutiny from a care ethical point of view.
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Because care ethics developed out of feminist analysis and was rooted
in women’s traditionally under-valued experience, understandably,
there has not been as much written about care and masculinity. This
absence is changing as care ethics grows in popularity across a variety
of disciplines. Martin Robb, who has written extensively about masculinity in the context of care, furthers this vital conversation in
“‘With Prayer from Your Loving Father’: Men, Masculinity, Faith and
Care.” The chapter begins on a personal note, with Robb sharing
excerpts of letters from his great grandfather to his grandfather. He
leverages these letters in the context of Christian Methodism to
argue for a Christian masculinity compatible with care theory. In
particular, Robb challenges the notion that Christian masculinity was
handed down as a monolith. On the one hand, he acknowledges that
one form of Christian manliness was reinforced as “neo-Spartan virility as exempliﬁed by stoicism, hardiness, and endurance” by Christian
and quasi-Christian social institutions. However, that form of masculinity existed in tension with a narrative that Robb ﬁnds revealed in
his great grandfather’s letters where “the emotional spirituality of
Methodism offers him a language in which to openly express his love
for his son” as in closing his letters with kisses. Robb concludes with
a note about the signiﬁcance of imagination for care. Although the
tendency is to address care theory in the rational and analytic tradition of Western academic theory, he contends there is a need for an
“imaginative superstructure to inform and motivate care” that religion can provide.
The third chapter in this section highlights some of the harms that
can be wrought by well-meaning and caringly motivated but misguided applications of religious norms to sexual identities and practices. In his chapter “Theologically Motivated Conversion Therapy
and Care Epistemology,” Steven Steyl explores how deﬁciencies in
care ethical, epistemological dispositions misdirect some care-givers
into choosing conversion therapies for themselves or their care recipients on the basis of religious belief. While motivations for conversion therapies are not inherently theological, Steyl focuses his analysis on therapies motivated by spiritual teachings that lead caregivers
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to conclude that conversion therapy is morally good or permissible
on theological grounds. After laying out harms associated with these
therapies, he delineates “epistemic missteps” in the attentive, evaluative, and pragmatic phases of care. These missteps lead to harmful
applications of psychotherapeutic conversion therapies designed to
“sexually reorient individuals whose sexual orientation is deemed in
some way undesirable.” Steyl argues that the harms of conversion
therapy admit to “fecundity,” a phrase coined by Utilitarian philosopher Jeremey Bentham to indicate pains/pleasures that compound. To
rectify the missteps of religiously based conversion therapies, Steyl
develops a positive care ethical epistemology that emphasizes epistemic virtues and dispositions and denounces the corresponding subvices of inattention.
Family life and parenthood are standard themes of many religions.
As the fourth contribution in this section demonstrates, the promise
of the caring aspects of parent-child relations is not always religiously
explicit, especially for fathers. In his chapter “To Shelter an Egyptian
Firstborn: The Revelatory Potential of Care Ethics in Jewish Thought,”
Jason Rubenstein considers a seeming gap on parenthood in Talmudic
teaching, evident in Rabbinic alienation from their own children in
favor of students. Rubenstein’s chapter is a self-deﬁned “search for
spiritual ancestors” and “attempt… to realize some of the liberatory
potential feminism offers to men…deﬁned by our caring work, and
to Torah itself”. Rubenstein uses his experiences as a Jewish scholar
and father to explore the value of feminism for the Torah and Jewish
people, traditionally bifurcated into women who exclusively care for
others and men who only study. Rubenstein notes that what is at
stake “is not whether the rabbis performed childrearing work, but
how they appraised the value of childrearing work.” Drawing inspiration from the poetry of Merle Felde, Talmudic stories such as that of
Rabbi Akiva visiting his ailing student, and Nancy Hartsock’s Marxian feminist standpoint theory, Rubenstein extracts the liberational
possibility of caring work in Rabbinic thought. Against masculinities
rooted in hierarchical dualisms and abstractions, Rubenstein uses
Rabbinic texts to highlight the Torah’s most prominent reﬂections on
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care. They include retellings of the story of Exodus, which recount
God’s care for vulnerable babies birthed in the ﬁelds by Israelite
women enslaved in Egypt, and the efforts of these same Israelite mothers, in deﬁance of God, to save ﬁrst born Egyptian sons doomed by
God’s ﬁnal plague. Such stories “point the way to a more humane and
more Divine future, to the recreation of holy time”, but also to the
“irreducible ambivalence held by parents whose children are the beneﬁciaries of injustice.” Rubenstein afﬁrms that the potential of such
stories is to show that human caring and the memory of caring and
being cared for might be understood as the foundation of the Torah,
such that “the fundamental nature of the Torah, its alpha and omega,
is a type of caring work.”
The ﬁnal chapter in this section considers religious inﬂuences on
the educational aspects of care ethics, especially as pertaining to sex
education. In her chapter, “Care, the Sacred, and Sex Education in
Slovakia,” feminist philosopher Adriana Jesenková discusses the
Christian church’s exclusive grip on sex education in post-communist
Slovakia. After the Fall of Communism (1989), a strict separation
between the public and private sphere allowed the (particularly
Roman-Catholic) Church to gain exclusive control over questions
concerning sexual morality, to focus upon the sacredness of the family
and the home, and to keep this sphere out of reach of human rights
claims and sexual health issues. Misinformation, lack of information,
and discriminatory attitudes have led to detrimental outcomes for the
most vulnerable, particularly women and gender minorities. Looking
from a care ethics perspective, Jesenková ﬁnds the concept of the
sacred crucial for bridging the respective gaps between religious and
ethics education and the public and the private sphere. Building
upon the work of Tronto (2013) and Sevenhuijsen (1998), Jesenková
argues for equal opportunities for all in a democratic society, for
which proper sex education is vital to cultivate healthy sexuality and
to develop young people as relational social beings. For this, it is
important to reconceptualize the sacred as that which does not
revolve around rigid religiosity but rather around care and identity
formation as an inextricable part of building a democratic society of
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equals that protects and develops the vulnerable. Jesenková turns to
Noddings (2002) and Young (2010) for this. Noddings offers a view
of the sacred home as a place of creatively and adequately responding
to the needs of every member of that home, as well as where the
ability to create such homes is cultivated. Young describes caring for
bodies, home, and environment as a variable practice of identity formation in a critical reﬂection on value and (spiritual) meaning. This
reconceptualization contests the home as sacred and helps overcome
the dichotomy of private and public sphere. For if the sacred lies not
in rigid religion but in a caring approach to all, sex education can no
longer be considered as a privilege of religion but as a democratic
right for all.
The third and ﬁnal section of this volume contains chapters
exploring care ethics, religion, and spiritual traditions in the context
of justice. These chapters’ common theme is how justice can be best
achieved through religiously infused versions of democratic community building and relational preservation as associated with an ethics
of care. The ﬁrst chapter of this section, “In the Desert with Hajar:
An Islamic and Care-Based Approach to Disability Justice,” by Sarah
Munawar, explores the care ethical, medical, and religious limitations
that became evident after her father suffered a debilitating stroke and
cardiac arrest. Munawar traces the de-colonial potential of a carebased and Islamic approach to disability justice that enables Muslims
to interpret disability differently as a source of ongoing revelation.
Rather than interpreting her family’s experiences as the tragic destruction of her father’s body or her and her mother’s requisite shift to
invisible care-giving, Munawar explores the revelatory potential of
these transformations embedded as they are in relational networks
of secondary dependency through the story of the exile of the slave
Hajar and her infant into the desert. Critical of standard Islamic
medical discourses about care and disability within Islamic legal
scholarship, as well as the multiple colonialisms that inﬂuence the
treatment of disabled Muslims within medical-industrial complexes,
Munawar ﬁnds in both “imperial attitudes” that locate the Muslim
disabled as bodies without being and located outside of time. Munawar
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uses the story of Hajar to challenge the ideas that disability is to be
understood as divine punishment, misfortune, test, or noble pain that
makes one more proximate to Allah, asking why it cannot lead
instead to richer and more substantial networks of care based on
doula. She posits that because a care-based epistemology of Islam is
inherently relational, it can partner with feminist care ethics to
reveal how multiple colonialisms interlock to disenfranchise disabled
Muslims and Muslim caregivers.
Similarly, in “Mother Eberly’s Coin: Care Ethics, Democratic Politics, and North American Mennonite Women’s Movements,” religion scholar Jamie Pitts interrogates how religious movements and
discourses can contribute to and expand the democratic work of care
ethics. As he explains, what Pitts is proposing runs counter to standard framings of justice, which view religious discourse as antithetical
to democracy. Pitts contends that caring religious discourse can have
a democratizing effect on religious communities and their inﬂuence
in society. In particular, Pitts addresses the historical experience of
Mennonite women and the Anabaptist tradition. Pitts recognizes
that not all religious care discourse supports democratic caring, but
he wants to demonstrate a particular counterexample to resist a blanket stereotype of religiosity as undemocratic. Pitts offers a careful and
balanced history of Mennonite women in Europe and the United
States and how their commitment to social care is a driving force for
the community. He characterizes this history as “women bringing to
voice their experience as carers so that the full scope of their interests
and values might be taken seriously within their communities.” Pitts
ﬁnds that within their struggle, Mennonite women politicized their
care work in such a way that democratized their religious communities. Ultimately, for Pitts, Mennonite women develop a religious
rather than a secular form of democratic caring: “It is care ethics in
a religious voice.”
In the third chapter of this section, “Reimagining Justice as Preservative Care for Sustained Peace,” author Robert Ruehl uses indigenous spiritual traditions to enhance care ethics’ ability to rethink
a classic understanding of justice. Ruehl argues that a conception of
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justice rooted in desert, based on “getting what one deserves,” is limited because it overlooks whether rewards and burdens distributed by
desert genuinely beneﬁt the individual or their wider relations. Justice
as it pertains to an excellent, thriving person, such as those accounts
found in Plato and Cicero, make room for caring for particular relationships and should expand to include non-human relatives, speciﬁc
places, and ecosystems because of how they can facilitate sustained
peace. Indigenous philosophies enlarge care to impart justice with
more than the mere avoidance of violence among humans, in part by
reorienting the property and ownership relations of Western tradition. In Indigenous spiritual traditions, the earth and its resources do
not belong to humans. Rather, humans belong to the places and
things that nurture them. Humans have been given the gift of life
within fragile but sustaining relationships, and a good human being
not only shows gratitude but reciprocally cares for all aspects of their
gifted, sustaining relationships. Such a conception of justice emphasizes the vital importance of “a positive peace that seeks to cultivate
and sustain thriving relationships and lives for seven generations to
come”.
Finally, addressing the need for spiritual and caring remedies to
environmental degradation, Kimberley Parzuchowski turns to the
urgent ecological question of the ‘fouling of our nest’ by humans in
technologically advanced countries. Despite the abundant proof of
endangered or destroyed ecosystems, the ecological changes that are
required for our survival are not achieved. According to Parzuchowski,
the failure is twofold: we fail to see the need, and we fail to care. To
solve this failure of care, she argues, requires that we understand our
ecological crisis not only as a moral but also as a spiritual crisis. Parzuchowski draws upon care ethical notions of dependency, particularly from Noddings (1984) and Kittay (1999). She argues for a reconceptualization of the western dominant and anthropocentric notion
of moral subjectivity, as proposed by Native American theorist
George Tinker (2004) and Martha Nussbaum (1990), among others.
She points out that this anthropocentrism can also be identiﬁed
in care ethics and Christian theology. So even though the ideas

INTRODUCTION

XXXIX

of connectedness and entanglement are central to care ethics,
Parzuchowski argues with Bonnie Mann (2002) that we risk getting
caught up in self-referentiality because we have ceased to be wondered and revered by this. With the help of Martin Buber’s theological view of relationships, she ﬁnds that some care ethicists have
retained this idea. Joyful and communal rituals can rekindle our
sense of wonder, cultivate a sense of connectedness to earth as earthlings, and contemplate experiences of the providence of nature.
Parzuchowski offers a passionate plea, based on rich insights mixed
with remarkable everyday examples and experiences, for a spiritually
enriched care ethics that might help facilitate an effectively practiced
ecological turn.
In totality, this volume represents new and exciting forays into the
study of the rich interplay of care ethics, religions, and spiritual traditions. While the ideas here introduced represent cutting-edge interdisciplinary research areas, many of these chapters focus on mainstream world religions, especially Christianity, and thus do not
represent the full potential scope of such an investigation. We hope
that future projects and studies will be able to provide a yet broader
and more enriched consideration of religions and spiritual traditions
in the context of care ethics.
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Care Ethics and Forgiveness: Lessons
and Errors from the Christian Tradition
Ruth E. Groenhout

Introduction: Does an Ethics of Care need the Concept of
Forgiveness?
The concept of forgiveness has been controversial since a fairly early
stage of Western philosophy. Any philosophical account of ethics
that addresses the question of how those who experience abuse,
attacks, or mistreatment from another can or should respond must
consider the possibility of forgiveness, but the concept seems to
immediately generate the potential for unfairness (why should the
ones who were wronged now face ethical demands when they did
nothing wrong themselves?), injustice (and why should those who
did evil be set up as deserving of love and forgiveness rather than
being held accountable or punished?), and a general lack of balance
between committing wrongdoing and paying the appropriate price.
At the same time, forgiveness is a crucial part of a moral community. Finite, limited, dependent social beings need ways to address
errors, wrong actions, and the choice to mess things up, and one of
the vital aspects of addressing such issues is the possibility of forgiveness when wrong has been done. As Margaret Urban Walker argues,
forgiveness is a crucial part of the moral reconstruction necessary for
a process of preserving and restoring relationships (Walker 2006).
It serves to preserve relationships, community, and connections, and
it also allows those who have been wronged to move away from retribution to experience a relief from anger and resentment. And while
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in some cases the harm that may potentially be forgiven is caused by
those who are not in any concrete personal relationship with those
who suffered, as Walker notes, forgiveness “should restore, or return
to a functioning state, the conditions of moral relationship” (Walker,
162). But for it to do this, she goes on, it must restore relationships
of reciprocal trust, maintain certain boundaries, and honor moral values. The basic point is crucial: forgiveness is important, and human
social interdependence becomes almost impossible without it.
But an important part of relationality, such as forgiveness, comes
with a potential for misuse and abuse. For an ethics of care which
arose from the sense among many feminists that other philosophical
theories erased or elided the experiences and practices of women, this
recognition of abuse is no surprise. The argument for an ethics of care
almost immediately faced deep concerns about the misuse and abuse
of care itself, very often generated by the demand that women
provide care without reciprocity, an assumption on the part of countless privileged male theorists that caring work was animalistic and
lacking in rationality, all connected to the assumption that only practices that (very privileged) men engaged in had any moral weight
(Friedman 1995; Larrabee 1993).
So an adequate account of forgiveness that recognizes its important place of moral prominence in an ethics of care while also recognizing the ways that it can be demanded, as care was, of the more
vulnerable in society, while not recognized or supported when it is
provided, is necessary. And one important part of this account should
begin with a clear vision of how exactly that dynamic has occurred
in the historic development of Christian thought about forgiveness
and its relation to love. Just as forgiveness is crucial to care ethics, it
is also crucial to a Christian ethics of love. And just as forgiveness
can easily turn into an abusive demand of the vulnerable in an ethics
of care, it can turn into an abusive demand that the vulnerable support, enable, even pay for the evil done by the powerful in a Christian ethic of love. Seeing where the concept goes wrong provides
important considerations and limitations in the way that forgiveness
is understood, developed, and incorporated into the theory overall.
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It also structures the connection between care and forgiveness in
ways that avoid turning care into a characteristic that increases the
vulnerability of those who care the most and holds those who are
abusive to account.
Forgiveness and Relationality
The place to begin is the necessity of some notion of forgiveness in
any account of ethics that begins with emotional commitment to the
other, whether that emotional commitment is identiﬁed as care, or
love, or compassion. Ethical theories that focus exclusively on rational fairness between independent free agents do not ﬁnd forgiveness
an obvious necessity; almost by deﬁnition their account of agential
interaction is a matter of contract, consent, and equal opportunity
interactions, so if one or the other acts badly, the wronged agent
simply needs to demand some adequate form of retribution to even
the score, and interactions can resume in whatever way the agents
prefer. Interestingly enough, many of the philosophical accounts of
forgiveness rely on a Kantian ethical structure, which enables them
to make forgiveness primarily a matter of individual choice, but also
tends to build in assumptions about agents as predominantly equal,
rational, and independent. As Kathryn Norlock notes, this atomism
produces a problematic account of forgiveness in numerous ways. She
writes, “In addition to assuming a view of the moral agent as individualistic and rationally self-interested, paradigm and Kantian
accounts of forgiveness tend to demand a robust sort of integrity,
self-respect, and autonomy, which precludes forgiving for reasons that
fall short of what self-respect is taken to require” (Norlock 2018, 18).
But for an ethical theory that begins with emotional commitment
and focuses on relations between unequal, interdependent, social
beings, the picture is signiﬁcantly divergent.
Unequal beings, ﬁrst of all, do not stand in relationships of equal
freedom and independence. They are, instead, dependent on each
other in numerous and weighty ways. Among other consequences of
unequal relationships is that one or the other, often both, cannot
walk away from a relationship even when it is not going well. If one
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member of the relationship has enormous amounts of privilege and
power, while the other is quite vulnerable and dependent, and if the
powerful one chooses to act badly, the vulnerable one faces deep and
problematic choices no matter how they react. If they walk away from
the relationship, they may lose resources, protection, or needed assistance. If they remain in relationship, they face allowing the other to
continue to act wrongly, and perhaps do worse. Some obvious examples of this scenario are family relationships of dependence in which
one agent acts wrongly. The difﬁculty is particularly harsh when the
more vulnerable one is seriously dependent (small children’s relationship to their parents, elderly and medically limited parents and their
adult children, individuals with serious cognitive disabilities and the
family members who provide their care and other similar cases.)
In all of these cases, if the vulnerable and dependent members
lose the relationship they also lose necessary support and care, but if
they remain, the wrong-doing may continue. While some social situations provide a level of outside relationships that might mitigate the
power to abuse held by those in the more powerful position (other
members of the community, social structures such as legal and social
protective agencies, religious groups), even moving toward claiming
this outside level of support can be dangerous and problematic for
the vulnerable.
At the same time, wrong doing by the more dependent and needy
members of social relationships is also complex. If those with more
power and (as is often the case) more responsibility in the relationship
have been wronged, they also face problematic choices. Walking away
from vulnerable others who are in dependent relationships on one is
not something to do lightly, and may make one hate one’s self more
than allowing the wrong to continue. Moreover, breaking the relationship could do more harm to the vulnerable than is warranted,
even when maintaining the relationship will result in the continuation of the harm. It is also the case that the vulnerable may be dependent, but may also provide absolutely vital aspects of care for the more
powerful in the relationship, which can, again, generate deep problems in trying to maintain some reciprocal retribution of any kind.

CARE ETHICS AND FORGIVENESS

7

Again, even moving to thinking about actual human relationships
makes all of this deeply obvious and concerning. We can consider
similar familial relationships (parents with young adolescents face
some of these concerns on a regular basis) or move out into dependent relations of care that exist in so many other contexts (medical
professionals and seriously ill patients; professors and very young, very
vulnerable students) and in all of these cases, when the vulnerable
do wrong, it puts the powerful (if they are caring individuals) into
fairly difﬁcult situations, and into cases where maintaining the relationship may be important and may also require deciding to not
demand retribution or pay back that addresses the harm.
In deeply relational accounts of ethical connections, one of the
necessary structures that must be in place to address the case of
wrong-doing in the context of dependence and inequality, though it
may seem ironic, is precisely forgiveness. When a child throws insults
on values that are central to the parent’s sense of identity, or when
a physician acts roughly toward a dependent patient, maintaining the
relationship matters, but a real wrong has been done. Forgiveness
allows the relationship to continue, allows the one doing the harm
to (sometimes) recognize and apologize without fearing harsh retribution, and allows the one harmed to let go of anger and pain in many
cases. There is even a sense of forgiveness that is essential to the
health and happiness of the self. When one has done what one did
not want to, among the appropriate responses on some occasions is
the need to forgive one’s own self and move on.
Recognizing this does not entail that forgiveness cannot be misused and misunderstood. The next section of the paper turns to clear
and deeply problematic examples of exactly that sort of problem with
forgiveness. But before turning to those problems it is important to
begin by seeing how and why forgiveness functions in dependent
relational contexts, and to recognize that it is a practice that is vital
to caring relations. As in so many areas of ethical life, the complexity
in this case comes from the combination of these factors: forgiveness
is vital for healthy relationships, and its importance is one of the factors that makes the misuse of forgiveness so damaging and harmful.
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But also, an issue that will be addressed in the following section,
forgiveness should not be understood as a matter primarily of individual morality. How it is structured socially makes enormous differences in the way it functions, ways it can be abused, and structures
that protect both the importance and the proper structure of forgiveness in human communal life.
The Abuse of Forgiveness: Lessons from the Christian Tradition
Forgiveness is a central concept in Christianity, central to the teachings of the Christ of the Gospels and made integral to notions of
divinity and the love of sinful human beings. As Esther McIntosh
notes, “Forgiveness is the bedrock of the Christian tradition; it is at
the centre of the Christian story” (McIntosh 2020, 269). In particular,
the divine willingness to forgive is portrayed as the rationale for
humans to forgive other humans, and the picture of Jesus on the cross
praying for the forgiveness of those who were killing him is held up
as the epitome of righteousness for all humans. This picture represents
a very high standard of gentle response to viciousness and evil, and if
the Christian community were itself a place where victims of such evil
were cared for and protected that standard might be beautiful.
Christianity is clearly not the only religion that places forgiveness
in a central place. Julia Kristeva goes so far as to attribute forgiveness
to most religions as a necessary catharsis or puriﬁcation of hatred and
evil, and that it is this promise of forgiveness that “gives faith that
forgives its greatest appeal” (Kristeva 2010, 193), though she also
considers this part of the danger of religious tendencies toward fundamentalism. In the Christian tradition, which is the focus of this
chapter, forgiveness is closely associated with absolute altruistic love,
directed at the other with no thought or concern at all for one’s own
beneﬁt or needs. And given the identiﬁcation of God with Love, and
with precisely this type of altruistic love, the expectation that
humans, bearing the image of God, will themselves love and forgive
without demanding punishment or repayment becomes very strong.
As Lewis Smedes states in his explanation of forgiveness, “God is the
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original master forgiver” (Smedes 1996, 21), and beings who are
expected to reﬂect the image of that God must themselves heal the
wrongs of life, among other ways, by forgiveness.
Because of the importance of forgiveness to Christian theology
and philosophical thinking, it has been the focus of some feminist
philosophy of religion, most notably Pamela Sue Anderson, whose
thought developed in thought-provoking ways over time. Anderson’s
earlier work focused on the ways that forgiveness provides freedom
from destructive emotions such as resentment, even when there is no
acknowledgement of harm from the wrong-doer, as well as the ways
in which forgiveness should not be understood as an easy or straightforward emotional response, but is instead a struggle that requires
adequate time and space (Anderson 2001). In later work Anderson
moves to weightier consideration of the tension between forgiveness
and justice, particularly in cases where an abuser refuses to move
toward responsibility or reparation, and eventually argues that in
cases of ongoing abuse it may be necessary to withhold forgiveness in
order to protect self-respect for the abused (Anderson 2011; 2016; see
also Fiddes 2020.) The shift in Anderson’s thought was partially connected to recognition that on-going sexual abuse within the Christian tradition makes the traditional gloriﬁcation of forgiveness under
any circumstances problematic. And, unfortunately, there have been
numerous cases of sexual abuse followed by the abuse of the concept
of forgiveness, in the context of the Christian tradition.
Both the Catholic church and the Southern Baptist Convention
(SBC) have in recent years been identiﬁed as locations where multiple and egregious sex abuse practices have gone on extensively. In
both contexts, there has been a strong tendency to exclude those who
were abused from the community, while protecting the abusers to
a very high degree, and one of the crucial parts of that process was
demanding forgiveness for the abuser from the abused, from the community as a whole, and demanding forgiveness without any concern
for changing the abusive practices. As Kristin Kobes Du Mez notes
in her historical study of masculinity in American Christianity:
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Since 1998, around 380 perpetrators within the SBC had left a trail of
more than 700 victims….Many victims had been urged to forgive their
abusers, and it was victims, rather than predators, who frequently ended
up shunned by their churches (Du Mez 2020, 291).

Similar events in the Catholic church had been making the news for
years before these events, and like them, involved powerful protection of the abusers, shunning of the abused, and demands for forgiveness without any system of accountability or even remorse.
When those in power demand forgiveness from those who are vulnerable, who have suffered severe abuse, and when that demand
arises without any care or protection of those from whom it is
demanded, the misuse of forgiveness is at its peak. And unfortunately
that has been done far too many times in communities who claim to
be structured by love and care for the weak. It is precisely because
forgiveness is important and powerful that it has been used in this
way, usually in order to prevent any actual accountability for the
abusers. The ends sought are not in the least supportive of or healthy
for those who suffered the abuse. Instead, a faux version of forgiveness
is evoked to prevent the abused from bringing any charges against
the abusers, their public statement of forgiveness is demanded by the
powerful rather than freely offered, and they frequently are the only
members of the community who pay a price for the abuse, a horriﬁcally vicious response to those already wounded. But the demand for
forgiveness is heavily beneﬁcial for the abusers, since it justiﬁes,
for many in the community, maintaining the abusers in their ranks
of power, protecting them from any charges from outside the community, and providing them with extensive ﬁnancial and emotional
support so that they pay no price for what they have done.
This sort of abuse of forgiveness involves layers of inappropriate
instantiation of the basic concept. We can begin with the most basic
of misuses—the demand by the powerful, themselves either abusers
or supporters of abusers, that the victims forgive. Within the Christian religious context this is a particularly awful misuse of power,
because those who have the power and demand forgiveness are standing in roles of spiritual (righteous) leaders, so their demand (command)

CARE ETHICS AND FORGIVENESS

11

is a particularly powerful one, and one that involves betrayal of the
central commitments they ought to have (Scarsella and Krehbiel
2019). But more generally, any time those with huge amounts of
power use that power to demand forgiveness from the vulnerable who
already are suffering from the abuse for which they are being forced
to ‘forgive’ the basic structure of forgiveness is destroyed.
This ﬁrst, and obvious case of the use of forgiveness by the powerful to undercut the meaning of the harms and abuses caused makes
clear two of the most basic ways that forgiveness should never function. Forgiveness should not be demanded by the powerful in order
to protect themselves from accountability. In more general terms, this
also identiﬁes one central part of legitimate forgiveness, in that it
identiﬁes the problem of other agents demanding forgiveness rather
than the agent who is truly capable of forgiveness being the one who
decides how to act. Both the misuse of power to protect wrongdoers
and the attempt for people to control how and when other agents
dispense forgiveness are wrongful uses of the concept because both
involve treating the one who forgives as simply an object to be used,
not as a moral agent with the capacity and the right to determine
how forgiveness will be used. And both of these are deeply wrong uses
of the notion of forgiveness.
To forgive starts with the recognition (and being recognized by
others) that one has the right to demand punishment, or even revenge.
There really is no point to public avowals of forgiveness when those
being asked to forgive have already been excised from any moral
standing or power, other than to provide justiﬁcation for the abusive
power structures that led to the abuse in the ﬁrst place. Particularly
when the abuse is rampant, systematic, and focused on ethnic or racial
groups in addition to gendered structures, the attempt to force forgiveness and deny the righteousness of anger and ﬁghting the abuse and
the abusers demonstrates a problematic perspective on the part of
those endorsing forgiveness (Jaycox 2020; Pearl 2020). This is the
rampant abuse of power to provide even more support for those who
already have used their power to victimize the vulnerable; the meaningless public statements only serve to prevent any other victims from
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expecting care or support. As Jean Hampton notes, “how society
reacts to one’s victimization can be seen by one as an indication of
how valuable society takes one to be, which in turn can be viewed as
an indication of how valuable one really is” (Murphy and Hampton
1988, 141). When the powerful force victims to publicly make forgiveness statements without any concern for the suffering or abuse that
has occurred, the message is clear: these lives mean nothing.
Further, as numerous analyses of forgiveness have noted, forgiveness does not preclude standard legal punishment being nonetheless
applied (Murphy and Hampton 1988, 150; Pope and Geske 2019).
So when it is used for this purpose, again, it seems clear that there is
something deeply wrong with the situation. It is not actual forgiveness that is taking place; instead, the agent who suffered harm is
being used to enable the abuser to continue to abuse others, while
being diminished in value by that very use.
A third aspect of the improper use of forgiveness also occurs in
these cases, speciﬁcally the denial of the need for some form of
accountability on the part of the wrong doer. The demand for public
statements of forgiveness functions speciﬁcally to protect the abuser
from any accountability, again, a deeply problematic demand under
any conditions, and certainly problematic when it is forced on the
one who suffered harm. This harm, in particular, generates a deeply
problematic damage to what Margaret Urban Walker calls the ‘important normative boundaries’ that are essential to any sort of healthy
moral community (Walker 2006, p. 96). Practices of absolving the
powerful from responsibility for the wrongs they do splinter the structures that make social cooperation and trust possible.
Three basic aspects of forgiveness thus can be easily identiﬁed: it
should not be demanded by others, it should not be forced by the
powerful on those who are vulnerable, and it should not be exercised
speciﬁcally to ensure that those doing deeply harmful things are never
held accountable. These are all central aspects of the proper existence of forgiveness.
Other ways in which the concept of forgiveness can go wrong are
more a matter of degree than of absolutely destructive of the basic
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concept. As several theorists note, the emotions felt by those who
undergo harm or abuse include anger, resentment, the wish for revenge
and the like (Aumann and Cogley 2019; Nussbaum 2016; Blustein,
2014; Norlock 2009; Murphy and Hampton 1988.) These emotions
can make it very difﬁcult for the one who suffered harm to even
consider forgiveness, and depending on the degree of the harm suffered and how the agent holds themself to ethical standards, they can
undercut the very possibility of forgiveness. When the harm is horriﬁc, this seems appropriate in many cases, but if the harm is relatively minor and the victim’s response is far too vindictive, the inability to move toward forgiveness can take on a measure of negative
evaluation of character. Likewise, when the harm was not completely
intentional (though perhaps caused by negligence) the responding
anger can be too strong and result in problems. Because forgiveness
is an important part of interrelationality, and because harms that are
relatively minor or unintentional often do require that the one who
caused the harm be considered in many cases for forgiveness, agents
who become obsessed with anger can fail at this aspect. But because
forgiveness is not something that can be demanded by others, agents
who fail to forgive under these circumstances may act within their
rights even while acting in ways that reﬂect on their character problematically. Clearly this sort of issue is one that varies with degrees
of harm, intentionality, and, importantly, perspectival recognition of
how harms are weighed differently by the privileged and the vulnerable, in ways that often ignore true harms and weigh even minor
accountability on the part of the powerful as unacceptable.
And, though it goes beyond the scope of this paper, forgiveness
can generate any number of other issues, from when those harmed
over-emphasize their claims to reconciliation in problematic ways, to
when those who offer forgiveness use the public claims to forgiveness
to attack others who might not be guilty of any serious harm. In this
last category one can think of the many White people who feel so
harmed by groups such as Black Lives Matter that they feel as though
they have the right to demand that the BLM groups apologize, but,
claiming the high road, they offer forgiveness without demanding
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legal or public apologies…and are actually using the language of forgiveness to maintain deeply racist social structures. Joshua Lawson,
for example, the managing editor of The Federalist, in a blog post
describes the BLM movement as a “movement that removes the forgiveness, hope, and peace of the gospel and replaces those core values
with continual protest, fear, and anger.” But, he goes on, he himself
accepts the teaching of the Bible, when it “reminds us in Romans
12:19. ‘Dear friends, never take revenge. Leave that to the righteous
anger of God’” (Lawson 2020). In his own mind, it is those protesting
racial injustice who are doing evil, but he asserts his own unwillingness to demand punishment, asserting, instead, his moral purity.
Attempting to fairly evaluate where agents fall in considerations of
forgiveness takes on complexity in a world where the agent from
whom forgiveness is demanded is in that position precisely because
they are considered subordinate to a more privileged example of
humanity.
And as the wrongs addressed by forgiveness are complex and seen
from varying perspectives, it can also be the case that wrong-doer and
forgiving victim may interpret the nature of forgiveness in very different ways, and victims can simply get their response wrong. As
Jeffrie Murphy notes in Forgiveness and Mercy, it is not always clear
that forgiveness is compatible with respect for the other who has
committed the wrong. “Suppose you had wronged someone. How
would you like it if that person assumed that you could not come to
repentance on your own but required the aid of his ministry of forgiveness? Might you not feel patronized—condescended to? Forgiveness can be an act of weakness, but it can also be an act of arrogance.
Seeing it this way, the wrongdoer might well resent the forgiveness.
‘Who do you think you are to forgive me?’ he might respond to such
a well-meaning meddling” (31). Adequate analysis of the many complexities of forgiveness, repentance, the measure of wrong done,
and even the question of self-forgiveness are far beyond the focus of
a single paper.
As with any human social structure, there is no absolute way
to ensure that all moves toward forgiveness are appropriate, that
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forgiveness is always the right move forward, or that every claim that
one has forgiven is a positive reﬂection. But what does need to be
seen is that the potential for abuse of forgiveness is massive, and there
are ways to set it up so that it is not so easily turned into structures
abused by those who already have too much social power and want
to prevent the more vulnerable from holding them accountable. But
to make these structural situations possible it is vital to move beyond
a sense that forgiveness is primarily (or, worse, entirely) an individual
matter, and begin to recognize the structures that make it a largely
functional social structure. This is the issue the rest of this essay will
focus on, motivated by how a care-oriented account of ethics, emphasizing the interrelational nature of human life should take on certain
central social accounts of forgiveness that identify ways it should not
be used.
The Move from Individual Forgiveness to Social Structures that Construct
Forgiveness Properly
Analyses of forgiveness sometimes err on the side of focusing too
much on individuals and their relationships, while largely setting
aside a focus on how the structures of forgiveness, whether narrative
structures or actual policies, are formed and function in the broader
community. Charles Griswold’s analysis, for example, explicates
forgiveness as a two-person relationship (Griswold 2007, see also
Konstan 2010). While there are certainly reasons in some cases for
beginning with a two-person relationship, this also runs the risk of
making decisions about forgiveness, as well as the whole structure
of how it is understood more generally in a large community too
focused on individuals, often without adequate concern about the
complexity of various relationships of power and control in the social
context.
Discussions of forgiveness that arise in political theory are important here as they bring to light the various ways that narratives
of forgiveness need to incorporate a recognition of the social structures within which it functions as well as the ways that it can be
misused by groups to prevent adequate responses to various abuses. In
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particular the literature on how forgiveness needs to be understood
in the context of Truth and Reconciliation commissions, as well as
analyses of forgiveness that bring Hannah Arendt into the conversation shift attention across the boundaries between social and individual moral thought (Peys 2020; Grey 2019). It is vital to be cognizant of the ways that humans are interrelational, empathetic,
connected beings, as the ethics of care theorists have developed to
a phenomenal degree. As Arendt writes, “even if I shun all company
or am completely isolated while forming an opinion, I am not simply
together only with myself in the solitude of philosophical thought;
I remain in this world of universal interdependence (Arendt 1954,
242).” As members of the interdependent world, and as agents
responsible for the actions we choose to take, we live with a need for
forgiveness, and a need to structure that forgiveness into the social
and political structures within which we live. Arendt’s analysis of the
necessity and complicated nature of forgiveness in the political realm
begins with a conception of action that always generates the predicament that an action, one done, cannot be undone, it is irreversible.
She then goes on to bring in forgiveness:
The possible redemption from the predicament of irreversibility—of
being unable to undo what one has done though one did not, and could
not, have known what one was doing—is the faculty of forgiving…
forgiving serves to undo the deeds of the past, whose ‘sins’ hang, like
Damocles’ sword, over every new generation (Arendt 1958, 237).

She goes on to explain that forgiveness as a social practice is crucial
to the very possibility of human freedom and breaks the deterministic
causality that structures so much of the rest of the world.
But because forgiveness is essential for any human life, it becomes
a vital aspect of care of the self, and should be built into social structures for all humans, not just those with power. And it is necessary
to recognize how without appropriate social structures, ethical
demands on individuals can go very wrong very quickly. We need to
be talking across some of the standard philosophical silos to make
sure that all of these concerns are addressed. And in the context of
a caring account of forgiveness the need is particularly important.
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Social accounts of what forgiveness is and the proper structure of
forgiveness in human life need to recognize all of these dimensions.
People are interconnected and dependent continually on the emotional and supportive, caring relationships in which they live, and
forgiveness is important because it plays a crucial role in allowing
those structures to exist. But that picture of forgiveness is improper if
it does not recognize how important it is for individuals to care for
themselves as well as others, especially when the duty to care is structured in deeply racialized, gendered and class-based ways (Pearl
2020). Imbalances in how care is provided make it essential that
social accounts take unfair structural matters into account. And, even
more than this, accounts of forgiveness need to be structured to
address the abuse of power in the actual world, not ideals of mutual
love that ignore how some who love are abused by the very authority
ﬁgures they have been taught to respect and trust.
Given the earlier discussion of the abuse of forgiveness in contexts
where it functions to prevent the vulnerable from holding those in
power accountable, there are clearly a number of aspects of any concept of forgiveness that need to be clearly and deeply structured into
the social understanding of what forgiveness is and when it can legitimately be enacted. And while a complete and absolute account is
well beyond any relatively short essay, basic aspects of any decent
account can be identiﬁed and noted.
The ﬁrst, and most obvious, is a basic principle of who gets to
demand forgiveness, and it must be understood to belong to the
abused or the victim, not those in power. One reason for this is that
there are wrongs that ought not to be forgiven, if they are sufﬁciently
heinous. As Jeffrey Blustein points out, “If there are wrongs that are
truly unforgivable, then refusing to forgive another for his wrongdoing is not always morally objectionable” (Blustein 2014, 129). More
than this, forgiveness is not something that the harmed have a duty
to offer their oppressors. Committing wrongdoing against someone
else does not carry with it the right to demand that the one harmed
also now owes one forgiveness. A faulty view of forgiveness that
structures it in this way turns it into the demand that those wronged
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accept even more burdens and duties as a result of being harmed,
a particularly horrible way of structuring this particular moral concept.
But while the wrongfulness of this approach can be seen relatively
easily in the abstract, in actual practice it is much more complex and
can easily shift into this mode even when those articulating the
importance of forgiveness believe they are presenting it properly.
Consider, for example, the very simple case of two children. Child
A has whacked Child B on the head with a wooden block, and has
now been instructed by a parent to apologize. Once the apology has
been offered, Child B is often informed that now it is their turn to
forgive, because that is the right response to an apology. It seems as
though this is simply a matter of parental teaching of basic moral
responses, what Michael Slote describes as the ‘inductive training’ of
children that is necessary to develop empathy (2007). But the inductive training that Slote describes encourages children to understand
and feel the harm that their action has caused on another, in this case
the pain that A caused to B. The demand that the bruised child
forgive, practical as it may seem, adopts the opposite pose, one that
Slote rejects as authoritarian, that instead of helping the development of empathy focuses on the use of power to try to force a child
to obey certain rules. Slote notes that:
Induction contrasts with the ‘power-asserting’ attempt to discipline or
train a child through sheer threats…and with attempts to inculcate
moral thought, motivation, and behavior (merely) by citing, or admonishing with, explicit moral rules or precepts (2007, 15).

The command to forgive imposed on the child who has not caused
harm has already begun the move toward turning forgiveness into
a duty rather than a free decision on the part of the wronged. It is
only a short step from this training to the demand by church leaders
that victims of sexual abuse forgive, and both parties of the event will
have been trained to expect this result. And the religious basis for
this approach, coupled with its use in contemporary political reconciliation attempts, results in leaving the victims of abuse vulnerable
to on-going abuse as noted earlier, a vulnerability that is ramped up

CARE ETHICS AND FORGIVENESS

19

when forgiveness is moved into social and political contexts (Grey
2019).
What attention to better accounts of forgiveness in the social and
political context can help with is the capacity to draw attention to
better or worse ways to structure the basic core of forgiveness. Sam
Grey returns to Arendt to restructure this particular aspect of forgiveness, and the conclusion is that forgiveness needs to have a focus on
the past injustices of settler colonialism and racial injustice, coupled
with contemporary attempts at reconciliation. Grey argues that an
Arendtian approach to forgiveness calls our attention to the ‘precursors of forgiving’, the need for acknowledgement, reﬂection on, and
social restructuring of the power dynamics of settler colonialist racial
injustice (Grey 2019, 59). Also drawing on Arendt, Christopher Peys
describes forgiveness as “a powerful act precisely because it cares for
the worldly ‘web of human relationships’ that compromise the ‘world,’
the political space of freedom” (Peys 2020, 67). The worldly space of
freedom explicitly makes it impossible to consider forgiveness a simple duty or what the wronged person owes. Moving forward in freedom requires the precursors of forgiving, the recognition of unjust
structures and events, and the mutual move toward a juxtaposition
of the freedom and equality that Arendt considers essential to the
political realm.
If we begin with this social/political account of forgiveness, then as
we approach individuals with recommendations or support for forgiveness, we must begin with the acknowledgement that as long as
the harm emerged from and is built into oppressive and evil power
relationships, and as long as those relationships continue to structure
human lives, moves toward forgiveness require active change and
protection of those harmed. Even between the two kids we started
with, if one is bigger, stronger, and devoted to whacking things with
blocks, then forgiveness isn’t appropriate until the structure changes,
which may require putting the blocks out of reach until the whacking
stops. Without this structure being built into forgiveness, it does not
have an ethical presence in human relationships.
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This brings us to the second feature that any adequate account of
forgiveness needs to make clear both at the personal level and the
social structural level: forgiveness must never be used by the powerful
to control and increase the vulnerability of those who have been
harmed. This tends to over-lap with the ﬁrst: when forgiveness is
constructed as the moral duty of the abused, it becomes pervasive
that those with power will use that power to command the vulnerable
to forgive and so exhibit the correct level of performing what duty
requires. Unjust power structures and inappropriate accounts of moral
duty can reinforce each other in extremely problematic ways. But at
the conceptual level the two issues can be recognized as slightly different in that the ﬁrst is an inappropriate deposition of demands on
the individual while the second involves a serious misuse of power.
Again, this crosses the boundaries of individual and social/cultural
understandings. At the personal level, it is very typical for abusive
partners to use their power in a relationship to demand forgiveness
by those they abuse, and, again in conservative Christian contexts
this demand is often supported by the community as a whole. At the
social and cultural level, the language of forgiveness frequently
emerges from authorities, either legal or religious or cultural authorities, who use their position as the arbiters of what is right to place
enormous pressure on the more vulnerable to forgive. Writing about
the media representations of Black families who lost loved ones when
white supremacist Dylan Roof murdered worshipping members of
Mother Emmanuel African Methodist Church, Andre Johnson and
Earle Fisher note that the broader expectation in society consistently
is that African Americans will forgive the perpetrators of racist violence, and that this expectation connects heavily with religious narratives of forgiveness (2019, 10). But they also bring to the surface
narratives of unforgiveness that explicitly reject the pressure on African Americans to forgive as a denial of the basic humanity of Black
Americans (14-15). Likewise Myisha Cherry notes that when those
who forgive are held up as moral exemplars in spite of sometimes
horrendous harm, the use of them as exemplars can be emotionally
manipulative when it implies a duty to forgive. The actions of deeply
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moral folk who forgive under harsh circumstances are worthy of
respect, and in some cases should be examples we try to emulate, but
their existence does not give those who currently suffer reasons to
think that forgiveness is their duty as well (2017). When forgiveness
functions structurally to deny the true evil of actions, and to demand
and expect those who already pay the cost of racism to provide support for the racists who harm them, it has become immoral.
Finally, and again, not removed from the two concepts already
identiﬁed, but instead frequently interconnected, is the concept that
forgiveness should allow the perpetrator of the harm to walk away
without accountability or restorative commitments. While numerous
philosophical accounts of forgiveness begin with the necessity of
remorse and apology from the perpetrator (for example, Griswold
2007; Murphy and Hampton 1988), the actual function of forgiveness
in hierarchical communities frequently asserts the demand for forgiveness under conditions when the perpetrator has not expressed
any remorse or recognition of blame. Even worse, there is evidence
that the forgiveness, in some of the cases connected with the Catholic sex abuse scandals, functioned to generate a sense on the part of
authorities within the church that the abuse did not need to be
reported to secular authorities or punished (Gleeson and Zanghellini
2015.) It is vital to separate the notion of forgiveness from the question of which crimes and harms justify punishment, and when this
line is blurred, again, forgiveness becomes a problematic structure.
What is needed is a widespread structural commitment to separating
issues of punishment and accountability from issues of whether the
individuals who experienced harm have chosen to forgive or not.
Unless these questions are widely seen as completely separable, forgiveness again becomes problematic.

Conclusion: Yes, Care Ethics needs Forgiveness, but it also needs
to avoid the Harms the Concept can cause
Forgiveness is not an easy or simple choice, and while the three
aspects identiﬁed here are not the ﬁnal word on the topic, they begin
to shape some of the limits on how the social account of forgiveness
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must be structured. And from a care perspective, this is an important
consideration because it is not enough for individuals to care and
support caring relationships. A caring society needs to be structured
to support and protect the provision of care and to limit and destructure relationships that undercut or destroy care (Held 2006; Tronto
2013, Groenhout 2019). Because care work is so frequently required
of the more vulnerable members of society, and is neither adequately
respected or economically rewarded, if it is treated as the individual’s
choice it becomes something the powerful can demand of those with
less power, and the resulting structures are immoral.
Humans cannot live without care, and to adequately recognize
this, humans also need to recognize that the social structures that
support care are vital to human life. This is particularly clear in cases
such as social and cultural deﬁnitions and examples of what forgiveness is and how it ought to function in the imperfect world in which
we live. Humans do hurt each other, cause deep injury, and yet even
when that has happened, maintaining caring relationships needs to
ﬁnd a way to continue. Forgiveness plays a crucial role in this continued existence even after abuse, and it cannot be discarded. But if
it is not structured properly, and especially if it becomes merely an
individual moral duty, it no longer moves toward maintaining caring,
healthy relationships. Instead, it becomes a tool used by the powerful
to force the abused to pay an even higher price for the evil that the
powerful have already caused. The origins of an ethics of care in
feminist theorizing brings this relationship between privilege and
abuse of power to the forefront, and also makes it clear that it must
be taken seriously. As Virginia Held argued, “The ethics of care must
not, and in my view does not, lose sight of power as the very real
capacity to oppose what morality, even if persuasive, recommends,
nor of the power of the structures that keep oppression in place”
(Held 2006, 150). For forgiveness to function properly in caring
social communities, it needs to be structured in ways that diminish
abusive power.
And as is clear in the religious cases of sexual abuse that took
place in Christian churches which identiﬁed themselves with a God
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who is Love, in cases such as these the abuse of forgiveness becomes
horriﬁcally damaging to the vulnerable whose need for love and compassion was part of what made them both vulnerable to abuse and
then subjected them to the further violation of being forced to forgive and (frequently) then excluded from the community in which
the abuse occurred. One of the persistent narratives that one hears
from those who were abused is the way that the whole experience
destroyed their faith, undermined their ability to love, and set them
up for profoundly difﬁcult psychological battles to simply function
properly in life.
When the language of love is used to destroy the capacity to love,
it is deeply evil. Care theory needs to take this lesson seriously. Care
is central to human existence, but that does not mean that the language of care cannot be misused in ways that destroy the ability of
the vulnerable to experience or respond to care. In bringing the language of forgiveness into an ethics of care, it is of highest importance
that the structure of what is understood to be central to forgiveness
makes it much more difﬁcult to use in this way. And that requires
that forgiveness remains the agent’s to choose, not another’s to
demand, that forgiveness is never allocated to the powerful to control
in order to protect their own power, and that forgiveness never is
primarily structured as absolving the wrongdoer from accountability.
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Against Moral Certainty and Authority:
How Dogmatic Religious Ethics
is Incompatible with Care Ethics
Maurice Hamington

“My name is John, I love you and Jesus loves you.
[spoken from his kayak to the Sentinelese
on the shore of North Sentinel Island].”
John Allen Chau (Conroy 2019)
“Go therefore and make disciples of all nations,
baptizing them in the name of the Father
and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit.”
Matthew 28:19 NSRV

This chapter begins with a tragic story. Like many human tragedies,
there are numerous aspects and ways of interpreting the story. Still,
I focus on the role of moral certainty and authority, and by contrast,
the lack of epistemic responsiveness and humility, that serve to
underwrite this tale. Although the attention here is to a particular
event, the ultimate concern is how dogmatism hinders morality, and
speciﬁcally care. I contend that care ethics has a subversive element
in its resistance to authority and certainty that is incompatible with
a strict ideological view in religious morality.
On November 16, 2018, 26-year-old evangelical Christian missionary John Allen Chau was killed when trying to engage and convert the Sentinelese, a small community of 50 to 100 indigenous
people (Sasikumar 2019, 64) living on North Sentinel Island, part of
the Andaman Islands in the Bay of Bengal, India (Conroy 2019).
Described as “the most isolated tribe in the world” (Sasikumar 2019,
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56), the Sentinelese have been protected by the Indian government
with a three-mile boundary that includes a prohibition on photography. Accordingly, little is known about the Sentinelese language or
culture. However, they are regarded as an ancient community
descended from African migrants who traveled to the island roughly
50,000 years ago (Tharoor 2018, 4). Historically, the Sentinelese
have been intentionally reclusive and violent toward outsiders,
including, for example, attacking a ﬁlm crew in 1974 with arrows
(Pandya 2006, 174) and killing two poaching ﬁshermen in 2006
(McDougall, 2006).1
Chau’s death culminates a narrative of his life: a faithful believer
who wanted to spread the good news of his religion. The published
articles about Chau, who left behind an extensive biographical footprint on social media and in diary form, describe him as having two
passions: Christian evangelizing and outdoor adventures. Chau was
born in Alabama but raised in Vancouver, Washington. Growing up,
he was extensively engaged in the Pentecostal church attending
Christian schools, scouts, and missionary activities (Conroy 2019).
Ultimately, Chau graduated from Oral Roberts University. By all
accounts, he was smart, made friends easily, and had a passion for his
religious beliefs.
Despite his young age, Chau had plenty of missionary and
quasi-missionary experience through international travel (Conroy
2019). He took his mission to the Sentinelese very seriously. For
example, Chau prepared by participating in a three-week missionary
“boot camp” sponsored by All Nations Kansas City2 that included

1

Anthropologist Vishvajit Pandya questions the extent to which the Sentinelese
image as violent and savage is a colonial misrepresentation. For example, they have
been described as cannibals although this claim has never been proven (2006, 175).
2
All Nations Kansas City is a chapter of All Nations International, an organization with a mission dedicated “to make disciples and train leaders to ignite church
planting movements among the neglected peoples of the earth” (All Nations). Their
website includes a list of “Priority People Groups” to target for evangelization as well
as training resources such as “Senders University” which helps train for “taking the
good news to the last remaining unengaged people groups on earth.”
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missionaries role-playing as indigenous people who could not understand Chau and acted aggressively toward him. Chau was described
as an excellent participant (Gettleman, Schultz, Venkataraman
2018). Chau also undertook linguistic and emergency medical training to ready himself for the trip (Gettleman, Schultz, Venkataraman
2018).
Chau visited the Andaman Islands several times between 2015
and 2018 but only made contact with the Sentinelese on his ﬁnal
trip. On 14 November 2018, he made his approach at night to avoid
the coast guard and navy patrols. He hired some local ﬁsherman
to take him near the North Sentinel Island, where he used a kayak to
paddle to shore on his own, taking gifts, including ﬁsh. The ﬁshermen
waited at a safe distance returning to the island at set times to bring
Chau food. On 16 November, Chau was shot by arrows but escaped
back to the boat for supplies. Perhaps foreshadowing his demise, he
left the ﬁsherman with a journal and went back to the island for
a ﬁnal time. On 17 November, a burial with the body matching the
description of Chau was spotted from offshore (Sasikumar 2019,
57-58). Some of Chau’s ﬁnal words recorded in his diary reveal an
ambivalence toward dying yet a conviction to carry on: “I think
I could be more useful alive, but to you, God, I give all the glory of
whatever happens.” He also asked for forgiveness on behalf of “any
of the people on this island who try to kill me” (Conroy 2018).
There is no question that Chau had a desire to do good and
believed he was acting in accordance with religious moral authority,
“God’s will.” However, is certainty and adhering to authority sufﬁcient to constitute care ethical action? Does it demonstrate care? This
chapter seeks to highlight the anti-authoritarian nature of care. To
do so, Chau’s case is examined as an example of how religious normative assumptions about the good can diminish the humility and
responsiveness necessary for the moral good of care.

Moral Forces: Personal, Political, Religious
There is nothing simple about considering the moral factors in Chau’s
death. It is clear that his death is a tragedy, but as one digs into the
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facts of the case, the moral analysis becomes cloudy. Four players are
brieﬂy outlined.
Given his demise, Chau is the central ethical ﬁgure. A typical
response found in the media is that his trip was a foolish act by
a reckless individual who took his mission to an extreme level. As
one person on Twitter claimed, “John Allen Chau is not a martyr.
Just a dumb American who thought the tribals needed ‘Jesus’ when
the tribals already lived in harmony with God and nature for years
without outside interference” (Conroy 2019). Indigenous advocacy
groups agree, noting that the Sentinelese just want to be left alone
and have legal protections to do just that (Survival 2018). The general conclusion of the popular sectarian analysis is that Chau unnecessarily put himself at signiﬁcant risk in pursuing an illegal and
immoral act. However, placing all the moral culpability on Chau’s
shoulders does not entirely honor the complexity of the circumstances. Keep in mind that the goal of this chapter is not to adjudicate who is to blame for Chau’s death but rather how moral certainty
can fund misguided care, which manifested itself in this case by missionary work. Further discussion of Chau’s actions are addressed later.
There are several other actors in this tragedy, including the Sentinelese. Although the Sentinelese killed Chau, commentators
implicitly offer them moral absolution analogous to when an animal
kills a human. However, part of the process of respecting the Sentinelese is to remember their moral agency. They did indeed kill him,
and in most circumstances, the party that committed the murder
would be the central focus of any ethical interrogation of this tragedy. One could argue that their actions were a form of self-defense
given the history of death and destruction wrought by unwanted
missionaries. Perhaps Chau’s persistence made violent action inevitable. These arguments have some merit, but it does not take much
to imagine that the Sentinelese could have taken a less-lethal action
to communicate their desire to avoid outsiders. One can respect
a culture without falling into an absolute moral relativistic stance
that exonerates all their actions. Indeed, the Sentinelese did not
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demonstrate any care for Chau, but neither did they initiate or desire
the encounter.3
The confrontation also had a broader social and political context,
which brings us to another actor in this case: the colonial power of
India. The autonomy and protection of the Sentinelese rely on the
nation-state of India. Clearly, India cannot ensure complete isolation
(as it failed in the case of Chau and others), nor is it immune to
economic issues that threaten the privacy of the Sentinelese. As
recently as 2018, relaxed some of the protection laws as a result of
pressure from the tourist industry (Sasikumar 2019, 66). A few
anthropologists argue that bucolic visions of cultural isolation are
a ﬁction (Hill quoted in Gettleman 2018). John Bodley points out
the paradox of isolation when he asks how can the outside world
know what the Sentinelese need if there is no contact with them
(Gettleman 2018). Even if they are the most isolated peoples in the
world, the Sentinelese are still subject to decisions made by powerful
others around them, so there is a geopolitical history and context to
consider in this tragedy. The Indian government demonstrates a kind
of care analogous to that witnessed in colonial circumstances with
the one caveat that India is not actively endeavoring to extract any
apparent resources from the Sentinelese. They have complete control
over the fate of this indigenous community. Should the Indian government be doing more to ensure the well-being and ﬂourishing of
the Sentinelese?
Third, and most important for our consideration in the rest of this
chapter, what is the role of dogmatic and authoritative religious
morality in Chau’s death? At least in part, Chau was driven by an
evangelical Christian faith that placed proselytizing as an ultimate
good, so much so that martyrdom is an acceptable subtext. Do the
religious organizations that trained and molded Chau’s commitment
3

The challenge of isolationism is an interesting one for a relational care ethics,
given the vital importance of subjective need expression and care assessment as well
as the ontological claim of relational embeddedness.
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to spreading the faith care about the Sentinelese, or about John Chau
for that matter? There are approximately a half-million Christian
missionaries operating in the world today motivated by a conviction
about the truth of their message and their faith.4

Religious Moral Certainty
“There are no more dangerous people on earth than those who believe
they are executing the will of the Almighty. It is this conviction that
drives on terrorists to murder the inﬁdel.”
Arthur Schlesinger (2004, 116)

Certainty has an understandably positive connotation in Western
thinking. It also has a positive psychological impact. We generally
have a feeling of well-being when we are sure about our context, our
future, and what will happen next. Humans save money, buy insurance, live indoors, and create routines, all as part of a quest for greater
certainty in their lives. On the other hand, surprises and unexpected
events can create disequilibrium, sometimes resulting in disconcerting anxiety. Religion can provide a clear and certain cosmological
path by answering big questions of ontology and metaphysics through
an authoritative position of invoking a deity or otherwise powerful
authority. Accordingly, religion can bring calm to existential anxiety
over life’s purpose and the terror of inevitable death. Religion can
also offer moral certainty, answering the fundamental question of the
right thing to do? The compatibility of powerful authority and certainty with authentic care is what is at question here.
All religions provide some degree of moral teaching. Religion also
supplies one of the few contexts outside of education where ethics
can be discussed on a regular basis. Such opportunities for moral discussion are ostensibly positive, providing needed engagement and
4

Saba Imitiaz reports that the number of Christian missionaries in the world
reached 440,000 in 2000. She also notes that Christian missionary work is diverse
and changing. Today, more Christian missionaries choose to lead with needed good
works rather than religious conversion, although that remains part of the ultimate
goal (2018).
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experience in considering personal and social values. However, religion is also a realm in which authority, including moral authority, is
emphasized as manifested through sacred texts, dogma, and religious
leaders. Religious authority is often framed as ultimate and unquestioned. In endeavoring to achieve an open and honest rational moral
position, the infusion of a powerful authority interjects potential
harm. Appeals to authority, argumentum ad verecundiam, can sometimes be helpful if an appropriate authority is chosen (Woods &
Walton 1974, 135-136). For example, when discussing medical ethics, a hospital’s chief ethicist may bring a critical perspective. However, even when the authority is sound, if the arguments they use are
not, then a fallacy occurs because that person’s inﬂuence can sway
the discussion beyond rational argumentation. In this inquiry, we are
interested in the psychology and implications of argumentum ad
verecundiam. Appeals to powerful authority can limit debate and create a potentially false sense of security if the authority is thought to
have the deﬁnitive moral position such as that of a deity or the representative of a deity. This sense of security can be heightened if the
god is deemed omnipotent and omnibenevolent. This concern about
authority is not intended to universally discount moral expertise, but
rather to favor proportionalism whereby moral expertise is a participant in moral deliberation but not the end of such deliberation. This
chapter can be characterized as a search for moral proportionalism
whereby the moral agency is not diminished by the presence of
a priori claims to moral authority when deciding on ethical action,
particularly where care is involved. The expression of moral authority
in religion as dogma or unreﬂective belief diminishes moral agency
by leveraging ultimate authority (god) to preclude careful deliberation regarding how to act.
Psychological factors can play an important role in moral knowledge. One’s disposition toward an underlying deity, and thus a moral
authority, impacts how ethics is approached in practice. Philosophers
such as Wittgenstein recognized the role of psychology by describing
certainty as a mental state instead of a deﬁnite knowledge proposition
(1972, 308). However, even Wittgenstein acknowledges that the
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distinction between human declarations of “I know” and “I am certain” are tenuous (1972, 8). Given the epistemic knowledge equation, x knows P, where x is a believer in religious faith and P is the
moral teaching of any given religion, the variables and relations of
the equation are problematized by the authority or credence that x
gives P. If P provides moral insight that helps x deliberate and act in
a responsive way to a given person or situation, then that moral
teaching can be a helpful ethical tool. However, if x considers P
absolutely authoritative and mandatory, thus ineligible for questioning, then the moral authority of the religion is stiﬂing to moral autonomy, choice, and subsequent action. Such as, in this case, the imperative to spread god’s word and convert nonbelievers without similar
self-openness to change. I contend that care ethics is anti-authoritarian in general (addressed later in this chapter). Religious ethics can
be one example of an authoritarian morality that care, in its fullest
sense, is often incompatible with.
The moral authority of religion is in many instances tied to the
existence of a deity as well as a cosmology of retributive justice.
Although world religions and spiritualities vary widely, generally, an
authoritative god adds legitimacy to the morality of a religion. Similarly, the fear of punishment, as well as the positive rewards of moral
adherence, can be a factor in the ethical decision-making of a religious believer. The existential proof of god or retributive cosmology
is spurious, but nonetheless, they are widely held beliefs. For example,
72% of Americans believe in the reality of heaven, and 59% of
Americans believe in hell, according to the 2014 Pew Religious
Landscape survey (Murphy 2015).
Part of the difference between religious and care ethics is nested
in the entanglements of ontology, epistemology, and ethics. This
article is not intended to confront the existence of a deity (the question of theism), nor the right of a religion to take a moral position
on a subject, but rather the concern here is how seriously moral authority
is taken. In other words, the critique from the standpoint of care ethics is
not with religion per se but with moral ideology and dogmatism whereby
moral authority is not questioned. Although dogmatism is not inherent
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to theology, religious beliefs and teachings are often presented to followers as sacrosanct. Therefore, questioning teaching is blasphemy or
a sacrilege resulting in the questioner being labeled “inﬁdel” and possibly even shunned or excommunicated.

Pervasive Reliance on Moral Authority Creates A Form of Banality
“If we simply defer to a higher, more powerful authority—be it a boss,
a sergeant, a senator, a teacher, a parent, a judge, etc.—when navigating
morally precarious situations, then we are irresponsibly relieving ourselves of doing the difﬁcult work of moral deliberation”
Phil Zuckerman (2019, 54).

That which is banal is unoriginal and ordinary. Hannah Arendt contends that a lack of critical thinking and engagement can result in
unintentional evil. In her analysis of Adolf Eichmann, the architect
of the Final Solution, she describes, “I was struck by a manifest shallowness in the doer that made it impossible to trace the uncontestable evil of his deeds to any deeper level of roots or motives” (Arendt
1978, 4). Arendt made it clear that he was not unintelligent but
simply unthinking: “it was not stupidity but thoughtlessness” (Arendt
1964). When humans do not question authority, then an unthinking
banality abounds.
Chau was nothing like Eichmann. Eichmann was part of an organization that killed millions, and Chau tragically died without harming anyone that we know of. Although Eichmann lacked any “ﬁrm
ideological convictions or of speciﬁc evil motives” (Arendt 1964).
Chau was convinced that he could do good. What they did share was
an unreﬂective approach to morality. Eichmann followed the Nazi’s
racist and homophobic propaganda like a bureaucrat who simply
had a job to do. Chau did not question that his Christian faith
made evangelization a moral good. Using Arendt’s approach, a major
difference between Chau and Eichmann has to do with convictions.
According to Arendt, Eichmann exhibited no moral convictions, but
it was clear that Chau held a “good will” toward others according to
prevalent norms of evangelical moral standards. No one can accuse
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Chau of behaving in self-interest or with an aim to do harm. Although
his ethical framework had other important elements, Immanuel Kant
indicated, “There is nothing it is possible to think of anywhere in the
world, or indeed anything at all outside it, that can be held to be
good without limitation, excepting only a good will” (Kant 2002, 9).
It is hard to argue that Chau did not exhibit a goodwill—from his
narrow perspective, he was endeavoring to do good—but is good
intent a sufﬁcient condition of care? As is addressed later in this
chapter, care requires responsiveness—engagement, attentiveness,
engrossment—with the other that is not exhibited in the Chau’s relationship with the Sentinelese. However, as earlier stated, this analysis
is not intended as an unmitigated moral adjudication of Chau.
Although Chau must be responsible for his actions, he did not originate the normative moral narrative for the religious institution he
was a part of and for which his goodwill was based upon. He did,
however, fail to care. Chau abdicated moral reﬂection in the banality
of his actions.
The statements by religious leaders in the aftermath of Chau’s
death demonstrate a kind of banality in their tolerance of his actions.
The institutions that knew and supported Chau praised him but did
not offer any self-criticism of the religious dogma that motivated him.
The tragedy was not a source of moral reﬂection or deliberative pause
by these organizations but rather a bump in the road as the dogma
presses on. For example, Richard Albert Mohler Jr., the president of
the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary in Louisville, Kentucky
stated, “I don’t question his motivation, I question his methods”
(Gettleman, Schultz, Venkataraman 2018). In this manner, Mohler
supports the ethics of evangelizing. A statement by the President
of Oral Roberts University, William M. Wilson also reﬂects a lack of
introspection regarding religious dogma and its impact on ethics:
I am convinced that John believed God called him to reach the most
isolated people groups in the world. His heart was bursting with love for
them. This overwhelming passion led him outside the normal boundaries
and pushed him to do what others could not and would not do. He prepared himself mentally, physically, and spiritually for years to pursue this
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passion. There was no perfect way to do this but I am convinced John
did not want to hurt anyone. I am also sure he never dreamed his martyrdom would create a global media storm nor did he want to be famous.
He was simply willing to commit his whole life if necessary so these precious people could know the love of Jesus Christ. Our prayers continue
for John’s family and friends during this time of loss (Oral Roberts
University).

Wilson’s notion of preparation did not go so far as to question whether
evangelization is morally appropriate. Similarly, All Nations, the
evangelical organization that helped Chau train for his mission to
the Sentinelese, was careful to praise Chau and avoid self-critical
analysis while eschewing any ofﬁcial connection between the organization and his endeavor. According to Mary Ho, International Executive Director, “As we grieve our friend [Chau], we also know that he
would want us to pray for those who may have been responsible for
his death, the Sentinelese. Throughout church history, the privilege
of sharing the gospel has often involved great cost. We pray that
John’s sacriﬁcial efforts will bear eternal fruit!” (Ho, 2018).5 The good
of spreading the Christian message is not subject to interrogation.
There is a hint that maybe his death will do some good, perhaps lead
the Sentinelese to reconsider, or maybe Chau’s death inspires other
missionaries to go forth. The belief in the moral good of evangelization is left unscathed by these statements.
Chau’s death is a tragedy born of a particular Christian narrative
held with a high degree of certainty that spreading the Good News
is a good above all others. This notion is so pervasive as to achieve
banality among speciﬁc populations. When philosophy valorizes the
moral certainty of a “good will” without consideration of grounded
relationships and context, it lacks the resources to directly challenge
such a narrative that a missionary’s actions are good as long as they
mean well. As the next section explores, care ethics is radically
5
When asked, individual missionaries were not so solid in defense of missionary
morality. In a New York Times article that brieﬂy interviewed a dozen missionaries,
the reactions ran from criticizing this kind of missionary work to defending the effort
as part of a greater calling (Moore 2018).
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different than a rule-based deontological approach to morality in that
it cannot ignore the need for responsive engagement. In a care framework, the notion of a good will is expanded to entail more than good
intentions and includes responsive engagement with the other.

The Crucial Role of Responsiveness in Care
“Caring is largely reactive and responsive”
Nel Noddings (2013, 19)

Care ethics has been characterized in several ways by prominent
scholars such as Nel Noddings, Joan Tronto, Virginia Held, and others. I favor a threefold understanding of care as a moral ideal marked
by inquiry, connection, and action. This framework is not inconsistent with the previous conﬁgurations of care, but it does offer a particular set of emphases. Care begins with knowledge. Understanding
the other—the one cared for—is crucial for the efﬁcacy of care. Care
is thus knowledge work, a kind of active inquiry that involves listening and attending with a goal of apprehending the context and the
unique particularities of those cared for (Dalmiya 2016). Without
inquiry, care can be superﬁcial or misguided. Entangled in inquiry is
a connection to the target of care. This connection can be framed as
“empathy” (Slote 2007, 4) or “affective displacement” (Noddings
2013, 16). Employing either term, the other is not just an object of
a transaction—an abstract customer or stereotype—but a relational
reality for concern. In this case, people are not just subjects to be
converted without reciprocal openness to the mutuality of ideas and
perspectives. Family and friends can more easily achieve affective
displacement through proximal knowledge but it is challenging to
connect with or care for the distant and relatively unknown other.
Finally, there must be action, broadly construed. Care ethics is more
than dispositional (although disposition is part of the connection).
There must be tangible action or practices (Held 2006, 39) on behalf
of the other. If we take the interplay of inquiry, connection, and
action seriously as the basis for a caring morality, then relational
openness and responsiveness are valorized. To care is to respond
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within relationship to the other in a way that promotes growth, ﬂourishing, and well-being.
The depth of responsiveness is both the challenge and effort of care
as well as a prime determinant of its efﬁcacy. To be truly cared for, one
must be listened to and understood. Different theorists have come at
the issue of responsiveness differently. Noddings described care as
engaging “engrossment”: “all caring involves engrossment. The
engrossment need not be intense nor need it be pervasive in the life
of the one-caring, but it must occur” (2013, 17). Fiona Robinson
addresses the central role of listening in care (2011). Klaartje Klaver
and Andries Baart emphasize the role of attentiveness and presence
(2011). Although employing different language and emphases, each
of these approaches values a depth of understanding that takes time
and effort to achieve in order to respond well to the needs of the other.
Responsiveness is a crucial aspect of care ethics. Luigina Mortari,
drawing upon Noddings, claims, “responsiveness implies an active and
watchful presence supported by an ethical attitude that consists of the
readiness to expend oneself and make oneself available” (2016, 457).
In this manner, it is not morally sufﬁcient to be recognized as a caregiver, a doctor, nurse, etc.. One must also respond to the other as an
individual who has needs that they must deﬁne. As Joan Tronto
claims, we must be careful not to characterize “all care as good care”
(2013, 24). Failure to have a depth of personal response can result in
what Neil O’Hara describes as “callous carers,” or those “who show
little or no consideration or particular concern for others put in their
care” (2018, 35). The value placed on responsiveness is what differentiates care from traditional moral approaches regarding authority.
As a ﬁeld, ethics is part of value theory. Values and commitments
create a moral constellation. For example, a moral commitment to
the Ten Commandments is to create an ethical universe where moral
authority is vested in those rules. Valuing responsiveness in service
of the growth and ﬂourishing of the other is to place a kind of moral
authority in a relationality that is not hard-wired to speciﬁc moral
claims or formulae. Caring responsiveness recognizes the messiness of
the human condition resulting in a normative decision or action that
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emerges from the relationship and context. Thus, care is a ﬂuid and
dynamic morality requiring the difﬁcult work of engaging particularity. One might describe the care approach as having an “emergent
normativity.” If one takes caring postures (Mortari 2016, 457-460),
then the commitment is to care, but one cannot be certain how that
care will take shape until they engage in inquiry and connection with
the other. The care mandate emerges from the situation. There is no
a priori rule of action. No dogma or ideology, just a generalized openness and commitment to care for the other, is required to help them
grow and ﬂourish.
A care ethical epistemology and normativity differ from that evident in the law-giving Abrahamic tradition. A care approach is not
simply an alternative to rules or formulae but rather views such
approaches as tools or guides. A truncated example might be drawn
from property rights. The Ten Commandments indicate that thou
shalt not steal, and modern-day capitalistic societies put a great deal
of emphasis on the signiﬁcance of property rights. Indeed, consistency
of ownership in accordance with rules can create social and personal
stability and stability that is important for human ﬂourishing. In
other words, there is much to support rules surrounding property
rights; however care does not begin with rules, but rather it starts
with the needs of one another to grow and ﬂourish. Rules and duties
can be stated with certainty, but the human condition requires
a humble openness to understanding the other and responding
accordingly. For example, stealing food or giving up property for the
beneﬁt of others through taxation might be a caring approach depending upon the circumstances.
One might ask whether care ethics just replaces one ideology, care,
for another, such as religious moral dogma. Care does provide a moral
ideal but it comes in the form of a tension rather than a mandate.
Care theory offers a moral ideal of care—a state of relational being
to strive for and improve toward without the expectation or possibility of achieving perfection. There is no perfect state of caring. One
can always learn more or do more. Accordingly, the ideal of caring
resonates with Jacques Derrida’s notion of aporia or an unattainable
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ideal for which the tension with reality motivates the striving for, but
never achieves perfection (1995, 29).
Care is a relational and responsive ethic, and thus, a care provider
must be humble before the other in a manner that cannot rely on
rules or intentions alone. The Chau tragedy leaves one wondering
where was care in this scenario and speciﬁcally whether Chau or the
Sentinelese were cared for. Chau is not an interchangeable agent who
can simply be stereotyped and made to ﬁt a moral formula, and neither are the Sentinelese. The details of this tragedy reveal the manifestation of moral conﬁdence and its pitfalls. Chau was conﬁdent he
could do good for the Sentinelese, as were the evangelical organizations like All Nations. Chau’s commitment to his mission was such
that he was persistent even when the dangers became more apparent
to him.
Although the case of John Allen Chau is somewhat sensationalistic and received a great deal of media attention, the underlying role
of religious certainty in moral deliberation and action shadows many
ethical issues, including religious certitude about abortion, gay rights,
and the equality of women. By contrast, care ethics is knowledge
work that requires engagement with the particulars of context,
including listening to and responding to the one cared-for.

Conclusion: Care As Humble Yet Subversive
“Humility is opposite a number of vices, including arrogance, vanity,
conceit, egotism, grandiosity, pretentiousness, snobbishness, impertinence (presumption), haughtiness, self-righteousness, domination, selﬁsh
ambition, and self-complacency.”
Roberts and Woods (2003, 257).

In this chapter, I have endeavored to interrogate the tragic circumstances of John Allen Chau’s death to make a point about valuing
care. The chapter reviewed the speciﬁcs of the case and the entanglement of moral forces involved in the horriﬁc outcome. In particular,
the role of moral certainty and the banality of over-reliance on
a moral authority for ethical answers was discussed. Care theory offers
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an alternative to such dependence on moral authority as it values an
authentic response to the need of others. In this conclusion, I reinforce the argument in the chapter with a focus on humble moral
subversion.
There is a paradox in the use of the term “faith” when it comes to
religion. Faith usually implies a lack of factual certainty. Synonyms
for faith include trust, belief, conﬁdence, conviction, reliance, dependence, and optimism. These words express varying degrees of certainty which reﬂect the range of faith positions taken by religious and
spiritual believers. Nevertheless, when combined with a zeal for religious moral authority, faith can appear as a hyper-certainty manifesting in dogmatism, fundamentalism, and assertive evangelization.
The certainty of religion is a special case of ideology6 because of
the role of mediation. Certainty of a deity’s will is a fraught concept
which also includes an interlocuter. That mediator can take the form
of a text or a religious leader or some combination of them. These
ﬁgures or artifacts are often imbued with heightened moral authority.
Religious certainty can thus empower the mediator.7 Religious texts
and leaders speak for their deity. Religious leaders as mediators of
religious authority and teachings bring the fallibility of humanity to
their positions. In a 1966 peer-reviewed article, Paul C. Empie asked,
“Can organized religion be unethical? His answer was “yes” when it
endeavors to seek “self preservation, prestige or power” (73). Religious institutions have historically played a conserving role in maintaining the morality of their time by using the moral authority of
religious narratives supporting positions that would be considered
unethical today such as slavery, anti-miscegenation and keeping electoral franchise from women. Despite this history, religious moral
teaching is often granted an authoritative and reliabilist position
that is timeless and above reproach. The certainty of this imposed

6
Here I am using ideology in a pejorative sense as the valorization of ideas over
people.
7
These religious mediators have historically been predominantly male thus reifying masculinity.
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morality can reduce the choices and creativity needed for human
beings to respond to one another’s needs. Whether it is the young
person struggling to ﬁnd support for a non-conforming sexual identity
or a woman who has decided to have an abortion, care should not be
fettered by external dogmatic positions of right and wrong. To paraphrase Noddings and apply her sentiment regarding education to the
context of religion, the believer is infinitely more important than their
religion.8 Religion should not be a barrier to human connection and
understanding, but rather it should enhance human growth and ﬂourishing if it is to be considered a good. Although care theorists are
often reluctant to make normative claims, perhaps it is time for care
scholars to more forcefully denounce the dis-connective and thus
uncaring practices of the world’s religions. As Tronto, applying feminist sensibilities indicates, care always exists in a political context
(1993, 137-141) and institutional religion is steeped in political practices. Given the complexity and ambiguity of responding to the other,
humility, not certainty, is the moral character needed to help humanity care for one another.
Humility is generally not as acclaimed for its central role in morality as it should be. Some philosophers even regard humility as a detriment.9 Dennis Whitcomb, Heather Battaly, Jason Baehr, and Daniel
Howard-Snyder describe two important elements of intellectual
humility as appropriate, attentiveness and owning one’s own intellectual limitations (2017, 516-517). Both characteristics are signiﬁcant for this project. The hubris of certainty can mitigate attentiveness to the other who requires care and result in an inﬂated conﬁdence
in one’s knowledge of the circumstances. As indicated earlier, care is
8
In a beautiful passage describing relationality as the centerpiece of education
rather than the mere transmission of disciplinary knowledge Noddings states, “the
student is inﬁnitely more important than the subject matter” (2013, 20 and 176).
Certainly, the role of organized religion is not simply to achieve as many adherents
to a particular ideology as possible. Those adherents are human beings who need an
open care not fettered by religious stipulations.
9
In particular, Hume, Nietzsche, and Spinoza consider humility a detriment to
agency. See Snow 1995, 211.
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knowledge work and in the process of inquiry into the context and
needs of the other, humility is crucial. Both epistemic and ethical
humility is called for to obtain the responsiveness required in care.
To be sure of what another person needs in advance of listening and
learning from them is to diminish the efﬁcacy of care and potentially
to do harm. Such epistemic hubris can be a form of injustice (Fricker
2017, 53) demonstrating a lack of respect for the other as well as
failing to utilize knowledge gained from the particular individual to
maximize care. This hubris is demonstrated, for example, when
a doctor is conﬁdent of the illness and treatment before listening to
the patient. Humble responsiveness represents an authentic position
of desiring to help someone ﬂourish.
However, humility also has a political dimension, particularly in
the context of a feminist ethic of care. Signiﬁcantly, care theory arose
out of a feminist context because feminism is sensitive to power structures. The Sentinelese are a people with a history who are impacted
by colonialism. Thus humility also demands that oppressive colonial
history is remembered and owned rather than ignored. Serene Khader
describes rampant “unconscious unjustiﬁed paternalism’’ (UUP)
which she describes as “a type of paternalism in which one party
unjustiﬁably substitutes her judgment for another’s because of difﬁculty distinguishing her desires for the other from the other’s good”
(Khader 2010, 742). Khader is particularly concerned that Western
feminists rely too heavily on stereotypes of oppression for nonWestern peoples. Even though care-giving and development work
share many characteristics, Khader suggests that despite widespread
UUP, the particularism of care theorists such as Eva Kittay, Sara
Ruddick, and Carol Gilligan provides tools for resisting colonial
paternalism. For example, a care ethic is framed as requiring attending to the other in an encounter rather than in the abstract (Khader
2010, 755). Humility can provide the reﬂexive space to openly and
honestly learn how to best care for the other.
Although the colonialism of settler nation-states is usually the
focus of post-colonial studies, religious institutions are also colonial
powers. Often political colonialism and religious complement one
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another. One might think of proselytizing as another practice of colonialism which might be described as a “conscious unjustiﬁed paternalism.” A humble, more responsive approach to the Sentinelese might
be to listen and learn to see what could be done for them, which may
have been to leave them alone. This is not to suggest a passive or
unengaged position but instead an active effort to let the Sentinelese
know that there are people there to help them should they need it.
Nevertheless, if they want and need to be left alone, that will be the
action taken out of care and respect.
Subversion is not typically associated with humility. However, care
is subversive of moral authority because it must begin in the relational responsiveness to the other and their context. A law, a rule, or
a divine command cannot limit moral deliberation and engagement
for those who truly care. Humility comes ﬁrst, which subverts authoritative and certain approaches to ethics. In describing the ethics of
care in a medical context, German philosopher Giovanni Maio
describes how an ethic of care subverts the authority of medical institutions and their practices:
Precisely because care ethics assumes that there are no unambiguous
solutions, it attributes more value to doubt; the attitude of tentative
hesitation has no trace here of the negative connotations that are necessarily attached to it in the constant bustle of large medical institutions.
This confers on care ethics nothing short of a subversive power in relation to action as well. This subversive power can be extremely restorative because it can give rise to the insight that good medicine means
not simply doing things but also allowing these things space to thrive
(2018, 60).

Note how Maio emphasizes the humble approach of doubt and tenuousness. Over-reliance on moral authority chokes off the “space to
thrive” necessary for care to blossom.
One of the conclusions of this analysis is to diminish one’s certainty about any ideology in the face of fellow human beings in need.
It is an odd claim to say that people should take their religion less
seriously. However, that is the case here, albeit in a particular way
regarding moral certainty. Of course, those who hold various religious
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and spiritual traditions can and do care for others in rich and wonderful ways. However, people who banally turn their critical moral
thinking over to an authority, any authority, do so at the potential
peril of themselves and those they encounter. To align with a more
caring approach, the world’s religions should take a more honest
and humble approach to their own teachings.10 Such an approach
may seem like a contradiction to certain forms of religious beliefs, but
if care is to be enacted this tension will have to be resolved. One
cannot care and run roughshod over someone else’s culture and context. Ethics, and particularly the relational effort needed for care, is
hard work. Abdication of deliberative responsibility to an authority
is a fraught shortcut that has the potential to mitigate care and do
harm.
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The Pain of Imagining Others:
Caring for the Abstract
and the Particular in Jewish Thought
Sarah Zager

In the past three decades, care ethics has become an increasingly
diverse strand of ethical thinking; however, many of these articulations of care ethics deploy a critique of the “abstraction” that care
ethicists ﬁnd at the basis of other ethical theories.1 This critique is
designed to target two kinds of abstraction: First, care ethicists claim
that many ethical theories rely on a faulty philosophical anthropology which assumes that the self can and should be “abstracted” away
from the particular familial, social, cultural, and economic circumstances under which it has grown and developed. Second, they argue
that contemporary ethical theories—especially, but not exclusively,
deontological ones—rely on “abstract” formulations of moral rules.
Often, care ethicists link these two kinds of abstraction together,
suggesting that replacing this overly abstract philosophical anthropology can better account for the ways that women develop ethical
knowledge through their relationships with particular others. In turn,
they also hope that recognizing these new sites of ethical knowledge
will lead ethical theorists to eschew “abstract” moral rules. According
to these theorists, rejecting these two forms of abstraction—an
abstract philosophical anthropology and abstract ethical theoretical

1
Often, “liberalism” is the implicit target of care ethics. More work would need
to be done to think through how these charges would apply to ethical theories that
are explicitly anti-liberal or that are not always accompanied by liberal political
theories.
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formulations—helps make care ethics a distinctly feminist project,
designed to highlight the voices of the women, especially women of
color, who continue to do a disproportionate share of care work in
western societies.2
In this essay, I suggest that care ethics’ rejection of abstraction
creates signiﬁcant problems which undermine the pursuit of its feminist desiderata. The particularized philosophical anthropology that
care ethicists promote highlights the experiences of cisgendered,
straight women who bear biological children while eliding key elements of the experiences of many parents (both women and others),
especially those facing infertility and pregnancy loss. In doing so, it
lifts up some women’s voices over others and fails to fully account for
important forms of “care work” that these parents perform. Drawing
from my own experiences with infertility at a young age, I argue
below that experiences of infertility often require substantial “care
work,” but that this “care work” is for another that remains abstract
in some relevant sense.
In order to make this argument, I begin by investigating the structure of care ethicists’ arguments for the importance of replacing
“abstract” moral concepts with an emphasis on “particularity.” I show
that this notion of particularity is not only distinctly embodied, but
also described in terms of heredity. This embodied heredity concept
of particularity is not in itself harmful, but many classical care ethicists use a physical, genetic connection between parent and child as
the (or at least a) main indicator of an embodied, “particular” caring
relation. In addition, the arguments care ethicists make for embodied

2

Despite a wide range of advances, women still do a disproportionate amount of
household work, including childcare, with one study showing that American women
do on average four hours of household labor per day, compared to men’s 2.5 hours.
(Wezerek and Ghodsee 2020)
Notably, despite care ethics’ claims that to highlight the voices of women of
color, almost all of the leading voices in care ethics are white. While Virginia Held,
a leading care ethicist whose work I consider in detail below, is optimistic about care
ethics’ ability to change the economic forces that lead to a devaluing of care work,
especially done by women and women of color, the work remains cut out for us.
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particularity are infused with theological language that is deeply connected to anti-Jewish modes of rhetoric which reject Judaism as a
“disembodied” set of rules which teaches its adherents to disregard
the physical world, and the ethical connections it creates, in favor
of a “blind” allegiance to religious rules. Taken together, the emphasis
on genetic relationships as a mark of “particularity” and the troubled
history of these arguments suggest that care ethics’ rejection of
abstraction needs to be revised. In the ﬁnal sections of the essay,
I outline one form that such a revision might take, drawing ﬁrst on
my own experiences and then on Jewish texts which imagine a form
of anticipation that is distinctly disembodied, but that still requires
very particular, physical actions in response to it.

Care Ethics’ Critique of Abstraction
As noted above, “care ethics” is an increasingly diverse traditional
of ethical thinking, and providing an exhaustive history and analysis
of its progression lies beyond the scope of this essay. Here, I focus my
analysis here will focus on two key works in the history of care ethics
as representative examples: Nel Noddings’s Caring: A Relational
Approach to Ethics and Moral Education (ﬁrst published in 1984), and
Virginia Held’s The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, Global (2005).
Noddings’s work was one of the foundational texts in care ethics and
represents one of the ﬁrst works translating some of the key claims of
Carol Gilligan’s In a Different Voice (1982) into explicitly philosophical terms.3 Held’s Ethics of Care serves in part as a summary of where
care ethics has been in the intervening 21 years; it seeks to put care
ethics on the map as an ethical theory in its own right with something to say to a broad audience in both philosophical ethics and
political theory. In what follows, I outline Noddings’s and Held’s critiques of abstraction, considering their rejection of both abstract

3
The psychology community has raised signiﬁcant questions about Gilligan’s
methodology; even after these questions were raised, the philosophical literature in
care ethics rarely qualiﬁed its use of Gilligan’s different “voices.” For a summary of
this controversy see Graham (2012).
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philosophical anthropologies and of “abstract” moral rules and
principles.4
Both Noddings and Held begin by claiming that existing ethical
theories have proceeded with a mistaken philosophical anthropology.
Held argues that most standard ethical theories “have posited an
abstract, fully rational ‘agent as such’ from which to construct morality, while missing the moral issues that arise between interconnected
persons in the contexts of family, friendship, and social groups,” and
that therefore, “one of the central goals of the ethics of care is to
“[call] into question the universalistic and abstract rules of the dominant theories” (Held 2006, 13, 11).
This critique of abstraction is often motivated by (and sometimes
also results in)5 a rejection of moral rules, which are often assumed
to be inherently “abstract.” For example, Noddings writes that caring
is simply incompatible with rule-following: “To care is to act not by
ﬁxed rule but by affection and regard…. Rule-bound responses in
the name of caring lead us to suspect that the claimant wants most
to the credited with caring” (Noddings 2013, 44). Building on this
assumption, Held argues that the ethics of care prompts us to “see
more hope for moral development in reforming practices than in reasoning from abstract rules” (Noddings 2013, 19). Though these claims
are clearly rhetorically linked in both Noddings and Held, there is no
obvious conceptual reason that they must be linked. We might argue,
to borrow terminology from Seyla Benhabib, that a “situated self”
nonetheless ought to be subject to ethical rules or principles, even if
we at the same time argue that her position in certain kinds of social
relationships might change the way that those rules or principles
apply to her in some circumstances (Benhabib 2013). Similarly, we
might reject deontological moral theories, while retaining a roughly
independent, individualistic, and “abstract” picture of the self; many
4

As I will show below, Noddings uses “principle” to refer to moral rules or prohibition. This stands in contrast to standard distinction between rules and principles
in legal theory, where rules are more speciﬁc regulations deployed in the service of
broader legal desiderata or “principles.”
5
As I will show below, the logical ordering of these two claims varies.
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neo-Aristotelian virtue theorists take this approach when they focusing on giving conceptual accounts of “the virtues”.6 Having recognized that rejecting one kind of abstraction need not lead us to reject
another, in what follows, I will draw on recent work in Jewish feminist thought and care ethics to argue that rules or moral “obligations”
need not be “abstract” in this pejorative sense; rules and obligations
can and do demand speciﬁc, embodied actions that are geared towards
caring for particular others.
For both thinkers, there is something distinctly “feminine” about
this rejection of moral rules. Held writes:
Women’s experience has typically included cultivating special relationships with family and friends, rather than primarily dealing impartially
with strangers, and providing large amounts of caring labor for children
and often for ill or elderly family members. Affectionate sensitivity and
responsiveness to need may seem to provide better moral guidance for
what should be done in these contexts than do abstract rules or rational
calculations of individual utilities (Held 2006, 24).

Similarly, Noddings argues that treating ethics as a system of rules is
fundamentally opposed to the “feminine” approach to ethics. She
writes, “This approach through law and principle is not, I suggest, the
approach of the mother. It is the approach of the detached one, of
the father, The view expressed here is a feminine view… It is feminine in the deep classical sense-rooted in receptivity, relatedness, and
responsiveness. It represents an alternative to present views, one that
begins with the moral attitude of longing for goodness and not with
moral reasoning” (Noddings 2013, 23). Recent work in both psychology and gender studies has critiqued this kind of gender essentialism
extensively.7 Without rehearsing these critiques here, it is sufﬁcient
to note that, for Noddings and Held, a rejection of “abstract moral
6

Think for example of Alasdair MacIntyre’s emphasis on Homeric concepts of
virtue in McIntyre 1981. Noddings criticizes virtue ethics precisely for its focus on
individual actors’ moral development. See Noddings 96-7.
7
Heyes (1997) summarizes the versions of these critiques which deal speciﬁcally
with Gilligan and makes an effort to respond to them. As she notes, this work is built
on broader work on gender, which challenges the stability of the categories of men
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rules,” is assumed to create space for a distinctly feminine moral
“voice” to emerge.
In order to pursue this feminist ethical agenda, Noddings and Held
offer an alternative philosophical anthropology. A standard version
of this argument proceeds as follows. While classical philosophers
tended to assume that people were best understood as “independent”
and “individualized” beings whose family connections were only incidental, care ethics focuses on the fact that all people require some
form of particular care in their lives, always in childhood, and very
often at other points in life as well.8 In her version of this argument,
Held compares her relational connection philosophical anthropology
to the purportedly individualized one used in both Kantian and utilitarian moral theories.
Deontological and consequentialist moral theories of which Kantian
moral theory and utilitarianism are the leading examples concentrate
their attention on the rational decisions of agents assumed to be independent, autonomous individuals. Virtue theory also focuses on individual persons and their dispositions. The ethics of care, in contrast,
conceptualizes persons as deeply affected by, and involved in, relations to
others; to many care ethicists, persons are at least partly consisted by
their social ties (Held 2006, 46).

Noddings goes in further, rejecting the idea that the ethics of care
should produce a stable philosophical anthropology at all. While she
acknowledges that “there is, I think, a logic of the caring relation,”
she also claims that care ethics “does not evolve inevitably out of the
‘logic of the concept’ nor out of a catalog of what is known about
persons caring.” The problem with these, she argues, is that “Both
require a move to abstraction that tends to destroy the uniqueness of
the caring itself” (Noddings 2013, 52). Nodding’s choice of words is
important here—the “move to abstraction” does not just undermine

and women. For the one highly inﬂuential version of the argument against gender
essentialisms, see Chapter 1 of Butler 2006.
8
For another strong version of this story, see Benhabib 2013.
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our ability to recognize or learn from relationships of care, it also
undermines our practice of them.
Though they tend to reject “universal” language as being “abstract,”
both Noddings and Held both point out that care is in some sense
“universal.” Noddings writes that care ethics avoids relativism because
it “contains at its heart a component that is universal: Maintenance
of the caring relation” (Noddings 2013, 101). Held spells this out
more directly when she argues that care ethics is based on “the truly
universal experience of care,” because “every human being has been
cared for as a child or would not be alive. Understanding the values
involved in care, and how its standards reject violence and domination, are possible with the ethics of care” (Held 2006, 3). Even
though it is distinctly universal (in the sense that everyone has it),
this experience is nonetheless particular: there is an individual person
who cares for me, and there is an individual person for whom I care.
Focusing on this person, Noddings and Held argue, centers the voices
of women who provide this kind of individualized care, and may even
help bring about social realities that are more likely to facilitate and
value caring relationships.
This observation about the universality of experiences of care
anticipates some of the kinds of philosophical moves I want to make
later in this essay—by claiming that “care” is a universal experience,
while also recognizing that it is in some sense also deeply particularized, Held and Noddings open the door to an ethical theory which
makes space for some notions of universality and alongside a strong
emphasis on the particularities of lived relationships. Given what
they take to be the strong link between the “universal” and the
“abstract,”9 this suggests that it might also be possible for the abstract
and the particular to exist side by side and to interact.

The Care Ethical Critique of Abstract Philosophical Anthropology
Here, I argue that the philosophical anthropology of Noddings and
Held is deeply limited and fails to make some important experiences
9

I will trouble this connection to some degree below.
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of care, including experiences of parental care, sources of ethical
knowledge. To see why this is, we need to get a better sense of what
Noddings and Held take to be the markers of the kind of “particularity” that they want care ethics to prioritize. In what follows, I show
that both Noddings and Held replace the “abstraction” found in traditional ethical theory with a version of “particularity” that is both
embodied and genetic; in fact, it is precisely this embodied, genetic
connection that makes “particularity” ethically signiﬁcant.
For both Noddings and Held, the paradigmatic “particular” relationship is the one between biological mother and child; often, the
ﬁrst moment of a new biological mother holding her child is used as
the key vignette which illustrates what constitutes a “particular” relationship. For example, in response to David Vellman’s claim that
Kant’s writing about reverence is designed “to rule out persons as
proper objects of reverence insofar as they are inhabitants of the
empirical world,” Held writes that “the ethics of care, in contrast
would have no trouble, I think, describing the feelings of parents
toward a newborn child, in all her empirical embodiment, as reverence. The feeling of a parent of a newborn may have, that this child
is the center of the universe and that there is nothing more important
in all the world, is not only a temporary emotional distortion that
will soon be modiﬁed” (Held 2006, 92). Not only does Held want us
to be able to describe this feeling as a form of “reverence,” she also
takes this “reverence” to issue in an ethical conclusion; in fact, for
both Noddings and Held, this feeling of a parent ﬁrst holding their
child becomes a kind of metonymy for the ethical content of the
ethics of care. Held continues, “What a parent may value in her child
may well not be what makes this child like every other, but the very
particularity of the child and of the relationship that exist between
them, such that she is the mother of this child and this particular
person is her child” (Held 2006, 93).
For both Noddings and Held, this sense of “mine-ness” is deﬁned
biologically. This becomes evident when each of the two authors
discuss reproductive ethics, including surrogacy and abortion. In her
discussion of abortion, Noddings writes that, under most
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circumstances, it makes sense to treat a fetus as an “information
speck” which does not have the same moral status as a human life.
However, she argues that ethical situation changes signiﬁcantly, when
that “information speck” becomes “mine.” Importantly, for our purposes, this happens when the mother contemplates the traits the
child might inherit from its biological parents. She writes:
But suppose the information speck is mine, and I am aware of it. This
child-to-be is the product of love between a man deeply cared for and me.
Will the child have his eyes or mine? His stature or mine? Our joint love
of mathematics or his love of mechanics or my love of language? This is
not just an information speck; it is endowed with prior love and current
knowledge. It is sacred, but I—humbly, not presumptuously—confer
sacredness upon it. I cannot, will not destroy it. It is joined to loved others through formal chains of caring. It is linked to the inner circle in
a clearly deﬁned way. I might wish that I were not pregnant, but I cannot destroy this known and potentially loved person-to-be (Noddings
2013, 103).

The mother-fetus relationship Noddings describes here has a social,
cognitive, and emotional component which is partially separable
from biological heredity—Held argues that part of what makes this
ethical being signiﬁcant is the “love between a man deeply cared for
and me,” and she explicitly rejects such a claim of ethical signiﬁcance
in a case where no such emotional connection to the man in question
exists (even if he is biologically the father of the child) (Noddings
2013, 104).10 But, when this relationship is present, its signiﬁcance is
interpreted through the woman’s musing about heritable traits—we
know that this is a “sacred” being and not an “information speck”
because we can wonder whether the child will have “his eyes or
mine.” This, Noddings argues, means that, even though the child is
not yet a particular, embodied other in its own right, “there is already
relation albeit indirect and formal“ between parent and child
10
This approach also assumes that whether a pregnancy is “wanted” is marked
by a speciﬁc kind of relationship to a male romantic partner. This is, of course, not
the case for all pregnancies in which the gestational parent “assents” to the “known
and potentially loved person-to-be.”
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(Noddings 2013, 103). In one sense, Noddings anticipates the philosophical direction I want to go by acknowledging that a relationship
of care can be “indirect and formal,” both adjectives usually used
pejoratively in care ethics. But, Noddings does not allow the recognition of the possibility of “indirect” “formal,” and, we might add,
“abstract,” relationships of care to inform the broader philosophical
anthropology that she advocates in the rest of the book. Almost in
the same breath as she acknowledges these forms of abstract care,
Noddings retreats to a notion of “natural care” which seems to rely
more heavily on the heritability that she focuses on earlier in the
paragraph. Just following the passage quoted above, she explains the
hypothetical mother’s decision to keep the pregnancy as “an ethical
one borne of natural caring” (Held 2006, 103).
Held makes a very similar set of claims in her discussion of surrogacy, which she prefers to call “contract pregnancy” (Held 2006,
120). Citing Mary Lyndon Shanley’s work on this issue, Held argues
that in pregnancy, “mother and fetus are strongly interrelated, and
a birth mother will never stop being the woman who gave life
to a particular child, whether or not the child is raised by others”
(Held 2006, 40). While this is in some sense vacuously true—a person who gives birth to someone will always be the one to have done
so—Held means for this fact to produce an ethical judgment: because
“a birth mother will never stop being the woman who gave life to
a particular child” the embodied connection between a birth mother
and “a particular child,” is especially ethically signiﬁcant. Implicitly,
Noddings seems to suggest that the adoptive parents’ relationship
with their child is more mutable, even though the same logic might
easily apply to the acts of parental care that the adoptive parent carries out: the person who raised the child will always remain that
person in much the same way as the person physically gave birth to
a child always will be. What is truly distinctive about the relationship
between birth mother and the child, then, is its immutability, but its
grounding in biology. Noddings grounds her ethical claim not in
actual acts of care that a parent performs, but in the biology that she
takes to be representative of it. In the end, though, lived experiences
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of care have receded into the background here. This is not an ethics
of care so much as an ethics of heritability.

The Theological Background of Care Ethics’ Rejection of Abstraction
Noddings’s afﬁrmation of embodied particularity makes frequent use
of religious terminology, images, and concepts, and draws signiﬁcantly
on anti-Jewish tropes. Her reliance on this conceptual vocabulary
helps us recognize some of the dangers in the kinds of critiques of
abstraction we see in both her work and Held’s. At several points in
the book, Noddings returns to the biblical story of the binding of
Isaac in Genesis 22, using it to contrast what she calls the ethical
approach of the “father” (Abraham) and “the mother.” She writes
that while Abraham is willing to sacriﬁce his son at God’s command,
“for the mother, for us, this is horrendous. Our relation to our children is not governed ﬁrst by the ethical but by natural caring. We
love not because we are required to love but because our natural
relatedness gives natural birth to love” (Noddings 2013, 61). For
Noddings, recognizing the ethical signiﬁcance of this “natural relatedness” produces a theological conclusion. She writes,
Abraham’s obedience ﬂed for protection under the skirts of an unseeable
God. Under the gaze of an abstract and untouchable God, he would
destroy this touchable child whose real eyes were turned upon him in
trust, and love, and fear. I suspect no woman could have written either
Genesis or Fear and Trembling, but perhaps I should speak for myself on
that. The one-caring, male or female, does not seek security in abstractions cast either as principles or entities (Noddings 2013, 61).

There is an implicit incarnational theology in Noddings’s language
here. The paradigmatic mother’s “natural relatedness” leads her to
demand a God that is not “abstract and untouchable,” but instead
“touchable” and “particular.” Noddings also implicitly associates
the this “abstract and untouchable” God with a God who issues
“commands” or laws. An abstract God, Noddings implies, is one who
will issue abstract moral rules. In this way, Noddings suggests that
someone focused on “natural caring” must not have the kind of
abstract theological approach which she associates with Abraham,
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and, in addition, must not endorse the idea that any God, incarnational or otherwise, could issue moral rules or commands. But, as we
will see below, sources in Jewish thought challenge these links
between “natural caring” and a rejection of deontic divine commands, instead arguing for both a strong sense of obligation and
attention to embodied acts of care.
Noddings’s analysis here seems to assume that both Genesis and
Fear and Trembling view Abraham’s decision to sacriﬁce Isaac positively. However, this is far from clear—many interpreters have read
Genesis’ as an effort to reject child sacriﬁce.11 In addition, the history
of Jewish interpretation of this story has also included several efforts
to dramatize Sarah’s reaction to the episode, including one which
explains her death in the following chapter of Genesis as a direct
result of hearing that Abraham tried to sacriﬁce Isaac.12 This suggests
that having a robust divine command theology (as the rabbis do) is
nonetheless compatible with recognizing Sarah’s role in the story.
This rhetoric has a long history; these very critiques were frequently leveled against Jews and Judaism. Strikingly, Nodding’s critique of Abraham closely tracks Hegel’s critique of Abraham as articulated in his early theological writings. Hegel identiﬁes many of the
same ﬂaws in Abraham as Noddings names in the name of “woman.”
Hegel claims that, by sacriﬁcing his son, Abraham “snaps the bonds
of communal life and love,” because he is a “wholly self-subsistent,
independent man.”13 This leads Hegel to offer a broad critique of
Judaism in general. In “The Moral Teachings of Jesus,” Hegel claims
that Judaism forces its adherents to prioritize the universal over the
particular in a way that is deeply damaging: “For the particular—
impulses, inclinations, pathological love, sensuous experience, or
11
For a discussion of this see Levenson 1993. There is also signiﬁcant debate in
Kierkegaard’s reception about whether the “theological suspension of the ethical” is
lifted up as a laudable ethical approach, or whether it represents only a temporary
stage in a larger dialectic. For more on the relationship between the Kierkegaardian
reading of the story and modern Jewish thought see Koller 2020.
12
See Pikei d’Rabbi Eliezer 32.
13
Ibid., 185.
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whatever else it is called—the universal is necessarily and always
something alien and objective” (Hegel 1975, 211–12). Noddings, too
argues that the “universal,” whether a purportedly “universal” God or
a supposedly “universal” moral rule represents an unwelcome intrusion into “natural” and particular relationships of care.
Hegel then argues that Christianity offers an alternative to the
isolation of Judaism’s forefather. For Hegel, Jesus provides us with an
example of an ethics which prioritizes ethical connections between
people, especially family members: “Against such commands Jesus set
virtue, i.e., a loving disposition, which makes the content of the command superﬂuous and destroys its form as a command because that
form implies an opposition between a commander and something
resisting the command” (Hegel 1975, 211–12). For Hegel, this Christian ethical approach allows us feel a kind of joy that Judaism’s
emphasis on “commands” which required “a bare service of the Lord,
a direct slavery, an obedience without joy, without pleasure or love”
makes impossible (Hegel 1975, 206). The ethical “voice” of Nodding’s
“woman” is not as distinctive as she claims: against the backdrop
of Hegel’s claims, we can see that the ethical “voice” of Noddings’s
“woman” bears a striking similarity to that of a nineteenth-century
man.
This theological context also allows us to reread Noddings’s claim
that no woman could have devised an “abstract” God who could not
be touched, but who issues moral commands. This claim has a somewhat shocking conclusion: Noddings is claiming that a woman cannot
be a Jew, because the Jewish God is, at least on this account, not ever
going to be made ﬂesh in the way that the Christian God is.14
14
This is not to say that Jewish feminists have not critiqued Jewish conceptions
of God as rooted in patriarchy; but, they have not tended to identify God’s abstraction
as a mark of patriarchy’s inﬂuence. In fact, in one of the most inﬂuential works of
Jewish feminist theology, Judith Plaskow’s Standing Again at Sinai, God’s abstraction
is not mentioned at all. Despite this, however, some critics, including Cynthia Ozick,
did argue that Plaskow’s feminist theology amounted a to a return to the idolatrous
forms of religiosity that Judaism had long rejected, and that such a conception of
God “slanders and sullies monotheism” with its anthropomorphism. Thinkers like
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Noddings also contrasts the abstract commands of an abstract God
to a more natural form of “faith” which she thinks ought to structure
moral relationships. She writes that care ethics “does not attempt to
reduce the need for human judgment with a series of ‘Thou shalts’
and ‘Thou shalt nots.’ Rather, it recognizes and calls forth human
judgment across a wide range of fact and feeling, and it allows for
situations and conditions in which judgement (in the impersonal,
logical sense) may properly be put aside in favor of faith and commitment” (Noddings 2013, 45). This too draws on an anti-Jewish trope,
in which an overemphasis on divine command (and on general rulefollowing) is taken to be a sign of a lack of “faith.”15
We can see this more clearly when Noddings turns directly to
discussing care ethics’ implications for religious practice. Noddings’s
explicit treatment of religion is grounded in her general claim that
institutions cannot be ethical—at least not in the sense described in
the ethics of care—because institutions rely on rules to structure the
relationships within them. Noddings claims that “frequent insistence
on obedience to rules and adherence to ritual contributes to the erosion of genuine caring” (Noddings 2013, 13). More forcefully, she
asks her reader to contemplate whether women ought to seek entrance
to previously male-dominated institutions, using religious institutions
as one of her key examples. She writes:
Similar decisions will have to be made as we consider penetrating other
male institutions. Should we, for example, demand the right to don ceremonial robes and scatter ritual blessings on our peers, or should we
gently and ﬁrmly insist that our brothers yield to the real and special
blessings of human tenderness and caring? Should we maintain—by
joining in full measure—institutions that separate the saved from the
pagan, the believer from the infidel, the circumcised from the
uncircumcised, man from woman, as though the ﬁrst set were privileged
of God and the second scorned? (Noddings 2013, 132).

Ozick (and many other Jewish women) belie the notion that women cannot be
strong advocates for an abstract conception of God. See Ozick 1983; Plaskow 1991.
15
This tradition has a long history, rooted in Paul’s letters. See for example
Galatians 3:10.
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Though it is not clear that she intends to refer to Jews (rather than
Catholics, or perhaps even all forms of organized religion), Noddings
echoes many classic dichotomies used in anti-Jewish rhetoric. First,
she opposes “ritual blessings” and “ceremonial robes” with “human
tenderness and caring,” making it seem that we have to choose
between the two, or that “ritual blessings” cannot, themselves be an
act of care.
The assumed opposition between “ceremony” and “ritual” and ethics also has a long history, and, crucially for our purposes, it has played
a signiﬁcant role in the history of ethical theory, especially in the
German philosophical tradition. In Religion within the Boundaries of
Mere Reason, Kant opposes a “statutory religion” and “moral religion,”
arguing that “Christianity has the great advantage over Judaism of
being represented as coming from the mouth of the ﬁrst teacher not
as a statutory but as a moral religion” (Kant 1998, 6:167). Just as
Noddings argues that institutions cannot be ethical because of their
reliance on rules, Kant claims Judaism’s reliance on rules undermines
its claim to being a “moral religion.” In addition, by invoking the
distinction between the “circumcised” and the “uncircumcised,”
Noddings also invokes a long history of anti-Jewish rhetoric which
accused Jews of prioritizing the ethical needs of members of their own
group over and against those of others.16 Noddings levels this critique
at all religions, including Christianity. At the same time, though, her
reasoning does this by arguing that her reader should work hard to
avoid becoming someone who is too focused on “ceremony,” “ritual”
and “circumcision”; she is asking her readers to avoid becoming too
Jewish. Understanding this theological background allows us to reread
the emphasis on “embodied,” “natural” caring relationships in both
Noddings and Held. The apparent choice between an “embodied”
and “abstract” ethics has a long history, rooted in the apparent choice
between an “embodied” and “abstract” religion.

16

Debates about this played a central role in debates about whether to grant Jews
citizenship. See for example Kirwan 1956.
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This theologically-laden dichotomy also inﬂuences the way that
Noddings construes the paradigmatic relationship of “natural care,”
the relationship between a woman and her newborn biological child.
Noddings imagines that the paradigmatic interaction between mother
and child sparks theological reﬂection. Noddings begins by noting
that “For many women, motherhood is the single greatest source of
strength for the maintenance of the ethical idea. The young woman
who has just given birth to a child may, if she has a religious faith,
turn in wonder and gratitude toward the God she thanks for the safe
delivery of her child. But she may equally well lie awake all night
thinking on this strange God” (Noddings 2013, 143). In what she
takes to be a paradigmatic moment of care, Noddings imagines that
the woman becomes preoccupied by questions of divine embodiment,
imagining that the mother would ask herself: “What then, of God or
gods? Why, she wonder would an all-knowing and all-good God create a world in which his creatures must eat each other to survive?
Why, oh, why, would he withhold his physical presence from them?
Why would he demand that they—much the needier and weaker—
love Him?” (Noddings 2013, 143). We can identify two rhetorical
peaks in this imagined reverie, each making a signiﬁcant theological
claim. The ﬁrst, marked by a “why, oh, why,” is a question about why
God would “withhold” God’s physical presence or incarnation; this
reprises Noddings’s earlier concern that the ethics of care could not
endorse an “abstract” or “disembodied” God. Second, Noddings
rehearses a question about divine command which has preoccupied
her throughout: earlier in the book, Noddings argues that the ethics
of care is not a form of “agapism” because, in the ethics of care,
“There is no command to love nor, indeed, any God to make the
commandment” (Noddings 2013, 48).17 In order to understand its
theological history, we need to further spell out why Noddings ﬁnds
17

It is not obvious that all forms of “agapism” place this much emphasis on the
divine command to love, as opposed to the love demonstrated by God and Christ,
or other sources of love. In fact, the philosopher C.S Pierce describes a form of
“agapism” in which the “law of love” functions similarly to a natural law, rather than
a divine decree.

THE PAIN OF IMAGINING OTHERS

65

the idea of a God who demands our love so troubling. In this passage,
she suggests that there is something strange about demanding
that a being that is much weaker and more vulnerable love God,
but a similar dynamic plays out in many of the caring relationships
that she describes. The cared-for person is, at least in some relevant
respect, more vulnerable than the person caring for them, yet it is
ethically signiﬁcant for the weaker party to love the person caring for
them. In fact, she argues, this kind of “responsiveness” is required
for a relationship to really qualify as a relationship of care (Noddings
2013, 94).18
Noddings’s rejection of a God who demands or commands love is
also rooted in her claim that care that is offered in response to a rule
or a sense of obligation is not genuine care, because it cannot be
a product of the kind of spontaneous love or joy that she takes to be
the hallmark of genuine, natural care.19 Kant too, rejects the possibility that “love” can be commanded, for much the same reason as
Noddings. Kant makes two claims about the moral status of love: ﬁrst,
he argues that because love is an emotion rather than an actionguiding maxim, it cannot be the subject of a moral duty (Kant 1996,
6:401). Second, Kant argues that love helps the actor develop the
kinds of inclination that will allow her to think and act morally; in
this way, love is a necessary precondition for moral action, even if it
18
Noddings writes “Our logic may be summarized. A caring relation requires the
engrossment and motivational displacement of the one-caring, and it requires the
recognition and spontaneous response of the cared-for. When caring is not felt in
the cared-for, but its absence is felt, the cared-for may still, by an act of ethical heroism, respond and thus contribute to the caring relation. This possibility, as we shall
see, gives weight to our hope that one can learn to care and learn to be cared for.”
19
In addition to the problems described here, this deﬁnition ends up excluding
the care performed by paid caregivers as a form of genuine care. This threatens to
devalue the very work, often done by women of color, that care ethics claims
to center. This is another way in which the rejection of rule-based, institutionally
structured care, which, as I show here, is rooted in part in care ethicist’s rejection of
abstraction, undermines the aims of care ethics’ feminist project. Notably, Mara
Benjamin is able to give a robust account of this kind of care, perhaps because she
does not place the same emphasis on “natural” care and the rejection of rules and
institutions.
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itself is not the subject of a formal moral duty (Kant 1996, 6:402).
Recognizing these problems, Kant reinterprets the command to “love
your neighbor as yourself” so that it “does not mean that you ought
immediately (ﬁrst) to love him and (afterwards) by means of this love
do good to him. It means, rather do good to your fellow human
beings, and your beneﬁcence will produce love of them in you (as an
attitude of the inclination to (beneﬁcence in general)” (Kant 1996,
6:402). Here, Kant understands love in a similar way to Noddings—
for both thinkers, love is best understood as something cultivated
through doing good actions—caring—for others. However, Kant
understands this as a version of the “saying” or “command,” and even
an expression of acting in accordance with one’s duty. In contrast,
Noddings rejects this deontological language entirely. Noddings
seems to ignore the approach that Kant considers here—in which
duty and care (and the love that care can produce) are intricately
related.
In the following section, though, I will argue that Jewish care ethicists have pursued this possibility, even as they offer trenchant critiques of abstraction in Jewish thought. This suggests that we may be
able to separate the philosophical anthropological version of the critique of abstraction from the version which rejects deontology as
overly abstract. As we will see in the following section, recent work
in Jewish care ethics rejects abstract philosophical anthropologies,
while retaining a strong emphasis on obligation and on ritual practices structured by rules.

Jewish Critiques of Abstraction
In recent years, there have been signiﬁcant efforts to use care ethics
as a tool for Jewish thought and theology, including one other chapter in this volume. However, these efforts have only rarely taken
notice of care ethicists’ use of use of anti-Jewish language and of
incarnational theology, if at all. Nonetheless, I will show here that
Jewish versions of care ethics take on a distinctive shape and adopt
distinctive versions of care ethics’ critique of abstraction; these differences may be explained, at least in part, by the implicit inﬂuence
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of this theological background. I wish to highlight two such differences here; the ﬁrst is readily apparent in Mara Benjamin’s recent
inﬂuential book The Obligated Self: Maternal Subjectivity and Jewish
Thought; the second is partially argued by Benjamin, and I will expand
it here. First, Jewish articulations of care ethics tend to be less hostile
to notions of moral obligation and moral rules—while, as we saw
above, contemporary care ethicists tend to view these deontic rules
as problematically “abstract” or “universal,” Jewish versions of care
ethics tend to take halakhic rules as their model, and view moral
rules as essentially particularized. Second, these versions of care ethics focus less on the notion of a “natural,” or “genetic” connection
between people as the mark of “particularity.”
The ﬁrst difference should not surprise us—as Benjamin notes in
the opening line of her book, “To be a Jew, according to the classical
textual tradition, is to be obligated” (Benjamin 2018, 3). Given Judaism’s heavy emphasis on deontological concepts like h. iyuv (obligation) and mitzvah (commandment), it makes sense then, that Jewish
care ethicists have been less willing to jettison deontological moral
concepts like obligations and rules. The second, though, might seem
ironic—Jewish culture and religion retains a signiﬁcant emphasis
on the importance of concepts of Jewish peoplehood, which is often
conceived as a kind of “family group,” which often places signiﬁcant
emphasis on endogamy, and whose central marker of communal
belonging is a physical, embodied ritual. While some modern Jewish
thinkers sought to distance themselves from this genetic notion of
“peoplehood,” others embraced it. The Weimar Jewish thinker Franz
Rosenzweig famously describes Judaism as a “blood-community”
(Rosenzweig 1971, 299). In this sense, the version of embodied, natural connection, that Noddings and Held prioritize could be seen to
help make sense of a stream of Jewish religious thought which often
makes Jewish ethicists and theologians nervous, perhaps even articulating it in a feminist key. However, Jewish care ethicists have by and
large not pursued this opportunity.
Part of this reluctane may be explained by contingent features of
the experiences of some Jewish care ethicists. Benjamin’s book
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recounts two distinct experiences of “maternal subjectivity,” one with
her biological daughter, and one with her partner’s biological daughter, whom she had to legally adopt because of the legal restrictions
on queer families at the time. Thus, Benjamin’s own personal experience may prime her to reject Nodding’s and Held’s emphasis on
“natural” relationships of care. Comparing her two experiences of
entering parenthood leads Benjamin to remark that “the difference
between becoming a mother through legal-bureaucratic means and
becoming a mother by virtue of giving birth raised, for me, an unexpected question: why didn’t I have to take on the responsibility of
being a mother to my biological daughter voluntarily, publicly, of my
own accord, as I had with my nonbiological daughter?” (Benjamin
2018, xix). Like Held and Noddings, Benjamin considers the relationship between embodied relationships of care and those that begin
as the result of a voluntary act of assent—Noddings argues that her
“natural” form of care only becomes “sacred” when the mother voluntarily assents to it and “makes it sacred.” However, this similarity
masks a more signiﬁcant difference: given their strong emphasis on
“natural care,” though, the need for a kind of “assent” or agreement
to get the relationship off the ground can feel like a retrojection,
something added to the theory in order to arrive at the pro-choice
conclusion that best ﬁts with the progressive politics Held and
Noddings otherwise tend to endorse. For them, “natural care” is the
default, and we have to do substantial analytic work in order to see
how some form of agency or assent might still be ethically dispositive.
Benjamin’s question reverses this assumption, by asking why there is
not some formalized form of assent that is built into the structure of
all caring relationships, even ones that seem entirely “natural.”
By asking this question, Benjamin implicitly asks whether “natural
care” might not be primary at all; it is just one of the ways in which
a person can become an “obligated self” who is engaged in a relationship of parental care.20
20

Benjamin generally uses the term “maternal” to avoid “whitewashing a reality
that still bears a strongly gendered aspect” because “even though men increasingly
serve as primary caregivers for their children, for many or perhaps most people,
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Benjamin arrives at this conclusion through a comparison with
different ways that Jews enter the Jewish community. She writes:
for born Jews, the covenant to which they are part precedes any single
individual’s life span or voluntary assent; Jews start out in some sense
‘always already obligated’ to the covenant… By contrast, converts to
Judaism undergo a formal process, including examination, assent, and
ritual action; but once they enter into the covenant, their membership
can be abrogated no more than the born Jew. In both cases—becoming
part of the Jewish people and becoming a mother—two distinct models
are available: entrance into the relationship is accomplished either biologically, without need (or even possibility) of assent, or as an act of
intention, with the accompanying demonstration through ritual act
(Benjamin 2018, xiv).

While Benjamin identiﬁes two models here, we can add others. For
those born with foreskins, the process of entering the Jewish people
looks different from the process for those born without them; despite
recent efforts to come up with more egalitarian ways to celebrate the
birth of babies assigned female at birth, signiﬁcant differences remain,
making the paths to entering the covenant, and to marking this process through ritual, even more diverse than the two options Benjamin
discusses here.
There is a similar diversity in the ways that people enter the obligations of parenthood—someone conceiving a pregnancy with an egg
donor might go through a version of both processes that Benjamin
describes here: they will sign paperwork accepting the relevant cells,
and consenting to the medical procedures necessary to implant them.
And, if the process is successful, they will also physically give birth
to the baby. There are many other forms of parenthood, and they too,
deserve to be recognized as sites of care ethical knowledge. In order
to do this, though, we will have to take on board the key assumption
behind Benjamin’s question and recognize that the kind of “natural
care” epitomized by the moment a biological mother ﬁrst holds her
baby, and taken as primary by both Noddings and Held, is not the
child-rearing remains differentiated along gendered lines, and caring for children is
coded female” (Benjamin 2018, xvii).
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only way that relationships of care, even relationships of parental
care, come into being.
To do this, we will need to reject some of Noddings and Held’s
other key assumptions. The diverse models of parenthood that Benjamin afﬁrms here, as well as the other forms that she does not name
speciﬁcally, are made possible by forms of “institution,” “rules,” “law,”
and “ritual,” that Noddings’s and Held’s analysis tends to reject as
antithetical to caring. Benjamin is only able to adopt her daughter
through a (highly imperfect) legal system which allows for parenthood to be entered into through contract; its attendant rituals allow
Benjamin, her partner, and her child to mark the relevant transition.
In Benjamin’s case, it would be better to replace the need for adoption by a same-sex partner with a fuller legal recognition of those
partnerships, but even if this were the case, parenthood through these
means would still be enacted through some combination of institutions, laws, and rituals. This fact does not undermine the more general point that adoption can be a meaningful form of parenthood,
which is entered into through a ritualized legal process, rather than
biologically; adoption, then, can produce relationships of care from
which care ethicists ought to learn. In all of these cases, ritual, intuition, rules, and law, play a role that could not be replaced by
a merely “natural” process of ﬁliation, but these forces did not undermine the particular relationship of care between parents and
children.
As we saw above, one of the main intuitions driving classical care
ethics’ worries about institutions, rules, and law is that these social
practices privilege the universal and the abstract over the particular.
However, Benjamin is able to ﬁnd strong, particularized forms of care
even in relationships that are marked by these forces. As Benjamin
notes, both of her children, and not just her biological one, placed
her under some form of “obligation,” which was highly particularized.
She writes:
To be an obligated self was to be subject to the law of an other: the law
of the Baby. The law could not be fulﬁlled in abstract, but only in active,
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embodied, material actions: soothing, feeding, cleaning, comforting, distracting, smiling, and wiping. It became the law of the crying toddler who
sought out not just any, but speciﬁcally our (or my), comfort; the law of
her seeking out our, or my face for approval or interest. The Law of the
Baby was not the Law of Any Baby but rather the Law of This Baby. This
Baby had to be woken up throughout the night to eat because she was
born small. This Baby responded with great interest to one particular
plush toy. This Baby’s imperative was to hold her at a certain angle so
she would fall asleep for a nap. The next day, the next week, This Baby
no longer responded to that position or that toy (Benjamin 2018, 8).

In this way, Benjamin is able to retain the sense that there is something about “This Baby,” which stakes a claim on me, without saying
that these relationships of particularized care are based on the “Law
of My Baby” where the sense of mine-ness is dependent on a “natural” relationship between the biological mother and the child.
Far from rejecting the notion of rules or laws as incompatible with
the particular needs of an individual child, Benjamin ﬁnds law to be
a useful metaphor for describing these demands.
Benjamin’s emphasis on the particularized experience of caring for
“This Baby” leads her to retain many of the same assumptions about
the problems with “abstract” moral reasoning. She critiques many of
the canonical ﬁgures in modern Jewish thought as relying too heavily
on a version of an abstract “other” with “no speciﬁc social location
or set of needs,” arguing that this led them to privilege a purportedly
universal “dyadic” relationship between the ethical actor and a faceless “Other” (Benjamin 2018, 13). Instead, she argues that we should
adopt a more particularistic approach:
By nature, a parent’s obligation is to a particular child or set of children,
each of whom has speciﬁc needs and desires. Some children’s needs and
desires are common to all children: the need to be fed, clothed, carried,
and comforted. These needs place a set of demands on all caregivers,
parent or otherwise. But children vary enormously in temperament, ability, and interests. A parent’s experience of obligation toward his or her
child thus cannot be conceived only in terms of a universal set of
demands that can be formulated only in abstract terms. In the maternal
context, obligation already contains within it the particularities of one’s
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child and the speciﬁc circumstances in which both parent and child live
(Benjamin 2018, 14).

Implicit in Benjamin’s argument though, is a critique of, or at least
a departure from, those care ethicists who reject language of obligation (Held does this strongly, Noddings rejects “principles,” but
retains language of “obligation”).21 For Benjamin, there is some way
in which the general notion of “obligation” is already somehow particularized in the context of a relationship of parental care.22
In what follows, I want to think this notion through more carefully, in order to suggest that the best way to do so is to rethink care
ethics’ relationship to abstractions. In many ways, what Benjamin is
describing here is an abstract notion of “obligation,” which gives
a basic structure for a relationship between a person and an action;
but, in the context of parental care, this abstract notion already contains within it certain kinds of particularized content (i.e. addressing
the speciﬁc needs of this child in front of me). Recognizing the relationship between the “Law of This Baby” and the general structure
of “obligation” more generally is what allows Benjamin to identify
disparate (and perhaps even seemingly opposite) actions as examples
of “an obligated self” responding to “The Law of the Baby.” An “obligated self” might sing boisterously with one child and then sit quietly
holding another, but both of these would be acts of parental care
carried out by obligated selves acting under the Law of This or That
Baby. Employing the abstract notion of obligation makes this kind of
identiﬁcation possible. Abstraction, then, is not the enemy here, it is
the tool by which we can name the relation we want to describe,
even if what it looks like to live that might look different, and be
marked out by different institutional structures, rituals, and rules, in
21
This may be because Held seeks to put care ethics in more direct dialogue with
contemporary debates in ethical theory. In order to argue that care ethics makes
a distinct contribution to ethical theory, she needs to distinguish it from all forms of
deontology.
22
We might wonder whether all obligations function this way: at some point
fulﬁlling an obligation requires some very speciﬁc, embodied action, which implicates
speciﬁc embodied others.
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each case. In order to see this, I present another example of how
abstraction can enter into care ethical relationships and thinking,
this time drawn from my own experience.

Caring for An Abstract Other
At the age of 27, I was diagnosed with “premature ovarian insufﬁciency,” meaning that I had very low ovarian reserve for someone my
age. The exact cause of my condition is still unknown, though it may
have been the result of a complicated appendectomy I underwent
three years earlier. At that time, when I presented in ER in Jerusalem
with lower abdominal pain, it was assumed that I had an ovarian cyst,
and I spent two and a half days on what was essentially a maternity
ward before it was ﬁnally decided to give up on the plan for me to
“wait out” the cyst and instead to perform a CT scan of my abdomen,
revealing an appendix that was multiple times the normal size. If the
ensuing infection really is responsible, my reproductive health issues
are a perverse result of the well-documented tendency to assume that
women’s pain is less severe and is more often than not caused by
gynecological issues.23 I did not have a gynecological issue to start
with, but I do now.
When I received the diagnosis, I was in graduate school, and
nowhere near ready to begin considering having children. The kinds
of “dependency work” that care ethicists tend to highlight (caring for
young children, the disabled, and the elderly) played only an incidental role in my life. My parents had had bouts of illness, but at the
time, they were living well and healthily thousands of miles away.
Later on though, I began to understand that there were other forms
of signiﬁcant dependency work that were key parts of my life, even in
the parts of my 20s that were characterized by a growing sense of
independence, and the exploration that comes with it. As I argue
here, one of the signiﬁcant problems facing care ethics is the relatively narrow range of caring relationships it tends to highlight; part
of this problem arises from the fact that it (and the general American
23

For a review of the literature on this see Samulowitz et al. 2018.
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culture milieu out of which it grows) tends to associate some life
stages with either “caring” or “being cared for,” in ways that obscure
the care that can occur in other life stages or between two people in
the same life stage. Anecdotally, it seems to me that many young
adults, especially the large number who live far away from family,
have substantial relationships of care with one another.
Within a few weeks of the initial diagnosis, I began treatment to
freeze my eggs. This process is arduous under normal circumstances—
it requires multiple daily injections, almost daily ultrasound and
bloodwork to monitor progress, and a quasi-surgical procedure at the
end to “retrieve” the egg for freezing. In my case, this process was
even more drawn out than usual—my body responded to the drugs
only sluggishly, and a process that usually takes around 7 days took
me over 14.
Up to this point, my scholarly work had tended to focus on “dead
white men,” often of the powdered-wig eighteenth-century persuasion. As an undergraduate, Kant’s theory of a universally shared
human dignity drew me in to the study of philosophy. As I began to
more directly contemplate and physically encounter the realities of
my body’s capacity to produce a particular other, for whom I hoped,
at some point in the future, to care, I began to turn to the care ethicists, hoping that they would provide me with some tools to think
through my experience.
On the one hand, there was a sense in which I began to identify
with these theorists more than I could have done before. My day
was now structured around the physical demands of this little cell,
which was encapsulated in a little follicle, whose measurements we
followed each morning via ultrasound. That little cell needed
one carefully timed injection in the morning and another at night.
When its follicle grew bigger, it needed yet another to keep it in
place until the doctor’s tools were ready to retrieve it. I had to bend
the rhythms of my life in order to sync up with the demands of this
microscopic entity, and, more importantly, with the possibilities for
future care that that entity represented to me. In that exhausting,
destabilizing time, I found some comfort in the idea that care could
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be a source of ethical knowledge and reﬂection. The process was
taking me away from my philosophical work, but the care ethicists
suggested that there was something I could learn through this process, too.
However, the form of care I engaged in in those months differed
in key respects from the kinds of care that care ethicists like Noddings
and Held describe—as I show above, their account of care is focused
on a kind of particularity that they think is only actualized in relationships between two fully particularized human beings. And, as
I show above, their accounts used the ﬁrst moment that an (assumedly
biological) mother holds her child in her arms was often the central
example used to advance their arguments.
On the one hand, this emphasis made total sense—I was, after all,
injecting myself multiple times a day in order to preserve the possibility (and, to be honest, the numbers were not in my favor) of having
that kind of moment, of being able to have a child that was “mine”
in that sense. The care ethicist’s emphasis on this moment, and even
on the need to have a “particular” relationship with a “particular”
other, exempliﬁed by the relationship between a biological mother
and her biological child, seemed to erase the kind of care in which
I was already engaged. I was already caring for this pesky little cell
and the growing follicle that encapsulated it. That cell is obviously
different from a particular child; the Law of the Cell was different
than the Law of Any Given Baby. The Law of the Baby is built on
a responsiveness to a particular other, but the Law of the Cell lacked
the speciﬁcity, the particular features that meant that it would need
a give plush toy, to be held at a particular angle.
The cell was, in some sense, not even really there—it was only
a biological potential that had to be coaxed into enough “maturity”
for it to survive its stay in the freezer. Its signiﬁcance was less as
a clump of biological material (though it surely is that, and I dutifully
pay $600 each year for its safe storage), than as an imagined person,
someone who made a kind of ethical demand of me, but who was not
yet a full-ﬂedged, embodied person with particular features. In this
way, the other I cared for was closer to the Levinasian abstract other
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that Benjamin rejects than the particular one she ﬁnds in the care
ethicists and uses to critique canonical ﬁgures in the modern Jewish
thought tradition. This other demanded my care in speciﬁc, embodied ways, but it remained abstract.
Benjamin begins her book by comparing the embodied form of
obligation characteristically undertaken by Jewish men, through the
mitzvah of wearing teffilin, and the ways that pregnancy physically
marks women’s bodies. “As with teffilin,” Benjamin writes, “this
boundedness is marked on the body: carved on muscles taut from the
weight of carrying children; etched on the face in lines of sleeplessness, worry, and delight; engraved in the visceral response to the cry
and needs of one’s child” (Benjamin 2018, xiv). Benjamin’s comparison highlights the ways that both of these experiences—of physically
binding oneself to the God of Israel by wrapping a leather strap
around the arm, of physically becoming bound to a child by hours of
carrying, worrying, and delight—inscribe one’s obligations on the
body of the obligated person. The egg-freezing also made a similar set
of physicalized inscriptions: a rotating set of injection sites around my
abdomen, some with bruises from less-than perfect self-administered
injections, a perpetual bruising in the creases of both arms from daily
blood draws. And, like lines of sleeplessness, worry, and delight that
Benjamin describes, the sense of expectation, hope, disappointment,
fear, and frustration also have left their marks on me, whether or not
representative lines are “engraved” on my face for all to see.24 These
inscriptions were made by the experience of caring for a being who
remained in some sense abstract; they were marks of my response to
the Law of the Cell.
As we saw above, Noddings and Held argue that adopting an
abstract philosophical anthropology, or an emphasis on moral obligation automatically undermines relationships of care. By describing
24

There is substantial discussion of the “stigma” of infertility and of its “invisibility.” Some of this is indeed due to implicit social norms which makes discussing these
issues difﬁcult, but it may also be that the kinds of “inscriptions” that infertility (and,
often, though not always pregnancy loss) leaves behind are ones that are not as
outwardly visible. But they are there.
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the Law of the Baby, Benjamin responds to this by recovering a form
of particularity in obligation. My experience suggests that we can
disentangle these elements further. This abstract other commanded
me to care for it in speciﬁc, embodied ways; my response to the Law
of the Cell made demands were nonetheless inscribed, felt, and
enacted on and through my particular body. Abstract others can
and do make moral demands on us, and these demands can be
responded to through speciﬁc physical actions.
My care for this abstract other may or may not directly result in
an opportunity to engage in more traditional care work, in which I,
like the mothers that Noddings and Held describe, hold my child to
my breast and contemplate the essentially embodied nature of
the connection between us. As many doctors told me throughout the
egg-freezing process, “the only way to ﬁnd out is to try.” As I entered
the second, third, and fourth rounds of this process, though, I began
to understand that this “result” was, in some sense, not the central
part of my experience, nor the source of its ethical signiﬁcance. If, as
seems likely at the moment, I have at least one child through an egg
donor, that child will be mine only in some more complicated sense
of the term. The musings that Noddings uses to describe the kind of
cognitive acceptable of the relationality between mothers and child—
“Will the child have my eyes? My love of philosophy? Or her father’s
penchant for numbers?”—will not be quite coherent, because, if the
child has “my eyes,” it will be a ﬂuke (or more likely, a product of
the fact that my partner and I share Ashkenazi Jewish ancestry and
some associated physical features). Our sense of “relationality” will be
differently constructed and will be facilitated as much by “institutions” (medical clinics, cell-banks, legal consent forms), as it will be
by “natural care.” This need not mean, however, that it is not a form
of “care work” which shapes my subjectivity, and, with God’s help,
the subjectivity of my as-yet-abstract, hoped-for child.
This kind of care for abstract others is not unique to experience of
infertility. Though I cannot speak from my own experience, it seems
possible that women experiencing pregnancy loss may also have some
sense of having “cared for” the lost pregnancy in ways that shape
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their own subjectivity and that produce meaningful ethical insights.
At a minimum, these experiences should push us to remember that
the moment of ﬁrst encounter between biological mother and child
that Noddings and Held prioritize is not only a site of the kind of
“joy” that Noddings takes to be a marker of care but also sometimes
the site of tremendous pain and sorrow. These kinds of narratives
rarely appear in care ethical theorizing, and we need to ﬁnd ways to
bring them into care ethical discourse.
Taken together, these experiences suggest that Noddings and
Held’s decision to make a physical, embodied, and even genetic connection to a child (or other dependent other) the paradigmatic example of care work ends up obscuring how important experiences of care
work. While Held and Noddings take “particularity” (which, as we
saw above, is typiﬁed by a physical, biological, connection) as the
marker of care relationships, this need not be the case. In turn, this
suggests that we need to reevaluate this notion of particularity, as well
as the rejection of “abstraction” of which it is both a part and a result.
In doing this, we should also interrogate the assumed connection
between “universality” and “abstraction.” Feminist philosophers often
reject the kind of “universal” ethical reason that they ﬁnd typiﬁed in
both Kant and in classical Utilitarianism. Used this way, “universal”
seems to mean “applying in the same way to everyone”—the potential problem with this kind of “universal” claim is that it assumes the
kind of equality it seeks to create; it assumes that everyone will be
best served by the same kind of ethical norm or outcome. However,
this critique of universality often comes hand in hand with the critique of abstraction, and the two terms are often assumed to be almost
synonymous. Held writes that care ethics seeks to correct “abstract
and universal claims of more familiar moral theories” (Held 2006,
10), and “calls into question the universalistic and abstract rules of
the dominant theories” (Held 2006, 11), noting that both Kantian
and utilitarian ethical theories “rely on simple, abstract, universal
rules” (Held 2006, 63). Similarly, Noddings suggests that care ethics
is a corrective to views which place too much emphasis on “universal principles,” or “universal love,” both of which she takes to be
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insufﬁciently attentive to the “particular.” My own experience of caring for abstract others, however, suggests that the universal and the
abstract are not quite the same thing, and that, by the same token,
“abstract” and “particular” are not antithetical to one another. The
other I cared for in those months of treatment was not “particular”
in the sense that Noddings and Held describe, or even in some less
“genetically” oriented version in which is marked only by a kind of
embodiment and the speciﬁc needs that it comes with, but which
does not require some “natural’ connection to a biological parent, but
I cared for it through a speciﬁc set of embodied actions. At the same
time though, it did not have the kinds of particular features that
Benjamin highlights in her analysis; it remains imagined, conceptualized with these speciﬁc features left blank or quite fuzzy around the
edges. It is an abstract other with particular needs; making it in some
sense “abstract,” but not “universal”.25
Some philosophers have argued that this “fuzziness” is characteristic
of “transformative experiences,” which have a unique epistemic structure, including and especially childbearing In her path-breaking article “What You Can’t Expect When You’re Expecting,” the epistemologist L.A. Paul argues that the experience of having a child
fundamentally changes one’s epistemology, and thereby, one’s evaluation of the experience itself; this makes it impossible to objectively
evaluate the experience in advance (Paul 2015). (She too focuses on
the experience of having biological children.) As someone experiencing infertility, I ﬁnd myself stuck (at least for the moment, though
hopefully not in perpetuity) on one side of the epistemic barrier that
Paul describes. I can, as Paul notes, only imagine what lies on the
other side of the barrier—this process of imagination requires a form
of abstraction. Not only do I have to imagine what it would be like
to go through the experience of bringing the other I am currently
25
The idea that rules can contain both generalized notions and particularities
has a long history in Jewish thought. Maimonides distinguishes between these two
levels of analysis for halakhic rules in Maimonides 1974, III 26.
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imagining into an independently embodied form of particularity,
which may or may not be marked by a genetic connection between
the two of us, I also have to imagine a version of myself who does not
yet exist in an embodied sense—I have to imagine what I will be like
once have I have had the transformative experience that Paul
describes. Here, however, I want to suggest that, for some people, the
experience of performing this kind of abstract thinking, and engaging
in the forms of embodied care which this abstract other can demand,
is itself a signiﬁcant experience of care, to which care ethicists ought
to devote their attention. This experience of living with and caring
for abstractions is a kind of transformative experience of the kind
that Paul describes. My relationship to childbearing, and to what it
means to do “care work,” has changed signiﬁcantly after each round
of treatment, whether “successful” or otherwise.
My arguments thus far suggests that we need to reevaluate the
rejection of abstraction and abstract thought that has been pervasive
in care ethics. Abstract thinking plays an important role in the kinds
of care work performed by parents confronting infertility and pregnancy loss—these experiences have been treated only rarely in the
care ethics literature, if at all. Thus, centering them expands
the kinds of care that care ethics can learn from and also allows
a wider range of people to be considered as “caring” subjects.
Though, as I showed above, she tends to strongly reject “abstract”
patterns of thought or conceptions of relationships, Noddings makes
a nod in this direction when she suggests that we can care for ideas.
Noddings writes that “The engrossment of caring may be directed to
objects and ideas, and to engage in this kind of caring, we need to be
free to pursue where we are led by the objects and ideas” (Noddings
2013, 174). Noddings argues that when someone has this kind of
“engrossment” with an idea, her subjectivity becomes blurred, in
a way that mirrors Buber’s I/Thou interactions (to which Noddings
refers frequently throughout). These kinds of relationships, she writes
“Involves a dual orientation towards objects that are confronted in
consciousness: I am subject, but then I am object. I relax my subjectivity. Again, we see the similarity between this sort of activity and
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caring for human beings” (Noddings 2013, 176). Here, Noddings’s
argument implies that that we can relax the requirement that care
relationships be based on a “natural” connection with an embodied
other, though she does not use this argument to temper her earlier
claims about abstraction and particularity. By the time Held writes
her restatement of care ethics, this openness to caring for “objects
and ideas” has all but disappeared. To some extent then, reclaiming
a place for abstraction in care ethical thought is actually a return to
some aspects of care ethics’ beginnings; however, such a return needs
to be accompanied by a new awareness of the role of anti-Jewish
categories and ideas, and the exclusion of some experiences of care,
in care ethics’ earlier forms.

Abstract Expectation and Care in Jewish Thought
Above, we saw how Noddings and Held rely on an assumed dichotomy between a disembodied and embodied ethics, which in turn, is
rooted in a dichotomy between a disembodied and embodied religion.
Here, I suggest that Jewish texts can provide some useful resources for
thinking beyond this dichotomy, to begin to develop an ethics which
has room for both the kinds of embodied relationships of care for
particular others that Noddings and Held highlight, while not excluding other forms of care which are based on some form of abstraction,
or which are only made possible by the kinds of intuitional, legal, and
ritual forces that Noddings and Held criticize. This is not to suggest
that Jewish thought is the only possible source of such resources, but
rather that it might be one place to ﬁnd them. I hope scholars with
other expertise will also contribute to this discussion using other
texts, ideas, and experiences.
A rabbinic text discussing amulets thought to prevent miscarriage
provides us with one useful set of images for thinking through this
form of abstract care. In general, rabbinic law prohibits carrying
objects between private and public spaces on the sabbath, though
objects that are “worn” rather than carried are permitted. Thus, the
Talmud includes a detailed discussion about what kinds of objects can
be “carried out” on Shabbat. The rabbis consider whether a woman
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may go out with a “preservation stone,” a kind of amulet thought to
prevent miscarriage:
Our Rabbis taught ‘One may go out with a preservation stone on the
sabbath, according to Rabbi Meir.’ They said ‘even with a counterweight
to the preservation stone [that has the same weight].’ And not only
someone who has previously miscarried, but also in case she does miscarry; and not only someone who is pregnant, but also in case she
becomes pregnant and miscarries. Rabbi Simlai said in the name of
Abaye, ‘This applies only in a case where one ﬁnds a stone that is already
the same weight [and not in a case where one cuts the stone to be the
same weight].’ Abaye asked, ‘And what about a counterweight of a counterweight?’ Let this dilemma stand unresolved (B. Shabbat 66b).26

Abstraction enters into this text in two distinct stages: the rabbis
begin by imagining an embodied act of care for an embodied fetus—
there is a pregnant woman who needs to prevent the loss of this
speciﬁc fetus by carrying this speciﬁc stone. Almost immediately,
though, the rabbis consider whether the stone could be replaced by
another stone, which shares some physical properties with it, but
is not in fact the preservation stone, but instead merely a stand-in,
a kind of representation. Then, they consider whether a representation of a representation of the stone might sufﬁce.
The rabbis also consider whether a woman might be allowed to
carry the preservation stone not in response to some embodied need
or reality—i.e. an already conceived fetus, or a history of past miscarriage which might necessitate additional precautions—but also a situation where the woman might carry the stone for a hoped-for, but not
yet realized, pregnancy. The rabbis permit what would otherwise be
a serious violation of biblical and rabbinic law in order to allow this
woman to care for a pregnancy which is not yet an embodied reality,
but an imagined, hoped-for presence.

26
I have offered a similar analysis of this text in my essay “Water Wears Away
Stone,” Nashim: A Journal of Jewish Women’s and Gender Studies. Fall 2020. Translations from rabbinic texts are my own; translations of biblical verses are from the
NJPS.
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This is a surprising move, given the other ways in which the rabbis
tend to restrict women’s bodies and sometimes refuse to trust women’s
own testimony about them.27 However, this kind of embodied care
for an as-yet abstract, hoped-for reality is actually quite familiar to
the rabbis. Rabbinic imagination of the future redemption of the Jewish people requires just this kind of embodied care—it requires physical, ritual actions—but the reality itself remains only imagined and
abstract; the messiah can only be imagined and expected, not yet
pointed to as an embodied reality. Some modern Jewish thinkers suggested that this kind of expectation is a permanent state; Yeshayahu
Leibowitz famously said that the Messiah is someone who “Will
come,” and that “any messiah who actually comes is a false messiah”
(Yeshayahu Leibowitz on the Coming of the Messiah n.d.). Other medieval and modern Jewish thinkers took this as an invitation to imagine
what the future redemption would look like in great detail, and even
to imagine that some embodied actions in the world meaningfully
concretize it, but they nonetheless recognize that these concretizations aim at an as-yet unrealized vision of the future. These concretizations too, are described as mitzvot, responses to a command or a
law. On this view, law demands concrete action, in the service of an
abstractly construed, and as-yet unrealized, redemptive possibility.
In both the Bible and rabbinic literature, this expectation of
redemption is described using infertility and eventual pregnancy.
Throughout the Bible, a “barren”28 woman is used as a metaphor for
the unredeemed Jewish people. To imagine Israel’s redemption, then,
the Biblical text imagines that this “barren” women has children. In
Psalms, God is described as “[setting] the childless woman among her
household as a happy mother of children” (113:9). Isaiah’s prophecy
depicts the redeemed Israel rejoicing as a woman who is newly able
to bear a child: “Shout, O barren one, You who bore no child! Shout
27

See for example debates about evidence of virginity in B. Bava Metzia 31b.
In general, I use the “person-ﬁrst” language of “[people] experiencing infertility,” but for biblical verses I retain the more traditional “barren woman” because this
matches the grammar of the Hebrew text and is more contiguous with the text’s
reception.
28
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aloud for joy, You who did not travail! For the children of the wife
forlorn Shall outnumber those of the espoused—said the LORD”
(Isaiah 54:1). The expectation of redemption, then, analogized to the
expectation of a woman trying (and often failing) to conceive—
redemption is achieved when conception again becomes possible.
The rabbis then read these texts alongside earlier Biblical narratives of women experiencing infertility, including Sarah, Leah, and
Hannah. Though these women were once described as “barren” and
“without children,” God “remembers” them and they give birth to
healthy children. The rabbis view the infertility of the Jewish people
as a whole (i.e. their lack of redemption), as the last step in this story.
‘[Setting] the childless woman among her household as a happy mother
of children’ (Psalms 113:9). There are seven childless women: Sarah,
Rebecca, Rachel, and Leah, as well as Manoach’s wife, Hannah, and
Zion. Or, another interpretation: ‘[setting] the childless woman,’ refers to
Sarah, our mother, ‘Now Sarai was barren,’ (Genesis 11:30). ‘A happy
mother of children,’ refers to ‘That Sarah would suckle children’ (Genesis
21:7). Or, another interpretation: ‘[Setting] the childless woman,’ refers
to Rebecca, ‘Isaac pleaded with the LORD on behalf of his wife, because
she was barren’ (Genesis 25:21), ‘A happy mother of children,’ refers to
‘and the LORD responded to his plea, and his wife Rebekah conceived’
(Genesis 25:21). Or, another interpretation: ‘[setting] the childless
woman,’ refers to Leah, ‘The LORD saw that Leah was unloved and he
opened her womb’ (Genesis 29:31), from here we learn that Leah was
without children. ‘A happy mother of children,’ refers to ‘for I have
borne him six sons’ (Genesis 30:20). Or, another interpretation: ‘[setting]
the childless woman,’ refers to Rachel, ‘Isaac pleaded with the LORD on
behalf of his wife, because she was barren’ (Genesis 25:21), ‘A happy
mother of children,’ refers to ‘The sons of Rachel: Joseph and Benjamin’
(Genesis 35:24). Or, another interpretation: “[setting] the childless
woman,” refers to Manoach’s Wife, ‘An angel of the LORD appeared to
the woman and said to her, “You are barren and have borne no children’”
(Judges 13:3). ‘A happy mother of children,’ refers to ‘you shall conceive
and bear a son’ (Judges 13:3). Or, another interpretation: ‘[setting] the
childless woman,’ refers to Hannah, ‘Peninah had children, but Hannah
was childless,’ (I Samuel 1:2). ‘A happy mother of children,’ refers to
‘[Hannah] conceived and bore three sons and two daughters’ (I Samuel
2:21). Or, another interpretation: ‘[setting] the childless woman,’ refers
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to Zion, as it says ‘Shout, O barren one, You who bore no child!’ (Isaiah
54:1). ‘A happy mother of children,’ refers to ‘Who bore these for me
When I was bereaved and barren’ (Isiah 49:21), (Pesikta d’Rav Kahanah
20:1).

In the rabbis’ imagination, these stories of infertility all have happy
endings; in each one, God intervenes and the women give birth; their
abstract others become particularized. In this way, the rabbis express
their hope that the redemption too will be shift and immediate. At
the same time, though the rabbis also know that this is not quite how
the stories go: Sarah’s newly born son is nearly sacriﬁced; Rebecca’s
twins grow up to hate one another; Leah remains the scorned wife,
whose only solace is in her children, but who, by naming the last
child Judah implicitly declares defeat in her search for love;29 Manoach’s wife bears a son who is thwarted by his lover; Hannah gives
birth to Samuel who presides over the Israelites’ ongoing political
woes. Living under Roman rule, the rabbis’ own path to redemption
will in all, likelihood be equally complex. The messiah—when it
comes—comes through “birth pangs.”30 In eliding all of this pain in
the midrash, the rabbis invite us to ﬁnd beauty, and even redemptive
potential, in the abstract expectation of the mother who tries to conceive. What happens as the children grow, and become increasingly
differentiated into adulthood, is less crucial than what happens when
these women discover they can conceive and safely bear children.
When this kind of redemption does come about, though, it is ﬁgured as a kind of surrogacy, or at least some kind of deviation from a
“natural” pattern of ﬁliation. In Isaiah’s telling, when God describes
Zion’s eventual redemption, the “barren” Zion ﬁnds herself reunited
with “the children you thought you had lost.” This is what leads the
personiﬁed Zion to ask, in the verse the Rabbis use as emblematic of
29

I ﬁrst heard this interpretation of Leah naming her sons from Shai Held.
Unlike after the birth of her other children, after Judah’s birth, Leah does not suggest
that the child is born in order for God to fulﬁll her prayer to for her husband to love
her.
30
Elsewhere, the rabbis suggest that these will be so violent that it might not be
worth living to see the messiah. See B. Sanhedrin 98a.
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a completed redemption “Who bore these for me when I was bereaved
and barren?” Even though Zion’s children are “restored,” the experience of this restoration is shaped by the experience of having expected
and hoped for them, and even having thought all hope was lost.
Contextualized this way, the rabbinic hope for redemption is analogized to the kind of care experienced by the woman experiencing
infertility and pregnancy loss, caring for some “abstract” other who
has not come into the world.
Like the kind of care that leads the woman to carry the preservation stone, this hope is sometimes quite distant from embodied, lived
reality. Both of these acts of care are experienced and expressed
through speciﬁc, embodied actions of care and devotion. The rabbis
imagine that human beings can participate in the process of redemption in a variety of ways, including ritual performance of the mitzvot31
and caring for the sick, the widow, the orphan, and the poor. All of
these are embodied actions carried out at speciﬁc times and addressed
to speciﬁc needs, but all of them are also understood to be expressions
of hope and, I want to suggest, care, for an as-yet-abstract reality.
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Theological Spelunking with Care Ethics:
Caring Ethical Standards for Relational
Maintenance across Religious Pluralities
Maureen Sander-Staudt

My mother often recounts why she married early and how the day was saved
by the courage of her uncle. She planned for a Christmas wedding but wed in
September because things had become unbearable in her family home. Raised
as a staunch Irish Catholic, she converted to my father’s Protestant religion.
Despite both being branches of Christianity, my grandparents steadfastly subscribed to Catholic doctrine that held all converts from Catholicism as apostates, automatically excommunicated and condemned to eternal damnation.
Similar consequences faced Catholics associating with apostates. My grandparents lamented her conversion out of fear for her mortal soul and their own.
They ambivalently attended her wedding, but refused to walk her down the
aisle. Just as my mother braced to walk alone, her uncle offered his arm,
whispering “If you were my daughter, I would walk you down the aisle”. Over
the next few years my mother’s relationship with her parents mended. This was
made possible in large part by my great uncle’s example. In 1962 Pope XXIII
established the pontifical council “Secretariat for Promoting Christian Unity”.
Two years later this council issued the “Unitatis Redintegratio” (Restoration of
Unity), an ecumenical decree allowing Catholic converts to other Christian
faiths to no longer be excommunicated as apostates. Dialogue was also opened
with those of non-Christian faiths. The decree remains controversial to this day
(Apostasy | Catholic Answers).

Introduction
For many in the world today care relations are inseparably entwined
with religion (Harper, 2012). Religious rituals and beliefs often bolster care relations, but are sometimes simultaneously damaging,
especially when conﬂicting. Both internal and external religious
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differences are ubiquitous sources of relational tensions. Although
religious belief is on the decline in the U.S., religion structures the
lives and relations of many, and globally, more often women than
men (Pew Research Center 2016; 2019). This is even though most
major world religions have patriarchal histories exclusive and oppressive to women and others. For such reasons foundational care ethicist
Nel Noddings (1984) posits an inherent antagonism between care
ethics and Christian ethics, and her analysis raises general questions
about the theoretical positioning of an ethics of care to religious
teachings and practices that seemingly run contrary to caring ideals.
How can care ethics reach within and across religious pluralisms to
maintain relations? In this chapter I distill Noddings’s analysis of
Christianity to provide more general standards for assessing religious
beliefs and practices, and ask how we might better care across religious relational tensions and pluralities.
Philosophically, a care ethicist might characterize the exploration
of the care ethical potential of various religions as “theological spelunking”, i.e. an open-minded, but critically perilous exploration of
certain religious approaches to care, in reference to Plato’s famous
allegory of the cave. In this allegory prisoners (representing the
human condition) mistakenly take the shadows on the walls of their
cave to be the source and stuff of truth. One escapee is able to perceive the true nature of the world beyond the cave and returns to
share this knowledge. Rather than being welcomed, the escapee is
violently rebuffed. This allegory classically distinguishes the need to
sort belief/faith from knowledge, and acknowledges the relational
pains associated with doing so. As such, it has nuanced applications
to religion, philosophy, and care ethics.1 Three aspects of Plato’s allegory readily apply to a care ethical assessment of religious approaches
to care. Like Plato’s metaphorical cave where truths are obscured by
shadows ﬁxed under conditions of captivity, religions often (but not
1
The use of Plato’s allegory of the cave as analytical framework does not assume
philosophy to be the singular or infallible source of truth, and recognizes points of
departure between this characterization of enlightenment and an ethics of care.
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universally) are 1) informed by power and its lack, in that they have
developed within and through sex and gender hierarchies and other
systems of social domination; 2) sources of epistemic and metaphysical claims that stem from esoteric origins, as well as privileged perspectives afforded by relational power dynamics that are 3) resistant
to change and its agents. This resistance to change stems in part
because change can be psychologically, physically, and relationally
painful.
Crossing religious worldviews and cultural milieus is also difﬁcult
without ﬁrst-hand knowledge, meaning that evaluating care standards
across pluralities requires epistemic displacements and loving moral
apprenticeships of the sort described by María Lugones (1987). As
Lugones points out, love reveals pluralities that are incompatible with
fusion or erasure of difference. These are perspectival explorations of
the other that yield subjective knowledge. While contemplation
of caring standards rooted in religion is already a kind of “theological
spelunking” of unknown and unfathomable metaphysical depths,
consideration of traditions outside of one’s own “web of relations” is
even more precarious. These features provide vital context for considering how religions structure their own approaches to care, behooving care ethicists to develop epistemic, normative, and pragmatic
standards for assessing the compatibility of care ethics with various
religious teachings and practices, in manners consistent with caring
ideals, that can reach across religious divides.
To this end I ﬁrst review Nel Noddings’ claim that care ethics and
Christian ethics are incompatible (1984; 1989), analyzing the New
Testament story of Mary and Martha as further evidence that Christianity seemingly has some incongruities with care ethics, while
acknowledging more generous readings. I then distill general care
ethical standards for assessing religious approaches to care implicit in
Noddings’ analysis and qualify her rebuke of Christian ethics with
ﬁve areas of potential compatibility. I ﬁnally use these adjusted reﬂections to scrutinize religion “writ large”, considering the case of the
Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ and the Latter Day Saints
(FDLS) to explore how religious abuses of care can be more caringly
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responded to and remedied by care ethicists, across pluralistic relational webs. The FDLS have come under legal scrutiny in the U.S.
because their invoked right to religious freedom conﬂicts with wider
state and federal laws outlawing polygamy and child marriage. My
claim is not that this case is “writ large” because it is paradigmatic of
Christianity or religion more generally, but that the extreme religious
beliefs of the FDLS clearly violate Noddings’ qualiﬁed caring norms,
yet highlight the need for sensitivity within care ethics to religious
differences, as well as the constitutive nature of religious belief to
many embedded care relations, and the difﬁculties issuing from singularly using justice approaches to resolve religiously infused relational tensions.
Nel Noddings’ Care Ethical Critique of Christianity
“Ah wanted to preach a great sermon about colored women sittin’ on
high, but there wasn’t no pulpit for me.”
Zora Neale Hurston, Their Eyes Were Watching God

In most ages women have lacked epistemic privilege in religion. The
silence of women in most religions is compounded by overlapping
social factors, such as race, class, familial and sexual positioning, and
education. The ethics of care initially sought to assert feminine power
in psychology and moral theory in the work of Carol Gilligan, by
afﬁrming the idea that women and the work of care yield “a different
voice” (Gilligan 1982). It raises the general question of how those
marginalized in and by ethics (and religion) can have their different
voices more readily heard. Care ethics today admits to an intersectionality of embedded relations, but remains dubious of dominantly
masculine understandings of religious concepts such as “God”, “spirit”,
“sacred/profane”, “piety”, “sin”, etc.
Nel Noddings, the other key founder of the ethics of care, pursued
this line of thought in her ongoing critiques of teachings associated
with Christianity. Her views are not infallible, but initiate thinking
about the amenability of care ethics and Christianity, and various
aspects of religions more generally. At ﬁrst glance, Christianity seems,

THEOLOGICAL SPELUNKING WITH CARE ETHICS

93

like many religions, to be compatible with care ethics in its commitment to care as a spiritual ideal. Historically, Jesus Christ exhibited
nurturing traits, taught both women and men, and preached love and
forgiveness for all humankind. Yet contrary to the feminist commitments of care ethics, the divine absolute in Christianity is typically
conceptualized as a Father-Son, in trinity with a genderless Holy Spirit.
Femininity is largely ﬁltered through the image of the Virgin Mary,
who Catholics revere as a saint but not Goddess, and Protestants as
the comparatively insigniﬁcant human mother of Jesus. Even in liberal denominations where women serve as ordained ministers, Christianity gives primacy to male spiritual authority. Caution is needed
not to overly simplify understandings of sex and gender roles in the
many nuanced branches of Christianity. But a care ethical treatment
of Christian theology starts by acknowledging with Noddings that it
to varying degrees perpetuates male supremacy in its understandings
of God and the good human life, and often remains committed to
abstract spiritual principles over relations with particular others.
In Caring, Nel Noddings cites “irreconcilable differences” between
Christian and care ethics (1984, 29). Her defense of this position
emerges from her analysis of how care ethics differs from Lawrence
Kohlberg’s stage six of moral development, characterized by transcendence to universal moral principles. This distinction is exempliﬁed in
Søren Kierkegaard’s interpretation of the story of Abraham and Isaac,
whereby Abraham’s willingness to sacriﬁce Isaac is justiﬁed as supraethical, because Abraham’s paternal bond to Isaac is superseded by
a higher and absolute duty to God (43). In contrast, Noddings characterizes Abraham’s obedience as “horrendous” because “the one caring, male or female, does not seek security in abstractions cast either
as principles or as entities”, but “remains responsible here and now for
this cared-for”, embodied as a “touchable child” (43). Caring moral
obligations are rooted in natural caring, which grounds ethical caring.
Nor does Noddings accept this story as a didactic device to teach the
moral impermissibility of human sacriﬁce. Such a lesson uses Abraham
and Isaac “fearfully and painfully” (44), possibly destroying care relationships without even consulting Isaac’s mother, Sarah.
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In Women and Evil, Noddings expands her claim that care and
Christian Ethics are incompatible by analyzing evil from the perspective of women’s experiences (1989). She rejects Augustine’s theodicy
which reconciles God’s goodness with the inﬂiction of pain and the
neglect of suffering (19-20). Noddings ﬁnds evil in these tendencies,
as well as God’s aloofness (19-20). She traces two dynamics underlying the incompatibility of Christian ethics with an ethics of care. The
ﬁrst of these characterizes embodiment as evil, especially women’s
sexual embodiment. Many churches see embodiment and connection
with particular others as impediments to clerical devotion, and Noddings
censures the paradox noted by Judith Hauptman—that “man’s welfare seems to be the primary mission of women in biblical and Talmudic accounts” (42). Quoting Susan Brownmiller, she denounces
the spiritual reversal of nature where woman is born of Adam because:
“with this unusual reordering of biological birth, the submission of
woman to man was given ﬁrm theological basis” (84). Such ideas
distort associations between sexuality, violence, femininity, and
power, spurring historical witch hunts and damaging relations.
Noddings rejects the dual poles of Christianity—tough masculinity
and forgiving and merciful femininity—in favor of an approach that
“seeks to prevent a second blow without striking back in violence”
(50-1). Instead of substituting male deities with female, Noddings
encourages critical religious education (40). The story of Genesis
should be placed in its historical context of struggle to defeat Goddess
worship, and one might add, the plurality of polytheism (56).
The second dynamic creating incompatibility between care and
Christian ethics for Noddings is the Christian ideal of the “angel in
the household”, which contains, commodiﬁes, and coerces women’s
care labor. Within Genesis she ﬁnds motherhood to be little venerated or featured. This ideal limits women’s virtues to the domestic
sphere, while the Virgin Mary resigns them to contradictory standards
of virginity and motherhood. Women are commodiﬁed by men wanting wives to be “virgin property” and mothers to be “asexual service
machines” (84-5). In response to the question of whether it is evil for
women to ﬁnd happiness in coercive care work, Noddings answers
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that such work is not itself evil, but that women (and men) who
coerce others to care thereby engage in evil. Women should not be
conﬁned to domestic tasks, nor should they alone perform them
(112). Noddings’ argument can be extrapolated as the normative
standard that although care work is essential, no one, male or female,
should be coerced or conﬁned to care work, especially when such
work constitutes a disenfranchised class.
For Noddings, real evil, moral evil, occurs when some agent causes
or fails to alleviate pain when able to do so (99). Offering another
important standard for care ethics, she rejects feminist attempts to
overcome evil by making people helpless in new ways or further separating them (113). Whereas liberal feminism seeks equality for
women by transitioning them from domestic work into the paid
workforce, for Noddings this only re-mystiﬁes work as legitimate only
when paid. Her point is bolstered in that while U.S. women have
been widely integrated into the paid workforce, it has been at the
cost of a wage gap especially pronounced for mothers, and of dependency upon unreliable, expensive, and sometimes exploitative care
services.2 But Noddings ﬁnds no relief in Christian religious traditions
that ratify evil by distracting people from each other and leading
them to believe that salvation rests in relation only to God (200-1).
She rejects attempts to reconcile feminism and faith that proceed by
arguing that Christian patriarchal practices have departed from an
original (divine) ideal of sex equality, or that they are open to reform.
For her, both approaches lack transformative power (223). Instead,
Noddings concludes that an ethics of care should be open to founding
new religions that avoid ontological and supernatural claims about
God, understanding “God” rather as referring to psychological human
realities (Ibid).

2
The Covid-19 pandemic has heightened tensions for U.S. women between paid
work and care responsibilities, with women disproportionately being ﬁred, leaving
the paid workforce, or taking pay cuts to meet caring needs of children, aging parents, and the ill (Adely 2020; Scharff 2020; Smith 2020).

96

MAUREEN SANDER - STAUDT

Ultimately, Noddings does not believe that people must be liberated from religion, but encourages care ethicists to be skeptical of the
ability for patriarchal religions to change in any substantial or timely
fashion, and to be dubious of ontological spiritual claims (2003, 241).
Speaking to women and others who feel ambiguous about religion,
she advises that each must ﬁnd their own way. Different people desire
different things, and some take refuge in formal religious settings,
while others prefer nature. Noddings ﬁnds that moments of solitude
are “essential” for progress to be made in any spiritual and philosophical journey (241). Yet ironically, the social and political dynamics of
care again impinge, as moments of solitude are precisely what care
responsibilities and religious activities can mutually thwart, as is further evinced by the biblical story of Jesus’s visit to Mary and Martha.
The Story of Mary and Martha
“Heavenly Father, we are tired.”

Noddings’ pessimism about the compatibility of care and Christian
ethics is bolstered to some degree by the New Testament story of
Mary and Martha as recounted in Luke 10:38, and some of its contemporary interpretations. In these passages Jesus and his disciples
visit Mary and Martha, the sisters of Lazarus, after Martha opens her
home to them. Whereas Mary sits at the feet of Jesus learning from
him, Martha makes hospitable preparations, as was socially expected
of women. Frustrated, Martha asks Jesus to admonish Mary for not
helping. Jesus responds: “Martha, Martha, you are worried and upset
about many things, but few things are needed—or indeed only one. Mary
has chosen what is better, and it will not be taken away from her” (Luke
10:38-42, NIV).
This story is often heralded as evidence that Jesus rejected the
expectation that women should be responsible for care work to the
exception of intellectual and spiritual activities, and that he ministered openly to women. On the one hand, this story recognizes women’s unique burdens of care, and follows Noddings’ recommendation
for the need of spiritual pause (if not solitude). But on the other hand
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it does not resolve the question of who does the work of care, and
how it is to be balanced with other activities. As Joan Tronto argues,
for care to be more just we need to “devote ourselves to practicing it
in more democratic ways”, and this includes religious domains (2015,
33). While the story of Mary and Martha takes the step of excusing
women from care work long enough for religious study, it retains sex
and gender hierarchies. Mary and Martha presumably will complete
this work later because caring need is persistent and perpetual, and
traditionally performed by women. Jesus retains male privilege in
being the teacher and arbitrator of the moment, with Mary at his
feet. Like the Christian ideal of a “virgin mother”, this story poses
a dilemma—care providers like Martha must complete care work
AND be able to set it aside for religious study.3 But the story of Mary
and Martha side-steps this tension by adopting the perspective of
those who have “privileged irresponsibility”, the ability to avoid
being personally responsible for care work as a result of being well
positioned in regard to class, sex/gender, race, and/or occupation, or
in this case, as spiritual teacher (Tronto 1994, 120). Jesus and his
disciples can continue religious study without considering how and
when Martha’s care will be completed (and in a pinch can assume
a miraculous ability to feed multitudes). The story of Mary and
Martha demonstrates how women are pitted against one another in
double binds, and how turning to other activities is impractical without comprehensive social change as called for by Tronto.
Some modern day treatments of this story on Christian websites
support this analysis. For example, on “Encouragement Café”,
a Christian web community with over 1.6K shares, contributor Lara
Sadowski relates to the story of Mary and Martha because “she longs
for a clean, organized home full of happy family and guests, but can
never achieve it, nor ﬁnd time for religious study”. This creates guilt
that she is “disappointing Jesus”. She instructs readers that “Jesus did
3
Noddings account of her own family’s choice to forgo church attendance
reﬂects this tension, in that she conﬁdes that they instead completed light chores,
as many families do.
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not intend for us to beat ourselves up if our kitchen is not picked up
or our laundry is left unfolded. He just longs to spend time with us.”
She encourages women to ﬁnd 5 minutes a day for religious pursuits
and then work to increase this time. This advice reﬂects Jesus’
response to Martha. Rather than questioning these norms and
attempting to change them, Sadowski offers this prayer:
Heavenly Father, we are tired. We have husbands, kids, parents, siblings,
carpool lines and dirty laundry. So many times we are so hard on ourselves because we can’t seem to juggle all of these balls at once. Please
help us to seek You ﬁrst above all things because we know You will always
direct our paths. Thank You for never giving up on us!

In addition to implicit heteronormativity, Sadowski does not seek to
redistribute care labor through sacred or secular channels, but implies
that women are spiritually ﬂawed unless giving precedence to a male
God over care work.
Understood this way, the story of Mary and Martha supports
Nodding’s thesis that Christian ethics is not fully compatible with
care ethics. Joan Tronto shares such concerns by observing that differences in religious beliefs and other social factors encourage “unsympathetic disregard” for others (2013). This psychological mechanism
makes it possible to praise oneself for one’s own caring while decrying
the care of others. Such judgments create empathy gaps toward those
who are less well off by casting their plight as due to choices rather
than the lack thereof (102). While the story of Mary and Martha
teaches that women should not be judged for foregoing care for spiritual pursuits, it is silent on how to combat such empathy gaps, and
the social tendencies of people to judge women more harshly than
men for domestic neglect.
But it may be rightly objected that this analysis cherry picks the
least generous interpretations of the Christian religious tradition.
One could give other examples more compatible to care ethics, such
as the Benedictine spiritual tradition wherein each task is a way to
honor God (ut in omnibus Deus glorificetur, “That in all things God
may be gloriﬁed”), so that spiritual tasks are not of higher value than
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domestic. Likewise, some women have been able to create Christian
communities that balance spiritual life and care, as in the Beguinage
communities in Amsterdam and Belgium, founded in the 13th centuries. These “cities of women” allowed single women and widows to
pursue spiritual life and economic self-sufﬁciency through paid care
work without binding vows, and to ﬁnd protection in times of war
and violence. Indeed, not all Christians accept sex/gender and other
social hierarchies that characterize modern day care labor. Jesus was
remarkable for teaching women at all, and for rating women’s religious education as of higher importance than their participation in
hospitality traditions unequally serving men. His willingness to challenge patriarchal traditions demonstrates the appropriateness of progressive religious change on behalf of care providers. Such considerations require care ethicists to qualify Noddings’ view that the
differences between Care and Christian ethics are “irreconcilable” in
favor of a more nuanced view that ﬁnds the baby in the proverbial
bathwater.
Qualifying Noddings’ care ethical standards for religious epistemology and
practice
“There is no religion without love, and people may talk as much as they
like about their religion, but if it does not teach them to be good and
kind to man and beast, it is all a sham.”
Anna Sewell

Noddings’ overall analysis implies at least six care ethical standards
for assessing religious belief and practice:4
1) Relational duties to particular others should take precedence over
abstract principles and Gods.

4
The ethics of care was originally characterized as an unprincipled ethic adverse
to general rules and standards. However, this view altered to allow for standards that
are contextually applied and sensitive to the particularities of unique relations,
that are distinct from the standards of justice (Benhabib 1987; Held 1993, 33-35)
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2) Religious epistemology should include the subjective views of
women and others involved in care, or who are otherwise disenfranchised.
3) Embodiment and sexuality should not be associated with evil. The
imposition of pain and the failure to alleviate pain count as evils.
4) Religious beliefs and practices should not damage or dissolve care
relations without serious cause.
5) Care practices should be widely distributed and non-coercive.
6) Claims about divinity should be understood as psychological and
natural human realities, not spiritual or supernatural ontologies.
These standards offer a promising base for care ethical religious assessment. But to afﬁrm the complete incompatibility of Christian and
care ethics is hasty. Christianity is at least an ethic about care, if not an
ethic of care. In moving toward a general theory of women and religion, Arvind Sharma notes the difference between considering
women and religion and considering religion and women. Similarly,
there is a difference between developing a care ethical theory of
Christianity, and a Christian theory of care ethics (2000). Even so,
there is some overlap and the needed variables for comparative analysis are complex.
Accordingly, there are at least ﬁve reasons to qualify Noddings
position that Christian ethics is incompatible with care ethics. The
ﬁrst takes issue with Noddings’ assessment of the incompatibility of
care and Christian ethics along the singular factor of sexual identity.
It cannot be doubted that those who identify and are identiﬁed as
women are expected to perform care work, but the practical demographics of care are complicated (Duffy 2011). Feminist lawyer
Kimberlé Crenshaw introduced the concept of intersectionality to
denounce discrimination against Black women stemming from the
U.S. justice system’s failing to track intertwining oppressions along
diverging lines of race, sex, class, religion, and other factors (1991).
Care ethics today recognizes intersectional lines of power and oppression and accordingly should not dismiss Christian ethics simply
because of sex-based hierarchies. Christian theology has and continues
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to be used as a tool against racism, poverty, and brutality against
people of color, and given that these are also care ethical concerns,
care ethics can converge at least with some religious ethics in resisting racism and sexism. A desire to identify and purge racist and sexist
elements of Christian ethics, while retaining other aspects that combat these social dynamics, is most compatible with ethics of care.
The complicated intersections of care, religion, and race are discussed by Black feminist Brittney Cooper in her book, Eloquent Rage
(2018). Reﬂecting on how Christian standards of virginity and abstinence created intolerable sexual repression in her life, Cooper calls
for a “Grown Woman’s Theology” that offers practical guides for living. Cooper’s own development was catalyzed by her churchgoing
Grandmother, who told her that despite being unmarried it was time
to start having “real good” sex, including not only pleasure, but quality sex education and birth control. Echoing Noddings’ insistence
that each woman must ﬁnd her own way, she describes her grandmother’s philosophy as a pragmatic blend of feminism and Christianity honed by life experience in the rural south (140, 134). At the
same time, she recognizes that many Black women and men ﬁnd
solace and strength in their Christian heritages.
The additional analytical factors of race, gender identity, age, and
regional differences evident in Cooper’s analysis of religion do not
bely Noddings’ argument, but complement and complicate it. Given
that both agree that the faithful should not be forced or coerced into
abandoning religion, and that Christianity is unlikely to fade away,
it makes sense to avail Christianity of care ethical feminist resources
(and vice versa). Cooper agrees that Black women have the right to
dissent from theologies that no longer serve them. She expands Noddings’ analysis in seeing a need for Black women to free themselves
from strictures of conservative Christian theology that discriminates
against LGBTQA+, excludes women as preachers and pastors, and bolsters racism (139). Similar to Noddings’ “skeptical theology”, Cooper
characterizes theology as a push and pull debate, and an ongoing
argument with God (139). She elevates the voices of Black women,
stating that “Black girls have unique visions of freedom, [that]… are
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God-given” (143). For her, God is nothing if not freedom, so Cooper
makes freedom her “theological compass”, which includes being free
from religious neglect, caring coercion, and racism (143).
Cooper notes that religion serves as a buffer for Black men and
women united in struggles against racism, highlighting different
stakes in Noddings’ rejection of Christianity for Black and White
care-givers. She encourages Black women to seek sacred texts “alongside the bible” (emphasis added)—such as “their grandmother’s words,
Sojourner Truth, Alice Walker, Zora Neal Hurston, Audre Lorde,
Patricia Hill Collins, Anna Julia Cooper, and Beyoncé” (142). In this
way, Cooper’s analysis is similar to Noddings in encouraging women
to nurture their own theological voices, but does not imply the same
conclusion that the differences between Christian and care ethics are
irreconcilable. Both can seek to lift the voices of the marginalized
and provide care to self and others in ways that are not coercive or
unequal, but Cooper makes more room for a feminist care ethic
within Christianity.
Thus, the second reason to qualify Noddings’ assessment is that it
underestimates the rich global history of Christian feminism. Religion, including Christianity, can be a source of power and vision
when it is brought together with feminist insights. As Rosemary
Radford Ruether notes, women’s access to ordination has been
secured in many Christian denominations, and since the 1960s a rich
literature of Christian feminist theological critique and reconstruction has developed (1999, 219-220). She recounts an immense diversity of feminist strains in Christianity throughout history and across
the world, representing numerous Christian feminist ﬁgures and
reform movements.
Noddings is likely to see this objection as an instance of the argument that Christian and care ethics are compatible because of an
original harmony of ends, possibly responding that care ethicists
might as well start a new religion. Creating a unique care ethical
religion certainly is a viable possibility to be fostered, but feminists
like Cooper and Ruether might rebut that it is worthwhile to look for
the baby in the bathwater before rejecting an established religious
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tradition that is of value to many, including feminists. Ruether
observes that although some past American feminists moved with
Elizabeth Cady Stanton to jettison Christianity for humanism, there
were other groups of feminists who used the Christian bible to afﬁrm
that the subordination of women thwarts the will of God. Christianity might fruitfully be reconsidered in light of a broad spectrum of
nurturing care relations. For instance, Avind Sharma notes that
“there may be more solid grounds for imaging God as a mother than
as a father” (2000, 174), whereas Ruether calls for male metaphors
for God to be supplemented not only with female, but also familial
and transhuman symbols (1983), and novelist Alice Walker posits
the ability to commune with the divine through purple ﬂowers in the
ﬁeld (1982).
The deep potential for metaphysical understandings of the divine
is the third reason to qualify Noddings’ assessment of Christianity.
Given the deep mystical potential for reconceptualizing divinity in
light of caring relations, care ethical Christian feminists may also
disagree with Noddings’ insistence that care ethics reinterpret theological claims as about psychological and not supernatural realities.
For theists this is a capitulation to atheism, or at least agnosticism in
care ethics. And although Noddings encourages healthy skeptical
spirituality without dogmatic certainty, this does not mean that care
ethics must be closed to religious mystical, supernatural, or otherworldly ontological possibilities, at very least for pragmatic reasons
(224-225). Noddings asserts that a feminist theology should be
engrained in the consequences of human life, with a feminist pragmatist theology being best for an intellectual reconciliation of feminism, pragmatism, and faith. (2003, 217). Maurice Hamington similarly defends a feminist prophetic pragmatism making it possible to
be a “friendly critic of religion, open to the commitment to care that
may issue from religious practice, while at the same time critical of
its various patriarchal structures” (2009, 87).5 Care ethical theology
5

Hamington points out that a prophet in ancient times was “not a fortune-teller,
but a radical social critic”.
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is not groundless—it favors an ontology of natural caring over ontological spiritual claims because this is where care needs are met and
assessed. But care ethics can also remain open to the reality of metaphysical supernatural claims, and how they can pragmatically serve
care ends.
Supernatural claims pragmatically serve to complete care in many
ways. One might consider the case of Linda Santo who supports her
disabled daughter, Audrey, with money from pilgrims who view
Audrey as a Saint and performer of miracles (James 2012, 112). Additionally, the promise of heavenly reward and punishments, tempered
by mercy and grace, bolster caring behaviors often more effectively
than mere human remonstration. Noddings’ observation that religion
is born out of human longing for relationship, a longing for God, communion and connection, can also ground ontological claims about the
nature and existence of “God” (2003, 219). Interestingly, Noddings
does not further explore how care ethics might contribute to the longing for relationship with a personal God (transcendent or immanent),
or consider how religions like Christianity are appealing to many not
least because they promise continued relationship with deceased loved
ones. In offering belief and hope for an all loving, watchful God, and
for lives beyond the present, religions like Christianity offer comfort
in response to one of the harshest of human conditions—imminent
death and separation from those whom we love and care-for. Care
ethicists friendly to supernatural claims of Christianity might then
adapt the American pragmatist philosophy of William James, who
argued that the “will to believe” in spiritual realities is at least sometimes justiﬁed for pragmatic reasons over their ultimate scientiﬁc realities (1896). Despite their uncertainty, religious beliefs in an afterlife
can provide comfort and sustain one’s ability to care for self and others
after the trauma of death. Thus, care ethics encourages skeptical openness to spiritual and supernatural beliefs, especially their misuse, and
is rooted in natural realities of care. But it can also be open to expanding spiritual care beyond the natural world of the senses, and to the
idea that care relations could possibly extend beyond the physical
world of ﬁnite bodies and singular, shared lifetimes.

THEOLOGICAL SPELUNKING WITH CARE ETHICS

105

A fourth reason, then, to qualify Noddings assessment of the
incompatibility of Christianity and care ethics, is that Christianity is
replete with caring themes that serve to motivate and complete care.
In Christianity God is generally understood as Father and Son, and
so is centrally conceptualized as caregiver and care-receiver, albeit
masculine. In many world religions, including Christianity, caring for
others features as a/the primary religious duty. The life and ministry
of Jesus is centered around care for the needy and Christian doctrines
help develop and fulﬁll these goals more justly. As Ruth Groenhout
argues, Christian Agapeic theory can help care givers to “just say no’’
to endless demands for care (Groenhout 2003). Religion can also
redistribute individual care work via fellowship activities, which
sometimes have more presence and precedence than secular. Lonnae
O’Neal Parker observes that even though the “marble ﬂoor” prosperity theology of some Black churches undercut their ﬁnancial commitments to education and poverty, other churches provide vital community services (2005, 209; 211). Similarly, Tronto includes places of
worship as important contributors to networks of democratic care
provision (2015, 33).
The ﬁnal reason to qualify the incompatibility of Christian and
care ethics is that Noddings does not give enough attention to the
dilemmas posed for care ethics by the vital importance of religion to
many people. For many, care relations are inherently structured by
religious belief and practice, and religious identity is so integral to
their sense of self that it cannot be discarded without damage. Religious concepts intertwine with the earliest memories of many people,
informing their caring ethical ideals. This is not to say that religious
teachings are to be upheld simply because of their popularity. Mary
Daly roundly criticized Christianity and rightly declared it irrelevant
to uphold religious teachings because “many people, including
women, are satisﬁed with it in theory and in practice”6 (1968, 176).
Rather, the claim is that care ethicists cannot avoid having to meet
6

This problem has been similarly evoked against the association between women
and care.
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these beliefs and identities with care, because disrespecting and challenging religious beliefs, or looking to change or eradicate them without diplomacy and consenting negotiation, can damage relations as
well.
Cooper’s analysis provides guidance on how to respond in a mature
caring fashion to others who have different religious points of view.
Cooper notes that many Black women are still deeply religious, and
while she doesn’t insist that they give up church and Jesus, she recognizes that this creates relational quandaries. When discussing with
other Black women the need to approach the bible differently, she
observes that their ﬁrst reactions are often: “But what will my mother
say?”. Cooper’s response is a maturely caring one that strives to balance the needs of self and others—she encourages them to engage in
caring dialogue, navigating their own needs as grown women even
when diverging from their desire to please the women who raised
them (145). The desire to maintain relationships across religious difference renders care ethics receptive to reconciling with Christian
ethics for the sake of relational maintenance, at least to
a degree, by opening space for shared thinking, consciousness raising,
and dialogue about which components of a religious tradition are
most in tension with care ethics and why.
In summary then, Noddings’ analysis of the tensions between
Christian and care ethics yields standards for assessing religious and
spiritual traditions, but does not support the view that they are utterly
incompatible, because of the intersectional nature of power dynamics,
the possibility of feminist and care ethical Christian sub-schools, the
pragmatic usefulness of openness to supernatural possibilities,
the contributions Christianity can make to the provision of care,
and the desire for relational maintenance. How to respond to oppressive religious practices is a question that evokes different responses
from justice and care perspectives. I thus conclude by considering
a case instructive for demonstrating the relevance of theological spelunking with care ethics in a more practical sense, the case of Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ and the Latter-Day Saints (FDLS).
Interactions between this church and the larger political state
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illustrate challenges for a care ethical treatment of religion and illuminate differences between care and justice responses to it.
Care Ethics and the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ and the LatterDay Saints
“If you think your religion gives you the right to rape children, then your
religion needs to be burned to the ground.”
Flora Jessup
“I have very tender feelings for the FDLS people. They have so much
good in them. I pray they will ﬁnd the strength to re-examine what they
have been told to believe.”
Elissa Wall

A clear case of religion as a Platonic cave “writ large” is that of the
Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ and the Latter Day Saints
(FDLS). The FDLS certainly is not representative of every Christian
church and is considered a cult by the mainstream Mormon church.
The value of studying the FDLS from the perspective of care ethics
is not only that it demonstrates the extremes to which religion can
contain, commodify, and coerce women to care, but also that it illuminates differences between justice and care responses to such abuse.
More importantly, the case of the FDLS calls for caring response. The
goal is not to besmirch Christianity as a whole, but to show that even
in extreme cases of religious dogma and practice, an ethics of care
recommends a relational approach that reaches across the spectrum
of religious pluralities to minimize harm and maintain relations. As
I shall argue, although there are legitimate concerns for how girls and
women in the FDLS are coerced to care, and how boys and men are
made complicit in patriarchy or expelled, at the same time, FDLS
communities exemplify the potential to use religious belief and practice to better meet needs for care.
The FDLS community spans Canada, U.S.A, and Mexico, with an
estimated 6000-8000 members in the U.S. This group has become
well known for its tradition of polygyny, and for the 2007 and 2011
convictions of leader, Warren Jeffs, on charges of being an accomplice
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to rape, and sexual assault on a child. These and other religious
dynamics of the FDLS exemplify at least four instances of religion
being used in ways that clearly violate the modiﬁed care ethical standards identiﬁed in section 3.
To begin, the use of religion to contain, commodify, and coerce
women to care is explicit in the FDLS under the leadership of Warren
Jeffs. Members, especially women, are encouraged to “keep sweet”,
meaning that they are to submit to spiritual leaders without dissent
or complaint. Women are subject to male church elders, fathers, husbands, and sons, but there is also male hierarchy (Hannaford 2018).
A man’s status increases in proportion to the number of his wives and
children, with men at the highest levels claiming scores of wives
and hundreds of children. Under Jeffs, men who challenged the status
quo had their wives and children reassigned to other men, and rebellious boys were sent for reeducation or expelled from the community
altogether. Known as “lost boys’’, they have formed communities in
cities such as Phoenix and Salt Lake City (Jeffs and Szalavitz 2009).
In her book Escape, Caroline Jessup recounts how she became disillusioned with the FDLS community in Colorado City, AZ, and in
2003 ﬂed with her eight children (2007). She reports how girls like
her were coerced to become sexually subordinate caregivers, groomed
from an early age to ﬁnd their highest mission in pleasing husbands.
This life goal is referred to as “Glorious Womanhood”. Some girls do
not discover whom they are to marry until days or hours before their
wedding ceremonies. Prior to Jeff’s conviction, some like Caroline
Jessup married men over eighty, and/or their ﬁrst cousins, as in the
case of Elissa Wall, who initiated the charges that eventually led to
the imprisonment of Warren Jeffs (Wall 2008).
Second, there is a lack of critical education in the FDLS. Under
Warren Jeffs, FDLS communities not only lacked critical religious
education as recommended by Noddings, but even comprehensive
historical, civic, and health/sex education. Children attend primary
school, but most were then home schooled or educated in the schools
established and administered by Warren Jeffs. The curriculum in
these schools removed images of Black Americans and U.S. and
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world history past the 1800s. FDLS refugees report being taught that
Warren Jeffs was president of the United States. Children were not
educated about their bodies, sex, or civil and women’s rights (Jessup
2007).
Third, as Noddings admonishes, FDLS communities use ontological supernatural claims to ground patriarchal power. FDLS beliefs are
reinforced with religious metaphysical claims that uphold the epistemic privilege of those identiﬁed as spiritually enlightened. The
FDLS teach the mainstream Mormon epistemology of “continuing
revelation” (Cook 2020) which emerges from living representatives
on earth in the male priesthood. In the FDLS, patriarchal leaders
have knowledge of spiritual realities afforded by their divine appointment. The true reality is an otherworldly one, and a woman can gain
eternal blessing only if her husband allows her to enter the kingdom
of God (Jessup 2007).
Fourthly, FDLS communities show a willingness to damage and
sever relationships in favor of abstract entities and principles. The
reluctance to question FDLS religious habits is reinforced by the
threat of being “shunned”, as those who leave have little hope of
further connection with family and friends. In some cases, this ostracism is welcomed. But often those ﬂeeing FDLS oppression experience heartbreak over those left behind, ambiguity over their religious
disillusionment, and anguish in the face of rebuke from those they
seek to help. At age 14 Flora Jessup ﬁled sex abuse charges against
her father and then created an underground railroad to assist children
ﬂeeing the community (Jessup and Brown, 119). Most of her family
will not speak to her, apart from her sister Ruby, who after years of
being placed in hiding and forced to marry her step-brother (also her
second cousin), ﬂed and reunited with Flora in 2013 (Ng 2013).
Given that the religion of the FDLS under Warren Jeffs violates
care ethical standards, the next question to consider is how care ethics is to best respond to both those who wish to leave such communities, and those who wish to stay/return. In this capacity, FDLS communities pose three challenges for care ethics beyond how they
clearly violate Noddings’ earlier standards for religious approaches to
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care. First, although the right to exit such communities is vital by the
standards of care as well as justice, it is also true that leaving them
inﬂicts perceived caring damage. A second challenge arises from the
care ethical claim that all relations are embedded in interdependent
webs, because this insight is strained by the self-sought isolation and
self-sufﬁciency on the part of mainstream FDLS communities. Finally,
this case challenges care ethics in that the FDLS meet some standards
of care well, perhaps better than “outside” communities, who harass
them according to duplicitous standards. All of these are serious and
complicated problems, which I will brieﬂy address in the context of
how a care ethic might respond differently as compared to a justice
perspective, not only to religious pluralities, but also to failures to
care that come in tension with religious freedoms.
To the ﬁrst point, a liberal justice perspective stresses the right of
individuals to exit oppressive circumstances. An ethics of care also
endorses a right to exit under such circumstances but is also bound
to maintain relationships with those who wish to stay, and more precariously, to be left alone. But a care ethical perspective notes that
relationships in the FDLS arguably are also damaged when the dissatisﬁed leave. When Caroline Jessup ﬂed she faced immediate resistance from her two oldest children, protesting that she was “taking
them to hell”. Her oldest daughter, Betty, returned to the FDLS community in Colorado City two days after her 18th birthday. Betty now
avoids her mother and refutes her account. She complains that her
mother’s health problems related to post-traumatic stress disorder
saddled her with many household and child care duties which caused
her “current-traumatic stress disorder” (Adams 2009). What might
care ethics say about such relational damage?
To her credit, Noddings addresses dilemmas posed by competing
perspectives about care competence and incompetence afforded by
religious fundamentalism, which can be extended to the FDLS’
extreme norms of care work, marriage and family (Noddings 2002,
76). She recommends that care ethics avoid remedying relational
damage inﬂicted by oppressive religious beliefs and practices by
inﬂicting more relational damage, and instead seek to mitigate the
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need to strike a “second blow” (Ibid.). She further reﬂects that a relational response recognizes that exposures to different ways of life run
in both directions, and that indeed, “liberal educators and policy
makers may be in greater need of lessons of tolerance than the fundamentalists whose ideas they scorn’’, with top priority given to the
maintenance of “nonviolent relations” and “local dialogue and compromise” (2002, 76-7). However, this approach is complicated in the
case of the FDLS because of the self-sought isolation that is characteristic of such communities.
As noted, this isolation complicates the fundamental tenet of care
ethics that individuals are located within webs of interdependent
relationships. This case drives home that there are varying degrees of
interdependency, and that embedded webs of relations often have
multi-faceted and dynamic layers of insiders and outsiders. The FDLS
are one of several religious communities who, though sharing geographical spaces and legal jurisdictions with larger communities, are
largely self-sustaining in their care relations. They wish to be left
alone to autonomously self-determine their religious and political
affairs, and domestic lives. They eschew the political authority of
state and federal governments, do not recognize the religious authority of the larger religions, and have still less regard for secular interlopers, even when such interlopers are motivated by care.
At the same time, it is possible to say that such attitudes fail to
accomplish the desired isolation, in that members of FDLS communities have been prosecuted not only for rape and child marriage, but
also state welfare fraud. They are subject to media attention and
porous boundaries afforded by those who ﬂee and return to help others, and have opportunities for discursive dialogue with people outside of the community via border town businesses and internet chat
rooms. These more minimally embedded relations pose dilemmas for
both liberal justice and care ethical perspectives, further highlighting
their responsive differences.
While liberal theory and practice is faced with the dilemma of
needing to balance respect for religious freedoms and group rights
against the rights of individual dissidents, care ethical theory and
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practice is faced with the dilemma of being called to care about and
for (and to be cared about and for) members of religiously isolated
communities such as the FDLS, and the need to reconﬁgure relational ties in ways that are minimally damaging. Susan Moller Okin
illustrates this difference when she asks from a liberal perspective
whether multiculturalism is bad for women. Focusing largely on religious teachings and practices imbued with cultural patriarchy, she
concludes that multiculturalism is bad for women, and that liberal
feminists ought to support if not the outright extinction or assimilation of entire cultures into less sexist (and secular) cultures, then the
strong encouragement that cultures self-alter to reinforce the equality
of women (1999).
Responses to Okin’s proposal bring into relief the different voice
of care ethics. This is put poignantly by Bonnie Honig who shifts
Okin’s original question to ask whether feminism is served by liberalism, whose “relentless individualism…feeds a privatization, withdrawist conception of citizenship that is at least tensely related to
feminism’s project of empowering women to act in concert to advance
their own aims” (1999, 39). As Abdullah An-na’im points out, this
approach looks to uphold liberal laws and freedoms without asking
about the failures of some liberal societies to fully provide for an
adequate provision of care, education, and living standards, or “the
implications of cultural extinction for members of minority cultures”
(1999, 60-1). The justice perspective of liberalism is not wrong to
insist on the rights of individuals to exit oppressive communities,
especially when a community affords no other option than to stay
and submit or leave and be shunned. It is also justiﬁed to prosecute
and imprison religious leaders like Warren Jeffs for sexual crimes
against women and children.
But for a care ethical perspective this is not primarily because Jeffs
violated the legal standards of the larger community, but because
(and if) those legal standards are in place to protect those made vulnerable by oppressive or neglectful care relations. A more ideal
approach from a care ethical perspective is to meet the basic needs
of dissidents and dependents, which in time may ideally include them
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returning or reconciling to mend fractured relations, at least with
those who were not direct perpetrators of assault or injury. Okin’s
latter suggestion, to listen to and support dissatisﬁed members of
a religious community, especially young adults, and to create opportunities and spaces for mutual world traveling and reform, is preferable to care ethics than the call for cultural extinction or assimilation. This is because as Yael Tamir notes, such internal reform and
the struggle for it can be seen as part of the preservation of religious
culture (1999, 51). As such, a care ethical approach to the call for
care and solidarity across religious and cultural differences requires
three things: 1) the location of possibilities for the development of
enhanced interdependent relations in order to respond to the needs
of dissidents and traditionalists, 2) the epistemic centering of those
who claim relational harm (or not), and 3) the willingness of outsiders to inspect their own religious and cultural traditions for relational
harms and unmet care needs, as much if not more than others.
Thus, the FDLS directs care ethics to address hypocrisy in the use
of caring norms, which may cast the FDLS as “other” without “theologically spelunking” within the status quo. It must seek to avoid
what Homi Bhaba calls, characterizing Okin’s liberal critique, “a gaze
that is above and elsewhere” (1999, 82). This not only means that
necessary religious reforms are to be primarily initiated from a relational posture that is “side-by-side and within,” but also that this
scrutiny does not exclude religious status quos. Theological spelunking with care ethics requires looking for “caves” in mainstream religious and secular worldviews, and to turn the critical gaze of careethics “within the here and now” of one’s own cultural and religious
spaces. This type of self-reﬂection is ironically endorsed by many
spiritual and religious traditions, including Christianity.7
Considering again the legal interventions into FDLS communities
by U.S. state and federal authorities, from a care ethical perspective
there are notable double standards afoot. Rarely reported is that
7

In Luke 10:42 Jesus teaches, “Why do you look at the speck of sawdust in your
brother’s eye and pay no attention to the plank in your own eye?”
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FDLS communities provide citizens with free communal stores of
food, housing, and health care (Jessup 2007; Wall 2008). Those leaving these gift economies struggle when food and housing must be
“earned” via competitive and scanty paid employment in the larger
liberal U.S. economy. Some FDLS women counter that while they
face challenges like all families, polygyny can offer companionship
and care-sharing, freeing up individual women to pursue their own
ambitions. As noted by O’Neil Parker, this option is not always available to women in mainstream U.S. society. Due to the Covid-19
pandemic, liberal sex/gender norms of care associated with the Protestant work ethic, and the lack of more robust welfare and care support programs, many women in monogamous U.S. households are
ﬁnding their economic opportunities curtailed and their care burdens
multiplied, with little attention devoted to meeting their needs
(Scarff 2020; Smith 2020).
Moreover, there is hypocrisy in the status quo approach to the
FDLS in that many of the abuses evident in the FDLS are also evident in mainstream Christianity. To take one example, RomanCatholicism promotes its own form of glorious womanhood, bars
women from the priesthood, resists birth control and sex education,
and sometimes shuns and excommunicates those it sees as apostates.
This includes those who facilitate abortion, same sex relations, or the
ordaining of women. At times it has shielded male sex offenders
behind a brotherhood of the cloth (Balk 2010; Bonavoglia 2012;
Hornby 2013).8 While Roman-Catholicism and other Cristian
denominations fare better in providing for caring needs through religious charities (as do religions like Islam with its practice of zakat) as
the story of my mother’s wedding bears witness, it, too, has struggled
with how best to maintain relations with converts, dissident “apostates”, and non-Christians.

8
The Association of Roman Catholic Women Priests (ARCWP) says that there
are now more than 124 female priests and 10 bishops worldwide, though the Vatican
considers them excommunicated (Hornby 2013).
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To highlight additional hypocrisies with the status quo use of caring norms to intervene on behalf of those harmed by FDLS policies,
responses by the U.S. justice system to the FDLS fall short of Noddings’ standard of “preventing a second blow” without inﬂicting further damage. The mainstream U.S. media capitalizes on the sensationalism surrounding the FDLS, and state agencies have not always
responded in caring ways to them. In 1953, ofﬁcers from the Arizona
Department of Public Safety and National Guard raided the FDLS
community of Short Creek, arresting 400 polygamists, 263 of whom
were children. 150 of these children were separated from their parents, some of whom were never returned (Driggs 1990; 1992).9 What
is now known as “the Short Creek raid” resulted in decades of broken
relationships and mistrust between the FDLS and state authorities.
A second raid in 2008 on the Yearning for Zion ranch in Colorado
exacerbated tensions even as it yielded vital evidence needed to convict Jeffs (Van Sant 2008). Initiated by what was later determined to
be a fraudulent call for help from a non-FDLS woman posing as an
FDLS child bride-to-be, this raid was fruitful in the interests of justice, but led to another painful detainment of hundreds of FDLS
mothers and children who denied being victims in the ﬁrst place.
Given that an ethics of care stresses the importance of “caring about
caring”, members of isolated communities like the FDLS who request
aid from outsiders should be met with caring response, but so, too,
should their dependents, and those who choose to stay or return.
While the arrest and conviction of Jeffs is justiﬁed as vindication to
his past victims and the prevention of future crimes, care ethics questions the justice response to these crimes absent a plan to improve
larger embedded relations.
As of today, the incarceration of Jeffs has been followed by
improved FDLS religious standards along the lines of Noddings’ recommendations, but this has largely been accomplished by caring
reform from within, and freer collaboration between insiders and
9

This legal practice anticipated what in 2018 became immigration policy under
U.S. President Donald Trump.
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outsiders (Danovich 2019). Activists like Caroline and Flora Jessup,
viliﬁed by most FDLS elders, reveal the possibility of dissent to the
youth, even if at a spatial and philosophical distance. The internet
has opened discourse facilitating broader “theological spelunking”
and world traveling across geographical isolation and religious ideological differences. FDLS bloggers voice the other side of the story,
portraying themselves as a community discriminated against because
of the actions of a few and subject to problematic criminal justice
double standards. As one FDLS blogger puts it, “In a world where
anything goes, why not us?” (FDLS Blogspot). Indeed, one must wonder whether the popular preoccupation with FDLS communities in
the U.S. (via books, television shows and documentaries) has more
to do with voyeuristic religious othering than with concern for gaining a more nuanced understanding of FDLS lives, beliefs, and virtues,
in order to help meet the self-deﬁned needs of FDLS dissidents and
traditionalists. Tronto’s “unsympathetic disregard” cautions against
casting aspersion on religious others who look and live very differently from those in conventional society, because it encourages hypocritical smugness which prevents self-scrutiny of egregious lacks
of support for care in many mainstream religious and secular
communities.
As Noddings recognizes, if there is to be any harmony between
Christian and care ethics, it will be through relational dialogue and
empathy. As my Great-Uncle demonstrated, navigating religious pluralities can be highly personal and emotionally charged. People have
the right to challenge, change, and exit religions that they ﬁnd ill
suited to their needs. But it is best to do so with relational diplomacy
and sensitivity to the value that such religions may play in the lives
and relations of others, in ways that lead to the least amount of relational damage. Reforms of religious beliefs and practices that are
destructive to relationships can be reformed and amended by small
acts of care that bring people together, as much as, if not sometimes
better than, legal interventions by impartial or hostile law enforcement agencies, or ofﬁcial religious institutional reforms.
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Conclusion
In this chapter I used Plato’s allegory of the cave to go “theological
spelunking with care ethics”, showing how Noddings’ critique of the
differences between care and Christian ethics yields religious standards that prioritize care completion and recommend a skeptical,
pragmatic theology. I argued that the New Testament story of Mary
and Martha supports Noddings’ thesis about the incompatibility of
care and Christian ethics to a degree, but that she overlooks some
of their potential afﬁnities. After qualifying Noddings’ care ethical
standards to account for intersectionality, the possibility of care ethical Christian sub-schools, pragmatic openness to supernatural possibilities for care, the contributions of Christianity to the provision of
care, and the desire for relational maintenance, I then applied
Noddings’ analysis to the U.S. state response to the FDLS. I argued
that while care ethics endorses the imprisonment of Warren Jeffs, it
highlights double standards in the liberal state’s justice interventions
and seeks to reduce and improve relational damage caused by them.
Platonic caves of oppressive care and theology abound, and religious
epistemology is eminently suited to create them. But care ethics,
Christianity, and other religions can sometimes agree that a relational
approach helps to explore and escape them, or better yet, improve
them with minimal damage to relationships.
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Spiritual Care: The Spiritual Side
of a Culture of Care
Luigina Mortari

Premise
‘Spirituality’ comes from the Latin word spiritualitas. In Latin, spiritus
is breath, the breath that keeps us in life. In the Italian language,
‘aver spirito,’ to ‘have spirit,’ signiﬁes having an inner energy that
manifests itself in a positive way of being. In ancient Greek, the
spirit, the vital breath, is designated by the term psyché, meaning
‘soul.’ But psyché has another meaning, that of ‘butterﬂy.’ The butterﬂy is an extremely delicate entity, which lives by its beauty: if we
touch the colored patterns on its wings, these patterns are irrevocably
damaged and the butterﬂy, violated in its delicate beauty, will never
ﬂy again. The soul, the spirit that gives life to that being-here that
we are, is like a butterﬂy: it has the energy to ﬂy high but is also
extremely fragile. So our spiritual life requires care.
This chapter will address care for the spiritual life that is the
essence of our human life. The main reference point for this study on
spirituality is ancient Greek philosophy, in particular the theories of
Plato, Aristotle, and Plutarch. The reason for this choice is that
ancient Greek thought, the root of Western culture, offers seeds of
wisdom which, if they become at this historical moment the object
of intense reﬂection, could generate a new politics of existence, more
faithful to the needs of the human condition. Indeed in ancient
Greek philosophy, we ﬁnd the seminal concepts of care, spirituality,
and ethics. Here the spiritual life is conceived as a primary ontological tension, which is in the soul before any systematic interpretation
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given by the different religions. This spiritual activity is the answer
to an originary need that each human being can engage in if he/she
stops any practical involvement and listens to the intimate logos that
speaks inside him/her. As the Spanish philosopher Maria Zambrano
claims, if we stop acting and silence the mind, then the soul can
explore the ‘originary deep root of life,’ a generative matrix that takes
place before any vital concrete phenomenon (2011, 49). To perceive
this “deep root” means to perceive the mystery that accompanies life.
Zambrano suggests that the ﬁrst way in which reality manifests itself
to the human being is that of complete concealment and the ﬁrst
reality that conceals itself to the human consciousness is the essence
of the human condition (2011, 48). To feel mystery is the essential
nourishment of spiritual life. If there is no consciousness of the puzzle
and acceptance of the insolubility of this mystery, there cannot be an
authentic spiritual life.
To nourish the spiritual life is to care for the soul. Nowadays, to
theorize on care is a fundamental cultural ﬁeld; in particular, care
ethics is a discourse essential for a politics of care. But when the
object is spiritual activity, care ethics reveals a limit that obliges us
to rethink it. Indeed, care ethics is based on an embodied conception
of care and forgets the immaterial dimension of human life, but also
the immaterial life requires care. Care is said to have as object “child
care and people who are disabled, chronically ill or elderly” (Robinson
2011, 1). When Fiona Robinson lists the problems that are a consequence of the lack of care, she speaks of health problems (2011, 3).
In short, care is conceived as the action to provide things that are
essential to preserve life and repair it when the body becomes ill:
these are real dramatic problems. But human life is also spiritual life
since to be human means breathing the breath of the soul. For that
ontological quality, care not only requires providing material things
(biological resources, home to inhabit and where to live in the shelter
of the weather, and therapeutic gestures of cure) and provide immaterial things that can nourish the spiritual life.
This study assumes that the ancient Greek philosophy is an essential reference to spiritual care since this tradition has given intensive
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attention to celebrating care as spiritual nourishment (Mortari 2016).
But, since the theories on ethics of care have been developed in the
contemporary culture, it is necessary also to refer to the scholars of
“care ethics”; many of these are women who reﬂect on care starting
from the analysis of their direct concrete experience.
For a rigorous discourse, an obliged step consists in making evident
the ontological primacy of care. Accordingly, I start from an eidetic
phenomenological analysis of the human condition to name its ontological qualities (Mortari 2018); the rationale for this inquiry is that
identifying the ontological essence of human life is a necessary step
to provide a rigorous ground both for a theory of care and for the
cultivation of spirituality. To enroot the discourse in the concrete
reality, the reﬂection is grounded on previous empirical research on
the practices of care (Mortari and Saiani, 2014). Theoretical and
empirical analysis makes evident the need for a new kind of politics
of existence where care, ethics, and the cultivation of spirituality
must become the cornerstone. Since human life is a continuous moving in time that is oriented by the desire for good, then to understand the right way to interpret the spiritual life is to reﬂect on this
tension. Such reﬂection is necessary to discover a practice of caring
spirituality.
The ontological call to care
Much of contemporary philosophy has in many ways betrayed its
original purpose, which is to reﬂect on life to ﬁnd the knowledge of
living, which in ancient Greek is called the ‘technique for living.’
Philosophy seeks knowledge that helps us live and ﬁnd the proper
measure to inhabit our own time; thus, it should be conceived as
a form of practical thought that day by day seeks a living and transformative truth capable of orienting the practice of care for our life.
Saying that philosophy is the philosophy of existence is like saying
that technique of colors is the science of painting
It is essential to seek a technique for living because, as beings, we
are incomplete. We are a bundle of possibilities, which must ﬁnd the
knowledge necessary to give form and meaning to life. Indeed, if we
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carry out a phenomenological analysis of the human condition, we
discover ourselves as uncomplete entities called to become our being.
We are not fully realised, but we are potentialities of being. We are
dynamis, a Greek term that means potentiality not yet unrealised. Our
being exists within the possibility of being. We are energy in search
of form. In ancient Greek, ‘form’ is eidos that also means ‘idea’; this
double meaning shows that our search for a form of life requires an
idea. To be called to give shape to our being means to be called to
transcendence, going beyond what already is, to create the possibilities of a fully human life. Being called to search for a form of life is
the essence of the human condition.
This essence can be problematic for us, insofar as the idea of beinghere is not a thing we have but which we have to search for. This
lack of an ontogenerative idea for shaping our being in the world
makes us radically different from other forms of life. Like other animals, we are part of nature and, as the poet Rilke claims (1996), like
every natural entity, we are at risk since nature protects nothing;
indeed, every entity born to life is abandoned to itself and at risk.
We are not only at risk, but we are also risk-takers, for unlike other
creatures, who are born with a ready-made map for living, we have
to construct our path on our own time. We are not like the migratory
birds that know straight away how to cross the sea; in order to cross
the time of life, we must construct a map that guides the steps of living. We need an idea of life.
Because of this ontological condition, we need a technique for
living, in other words, a philosophy for existence that consists in
orienting the search for the best idea for modeling life and for identifying the actions that are necessary to actualize this idea. Moreover,
this ontologenerative work is challenging because the human condition is fragile and vulnerable. Indeed, we do not have sovereignty
over life, and we are always dependent on the other.
We do not have sovereignty over life because we are positioned in
time beyond our choosing. For our entire lives, we are assigned to time;
like a log dragged into the sea, we are immersed in the continuous ﬂow
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of time without having the possibility to decide the rhythm of living.
We do not have the power to move from not-being to being-there. We
are our potentialities of being-there, but we do not have the primary
potentiality to begin to be in the world.
When we arrive in the world, we ﬁnd ourselves always dependent
on what is other than us. We are dependent on nature because to
conserve life in its biological materiality. We need things that only
the natural world can give us. Yet, we do not live only biological life,
but an immaterial life, and to conserve and nourish this life, we need
things that only the other human beings can give to us. We are relational beings, and all our conditionedness consists in this relatedness.
The lack of sovereignty and the conditionedness make human life
particularly fragile and vulnerable.
The reﬂection on the fact that human beings are conditioned entities is developed by Hannah Arendt (1958, 9). But her discourse
analyzes the ontological dimensions of the “conditionedness,” especially in relation to the physical and manufactured world, without
deepening the problematic dependency of a person concerning others. We must wait for the feminist thought on care to ﬁnd a more
complete and gendered analysis of the dependent condition of human
beings. In particular, the work of Eva Kittay should be considered.
Kittay, starting from the analysis of her experience, deﬁnes the labor
of care as a dependency work by identifying the work of caring with
a practice for those who are inevitably dependent (1999, ix). As
regards the concept of dependency, Kittay outlines that all human
beings are dependent on others. Still, there are some periods of time
(infancy, childhood, old age) where the dependency is more intense
and, for some persons, even becomes an insuperable condition of life
(disabled people, chronic patients). Moreover, dependent persons
require more care: this is an unquestionable phenomenic data. But,
as regards this data, a political dramatic problem is evident: care for
dependent persons is a burden of women, and the women who take
care are in a disadvantaged social position, since the labor of care is
devalued and unpaid (Kittay 1999, xi).
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The sophia of existence
Being called to give a shape to life, the best possible shape, to our
possibilities of existing given our immersion in a condition of fragility
and vulnerability makes it necessary to care for life. Even if there is
not a well-deﬁned concept of care (Hamington 2004, 2), everybody
knows from experience that care is essential to life. Without care, we
cannot live, since to care for life means nourishing and protecting
ourselves, creating the conditions for life to ﬂourish, and to repair life
when the body or the soul suffers injury. Care is an indispensable way
of being since the human condition is that of being called to “care
for oneself by oneself” (Plato, Statesman, 274d). Thus, to care for life
is to care for oneself, for others, and for the contexts in which we
live, both natural and artiﬁcial.
Among contemporary theorists, the ﬁrst thinker who reﬂected on
care was Heidegger (1962). When Heidegger addresses care, he refers
back to an ancient tale whose protagonist Cura gives form to the
human condition by fashioning some clay she ﬁnds along a riverbank.
This mythical tale is a metaphor to say that being-in-the-world means
to have the responsibility to ﬁnd the right way and the right actions
for modeling our being-there. Indeed, we who are dynamis, in other
words, potentialities of becoming something, bring about our potential for being through actions which shape the form of life. The technique of living consists in understanding what actions to carry out in
order to shape a good life and how to put them into practice.
To conceive the technique of living means having the knowledge
and wisdom of care; in other words, knowing what good care is and
how to put it into practice. If human beings possessed the knowledge
and wisdom of living, they would be capable of what Socrates deﬁnes
as “perfect care” (First Alcibiades, 128b), and they would experience
the full pleasure of being in the world. If it is true that care, insofar
as it is a primary ontological action, guides our being-there to its
essence, then having care for oneself and for others is not only a possible ideal for existence but the ﬁrst and originating necessity for
being. In this sense, care is the ethics of being in the world.
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In the First Alcibiades Socrates engages the young Alcibiades in
a dialogue that has as its object the theme of “care for self”. In order
to reach an understanding of what it means to care for oneself,
Socrates explains that it is fundamental to understand the nature of
our essence, and after many dialogic exchanges Alcibiades reaches
the conclusion that our essence is the life of the soul (First Alcibiades,
128c). Beginning with this ontological assumption, care for oneself
is seen to care for the soul. As introduced above, in ancient Greek,
the ‘soul’ is termed psyché, and this term means the vital breath, the
spirit; so, if our essence is in the soul, then it follows that our essence
consists in the spiritual life. If we accept this Platonic ontological
vision, then the primary question for life is to understand how to care
for the soul, for our spiritual life.
But what does it mean, to care for the soul? Socrates guides Alcibiades to understand that to have proper care for the soul (First Alcibiades, 128b) is to care for the virtue of the soul, and that virtue consists in searching for sophia (133b) (in Latin: sapientia), a word
commonly translated as wisdom. Socrates explains to Alcibiades that
the search for sophia consists in knowing our own essence and what
are the good things for life (First Alcibiades, 134d). This search is
a spiritual work, for this knowledge nourishes the life of the soul of
what is the truth for existence. So the sophia, in other words being in
possession of the technique for living, is knowing “the good things”
for life (First Alcibiades, 134d), “the realities that are worthy of love”
(Phaedrus, 250d), those which are to be sought in order to make life
a time worthy of being lived.
The virtue of the soul, which consists in dedicating vital energy
to search for what is good for human life, is the ﬁrst virtue of politics
(First Alcibiades, 134b-c); politics, understood as the actions which
shape our way of living together, needs the sophia, in other words it
needs to know what are the good things for all citizens.
Since this chapter explores the radical importance of thematizing
care with regard to the spiritual life in the present time, the Platonic
theory of “care for soul” is relevant. However, this consideration
should not overlook the limits of the intellectual Platonic theory of
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care: not only is it a theory conceived by men for men, but it is also
focused on the soul and forgets the body as an object of care. Instead,
the feminist theory of care assumes the importance of the body and
analyzes the practice of care as an embodied action (Hamington
2004; Kittay 1999; Kittay and Feder, 2002; Tronto 1993, 2015). Conversely, the necessity to emphasize the embodied side of care brought
some scholars to set aside attention to care for the life of the mind.
Reexamining the concept of care in Plato allows us to rethink care
as a cognitive and spiritual work and, at the same time, to ﬁnd in this
philosophy the ﬁrst conception of politics as a work of care, precisely
the work of caring for the community. Constructing bridges among
different traditions (as Vrinda Dalmiya does by relating care with
both virtue epistemology, which has Aristotelian roots, and the Sanskrit epic, Mahaˉbhaˉrata (Dalmiya 2016)), certainly requires a rigorous
method and epistemic precautions. Still, it can fertilize new generative frameworks of thinking.
The necessity of the good
The ﬁrst virtue of the soul is to remain faithful to the ﬁrst necessity
of human life: to search for the good. Human life is not something
already realised, but it searches for its shape, and the telos, or the
purpose, that guides this existential search is the idea of good. The
search for sophia leads to the “plain of truth” (Phaedrus, 248b) if we
remain faithful to what is of prime necessity for human life, in other
words what is good. Socrates states that perfect care takes place when
we make something better (First Alcibiades, 128b), but in order to
make something better it is necessary to have an idea of good. Thus,
the ﬁrst essential virtue is keeping the soul directed towards the
search for the good, since this is the necessary condition in order to
care for life. The search for the good is the fundamental research for
life. There is not ethics, religion, or spiritual traditions if there is not
the search for the good. And the proper telos (aim) of the spiritual
activity consists in reﬂecting on the good.
The idea of good is fundamental in ancient philosophy: Plato,
Aristotle, Plotinus, Plutarch. But over time ethics has forgotten to
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reﬂect on what is good. The idea of good is not an esoteric notion,
but it is the tool of every human being (Murdoch 1997, 301). Nonetheless, a perfect understanding of this idea cannot be grasped, and
so placing ethical action on the plain of the search for what is good
means taking on a work of thought that can never end. For this reason Murdoch states that the quality of the ethical action is to be
endless (1997, 321). Consequently the practice of care, that is ethical
in its essence, is immersed in an inevitable imperfection, and for this
reason it requires dedicated thinking to examine in depth the ethical
questions that correlate with the question of good.
Plato deﬁnes the idea of good as “the most important knowledge”
(Republic, VI, 505a), because it is only with a knowledge of this idea
that we can discern things of value for life: what is “the most desirable life” (Philebus, 61e). We constantly ﬁnd ourselves faced with
choices, to the extent that we might say the question which indicates
the problematic nature of human life is “what should we do?” and
only the idea of what is good can help us ﬁnd what is truly worthy of
choice (Philebus, 22b). For this reason the idea of the good constitutes
the greatest knowledge, not because this is a knowledge that we reach
at the end of a long path, but because the idea of good should be at
the basis of any research.
The good is what every soul pursues, and because of which a person
carries out all their actions (Plato, Republic, VI, 505d-e). We always
pursue what is good, even when we simply walk, since when we walk,
we suppose that it is better to walk, and conversely, we stand still
when we think that this is good (Gorgias, 468b). In the ﬁrst book of
the Nichomachean Ethics, closely related to the question Plato raises
in the Euthydemus (278e), “Is it not perhaps true that all men wish
for good?” is Aristotle’s statement that every being tends towards
what is good (Nichomachean Ethics, I, 1, 1094a). A faithful interpreter
of Plato and Aristotle, Plotinus writes that the properly human
thought is this: “to move towards what is good and to desire it”
(Enneads, V 6, 5, 5-9), since “the energy of all things is turned towards
what is good” (Enneads, V 6, 5, 15-19).
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If we feel that there is some truth in this vision, then being in the
world according to nature, that is, according to the proper order of
things, means seeking the form of being by situating our search “in
the order of what is good” (Plotinus, Enneads, III 5, 1). To maintain
our desire to search for what is good is to follow the path of the
hedgehog, because as the poet Archilochus says, “the fox knows many
things, the hedgehog just one, but it is a very important one” (fragment 30).
Staying with our thought in reality and following the intimate
order of things means staying within the necessity of the good. The
essence of having care for life is within the order of the most difﬁcult
simplicity: doing that which, and only that which, good asks of us,
even if our vision is imperfect; this is the meaning of staying within
the necessity of the real. Staying within the necessity of the good is an
indicator of a pure choice, that choice where there is no choice
(Murdoch 1997, 332). In this sense doing what is right is “obedience
to reality” (Murdoch 1997, 332). If we reach the point of grasping
what in reality is necessary, the problem of will is no longer an issue
since the right action becomes that of obeying reality itself.
The expression “staying within the necessity of the real” might be
perceived as problematic in that it seems to subtract value from liberty, but in reality it asserts that the greatest liberty consists in
answering the call of what is good. A passage from the Republic reinforces this point. Socrates claims that the person who is lacking in
education is the one who confuses what is necessary with what
is good (493c). This statement might seem to be in contrast with
the thesis of the identity between the necessary and the good, but the
statement should be interpreted in light of Socrates’ observations in
the immediately preceding lines, where he states that the person who
lacks education is the one who has no real knowledge of what is highminded or shameful, good or bad, just or unjust, and thus tends to
deﬁne as good the things which he likes and as bad those things
which make him suffer (493c), thus mistaking “subjective necessity”
for the “true necessity” which lies in the objective order of things.
Subjective necessity is deﬁned as “Diomedean necessity”, which
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consists in the compulsion to do only the sort of things that please
us, and not the things that are truly good and beautiful (493d). Staying within the necessity of the real means following the good necessity: the necessity is suggested by what is good, adhering to that
which will grant us the feeling of maximum liberty. Knowing what is
good not subjectively but objectively, that is, means knowing the
truth of living. This truth does not require great effort; rather, it
activates an intimate consensus of the soul. Truth, which is knowledge of what is necessary to do good, is the real fount of free acts, the
only generator of true sense, the one which gives life to life. By acting
in accordance with the necessity of what is good we experience an
instant of maximum intensity of being in the world. To live according
to the sense of what is necessary requests that form of passivity in
which the maximum intensity of the being-there is realised.
This thesis about the good is not the result of an abstract reasoning, but comes from an analysis of experience. When we ask a person
who has carried out actions which have been deﬁned by others as of
good care, in the sense that they have had the effect of making
another feel to have experienced something good, he/she replies in a
very simple and effective way from which it is easy to infer that doing
something which does good to the other is something which is necessary and
which he/she does simply because it must be done, almost without thinking
about it. A nurse who did not spare her energies in the most difﬁcult
early moment of the coronavirus epidemic (February to May 2020),
spoke to me about the difﬁcult situation she found herself facing in
times of exhaustion. Patients were arriving one after the other and
there was very little time and not enough staff. She said: “I didn’t
dwell on the thoughts, by thinking too much, I just do what I have
to do” (Luisa). When we grasp what we must do in order to do good,
the mind does not need to come up with complex reasons or elaborate thinking, we just act as the necessity of good asks to us and that
is all.1
1

The work of thinking, which is typical of philosophizing, makes sense if it is
not only “thinking on the desk” but “thinking into the reality”; for this reason,
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María Zambrano claims that at the moment of decision the conscience aches a “subtle suffering” because to decide to act always
involves a kind of violence (2011, 72). But the empirical research on
the act of deciding in the practice of care reveals that those who act
by obeying to the necessity of the good do not avoid the sufferance
of the decision; it is a sort of pure action. The analysis of decisionmaking processes shows it not true that “moral choice is often a mysterious matter” (Murdoch 1997, 342); rather it is very clear, becoming mysterious only if we seek in the agent the conﬁrmation of
sophisticated philosophical reasonings carried out in the abstract.
The straightforward yet essential way of reasoning of those who are
engaged in the practice of care “is not a proof that convinces those
who prefer subtle reasonings, but only the wise men” (Phaedrus,
245c). The thinking of just people, which is to say those people capable of a just care, is always very simple and essential. The ethical
agents reasons thus: reality demands something good and so that is
what is done. The actions which have “most purity, most energy, most
life” are carried out without the need for complicated acts (Plotinus,
Enneads, I 4, 10, 25-30). Ethics is far removed from any calculation

I cultivate the reﬂection on the philosophical traditions and the empirical inquiry
at the same time. To stay with the thinking among the things, by listening to the
voice of people, is a form of teaching, which I have learned from two women philosophers: María Zambrano and Simone Weil. There is a rich truth in the telling full
of sufference of a nurse, in the telling full of passion of a teacher, in the telling
full of ethical dilemmas of a social worker, than in some books about care. When
you adopt the phenomenological method, which emphasizes thematizing across phenomena, it happens that some theorizations shatter under the impact of the experience. Nobody can spoil the value of Levinas’ thought, that provides useful categories
to meditate on care; however the analysis of caregivers’ reasonings shows that his
theory, according to which “the responsibility for the other can not have begun in
my commitment, in my decision” (1998, 10), is not in accordance with the data that
emerge from the analysis of the ways of reasoning a caring person develops when he/
she is challenged by a critical decision. Indeed, to care for the other always requires
a decision and it is just because I take the decision to act for the other that I can
care for her/him. Perhaps it is true that “the good … has chosen me before I have
chosen it” (Levinas 1998, 11), but if my conscience does not decide to obey to the
call of the good there is not the possibility of an authentic ethical presence.
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(Aristotle, Ret., 1389a), from any rules, from any self-obligation.
Ethics of care is answering with solicitude to the quest of making
good.
Obedience to reality does not mean accepting everything which
happens; this is blindness. Rather, it means keeping our desire oriented towards the ﬁrst necessary choice, which is guided by the search
for what is good. Desire leads to something good if, as the ancient
Greek afﬁrmed, it is kata physis, that is, in accordance with nature.
Acting in accordance with nature is quite different from acting in
spontaneous fashion, and means keeping faithful to the order of the
real; such is the desire which is an expression of the tension felt by
the soul and the soul in its originating tension, seeks that which is
good. The Stoic philosopher Zeno maintained that the human being
is required to be coherent with the nature of things and that this is
the ﬁrst virtue (Radice 2018, 87). We can understand this thesis if,
when we translate the Greek term physis with the word nature, we
understand it not as a collection of natural entities but as a living
energy, the energy which makes all things be. Since the energy of the
human being is a part of natural energy, when it acts in search for
what is good, it acts in accordance with nature, for every entity which
exists seeks the good. In this sense seeking what is good is obedience
to the necessity of the real. Adhering to the necessity of the real
means keeping our desire anchored in reality: as reality asks for what
is good, the proper desire is to respond to the request for the good.
This is the ethical nucleus of the right and good action of care.
According to Murdoch, it is the idea of perfection which should be
at the heart of ethical reﬂection, and which should be sought beginning with the question “how can we make ourselves better?” (1997,
364). Instead, it is a mistake to assume that this is the central question of ethics, as it leads the individual to concentrate on himself.
It is a misleading question because it is not realistic in the sense that
it does not adhere to the quality of the real; as a question it is not
faithful to the ecology of life where everything is interconnected, and
insofar as it is not realistic it cannot be ethical. Besides, excessive
attention to this question risks generating attitudes of neurosis. It is
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the idea of what is good that should be at the heart of ethics and
which should constitute the object of thought.
The ﬁrst ethical question, that is the essential question of care, is
how to make something good. This is what ethics consists of. Ethics
comes from the Greek éthos, which means not only habit and character, as it is usually understood, but above all dwelling, or home. When
the human being is born he does not yet have his dwelling place;
when he/she is born he/she ﬁnds himself with his/her roots in the
earth and his/her branches stretched towards the sky, and from this
position he/she must search for a home where he/she can inhabit the
time of his life. He/she must seek a home for his soul, what Socrates
calls “the plane of truth” (Phaedrus, 248b). Since constructing the
home of the soul is having care for life, the knowledge to construct
the home, in other words ethics, is the ethics of care. Ethics, the
wisdom of inhabiting the earth and living under the sky, is, then,
the wisdom of care, thus requiring both a concrete involvement in care
actions and the practice of the care for the soul, since, without cultivating the soul we do not have the possibility to develop the intimate
cognitive and affective postures that constitute the essence of care.
Before developing the other parts of the discourse, it is necessary
to explicate the relation between care ethics in its feminist root and
the conception of ethics delineated here. Care ethics is a feminist
perspective (Bowden 1997; Bubeck 1995; Gilligan 1982; Noddings
1984; Held 2006) and the feminist tradition would appear not compatible with the male-dominated philosophy of Plato and Aristotle
that, instead, constitutes the main reference of the present conception of ethics that is developed in this study. But, through my empirical research on the practice of care, I have found the same ethical
core, in the sense that at the core of the ancient philosophy as well
as at the core of the action of care there is the question of good.
My method of inquiry is phenomenology as way of inquiry that
searches for the essence of the things and the phenomenological
method is the analysis of a phenomenon. Care is a practice and as
a practice is a phenomenon. By following the phenomenological
method I investigated many practices of care worked out by mothers
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with children in foster care, teachers, social workers, educators, and
nurses. Through interviews and narratives, I searched for grasping
what is the essence of the work of care: it resulted that when a person
cares for he/she searches for a good experience for oneself, or for the
other, or for the community. This indicated that the decision to care
for the other is the desire to create the conditions that allow he/she
to have experience of the good.
Ethics is ﬁrst of all a practice: the practice of searching what makes
possible to have an experience of good. From the analysis of experience it resulted that at the core of ethics of care there is the search
for good. But that is the main question of the Platonic and Aristotelian thought. To care is to search what is good for the other. It is on
this concrete phenomenic data that it is legitimate to take into consideration the Platonic reﬂections on good in order to construct
the meaning of the ethics of care. As Iris Murdoch states (1997), the
problem of the modern and the contemporary philosophy consists in
forgetting the question of good and the analysis of care demonstrates
the necessity to go back to the thought of Plato for take those reﬂections that are important for going to the essence of care.
In summary: (a) care ethics assumes care as the pivotal way of
acting and care means placing the other at the center of action; it is
radically different both from the Kantian normative conception of
ethics and from the utilitaristic view. (b) Also the ancient Greek
ethics is neither normative nor utilitaristic, since it conceives the
ethical way of being not as an application of rules but a practice based
on a continuous reﬂection on the question of good. (c) The analysis
of the practices of care makes evident that good care is ethical in its
essence since it is moved by the aim to contribute to the other have
experience of a better condition; at the center of the thought of
a caregiver there is the question of the good of the other: if we analyze this statement we ﬁnd in it both the situational view of care
ethics and the primary place of good of the ancient philosophies. This
ﬂow of reasoning makes evident that it is necessary to avoid any ideological preclusion about some traditions of thought. The reality
teaches to build bridges and not to establish separations.
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Yet there is no science of the good
In the First Alcibiades Socrates raises a fundamental question: “what
does taking perfect care consist of (128b)?” If we accept the vision
according to care seeks what is good, then it follows that good and
just care should have as its reference point the perfect idea of what
is good. In other words, what are the things of value, those which
make life worth living? But in Platonic ontology what is perfect and
right is only that which is outside time. It is something both pure
and transparent, from which the truth of all things ﬂows. Thus even
were the perfect idea of good to exist, it would not be accessible to
our imperfect gaze; such an idea is not accessible to ordinary thought,
which is to say thought which moves in time, but only to a thought
which is not a thought, which realises itself in contemplation; and
contemplation is a kind of thinking that does not act and does not
develop. The contemplative soul is described in the Phaedrus (247b-c):
it takes its stand on the high ridge of heaven and a circular motion
carries it around those things which must be known. In contemplation there is no movement for the soul, but it is moved around; the
soul ﬁnds itself in a situation of entrustment to an energy different to
itself, which moves it. It is this condition of passivity which allows
knowledge of the essence of things. But for us, even while we are
stardust which yet retains something of the essence of the real, it is
not possible to remain within a condition of pure passivity. Our mode
of being is always that of action, and this goes for thought as well.
According to Plotinus, thought which manages to approach what
is good cannot be ordinary thought, which thinks by means of differences and opposites and proceeds by reasoning: it can only be intuition (Plotinus, Enneads, V 6, 6), that is, the thought that sees the
thing with absolute immediacy. But intuition thus conceived is not
available to human reason which acts upon the object; thought always
takes as its starting point a circumscribed space within which the
process of “adaptation” and “assimilation” of the object takes place.
In the thought of the ancients, the good is something perfect and
whole, which does not lend itself to being grasped through the
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technicalities of reason and its need to analyse and separate, in order
then to re-compose. This is perhaps why Murdoch—even though she
does not quote Plotinus—maintains that thought which thinks what
is good is in some way analogous to prayer (1997, 356), deploying this
term to refer not to a religious practice but to a way of thinking
which realises itself in full attentiveness to the object.
The reference to contemplation is therefore difﬁcult to sustain, for
the mind engaged in understanding something obscure has a need to
act upon the object. We come into the world called upon to act;
having care, which is our proper mode of being, cannot but be an
action, and this holds also for the life of the mind, in the sense that
thought which has care for ideas, realises itself through diverse cognitive moves. We cannot but act, and therefore entrust ourselves to the
imperfect way of thought which is accessible to us.
If we discard contemplation as a mode of knowledge, we are left
with thought in its normal form as the human mind knows it: thinking which knows that it always has to search and thereby proceed by
successive approximations within a reality which always retains an
area of opacity. The thinking which seeks a true knowledge of human
affairs is the thinking which manifests itself, as the Socratic method
teaches us, by circling repeatedly around questions (Philebus, 24d-e).
A divine mind does not need to ‘construct’ truth, but since it is
capable of a perfect realism, which consists in being able to see
the thing just as it is, truth is something which is welcomed in; the
human mind on the other hand proceeds by way of reasoning, and
reasoning proceeds by degrees. In this proceeding, which can be long
and arduous, there may be many obstacles to make us stumble, many
choices to be made along the path to be followed, and all of these
moments imply something impure which sneaks in. For this reason,
what is to be sought is the greatest clarity of thought and purity of
attention (Murdoch 1997, 356). Seeking “clarity and purity” (Philebus, 57c) means avoiding fantasy, which “can prevent us from seeing
a blade of grass just as it can prevent us from seeing another person”
(Murdoch 1997, 357), and seeking words which help us to see reality
in its essence, avoiding the opacity of that way of thinking which

138

LUIGINA MORTARI

approaches things in a manner already conditioned by pre-structured
theories.
The thinking which seeks to grasp the essence of the good is thus
arduous work, but even if we cultivate thought in the best way possible, the idea of good is destined to remain inaccessible. Such an idea
is not knowable by human reason because it is of a different order,
the mind being of the same quality as life: uncertain, fragile, always
lacking something. Plato warns us that knowledge of the good is not
of this world, in that if someone were to reach the point of acquiring
this knowledge, he would become a stranger to other human beings,
to the extent of being persecuted because nobody would be able to
understand what he was saying (Republic, VI, 516e-517a). It is given
only to divine creatures to know the idea of good, and even were they
to be able to explain it, we would not understand the deﬁnition, such
is the perfection of the idea of good compared to the imperfection of
human thought (Xenophanes, fragment 34).
It is disorienting to note that the mind thinks ideas which it cannot
comprehend, as it is when the mind thinks of the idea of the inﬁnite.
It thinks ideas which it cannot hold within the borders of its reasonings. And yet it can conceive of them without them appearing mere
invention or fantasy. We can conceive some ideas because our
thought is no other than the thought which governs the real, since
as all the things also we are part of the logos of the universe; however
we cannot explain them since the logos that permeates the universe
is present in our mind only in small and insigniﬁcant amounts (Philebus, 29c). The perfect idea of good is not given to us. It would therefore be out of place to seek the “entire knowledge of all things” (Philebus, 30b), while we can search for the “sophia of the human things”
(Apology of Socrates, 20d).
In spite of the impossibility of deﬁning good, we cannot avoid
taking on this search because we will never be able to know what it
is best to seek and to do if we do not know what is good (Plotinus,
Enneads, VI 7, 19). But what we need to seek is an idea of good which
is consonant with the quality of the human condition; “a mortal
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being must have mortal, not immortal thoughts” (Epicharmus, fragment 20). For this reason Socrates suggests shifting our attention:
“let’s abandon the quest for what the good itself is… it is too big
a topic” and he proposes examining questions that are offspring of the
good, which is to say questions which are congruent but of lesser difﬁculty (Republic, 506e). If we are in authentic search for the truth, it
is possible to reach the threshold of the house where the good inhabits (Philebus, 64c).
The practical idea of good
The idea of good to be sought cannot then be the perfect idea, which
is situated in the space of realities which are always identical to themselves and which know no change (Philebus, 59c), but it must be an
idea congruent with human nature and at the same time daughter of
the perfect idea of good (Republic, 506e). Such is the idea of “the
practical good” which is realised through actions (Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, I, 7, 1097a 23), for it is actions which constitute the
essential element of existence, in that the quality of life depends
largely on them (Nichomachean Ethics, I, 10, 1100b 33). Care ethics
is not a theory, but it is a way of being in relationship with the other,
which is guided by a practical idea of good. We are placed within
reality not as spectators, whose being consists in contemplating what
takes place, but as agents. Action, through gestures and words, is
a property of the human being; the good to be sought is, as a consequence, something which is conﬁgured as the outcome of actions.
Indeed, the question which characterizes our being in the world and
as such is an index of the problematic nature of human condition is
“what are we to do?”.
The following question is therefore decisive: which actions should
be carried out? According to Aristotle they are those actions which
allow us to have experience of eudaimonia (Nichomachean Ethics, I, 4,
1095a 18-19). At this point, in order to verify if the meaning of
eudaimonia is pertinent to the practice of care, it is vital to clarify the
meaning of the this term. Generally eudaimonia is translated by “happiness”, but here we should attempt a literal, more faithful meaning.
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The Greek word eudaimonia is composed of ‘eu’ and ‘daimon’; ‘eu’
means “in a good way” and ‘daimon’ means not only the divinity, and
precisely the divinity that dispenses destiny, but also spirit. In many
dialogues Socrates speaks of his daemon, that is his conscience, which
tells him what he must not do. Eudaimonia, understood as the good
to which the human being tends, therefore consists in a good quality
of the life of the soul.
The meaning attributed here to the term ‘eudaimonia’ is supported
by a passage of Philebus (11d), where, after posing the question of
good, Socrates turns to his interlocutors Protarchus and Philebus and
asks them to indicate the condition and disposition on which depends
the potential of the soul to reach a “good eudaimonia”. From this
passage we deduce that eudaimonia is held to consist in a way of being
of the soul. When Aristotle states that “the greatest goods are those
of the soul” (Nichomachean Ethics, I, 8, 1098b 14-15) and that these
goods consist in its actions and its activities, he is expressing his
complete accord with the Socratic/Platonic thesis. The actions and
activities of the soul are the spiritual practices through which we
realise care for self (Hadot, 2002).
Eudaimonia is a perfect good because it is always chosen for itself,
never in view of anything else (Nichomachean Ethics, I, 7, 1097a 34);
it is the thing which is most beautiful and most good, and therefore
also the most pleasing (Eudemian Ethics, I, 1, 1214a 7-8). The term
eudaimonia indicates “living well” and since the human being is essentially an agent, “living well” is the same as “acting well” (Eudemian
Ethics, II, 1, 1219b 1-2; Nichomachean Ethics, I, 4, 1095a 19-20).
When a person cares for another one, she/he acts guided from the
aim to procure a better condition for her/him; at the basis of her/his
behavior there is the awareness that to act in a right way is the most
important thing. The wellbeing of the soul springs up from this ethical kind of action. Thus, we can afﬁrm that the practice of care, when
it meets the needs of the other in the right way, procures eudaimonia
both to the caregiver and the cared for.
Care ethics reveals itself in the practice, which results to be meaningful for the caregiver even if care is a labor that requires a demanding
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involvement. This occurs because to care is to act in a just way and the
awareness of it is sufﬁcient to make someone feel a positive sentiment
in his/her conscience.
When I act to care for myself as well as when I act to care for
another, what is crucial is the idea of good. At this regard, the practice of care teaches me that it is not only necessary to search for
a concrete, immanent idea of good embodied in the daily life (about
this, it is possible to speak of a materialistic spirituality as the generative matrix of care ethics), but also to cultivate a manner of thinking
that is congruent with both the human limits of thinking and the
essence of care. With the help of the thought of the Spanish philosopher María Zambrano we can speak of a maternal thinking, that is
“narrative, humble, non-polemical, situated and compassionate”
(2003, 91).
A humile thinking is aware that it is not given to us to “seize what
is good in a single idea” (Philebus, 65a), but we must come to the
question by degrees, through a plurality of questions which move
between the opposites in which the movement of the real can polarize itself. The perfect idea of good pertains to a reality which is perfectly realised and always identical to itself, while we inhabit a reality
which is a place of mixing, where the good is mixed with the bad,
the just with the unjust, the beautiful with the ugly. Our mind is lost
if it seeks a perfect idea, because it is neither conceivable nor sayable
to a thought which thinks through differences: just as the life in
which we ﬁnd ourselves is a becoming between opposites: hot/cold,
dry/wet, fast/slow and so on, so ordinary thought can ﬁnd ideas which
guide our actions by reasoning through difference. These are the
questions which Socrates indicates as essential: “what is good and
what is bad, what is admirable, what is shameful, what is just
and what is unjust” (Plato, Gorgias, 459d). These are the primary
questions, which the mind cannot avoid examining if it does not wish
to dissipate itself far from what is essential. By examining these questions the soul comes to ﬁnd itself on the threshold of good.
These are difﬁcult questions which we must turn back to again and
again (Plato, Philebus, 24d-e). When Plato/Socrates enunciates the
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principle of returning again and again to questions, he is describing
the movement of the blissful soul which is led in a circle in its contemplation of ideas, with the difference that here on earth, where we
inhabit, the mind is not led but must gather up all its energies to take
forward the work of this search. In order to ﬁnd this epistemic energy,
the thought which goes in search for truth, and with it other “things
worthy of love” (Phaedrus, 250d), must be a thinking enamoured of
the things to be loved.
But the property of the human condition is not only a thinking
which proceeds by degrees and reasons through differences, but also
that which happens with the other. We are relational beings, and we
structure ourselves in relation with others. If in the pure world of
ideas thinking is a contemplation of the soul which alone with itself
keeps its gaze concentrated on the ideas which are always there, in
the imperfect and complicated world in which we live the search for
truth can only come about through dialogue with others, where
minds come together and assist each other. In this sense thinking is
engaging in dialogue, and those who engage in dialogue in the search
for truth are said to both be capable of a thinking enamoured of those
questions worthy of love (Philebus, 24e).
Counter-hegemonic spiritual care
The notion of spiritual care can be at risk when it is interpreted only
as an intimate practice, since it can retire from the world. If Socrates
indicates care for the soul as a preparation for the political life, we can
also state that spiritual care is imperative for acting according to an
ethics of care, since the labor of the soul that is in search for an ethics
of life is an essential component of ethics and politics of care.
In this perspective, the discipline of spiritual care should challenge
the tendency to interpret life on the basis of an acquisitive logic.
Murdoch states that “we are blinded by self” (1997, 382) and egoism
is functional to nourish the market logic which grounds neoliberalism, and this antipolitical and dangerous vision contrasts the practice
of care and makes more vulnerable both the recipients of care and
the caregivers. In order to cultivate a spiritual care able to challenge
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the acquisitive logic it is necessary to reﬂect on the essence of the
human condition.
When human being becomes self-conscious, he/she discover
a lack: a need for something other, and at the same time an obligation towards transcendence and thus to move in the world in search
of a form of life. When we leave for a trip in search of something we
pack our rucksack with whatever we need for the journey; for that
journey which is life the human being does not have a rucksack to
begin with, not a compass, and is aware of his constitutive lack: a lack
of those things necessary for life and a lack of a map of the directions
for existence. For this reason he/she is assailed by a form of avidity
for what he/she feels necessary in order to exist. This yearning for
something other, lies at the origin of the action of self-care, and is
the motivating drive which gives strength. But this desiring tension
has to ﬁnd the right measure, the mid-point between excess and
defect; without this, it becomes a form of avidity, which transforms
existence into an obsessive process of acquisition. Plutarch asserted
that an essential action of the technique for living is to avoid excessive love of self (471d); indeed the perversion of the human mind
when it is never satisﬁed with anything is the cause both of grief and
suffering and of a consumistic logic that consumes the time of life.
The language we use is very often inclined towards acquisitive
logic to the point of legitimising it. For example, when Plotinus says
that “happiness consists in the possession of the true good” (Enneads,
I 4, 6, 0-5), he leads us to think of good as an object which can be
acquired. In this case he uses the ancient Greek term ktésis that indicates not simply having, but possessing as in taking hold of the thing,
and he evokes a mercantile vision in that he indicates that something
can be acquired. For this reason having care of spiritual life demands
ﬁrst of all a critical reﬂection on the words that we use.
Egotism has its root in our unﬁnished being; we are insufﬁcient to
ourselves and always in need of something other. Because where there
is lack we ﬁll the need to ﬁll empty space (Plato, Philebus, 35a); from
absence is born desire and the desiring being always seeks something
to ﬁll the void (Plato, Philebus, 35b). It is from unbearable emptiness
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that acquisitive tension originates, the tension we ﬁnd represented in
the ﬁgure of Penia. In the Symposium, we read that Penia, or poverty,
comes to beg at the banquet organised to celebrate the birth of
Aphrodite. At the banquet, Penia ﬁnds Poros, or expediency, who
falls asleep, drunk on nectar. To ﬁll the lack in her being Penia comes
up with a plan to have a child by Poros and lies down with him, and
thus gives birth to Eros (Symposium, 203b-c). Eros, love, is thus born
from poverty and expediency, and such is his essence: to be poor,
lacking, and always in search of something that can ﬁll that lack. For
this reason Eros is the metaphor of the human condition, our being
always in need of something other and as such needing to seek out
what might ﬁll that original lack. We are active beings moved by our
desires.
What prompts our actions are our desires. In ancient Greek, the
term which indicates desire is epithymia, which is composed of epi and
thymos: thymos is the vital force, the soul understood as a way of feeling and desire, and epi indicates standing over; thus desire is a posture
of mind which leans over something and that something is the idea
of good towards which we tend. When what prevails is an egoistic
idea of good, a gaze enclosed within the conﬁnes of our own skin, the
search for good becomes an individualistic doubling down which forgets our relational essence, and thus the possibility of being in accordance with the order of things vanishes. Only when the good that we
seek is open to the transcendent with regard to the self does it create
movement which opens the actualisation of our own being in the
world to something other which is beyond ourselves. Precisely because
we are relational beings, it is only when the good we seek lies outside
our own personal space that we move in accordance with the order
of things.
However in our uncompleted and wishful condition there is also
a tension between what exists and what lies beyond ourselves. This
tension moves our being to the search for the true and good; it is our
condition of neediness which makes us “searchers of knowledge for
the whole of our lives” (Symposium, 203d). But feeling ourselves
uncompleted can become a vortex pushing us to all sorts of expedients
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to acquire everything that has the appearance of ﬁlling our sense of
insufﬁciency.
The way of egoism, which interprets good as the ﬁlling up of our
own emptiness, is the opposite to the way of care. We have said that
care is the search for good, or rather those fragments of good that are
accessible to us. According to Murdoch these fragments are lived in
concrete forms by simple people. By putting into play the concept of
simplicity, Murdoch is saying something essential about the good
practice of care and it is worth to interpret this concept from a caring
feminist perspective.
Feminist theorists argue that care ethics is radically different from
a systematic approach (Noddings 1984; Held 2006). Care ethics is
not conceptualized in a normative system of principles and rules,
it is not the application of a norm that pretends to have a universal
value, instead it is a practical response to the need of the other
in a concrete situation and an immediate response to this particular
condition. As the nurse Luisa explained, when the other, who
depends on my actions, shows a need, the conscience has not to make
reference to general rules and does not need to rest and engage in
complex reasonings; what the mind feels is the urgency to make
something for the other in order to make him/her live as well as possible (Tronto 2015, 4), and this requires a simple but essential way of
thinking. To act on the basis of a simple and essential reasoning must
not be interpreted as a spontaneous practice since the caregiver, who
works out a good care, is acting in the light of an ethical perspective
that is gained through a reﬂection on life, only that this ethics is not
normative, i.e. it does not come from general rules, but from the
awareness that each human being searches for the good and the right
way to be in relationship with the other consists in dedicating our
own practice to this research. In this sense, care ethics is a simple
ethics, but a simplicity that involves all the arduous labor of the mind
to ﬁnd what is right to do. What is essential rests on what is simple,
but the simplicity of the essential things for life are the most
arduous.
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If Murdoch helps us to see the essential simplicity of the ethical
practice, however, she makes an assertion that is very problematic
from the point of view of a feminist theory of care ethics. She identiﬁes simplicity in the “humble people who serve others” (1997, 381).
That assertion evokes the marginal position in which many female
caregivers are conﬁned (Tronto 1993) and at the same time reveals
the misunderstanding of care as a service (Bubeck 1995). It is necessary to avoid such an oblative vision of the ethical habit that legitimates a disposition to sacriﬁce. Instead, consider the idea of simplicity starting with an expression in the Christian Gospels that has
engaged philosophers from Husserl to Zambrano: “poverty of spirit
and purity of heart.”
It is difﬁcult to interpret this expression, for to grasp its full signiﬁcance would be to go to the heart of being. Nonetheless, it would
seem that “poverty of spirit” is given when we can keep to what is
essential, following the ways of knowledge directed towards the primary question and seeking the essential truth of this question. “Purity
of heart” can be thought of as being able to focus vital energy on
cultivating the feeling which has the force to sustain the search for
the real sense of being: trust, hope, serenity. These feelings keep us
removed from the tendency to facile consolations, to run after fantasies, and to keep our attention on the difﬁculty of the real. Purity of
heart is an absence of desires which distance us from the just order
of things and is given over to the necessity of the call to good; poverty
of thought is the capacity to bracket off those thoughts which claim
to systematise the real, distancing us from the real search for truth.
Thus we can say that care for the spiritual life is what sustains
clear thought and pure feeling, and spiritual care is the ground for
a good practice of care since the right action is sustained by the clarity
of thought and purity of feeling. This is the spiritual core of care ethics.
And since care is primary in life, care ethics has to be considered the
very essence of ethics.
It is necessary to further clarify to avoid a misleading interpretation of the spiritual life concerning care. The spiritual life develops
in a right way when it responds to what is necessary for life, and what
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is necessary is the truth, precisely the truth of existence. In contrast,
science searches for the scientiﬁc truth that is useful to understand
the phenomenic world, spiritual work searches for the truth that illuminates our being-in-the-world-with-the-others. But this truth is not
only an outcome of reasoning but it is gained through action. Precisely, the truth of existence is realised in actions that change the
human experience for the better.
Thus, spiritual life is not a mere interior activity since, if conceived in this way, it would divert from the world; instead, it is
a pragmatic activity since it is made of thoughts and sentiments that
are embodied in the material experience. Only the experience we live
with the others is the test of the truth. So, we can speak of materialistic spirituality.
The essence of actions of care
Since we, as human beings, are essentially entities who act, a good
quality of life depends on the quality of our actions. It is therefore of
fundamental importance to determine which actions are associated
with the good. If we can answer this question, we can come to identify
the agency that deﬁnes good care, that care which seeks what is good.
If we consider the experience of people who are thought of as
being witnesses to good care, it is self-evident that their action consists of acts which it takes no conceptual stretch to deﬁne as virtuous:
they have respect for the other person, they act with generosity, they
conduct themselves with a sense of justice, and they know how to ﬁnd
the proper measure in doing things. When it is necessary, they have
courage.
This phenomenological data, which indicate the essence of care in
virtues, ﬁnds noetic evidence in the thoughts of the ancients. For
Aristotle, who conceptualised the idea of “practical good,” virtuous
actions are decisive (Nichomachean Ethics, 1100b 8-10). Acting well
means acting in accordance with virtues (Eudemian Ethics, II, 1, 1219a
28). Thus we can say that the ethics of care is the ethics of virtues.
Plato and Aristotle are in complete agreement as to which actions
might make us feel good. Socrates says that the good of the soul
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consists in the virtues (Philebus, 48e), and Aristotle states that the
good of the human being consists precisely “in the activity of the soul
in accordance with virtue” (Nichomachean Ethics, I, 7, 1099b 26). In
other words, “the activity of virtue is the best good for the soul”
(Eudemian Ethics, II, 1, 1219b 32-33). It follows from this that searching for good means acting in accordance with virtue. Thus if we were
to seek the answer to the essence of “perfect care,” we might say it
was that which seeks good by acting according with virtue.
But since the good we seek is a practical good, the actions of the
soul are not enough: we also need the practical ones. Indeed Aristotle
states that for a good life, we need movements of the soul in accordance with virtue and the practical actions that draw inspiration from
them (Nichomachean Ethics, I, 8, 1098b 10-14/13-14). For this reason
he speaks of dianoetic or intellectual virtues, that is the virtues that
inform the search for science, and political virtues, that is the practical ways of acting in the public world.
We need to be clear what we mean by the term “virtue.” It is
a potentiality of being (Rhetoric, I, 1366a), that is to say, the way in
which we model our energy, our substance, orienting it towards the
search for good. Thus we can say that virtue is to live according to
nature, since it is to act in accordance to the order of things that for
the human being is the search for good.
With regard to the platonic question as to whether virtue is single
or many, the answer is as follows: since for everything there is an
essence which deﬁnes it, the same holds for virtue and its essence
consists in orienting action according to the good, but since the
modes by which it manifests its essence are different, virtues are
many. Indeed, when Aristotle speaks of virtue in the singular he is
describing the essence of the virtues as a whole; when he speaks in
the plural he is listing the modes of modelling being which actualise
essence: justice, courage, temperance, generosity, magnanimity, liberality, wisdom and knowledge (Rhetoric, I, 1366a).
Virtues, states Aristotle, “are necessarily a good, in that those who
practice them feel good and are in a condition to do good things and
to act well” (Rhetoric, I, 1362b). Virtues differ according to the energy
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on which they act. Virtues of the soul [in Greek: aretai psychés] are
the way of orienting its energy; virtues of the body [in Greek: aretai
somatos] are the way of nourishing and conserving its energy well,
keeping it healthy and looking well (Rhetoric, I, 1361b 1362b). Both
care for the self and care for the other need spiritual virtues and material virtues; a good maternal care gratitude the soul of the child
through vital and gentle words and cultivates his/her body with
gestures that communicate the best respect and delicacy. The physician or the nurse reveals to be a good caregiver when he/she is related
to the patient by having respect and delicacy both for his/her soul
and body.
Starting from this reasoning it is possible to reinterpret the ethics
of virtues. On the basis of a disembodied culture who tends to interpret virtues as disembodied acts, when we speak of “moral or civic
virtues” we tend to interpret them as relational acts that are put in
place from an agent who considers the other only as a rational being,
without a body. Instead, a good politics of care, as suggested by the
feminist thought, is a care that gives attention both to the material
life and the spiritual life.
Spiritual practices
Since good actions of care must be infused by good spiritual acts, an
authentic philosophy of existence is incomplete if it does not indicate the actions necessary to cultivate the life of the soul (Mortari
2014).
Plato deﬁnes as “tender and pure” (Phaedrus, 245a), the perfect
condition that has to be searched for by the soul when it looks at
truth. It is extremely difﬁcult to achieve such a condition, because
even though it is no more than a puff of air the life of the soul tends
to get bogged down in the continual contact with the things of life.
The soul, which is to say the organ of spiritual life, is like a shell in
the sea, which over time ﬁnds itself weighed down by the algae of the
sea that attach themselves to its surface.
The essential question for spiritual life then, consists in understanding how to have care for the energy of the soul and thus enable
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it to maintain its purity and power of caring for life. In order to ﬁnd
an answer to this question we need to seek in ancient philosophy
what can be deﬁned as “spiritual practices”.2 In this regard, we ﬁnd
some particularly insightful reﬂections in the philosophy of Plutarch,
who speaks of “healthy thoughts” (On Tranquillity of Mind, 470d),
those which contribute to achieving a good disposition of the soul,
deﬁned in ancient Greek by the term euthymia, which means a good
way to feel life.
According to Plutarch, there are two ills which can afﬂict the soul:
insensibility and ingratitude (On Tranquillity of Mind, 473c); in other
words not feeling the quality of the real, and not acknowledging
those phenomena and those actions which are indicative of the good
which happens. A good quality of the life of the soul is facilitated by
acts of gratitude. Thanking the other for a gesture or a word is an
essential act of recognition.
The most important acts of care are gratuitous, since they are done
simply because it is necessary, without expecting anything in return.
But, as the language itself suggests, there is a close relationship beteween gratitude and gratuitousness; indeed, since acting with care
requires a great deal of inner energy, both cognitive and emotional,
the agent of care needs spiritual energy, and the act of graditude that
he/she could receive from the cared-for is the best nourishment.
When I thank the other for what he/she has done, both her/his and
our spiritual energy nourish.
Knowing how to give thanks for what it is easy to take for
granted—“enjoying good health, seeing the light of the sun” (On
Tranquillity of Mind, 469e). Knowing how to recognise the value of
that “being able to speak and act” (On Tranquillity of Mind, 469e) is
a good that we often take for granted. When we are incapable of seeing the value of what is but cannot comprehend the fragility of
2

Hadot, an important French scholar of ancient philosophy, uses the expression
“spiritual exercise” to signify the work directed to the education of the soul. The
study of Hadot shows how ancient philosophy has a practical vocation, especially
Stoicism and Epicureanism. But the term “exercise” is too scholastic; for that reason
the term “practice” is to be preferred.
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certain goods, it is all too easy to lose these possibilities of being. Bad
politics come to the fore when citizens cannot see the good they risk
losing and allow themselves to be swept along by phantasmatic rhetoric. A good politics is therefore, one which invests in education.
Plutarch distinguishes between ”people without education” (On
Tranquillity of Mind, 467b) and “wise people” (467c). He presents us
with this distinction in the same paragraph where he speaks of welcoming events with temperance, letting us understand that the education of the soul, which leads to wisdom, is realised above all through
thinking, feeling, and acting in just measure. “Nothing to excess” was
one of the principles written at the entrance of the temple of Delphi.
The right measure is essential in evaluating the quality of events. The
quality of our actions depends, indeed, on the wisdom with which we
evaluate events.
For every event, it is vital to see what there is of good, despite our
tendency to focus attention on negative elements and get caught up
in tormenting thoughts. Torture a good disposition of the soul, it is
important to learn not to neglect what there is of good and favourable in circumstances which we judge negatively because they do
not happen in accordance with our desires (Plutarch, On Tranquillity
of Mind, 469a). Adopting this principle means acting in accordance
with nature, and, if we observe how our body behaves in reaction to
stimuli, we notice that when our eyes are wounded by something too
bright, we turn our gaze away and let it rest on the colours of the
ﬂowers and the grass (Plutarch, On Tranquillity of Mind, 469a). If we
persist in focussing on the negative, this connection becomes more
obvious and more vivid, producing a feeling of darkness in the soul.
Learning how to shift our attention to the positive makes it possible
for us to feel less unbalanced, less excitable, therefore more temperate. Shifting our attention does not mean eliminating the negative
but ﬁnding a way to make it bearable. Often the work of care itself
makes it difﬁcult to do so, as it results in reports of nurses and
doctors during the Covid-19 emergency: much trauma of the
spirit results from overwhelming and unrelenting care duties that
involve futility, bad decisions, absurdity, and death. The gratitude
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manifested by citizens and civic institutions is the primary duty of
a politics of care.
The condition for ﬁnding the right way of acting consists in practicing not becoming too closely attached to anything. Over-intense
desire towards everything rouses in us the fear of being left without
it, and in this, our joy becomes weak and uncertain, like a ﬂame
exposed to the wind (Plutarch, On Tranquillity of Mind, 474c-d).
Because of the need that every human being has to procure those
things necessary for life, he runs the risk of giving excessive weight
to things, investing in them in measure which goes beyond what is
necessary. Not dealing with things in just measure upsets the balance
of the soul. Plutarch advises us not to become too attached to the
things we have, or which we believe we have. Care for our belongings
(Plutarch, On Tranquillity of Mind, 471b) is necessary for it allows us
to ﬁnd some security, but when it is excessive and becomes a matter
of accumulating much more than is necessary, it prevents us from
having care of what is really essential. It is therefore a question of
learning to value not external goods but internal ones, such as virtues. It is not given to us to have sovereignty over our own lives; for
this reason, even what we think we own is, in reality, fragile and
uncertain. To protect the soul from inevitable suffering, experience
teaches us to think as little as possible of those things which do not
depend on us and to focus instead on our modes of being: learning to
take joy in the good which comes to us, and not to despair at the
good which is lost (Plutarch, On Tranquillity of Mind, 473f). Remembering always that our ontological weakness manifests itself in the
impossibility of grasping the real. We are the fragile guests of reality.
We need to do away with the tension to keep hold of things and
place all our trust in them to cultivate an attitude of acceptance. An
acceptance is an acknowledgment of the inevitable but never a surrender to the negative, which can be avoided by effort.
When we think of inner life, we tend to have an intellectualising
vision, while thinking is always, in fact, feeling. And so cultivating
spiritual life means cultivating a health-giving feeling, one who assists
us in the work of living. In the literature which speaks of care, we
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often ﬁnd reference to love as a feeling essential to care and thus to
ethical action.
The feminist philosopher Judith Butler admits that she does not
have a clear idea about love, suspecting that we can know love only
when all the ideas we have about it have been deconstructed (Butler
2002, 62-67). Zambrano (1950), on the other hand, perhaps because
she has been an attentive student of both Plato and Dante, does not
hesitate to speak about love, stating that since where there is no love,
there is no life, we cannot conceive of a philosophy which aims to
be of help in life without going into the theme of love. As Dante
states, “love is what moves the sun and the other stars” (Paradiso,
XXX). Murdoch, too, reserves a position of fundamental importance
for love, maintaining that the weakness of contemporary moral philosophy lies in its having chosen not to speak of the concept of love
(1997, 337). She maintains that reality—and for the human being
engaged in care, reality is not only what is, but also what should be—
“is revealed to the patient eye of love” (1997, 332). Kittay deﬁnes the
practice of care as “love’s labor” (1999).
Perhaps it is then impossible to avoid speaking of love, but ﬁrst,
a reﬂection is necessary.
We can say that love is necessary for ethics if we understand love
as the translation of the Greek term agapé. There is little said in
Greek dictionaries about the meaning of this word, but if we consider
how it is used in the Gospels, it indicates the spiritual love which the
soul is capable of. When Plato speaks of the life to be sought, he uses
the term agapétotaton (Philebus, 61e), which comes from agapé, which
is the way of feeling of the soul which is necessary for the search for
knowledge of the things worthy of being loved (Philebus, 62d), in
other words, things which are of the greatest importance for life.
In love as eros, there is an acquisitive urge: we love the other in
the sense that we desire not only to love but also to be loved: we love
in being loved. This acquisitive drive is not present in agapé. In
love as eros, there is a type of afﬁrmation of the self because we love
while seeking to be able to be loved: eros does not exist if there is not
a movement of feeling from one to the other. Aristotle says that love
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for the other also seeks something for itself (Nichomachean Ethics). In
agapé, we make ourselves the instruments of necessity. We love in the
sense of agapé when we seek that thing which has to be. Agapé is not
just a feeling, but a way of being, a way of acting in the world. And
the feeling which nourishes the mode of being which is agapé is not
a passion, but the originating feeling of trust and hope that all those
things which make life a good time to live may happen. The action
of care, which puts itself at the service of becoming what it is good
that it should become, has no certainty that what is desired will actually come about, for there are too many factors which intervene on
action. Only hope and trust in the possible can sustain this effort of
acting in uncertainty. Then, when a little of the good that we seek
actually occurs, we feel pure joy, the joy which the soul feels when it
sees happening what is necessary. We ﬁnd an example of the joy
which comes with agapé in the Gospel when Jesus explains that the
friend of the bridegroom rejoices in the joy of his friend. “That is
perfect joy,” and he adds, “He must grow, while I must be diminished”
(John 3, 29-30). In love as eros, there is always something egotistical,
which is not present in love as agapé.
And so we can say that reality, by which we mean that which is
in the order of necessity, is revealed to the gaze which patiently seeks
good, and this gaze is love as agapé. The fundamental disposition of
the soul consists in obeying reality as an exercise of care, moved by
that thinking and feeling which is agapé for good.

Conclusion
At the core of this writing, there is the following argumentative
nucleus.
There is an originary spirituality that reveals itself when the soul
remains in touch with the mystery of life. There is the possibility
of an authentic spiritual life when the soul, having put in bracket
any kind of theory, opinion, belief, can advert the sacred ground
that generates the ﬂow of life in the world. To be able to breathe in
a spiritual way requests the soul to keep in touch with inﬁnity,
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accepting not to be able to give it a name. Thus, the soul can cultivate a kind of purity of the heart and simplicity of the mind.
This breath of the soul is originary since it comes before every
systematic thought, before every theory, before every religion. Therefore, the authentic spiritual life cannot be confused with systems of
thought, neither philosophical nor religious.
The spiritual breath makes the mind conscious of the prime question for life: the question of good. To assume the research of good,
both as a thoughtful activity and a practical one is the generative
matrix of the practice of care.
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Section II:
Embodiment, Gender, and Family

The Fluidity of Becoming.
The Maternal Body in Feminist Views
of Care, Worship and Theology
Inge van Nistelrooij

In some senses [‘the mother’] is everywhere, our culture saturated with
her image in its varied guises, and yet theoretically she remains a shadowy ﬁgure who seems to disappear from the many discourses that explicitly try to account for her (Baraitser 2009, 4).
Maternal subjectivity is (I take it) a variation on female subjectivity, but
it is important to treat the two as distinct, otherwise we lose sight of what
is peculiar to maternity (Stone 2012, 4).

Introduction
Care theorists’ attention to maternity has always been characterized
by ambiguity. On the one hand, care ethics is rooted in feminist
research regarding practices of mothering, in which women’s practices, their self-understanding and their related morality were analyzed and expressed (Chodorow 1978, Gilligan 1982, Noddings
1984). As such, this research was part of the Women’s Movement of
the 1970s and women’s political consciousness raising movement
which was not unrelated to the legalization of abortion in many parts
of the (western) world (Gilligan 1982, ix). By expressing their experiences as women and mothers, they discovered and ﬁlled an enormous
knowledge gap that has existed throughout academic history, in
which women had lacked a voice until then. This lacking voice has
led to an almost total ignorance and neglect not only of women, but
also of topics that relate to all human beings, like birth (Schües
2008). On the other hand, the topics of maternity, pregnancy and
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birth have also been abandoned on purpose by most care ethicists in
the early 1990s.1 For instance Hankivsky (2014) describes the distinction between the ﬁrst and second generation care theorists as a move
away from ‘mothering practices’:
The earliest articulations were associated with the work of Carol Gilligan
(1982). They were linked to women’s morality and in particular, mothering, caring, and nurturing activities and experiences (Held 1993,
Noddings 1984 and Ruddick 1989, 1992). Second generation care theorists, led by the work of Tronto (1993), transcended such conceptualizations. They ﬁrmly established care’s importance as both a moral and
political concept, deﬁned as a “species activity that includes everything
that we do to maintain, continue and repair our ‘world’ so that we can
live in it as well as possible. That world includes our bodies, [our selves,
and] our environments [sic], all of which we seek to interweave in
a complex, life-sustaining web” (Tronto 1993, 103). (Hankivsky 2014,
253; emphasis in text, additions made by IvN)

Claiming a feminine speciﬁcity in the public realm had proven to be
an unsuccessful strategy for care theory to gain the political and moral
impact it deserves (Tronto 1993). As feminist theorists, care ethicists
sought to advance the equality of the sexes as well as classes, races
and ethnic minority groups. Therefore Tronto and Fisher devised
a broad deﬁnition of caring as social, moral and political practice
rather than embodied and gendered experiences. More speciﬁcally,
Tronto considers the ﬁrst care ethicists on mothering practices (especially Noddings 1984) as failing to acknowledge ‘the political setting
of their moral arguments at their peril’ (Tronto 1993, 3) and as following a politically naive, unsuccessful and ineffective strategy (Ibid,
1-3). For these reasons she has developed a care ethics as a broad
political and moral theory. Joan Tronto’s pathbreaking work has been
an invaluable new impetus for care ethics at the point where it found
itself increasingly stuck in binary oppositions of sexes and gendered
moralities.

1

Kittay (1999, 2019) continued to address maternity. Despite the title ‘Mother
Time’, Walker (1999) is about aging women, not mothers.
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This strategy is not disputed here, nor will it be contradicted.
I underscore the necessity and importance of Tronto’s work and the
change of course of care ethics that it brought about. Yet I will argue
throughout this contribution that a lack of attention for the way in
which each human being is ‘some mother’s child’ (Kittay 1999, 23)
and how we have come into being inside another person’s body, leads
to a distorted understanding of our reality, which is detrimental to all
mothers, with whatever gender they identify. I therefore uphold that
the embodied experience of maternity – i.e. pregnancy, birth, lactation – is of a particular kind, and that the female sexuality associated
with it still suffers from particular oppression, exploitation and violence which care theorists need to address (I return to these cases
below). For this reason, care ethicists should not abandon their
roots altogether, but need to ﬁnd a way to address the care ethical
ambiguity regarding maternity and pay renewed attention to it, for
the sake of those women and mothers who are oppressed, exploited
or violated.
The various strands2 of care ethicists have had their valid and
plausible argumentations that have underpinned their problematizations of care. We may now need a third strand, that readdresses the
topic of its early research that gave a voice to maternal experiences
and identity (Ruddick 1980, 1989; Gilligan 1982), without failing to
acknowledge care as a broad practice within a political context
(Tronto 1993, 3) and without falling into the trap of reinvoking ‘traditional sexist notions of gender roles’ or ‘a quasi-scientiﬁc grounding
for a view that men and women are essentially different’ (Tronto
1993, 85). Readdressing from a care ethical perspective both female
sexuality and pregnancy as morally and politically relevant topics,
and taking both the personal experience and the political context
into account, it might be helpful to start with some pioneering sources

2
The terminology of ‘generations’, as coined by Hankivsky and adopted by many,
is actually misleading: several of the ‘ﬁrst generation’ care ethicists are still writing
(Noddings, Tronto, Kittay). I therefore speak of ‘strands’ from this point onwards.
With thanks to Joan Tronto for this suggestion.
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and look for their present relevance through a ﬁlter that warns us of
these pitfalls. Within the framework of this volume I want to turn to
theorists who have tracked the religious roots of the oppression of
female sexuality and the pregnant body, an analysis from which many
lessons can be learned. By looking at the role of religion and by
including feminist theology I follow in the footsteps of theologian
and care ethicist Van Heijst (2008, 2011b). She argues that Christianity, like other patriarchal monotheistic religions, has contributed
importantly to the erasure of female representations of divinity such
as images of female fertility, advanced pregnant goddesses, who
embodied and gave birth to new life, in short ‘the maternal’ (Van
Heijst 2011b). Feminist theology offers – perhaps surprisingly –
sources that help reinvigorate the meaning of our coming into life
through somebody else’s body, some-body.
This contribution therefore puts the following questions central:
even though care ethics is a proponent of the philosophy of natality,
does it not, in its anti-essentialism and anti-biologism, blur the physicality of pregnancy and birth as well as the moral and political consequences of this physicality? If so, how could we re-include maternity in our understanding of care, while avoiding the pitfalls of the
early care ethicists, of essentializing, naturalizing, and containing
maternity to one gender or the private setting, and naively ignoring
the political setting of care practices? And thirdly, for what ideas
can care ethics draw upon feminist theology, which has contested
the theological underpinnings of essentialism, naturalization, and the
containment of maternity?
Before I proceed, however, I need to address certain tensions that
must be upheld and endured when discussing this subject, that is the
gender of ‘mothering’ or ‘maternity’.
The Tensions Involved in the Gender of Mothering and Maternity
I expressly aim to acknowledge the blurring of gender boundaries.
Traditionally considered as limited to two, gender is increasingly
acknowledged as a plurality. Pregnancy is no longer contained to the
explicit female body, and transgenders, intergenders, non-binary
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genders, and others, either experience pregnancy too or long to do so
in the near future (Schrupp 2019). As a result it is plausible to argue
that an emphasis on the embodied experience of maternity is not
‘essentializing’ women, and a neglect of this experience is to the detriment of all mothers, both those who identify as mothers and women
and those who identify as mothers but not as women. Since maternity
can no longer be analysed along the lines of a gender binary, it also
(and anew) challenges our assumptions of the male and female sex.
Moreover, fathers have expressed that discussing ‘mothering’ or
‘maternity’ fails to appreciate their involvement in child care and
makes them feel neglected and excluded. They have responded critically and negatively to the terminology of ‘mothering’ and ‘maternity’, and suggested to replace it with ‘parenthood’ or ‘parenting’ as
non-exclusivist terms.
In no way do I want to add to the suffering of fathers, co-parents
or other parents when they are ignored, mistrusted, misunderstood, or
insulted, when they care for their children. Nevertheless, the choice
of terminology is also a socio-political statement: asking the mothers
to understand ‘parenting’ as inclusive of their experience of pregnancy, birth and lactation, is something else than asking co-parents/
fathers to understand ‘mothering’ as inclusive of their care. The former ﬁts with the history of philosophy in which women have been
asked to understand male pronouns as inclusive of them, while their
particular experience and position was ignored. The latter would be
a reversal of this tradition, asking others to make a similar endeavour,
which would be a repetition of exclusion. There is no magic wand
that can make these differences go away: by prioritizing ‘parenting’,
no gender is essentialized or biologized, and parents may feel to be
recognized in their commitment to child-care more equally, but we
run the risk of ignoring the experiences of pregnancy, birth, and lactation. By prioritizing ‘mothering’ and ‘maternity’, we run the risk of
repeating a form of exclusion.
There are, however, several good reasons to uphold the maternal
terminology. These reasons are given with the ongoing oppression,
exploitation and violence which are explicitly targeted at women and
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the pregnable body. Women in general, but mothers in particular,
have a long history of being silenced – culturally, philosophically,
morally, and politically. Examples include:
– the global marketization and exploitation of women as surrogate
wombs3, a practice that poignantly came to light when new-borns
could not be ‘delivered’ to their adoptive parents during the
Covid-19 pandemic (see Surrogate Mother Ukraine 2020);
– discrimination against pregnant persons who do not meet the
norms of motherhood, like those too young, single, coloured,
homeless, migrant, imprisoned, lesbian, transgender, or intersex,
and count as ‘failed mothers’ and ‘failed womxn’4 (Macleod et al.
2020);
– the inﬂuence exercised by the hospital birth culture, in which
technocratic values dominate and the maternity care system is
fragmented, leading to biased medical information on risk and
pain during labor inﬂuencing the mother’s decisions (Newnham et
al. 2018);
– exclusion of fertile, menstruating and pregnant people from research
leading to inadequate information, undertreatment and overtreatment, which is a form of scientiﬁc violence (Rogers 2014, 68);
3

Stunningly easily one can ﬁnd providers of surrogate mothers and advertisements that market babies, like the Ukrainian women offered on the website of ‘Surrogate Mother Ukraine’ (2020) that includes ‘Guaranteed Baby Program (Up to
a Positive Result)’, ‘IVF Services (Advantages and Success Factors)’, ‘Egg Donors
and Surrogacy (Donor Selection)’, ‘Pass The Quiz (Find Out Surrogate Option For
You)’. Hewitson (2014) analyses the practice of ‘globalization and commodiﬁcation
of reproduction’ (1) and states that ‘India has become a world leader in the outsourcing of pregnancy, and the industry is estimated to be worth over USD 2 billion
a year’ (2). Taking the contexts of both the buying western persons (free to ‘purchase
gestational services’, Hewitson 2014, 1) and the surrogacy mothers into account, this
‘commercialization of child-creation …. simply consolidates the elite levels of consumption of wealthy nations and the global rich’ (Hewitson 2014, 1-2). I wonder if
we could speak of a ‘fertility drain’ here. See also Mahadevan (2014) for a rich analysis of relational, reproductive freedom, that combines global feminism, care ethics,
and post-colonialism.
4
A term coined by the authors of the reference in order to ‘disrupt normative
assumptions about gender and sex’ (Macleod et al. 2020).
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– the fact that in low income countries in 2019 the overall no. 1
cause of death concerns ‘neonatal conditions’ (WHO 2020);
– economic oppression in the long-term effects of maternity-related
job interruptions on mothers’ income (e.g. the inventory study in
10 European countries by Dotti Sani & Lupi 2017);
– the negative effects caused by cultural portrayals in the media of
pregnancy and birth as risky, dramatic and painful (Luce et al.
2016). This also raises questions regarding the laboring person
being depicted as passive, unknowing, helpless, and dependent
upon the medical expert (Faber 2018; Cummins 2020);
– the struggle to have women’s rights acknowledged as human rights,
to battle human / women trafﬁcking, to abandon obstetric violence, etc. as fought by the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW 2020) of the United
Nations Human Rights Ofﬁce of the High Commissioner (OHCHR
2020);
– rape as a weapon of war, which gained recognition as a violation
of human rights in the Nobel Peace Prize for Denis Mukwege,
human rights activist and gynaecologist, and Nida Murad, human
rights activist, in 2018 (see Nobel Prize 2018).
This list could be much longer and include racist and domestic forms
of violence which often intersect with sexual violence against women.
But I hope that it sufﬁces to show why I uphold the terminology of
‘mothering’ and ‘maternity’, since it is this speciﬁc combination of
role, position, physicality, and experience that makes mothers the
target of violence in many forms – familial, social, economic, medical, political. The ways in which female sexuality and mothers are
still violated makes maternity and mothering an urgent political
question.
Outline of my Argument
I proceed as follows. First, I need to keep in mind the multiple challenges mentioned above, and seek my way to focus both on the
oppression of female sexuality and (non-gendered) experience of
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pregnancy, and the challenges of non-essentialism, non-biologism,
non-binarism. For this I resort to a hermeneutical guide, which I have
found in two works of art by Louise Bourgeois which will serve as
symbols that ‘give to think’ (donne à penser, Ricoeur 1959) with
regard to pregnancy as well as sexual stereotypes. Her works function
in line with Paul Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of suspicion, as images that
do not pin down my interpretation, but rather keep me thinking in
a dialectic continuum. After my description of these artworks below,
I return to them at certain points in my analysis for this purpose.
In this contribution I seek to ﬁll the gap of maternity in care ethics
by drawing upon three germinal works in which this experience is
key. My selection of these works – Ruddick 1989, Rich 1986, and
Keller 2003 – has been guided by the context of this volume, i.e.
bringing together care ethics, spiritual traditions and religion.
I believe that these works offer substantial insights that allow us to
re-include embodied maternity in our understanding of care, while
avoiding the traditional pitfalls.
I ﬁrst characterize the ambiguity of care theory regarding maternity
which can already be traced back to the early days of care ethics.
Although mothering has been conceptualized in such a way that the
embodied experience of pregnancy has almost fallen outside of its
scope, it has not been ignored entirely. Especially Ruddick (1989)
offers rich material. After that, I turn to an analysis of historical
religious depiction of maternity based upon the classic analysis of
Adrienne Rich (1986) and the work of feminist theologian Catherine
Keller (2003). Keller’s work on Christian theology being a dominology, i.e. a doctrine that worships the ‘dominus’ (Almighty Lord)
while suppressing everything connected to pregnant bodiliness – its
womb, ﬂuids, uncontrollability, darkness – is not only helpful to
deconstruct religious oppression, but also to construct a different theology (Keller 2003). As such, theology of this kind can offer several
eye openers to care ethics. It shows how the physicality of pregnancy,
birth, and maternity – which should not be ignored in feminist theory – can be taken into account in care theory in morally and politically relevant ways. Speciﬁcally, it provides a new and promising
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perspective on our being as becoming. I conclude with a modest proposal for including this idea in care ethics.

Two Images as Hermeneutic Tools
It has often been pointed out (e.g. Mol 2008; Van Heijst 2011a;
Tronto 2017; Vosman & Niemeijer 2017) how the logics of marketization, efﬁciency, dynamization, and controllability, predominate
caregiving. On a deeper level the cultural embodiment of care impacts
what is valued and what is neglected or pushed aside (Van Heijst
2011b). Van Heijst’s research into historical care practices and
accompanying imaginaries shows how dependency, vulnerability, and
helplessness have been substituted by images of healthy looking,
happy choosing, and warmly bonding patients, older people and their
caregivers (Van Heijst 2011b). These images serve as a ‘mood board’,
she argues, that evoke a certain sphere that represents our cultural
conceptions of good care relations (2011b, 6).
An artist like Louise Bourgeois (1911-2010) offers provocative and
alarming counter images that explicitly aim to break through and
break with self-evident ways of thinking. Simultaneously, her works
allow for many interpretations, so what it is, exactly, that she calls
attention for, continues to be discussed. This makes her work especially suitable for my analysis, which also seeks this openness. I have
selected two of her images from the exhibition ‘To Unravel a Torment’ (shown in Museum Voorlinden, Wassenaar, The Netherlands
between December 2019 and the museum lockdown in March 2020
due to the Covid-19 pandemic, see Voorlinden 2019-2020). The
owner of the images, Glenstone Museum in Potomac, Maryland, has
granted permission for including them in this publication. Additionally I offer a brief description based upon the information from the
exhibition brochure and in my own words.
The ﬁrst is Ste Sébastienne (1998, ink on Xerox paper mounted on
canvas), which is a female variation of the classic depiction of the
Christian Saint Sebastian (Fig. 1). He is the informal patron saint of
gay men, usually depicted as a beautiful, erotic, young man, bound by
his hands on his back and tied to a pillar, pierced by arrows, dying
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(murdered) as a martyr. Bourgeois’ Ste Sébastienne neither has arms
and hands nor a head. Her body is voluptuous with large breasts, belly
and buttocks, which are emphasized by blue hatching lines. The
arrows do not pierce her body, but barely touch her in spots that are

Fig. 1: Louise Bourgeois, Ste Sébastienne
(1998, ink on Xerox paper mounted on canvas).
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made bright red – like a bull’s eye. ‘Ste Sébastienne represents a body
under attack’ (exhibition brochure, np, transl. IvN).
The second image is The Maternal Man (2008, archival dyes on
fabric) and shows the transparent silhouette of a pregnant body from

Fig. 2: Louise Bourgeois, The Maternal Man
(2008, archival dyes on fabric).

170

INGE VAN NISTELROOIJ

just below the breast(s) to the upper legs (Fig. 2). The belly is slightly
swollen and contains a head down, doll-like baby with stretched arms
and legs and an umbilical cord. The pregnant body has male genitals:
a prominent, aroused penis. Bourgeois ‘often spoke out against stereotypical gender roles and she believed men capable of maternal
instincts’ (exhibition brochure, np, transl. IvN).
I have selected these images because they confuse and disrupt.
When looking at them, we may become aware of our views, experiences and norms concerning female and maternal physicality, and our
traditions concerning gender and religion. In Christian iconography,
for instance, male bodies have often been depicted as the object of
violence, showing the tools of their martyrdom and their horrifying
yet sanctifying deaths. Not only are female saints hard to ﬁnd, we also
hardly come across images of women other than virginal, paradoxically even when a mother. Sexuality in a woman has rather been the
grounds for denouncing her altogether, up to the point where
throughout Christian tradition (but not only there) the sexual woman
as such has been the object of violence (Van der Waal, forthcoming),
like Ste Sébastienne. The classic distinction between the ‘mother’ and
the ‘whore’ align with the Christian moral deﬁnition of permissible
and rejected behavior of women, personiﬁed in Mary, mother of Jesus,
and Eve respectively. Alison Stone (2012) offers a sharp characterization of this distinction:
In her mediating function [between the spiritual and material realms]
Mary is emblematic of the good mother. By leading her worshippers
towards the spiritual realm, she leads them beyond the material and
maternal realm. After all, Mary has been worshipped above all as virgin,
miraculously able to conceive and bear a son without even rupturing her
hymen. According to the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception, Mary
inherits no stain of sin from her own mother Anne: this symbolizes
Mary’s freedom from the maternal context of her own childhood. As
virgin, too, Mary takes away the sin, and the necessity of giving birth in
sorrow and pain, which was supposedly unleashed into the world by Eve.
Thus Mary as good mother inescapably opposes Eve as bad woman – the
ﬁgure of embodiment, passion, sex, lust, and all that is earthly, mortal,
fallible and corrupt (Stone 2012, 51).
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Ste Sébastienne ‘gives to think’ about embodiment, passion, sex, and
lust, and their relevance in moral and political ways. Particularly,
Bourgeois thematizes how morality and power are gendered and
upheld by religion. She takes a well-known male, Christian symbol,
changes its sex and reduces its abilities by beheading and ‘dis-arming’
it. As such her artwork challenges powerful ideas of the ‘good’ woman
who preferably lacks the embodied and sexual characteristics, and the
‘bad’ woman who is sexual, sensual, and violated. The Maternal Man
thematizes the relationship of maternity and sexuality in a different
way. Bourgeois’ work confronts us with the deep-rooted imaginary of
female pregnancy that makes it hard to think ‘manhood’ together
with ‘maternity’. Her depiction of male sexuality and pregnancy is
full of tensions; and leaves these tensions intact. This also confronts
feminist theorists and care ethicists who have emphasized the desexualized, de-gendered, non-essentialist notions of care. They have
stated that care is not founded upon or rooted in the ‘nature’ of women’s capability to give birth, as Gilligan (1982) and Noddings (1984)
as well as classical (Christian) thought would have it. The Maternal
Man challenges the essentialism of thinking of pregnant bodies as
mothers and as women.
These two images serve as hermeneutic guides5 that underpin
feminist and care ethical analyses of women’s and care’s marginalization. Feminism in general and care ethical theory have pointed out
that care needs to be detached from (speciﬁcally) women’s bodies and
instead be connected to a social practice that anybody can (and
should) do and take responsibility for. This has led to an ambivalent
attitude regarding maternity. In care ethics, maternity is considered
both as a non-gendered practice (mothering) that is a source of practical moral thinking and understanding, and as an oppressive ideology
of women, called motherhood. In its emphasis on and aiming for
5

With ‘hermeneutic guides’ I refer to Ricoeur’s idea of ‘interpreting’, i.e. ‘to follow the path of thought opened up by the text, to place oneself en route toward the
orient of the text’ (Ricoeur 1991, 122). In this case I aim to follow the path not of
a text, but of Bourgeois’ artworks, which disrupt essentialist thought and may orient
towards a rethinking of maternity.
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equality, care ethics was at ﬁrst rooted in the experiences and practices of mothering and critique of motherhood ideology (Ruddick
1989, 17), but has increasingly ignored the female body and the
embodied experience of pregnancy. Bourgeois’ images help to reconsider both. By selecting two images instead of one, I also aim to keep
the tension alive between the ‘inclusive gender ﬂuid pregnant body’
of The Maternal Man on the one hand and the ‘explicit violence that
is aimed at women’s bodies’ of Ste Sébastienne on the other. Language
can sometimes be in the way when I discuss this tension below, but
I hope to speak consistently of pregnancy as an experience that is not
limited to one gender, while remaining sensitive for sexism in its
many forms that harms women in particular.

Care Ethics’ Ambiguity Regarding Maternity
Care ethics, and primarily its Anglo-American body of knowledge,
has insisted on the non-essentialism of caring, with the most notable
exception of Nel Noddings (1984). In her pioneering elaboration of
an ethics of care, which is speciﬁcally modelled after the mother and
child dyad, she emphasizes:
An ethic built on caring is, I think, characteristically and essentially feminine – which is not to say, of course, that it cannot be shared by men,
any more than we should care to say that traditional moral systems cannot be embraced by women. But an ethic of caring arises, I believe, out
of our experience as women, just as the traditional logical approach to
ethical problems arises more obviously from masculine experience (Noddings 1984, 8, emphasis added).

This view has been much criticized for its essentialism, most prominently by Joan Tronto (1993) who accuses Noddings of a ‘morality
ﬁrst’ version of caring that leads to a ‘dangerous politics’, lacking
‘strong conceptions of rights’, which leads to the inability to realistically approach ‘the kinds of problems that caring will confront in the
real world’ (1993, 160-161). Both Tronto (1993) and Ruddick (1989)
conceptualize care as a practice: it is something we do that includes
a certain attitude as well as ‘a form of practical rationality’ (Tronto
1993, 108-109; Ruddick 1989, 13ff, emphasis added).
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Ruddick (1989) explicitly deﬁnes mothers not as those who have
had the physical experience of gestation. Rather:
a mother is a person who takes on responsibility for children’s lives and
for whom providing child care is a signiﬁcant part of her or his working
life. I mean “her or his.” Although most mothers have been and are
women, mothering is potentially work for men and women (Ruddick
1989, 40, emphasis in text).

In brief: the caring practices of preservation, nursing, and training of
children are the practices of ‘mothering’ (Ruddick 1989, 17), and this
verb ‘mothering’ should not be confused with the ideologies of ‘motherhood’ in which a mother’s identity is ﬁxed6. Mothering signiﬁes
what people do and can do, which is not connected to their sex but
rather the result of social, moral and political practices. An ideology
of ‘motherhood’, however, is oppressive to women in many societies,
as ‘[i]t deﬁnes maternal work as a consuming identity requiring sacriﬁces of health, pleasure, and ambitions unnecessary for the well-being
of children’ (Ruddick 1989, 29, emphasis in text). Ruddick’s ‘practicalist’ way of thinking (13) helps her to detach sexual identity (‘the
female’) from the moral and political thinking that arises from the
practices of taking care of a child (‘mothering’). As such, her analysis
ﬁts with feminist theory, that emphasizes practices (e.g. in the use of
verbs rather than nouns), the social distribution of these practices
(and hence there changeability), non-dualism (male-female, culturenature, reason-emotion, detachment-attachment, etc.), and basic and
essential gender equality. As such, mothering starts from the moment
of birth, when anybody can start taking care of a child.
However, Ruddick (1989) acknowledges the knowledge gap that
both the philosophical tradition and feminist theory have yet to ﬁll,

6

Instead of adopting ‘mothering’ as elaborated by Ruddick, I take ‘maternity’ as
central for my plea. As Ruddick reserves ‘mothering’ for the practices of child-care,
I also take the embodied experience of pregnancy, birth and lactation into account
as one that for many mothers has profound impact upon their identity and selfunderstanding. Throughout this section I adopt Ruddick’s terminology; my own will
be developed in the next pages.
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i.e. ‘to tell the story of birth again, reconnecting the work of mothering to the female labor in which it begins’ (197). It is her explicit aim
to remain loyal to the feminist goal to detach social arrangements
from any essentialism and to simultaneously give voice to the birthing experience which (in 1989) was considered as exclusively female.7
She argues that both philosophy and feminism have fallen into the
trap of ‘minimization of birth’, which for philosophers may have
rooted in misogyny and for feminists in the fear that women would
(again) be deﬁned by it (193), but the effect has been the same:
‘When birth ﬁgures in reason’s story only as an absence, the birthing
woman is silent’ (196).
Ruddick aims to overcome this silence by telling the maternal
story of human ﬂesh, while separating (and reconnecting) the ‘potentially genderless work of mothering from the female birth on which
it depends’ (187). In wordings that – in this text – foreshadow Keller’s
language, Ruddick points at the ‘ﬂeshly beginnings’ (190) of every
human life that involve various uncontrollable ﬂuids not much
appreciated:
In many cultures birthing labor, the menstruation associated with it, and
at times even breastfeeding evoke disgust. Regarded ungenerously,
a woman’s birthing body – bloody, swollen out of shape, exposed in its
pain, its otherwise concealed parts broken open – is repellent. […] The
nursing couple is disturbingly sexual, while the milk of a nursing mother
is usually out of even the mother’s control, coming when it’s not needed,
staining, and dribbling, or “drying up” despite a baby’s hunger (Ruddick
1989, 190).

Another ﬂuid involved in the female fertile body, menstrual blood, is
highly associated with uncontrollability and object of social regulation and exclusion. Since menstruation is regarded as some form of
‘incontinence’, it must be bound and hidden (191). Because of their

7
Following Schrupp (2019) and others, I acknowledge that people who identify
as ‘he’ or ‘they’ at present can also experience pregnancy. New questions that arise
as a result, concerning embodiedness and relationality of pregnancy, also need to be
addressed, but that falls outside the scope of this contribution.
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cycle women have been regarded as irregular, unreliable, unpredictable, and therefore they have been excluded ‘from psychological
experiments as well as employment or posts that require stability’
(191). So general female physicality makes her societally unﬁtting, as
she embodies unreliability, a serious threat to classic Reason (3).
What is more, birth undermines the idea of individuality:
The growing fetus, increasingly visible in the woman’s swelling body, an
infant emerging from the vagina, a suckling infant feeding off a breast,
the mother feeding with and of her body express in dramatic form
a fusion of self and other (Ruddick 1989, 191).

However, in birth this fusion – as forming one entity – does not stand
in the way of a ‘reciprocal relationship’ of both mother and infant, of
two bodies that intimately and closely connect. So in some way there
is both a fusion and two-in-relationship. As will also become clear
below, the common language of two, one, fusion, or relationship, on
which philosophy relies, is under pressure when the topic of pregnancy and birth is discussed; and I consider this a sign of how strong
language, concepts, and symbols are permeated and debilitated by the
‘Great Silence’ of maternity to which Adrienne Rich (1986, 84)
alludes. So when Ruddick gives language to the ‘history of human
ﬂesh under the aspect of natality’ (205) one can see the need to ﬁnd
new, common language for this real-life experience. She applies the
unsuitable categories of fusion and self-structuring when she describes
birth, for while there is a reciprocal relationship of woman and infant
in birth, there is also ‘the dissolution of boundaries – a living being
inside another, emerging from another, a body feeding off another
body’ (210). Simultaneously the birthing woman is not erased or lost
in ecstasy and neither does her self-consciousness dissolve in fusion
with her infant:
A birthing woman is bound within herself through unshareable pain and
overwhelming sensation […]. Birth is singular, in outcome as well as in
process. […] [T]he entangling of self and other in birth – physical union
in metaphysical separateness – is a crystallizing symbol not of self-loss but
of a kind of self-structuring. The birthing woman is actively herself and her
activity is a giving to, a creating of another who could not live without
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her. Her creation fails unless the infant takes up the singular life, breathing, crying, kicking, sucking her or his own way into the world. Giver
and recipient are engaged in mutual, active, interdependent creation
(210, emphasis added IvN).

With a reference to Hannah Arendt, she describes how in the Christian language of ‘“glad tidings” and “a child is born” these physical
realities of birth are at best passed over’ (212). The new-born child
is quickly covered in clothes and the mother ‘is even less bodily’,
‘sexually innocent’, sitting ‘serenely with her child’ after ‘a birth
whose dangers and pains require no mention’ (212). In opposition to
such language8, Ruddick uncovers and pays ample attention to the
physicality of birth, in her history of human ﬂesh.
In general, we may conclude that care ethics has acknowledged
the embodied beginning and entanglement of life, of each person’s
life, and of all life, in a life-sustaining web, that is called ‘our world’
(Tronto 1993). In emphasizing care’s essence as a practice that is, can
and should be performed by all, care theory aims for basic and equal
human rights, a ‘caring democracy’ in which all citizens are acknowledged as needing and giving care (homo curans, Tronto 2017), and for
an understanding of human identity as relational. However, the experience and practice of pregnancy and birth, which is a great ‘inequalizer’, has received less attention and Ruddick’s description of the
bodily creation of new life has received little resonance within care
ethics. Instead, the emphasis has fallen upon those doing the caring
work, while ‘the birthing mother’ has remained silent and silenced.
So, to rephrase a question posed by Catherine Keller (2003, 223):
even though care ethics is a great proponent of Arendt’s philosophy

8

One might add that it is not only a matter of language. In Christian communities the nativity scene is performed, sung, narrated, depicted, and set up in living
rooms, gardens, churches, and public parks, all of which enhance the mystique and
saintliness of Mary, while making a farce of actual birth. These depictions might have
implications for modern day expectations regarding birth. With thanks to Maureen
Sander-Staudt for pointing this out.
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of natality9, does it not, in its anti-essentialism and anti-biologism,
erase the physicality of pregnancy and birth, the womb, and to ‘dry
her up’? And either way, does care ethics sufﬁciently acknowledge the
moral and political consequences of this physicality?
Certainly care ethics does not want to reproduce Ste Sébastienne,
meaning that care ethics opposes a subject position in which women
are identiﬁed by their breasts, belly and buttocks, rather than by the
works of their minds and arms, as has traditionally been their harmful
fate. However, by walking the same path (non-identiﬁcation with
physicality) care ethics simultaneously runs the risk of reproducing
the dualism which places the maternal, fertile, sexual capabilities on
a lower scale than the thinking and productive capabilities. This
leads to a simultaneous separation of cognition and production from
emotional, embodied, and reproductive capabilities. By emphasizing
that maternal practices can be performed by all genders, and in its
ﬁght against gender stereotypes (The Maternal Man), has care ethics
not lost sight of the embodied reality and the symbolic image of
maternity as mutual, interdependent creation?
In brief, this is a tricky subject. How to defend the bodiliness of
pregnancy and maternity as an important – also moral and political
– epistemological experience and symbolic image that is relevant for
care ethics without falling into the dangerous pitfalls of essentialist
theorists (from theology, philosophy, ethics and politics)? One answer
was given by Ruddick (1989) and Tronto (1993) and can be summed
up as criteria that need to be maintained. First, pregnancy is no guarantee nor an obligation for mothering, and the bodily experience of
pregnancy can and should by no means be taken as the basis for an
ethical capacity to care. Second, neither pregnancy nor maternity
should be taken as gendered: fathers, co-parents, trans- and intergenders, now or in the near future all can be both pregnant and maternal. Third, womanhood should never be reduced to the bodily
9
See for an excellent analysis of the concept of ‘natality’ and its implications for
care ethics Verhoeven 2003; and a relevant analysis from phenomenology Schües
2008.
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capacity of ‘pregnability’ (being able to become pregnant, a term
coined by Schrupp 2019), nor should a woman’s biology be considered as of more inﬂuence on her behavior than a man’s. For these
criteria we can apply Bourgeois’ images of Ste Sébastienne and The
Maternal Man. These works challenge (‘give to think’ about) our
views of the female body, as lacking the capacities to think and to
act, and as an object of lust and violence, and precisely in these characteristics an object of sanctiﬁcation; and the stereotypical identiﬁcation of maternity and the female.
A different way of answering the question of how to avoid essentialism is by turning the question around: why have the ideals of
non-pregnant and non-pregnable bodies become the standard
of human being? This, of course, is not a new question, neither in
feminism or care ethics, nor in theology. This approach – why not
look at pregnancy? – puts us on the track of two analyses of religions,
spiritual tradition, and Christian theology. Both show how primarily
the Christian tradition and theology have succeeded in almost completely erasing any reference – in language, imagery, symbolism – to
female fertility, making the male, non-pregnable bodies the standard
of human and divine being.

Prepatriarchal Female, Sexual and Maternal Divinity
Adrienne Rich’s classic Of Woman Born (1986) traces the many ways
in which maternity is marginalized, essentialized, worshipped and
penalized, all of which are deeply intertwined.10 In Rich’s analysis
patriarchal monotheism is responsible for the destruction of female
divinity of prehistoric times:
Patriarchal monotheism did not simply change the sex of the divine presence; it stripped the universe of female divinity, and permitted woman
to be sanctiﬁed, as if by an unholy irony, only and exclusively as mother
10

Margaret Urban Walker’s analysis of ‘necessary identities’ also comes to mind,
i.e. identities that ‘need to be naturalized, privatized, or normalized, in some combination’, and because those who bear these identities are ‘epistemically marginalized or
unauthorized’, they are made unable to contradict or contest their identity (2007,
177).
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(without the extended mana [i.e. spiritual power, IvN] that she possessed
prepatriarchally) – or as the daughter of a divine father (Rich 1986, 119,
emphasis in text).

Rich draws upon abundant archaeological evidence to underscore
that in prepatriarchal times the primal power was considered female,
not male, stating: ‘In the earliest artifacts we know, we encounter the
female as primal power’ (Rich 1986, 93). And she goes on to describe
these artifacts:
[T]hey express an attitude toward the female charged with awareness of
her intrinsic importance, her depth of meaning, her existence at the very
center of what is necessary and sacred. She is beautiful in ways we have
almost forgotten, or which have become deﬁned as ugliness. Her body
possesses mass, interior depth, inner rest, and balance. She is not smiling;
her expression is inward-looking or ecstatic, and sometimes her eyeballs
seem to burn through the air. If, as very often, there is a child at her
breast, or on her lap, she is not absorbed in contemplation of him (the
“Adoration of the Virgin” with the Son as center of the world, will come
later). […] She is for-herself even when suckling an infant […]. She exists,
not to cajole or reassure man, but to assert herself (Rich 1986, 93-94,
emphasis in text).

Rich ponders on what might have been their effect on women:
Let us try to imagine for a moment what a sense of herself it gave
a woman to be in the presence of such images. If they did nothing else
for her, they must have validated her spirituality (as our contemporary
images do not), giving her back aspects of herself neither insipid or trivial, investing her with a sense of participation in essential mysteries
(Rich 1986, 94).

Taking Bourgeois’ images of Ste Sébastienne and The Maternal Man as
hermeneutical guides enables us to make the following analysis of
Rich’s descriptions. The prepatriarchal female divinity obviously
sanctiﬁed the female body, also and primarily in its capacities to give
birth to a new life. But, like Rich emphasizes, this female divinity was
a woman in her own right, “for her-self”, not a woman lacking cognitive
or acting capacities, nor was her power or her capacity a derivative
of a male father, partner or son. Neither was she an object of violence
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or intending herself to be primarily an object of admiration or lust for
somebody else: she asserted herself. This prevents her from becoming
a Ste Sébastienne, that is: an incapacitated (lacking arms and a head)
object of violence.
Does Rich then fall into the trap of enhancing the female stereotype, as is questioned by The Maternal Man? This question is harder
to answer and urges me to differentiate. In twenty centuries of Christian theology the powerful, self-asserting, female divinity is deﬁnitely
not a stereotype, nor in other patriarchal forms of monotheism. In
popular culture and recent feminism, power-women-and-mothers
have been idolized by making powerful icons that may exert a similar
empowering force that Rich imagines the prehistoric images may
have done (e.g. Beyoncé, Michelle Obama, Jennifer Lopez, Serena
Williams). A more nuanced question is how all images run the risk
of stereotyping in a similar way. A power-mother or a power-parent
on the one hand, and a dependent-mother or dependent-parent on
the other, are both a reduction of the ambivalent experience of parental/
maternal care itself. Sarah LaChance Adams (2014) offers an alarming analysis of this reduction which leads her to a reappraisal of
ambivalence as an achievement rather than an incapacity (64, but
also throughout her book). Maternity, she argues, has a Janus head,
a head with two faces: the one being mutuality (the child is a part of
oneself), the other conﬂict or separation (the child as being in the
way of one’s own identity) (27-72). An emphasis on only one of the
two faces has been detrimental to mothers, who were either considered as pathologic (‘mad mother’) or evil (‘bad mother’) when they
failed to meet the standard of harmony or independence (1-6). Mothers (and the same goes for other parents involved in childcare) rather
have a double bind: they both want to be with and without the child
(36).
So as an imaginary, ‘the power-woman-and-mother’ has historically been lost as a divinity, but may resonate in the appealing images
shared on social media by a selected group of well-to-do, iconic
women. What is of interest to my undertaking here, is that in these
recent images certain aspects are repressed. The images of Bourgeois
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bring these to light, as they show the tensions involved in the physicality of pregnancy and maternity. What Bourgeois confronts us with
are those physical aspects which we tend or are coerced to hide in
shame: sexuality, genitals, the womb; and the ﬂuids that are involved,
like menses, vaginal moisture, sperm, amniotic ﬂuid, breastmilk. As
long as images hide these indispensable yet socially shameful aspects,
we might say that they are stereotypical. Whether it is serenity (like
Mary’s) or glamour (like Beyoncé’s), the very reality of pregnancy and
maternity remains hidden, unnamed, silent and silenced. In theology
– perhaps surprisingly – we ﬁnd critical thought on these aspects that
were once gloriﬁed as human fertility, and now have become something presupposed yet repressed.

Feminist Theology: Returning to Christian Roots of Oppression
It seems that patriarchal monotheism has not only changed the sex
of the divinity and put only the male and the mother as sanctiﬁable
ﬁgures in place; it also dispensed with an entire area of associations,
to the detriment of women to whom these associations were most
closely attached. Feminist constructivist theologian Catherine Keller
(2003) has developed a poetic kind of theological analysis in which
she uncovers these hidden associations in biblical texts and Christian
dogmatic teaching. I consider her analysis relevant because of Christianity’s dominance in culture and politics in many parts of the world,
as she shows us what has been covered, how it got there, and how
the covering up creates a power structure from which not only
women, bodies, and biology suffer, but all that is associated with
them. In Keller’s deconstruction of (Christian) religion she reveals
how the traces of the womb, the ﬂuids, the uncontrollable, the dark,
can still be found in foundational biblical texts. And since these
traces are there, Keller minutely shows how they slowly but steadily
got to be looked over and ignored, up to the point where they simply
had nothing to say anymore.
A reader might ask: why is this concern about the concealment of
women’s and pregnant bodies relevant? We know already that women’s sexuality as well as pregnancy are ignored, exploited, suppressed
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etc. Should we not rather look at how we can get out of this? I agree
that this is deﬁnitely something we should aim for: the liberation of
the pregnant body and of maternity. However, precisely for this it is
important to look at how this oppressive situation came about, not
only to see what we have lost, but also what was at stake for those
forces that oppressed, ignored, and covered it. Looking at how we got
here might be the best strategy to ﬁnd ways to get out of here. Therefore, I urge to consider the question: how did the female as divinity,
as power of fertility and procreation, of transformation, as embodied,
ﬂuid, dark, intimate, bloody beginning, come to be a threat, something to overcome and forget, to be ashamed of? And why, the persistent reader might ask, is this relevant for care ethics? The relevance
lies in the violence of discarding, I would answer. For it is a violent
act to only acknowledge an outcome and not the effort, to value the
product but not the raw materials, to honor the result but not pay for
the collateral costs paid to get there. This one-sided acknowledgement is also epistemologically relevant, as it leads to a distorted
understanding of our reality. As Joan Tronto (1993) has argued, there
is a strong connection between the marginalization and neglect of
care on the one hand, and the maintenance of power on the other.
Not acknowledging the care one’s existence has required and
requires every day is a form of ‘privileged irresponsibility’ (Tronto
1993, 120) that all care ethicists have opposed. Tronto writes:
The connection between fragmented views of care and the distribution
of power is better explained through a complex series of ideas about
individualism, autonomy, and “the self-made man.” These “self-made”
ﬁgures would not only ﬁnd it difﬁcult to admit the degree to which care
has made their lives possible, but such an admission would undermine
the legitimacy of the inequitable distribution of power, resources, and
privilege of which they are the beneﬁciaries (Tronto 1993, 111).

What has received less attention in care ethics so far is how the
privilege and power of so called ‘independent’ humans has been
shored by a long tradition of ‘self-making’, or ‘originating from nothing’, or ‘creating out of nowhere’, i.e. the theology of ‘creatio ex
nihilo’. For this I turn to Catherine Keller’s work (2003).
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Keller takes us back to the very ﬁrst words of the Jewish and the
Christian scripture in which heaven and earth are created, the story
of Genesis 1, 1-2. Those belonging to these traditions or to cultures
that have been permeated with the artful imageries, will have a general idea of this creation story along lines such as ‘In the beginning
there was nothing, but then God spoke ‘Let there be….’ and with
these words He created everything.’ Keller asks us to read the source,
or to re-read, and see what it literally says. For the ﬁrst two verses say
something else, something that has been hidden and even
forbidden.
(1) When in the beginning Elohim created heaven and earth, (2) the
earth was tohu va bohu(a), darkness was upon the face of tehom(b), and
the ruach elohim(c) vibrating upon the face of the waters (Keller 2003,
xv; (a) without form, and void, (b) the deep, (c) Spirit of God, transl.
Genesis 1, 1-2, King James Version).

So… there was not ‘nothing’, but there was an earth, there was darkness that was upon ‘the face of the deep (tehom)’, and before God
spoke, “his” spirit was already ‘vibrating upon the face of the waters’,
so there were also waters. Dark, deep, waters. Spirit upon the face of
water. These are the elements that are not only forgotten in common
memory but also explicitly covered over by the Christian doctrine of
creatio ex nihilo, i.e. the creation from nothing. Tradition – although
not from the very start – shows denigration for this text and for all
elements mentioned here. And this is the task that Keller (2003) sets
herself: to trace the ‘many denigrated faces’ of ‘the darksome deep’
(xvi) that is mentioned in the very ﬁrst biblical verses. She constructs
a feminist theology that acknowledges this darksome deep. But she
warns us that her feminism ‘attempts to free itself from the ‘light
supremacism’ of Euroamerican ideals’ (xvii), by including all the
‘denigrated faces’ of ‘the dark’: ‘formless monsters, maternal hysteria,
pagan temptation, dark hoards, caves of terror, contaminating hybrids,
miscegenation and sexual confusion’ (xvi).
The long tradition of theology has been predominantly characterized by the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo. This means that the literal
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biblical text of Genesis 1, 1-2 has been turned into a ‘doctrinal hegemony’ (4) which Keller traces back to the third century ACE, of an
‘”origin” that is absolute’ (5). With reference to Edward Said, Keller
makes the distinction between this absolute origin and ‘beginning’,
which ‘is always relative, contested and historical’ (5). The biblical
text, however, ‘knows only of the divine formation of the world out
of a chaotic something’ (4), a darksome deep. So this is the movement that the classical ofﬁcial theological teaching has made: instead
of considering ‘creation’ as it is described, as ‘creation from chaos’,
making creation a relational process, it has turned creation into an
act ‘barnacled with stereotypes: of a great supernatural surge of fatherpower, a world appearing – zap – out of the void; a mankind ruling
the world in our manly creator’s image’ (6). Here lie important roots
of the long western theological tradition of dominology, i.e. ‘the subjection of the oikos to the dominus’ (6).
The abiding western dominology can with religious sanction identify
anything dark, profound, or ﬂuid with a revolting chaos, an evil to be
mastered, a nothing to be ignored (6).

The entire idea that God did not create from nothing, but from
something, some material (mater-ial) that could be formed or transformed, would entail that God’s power was constrained; an unacceptable idea for an image of God as omnipotent (xvii).11

A theology of becoming: eye openers for thinking maternity
Once these meanings – of ‘creation from chaos’ offered by the original text and of ‘creation from nothing’ given by theological doctrine
– are uncovered, Keller aims to construct a theology that she calls

11
The connection between matter and maternity, and prepatriarchal imagery was
already described by Rich: ‘Prepatriarchal thought gynomorphized everything. Out
of the earth-womb vegetation and nourishment emerged, as the human child out of
the woman’s body. The words for mother and mud (earth, slime, the matter of which
the planet is composed, the dust or clay of which “man” is built) are extremely close
in many languages: mutter, madre, mater, materia, moeder, modder.’ (Rich 1986,
107-108).
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a tehomic theology, a theology of becoming. She explains that this theology centres around ‘relationality as a beginningless process’ (xvii):
So this becoming theology continues a deconstruction of the paradigm and
presumption of linear time: the bottom line of origin, the straight line of
salvation history, the violent end of the line of time itself. I mark “the
beginning” instead as a beginning-in-process, an unoriginated and endless process of becoming: genesis (xvii).

Keller also uses poetic words, like these from Hélène Cixous:
‘In the beginning, there can only be dying, the abyss, the ﬁrst laugh’ (3).

and her own:
Beginning is going on. Everywhere. Amidst all the endings, so rarely ripe
or ready. They show up late, these beginnings, bristling with promise, yet
labored and doomed. Every last one of them is lovingly addressed: “in the
beginning” (3).

Beginning then falls in between the categories, in an ‘alternative
milieu, neither being nor nonbeing’ neither a ‘changeless Being who
somehow suddenly (back then) created’ nor ‘the pure Nonbeing out
of which that creation was summoned’ (12). Rather beginning is
a ‘becoming as genesis’, creation that is not created by a Creator, but
creation that becomes in ‘inter-ﬂuencies of creatures – in ecology,
predation, genetics, cultures [that] crisscross the abyss of difference’
(12). In other words: a theology that is no longer a dominology, of
mastery by the dominus and subjection of the oikos. Instead, this theology dispenses with the stereotypes of ‘masculine creation vs. the
feminine passivity’ (17), the linearity of time where the ‘new future’
is cast in terms of the past, hence ‘liberation [is] granted by the power
of a creator God’ (20), the duality of ‘atemporality in God and temporality in creation’ (reference to Ivone Gebara’s ecofeminism,
21-22), and heterosexualism and colonialism which permeates ‘the
western theological market’ (according to Marcella Althaus-Reid, in
Keller 2003, 22-23).
What, then, does Keller construct as a theology of becoming?
I limit my description of her feminist ‘tehomic theology’ to where

186

INGE VAN NISTELROOIJ

maternity is one of the keys, where she seeks to overcome duality and
draws our attention to processes, to ﬂuidity, to instability.12 She
opposes ‘the sea of a monistic Presence’ that within theology has
been ‘well countered by the tradition of process panentheism – in
which chaos replaces the nihil and in which ﬂux, carefully mediated
by forms of stability, permanence and order, remains primary’ (218).
Central is ‘the third space […] from which both creator and creature
emerge as mutual differentiations’, in ‘the co-creativity of creator and
creature’ in which:
Creator and creature create, effect, each other; not from a prior nothing
but from their shared preconditions. This radical interdependence would
take place within the inﬁnite “creativity” (218).

Panentheism is not the same as pantheism and by applying this term
Keller remains consistent to her aim: to point at a difference without
clear demarcations. Pantheism would mean that the divine is everywhere; nihilism that the divine is nowhere; and theism would clearly
delineate ‘the divine’. Not so within panentheism:
The “en” designates an active indeterminacy, a commingling of unpredictable, and yet recapitulatory, self-organizing relations. The “en” asserts
the difference of divine and cosmic, but at the same time makes it impossible to draw the line. For is not the line always already smudged? The
smudge, the ﬂux, “is” the en, the overlap, of divinity with world, of world
with divinity (219).

Therefore
A theology of becoming negotiates its solidities, its solidarities, within the
ﬂux. It sketches not disorder but responsive, ﬂexible and therefore steadfast
forms of self-organization (216).

This poetic language is more revolutionary than one might think.
With it, she deconstructs traditional doctrines, looks for meanings in
12

Throughout her work, Keller’s indebtedness to the philosophers Whitehead,
Deleuze, Kristeva and Irigaray is obvious, although her views also diverge. She for
instance positions her work as a theology and unlike Kristeva and Irigaray Keller does
not delineate a female gender. With thanks to Rodante van der Waal for our ongoing
conversation on these subjects.
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a hermeneutics from within, and constructs a new theology. In her
‘tehomic theology’, ‘solidities’ are negotiated ‘within the ﬂux’, leading
to an entire new description of foundational concepts like creation
and incarnation. Both creation and incarnation (i.e. the Divine
becoming human in the birth of Christ) have previously been thought
of as ‘changeless symbols’, as ‘the origin and the climax of the timeline’ (226). Negotiating these ‘solidities’ from ‘the ﬂux’, or from
‘panentheism’, one can no longer uphold these ‘absolutes’, but needs
to see them as ‘irreducibles’: ‘Creation is always incarnation. […] And
then neither creation nor incarnation expresses a completed process’
(226-227). In other words, when no dichotomy is posited between
creator and creation, between divinity and world, but if both are
‘commingled’ and ‘self-organizing relations’ (219), then ‘incarnation’
cannot be considered as a ‘unilateral will, gift, or love’ but is far more
mutual:
If divinity becomes incarnate in endless new forms, the metamorphoses
of the creatures cast their effects back upon the divine. The divine and
the world form the conditions of each others’ becomings. Only, for
instance, in the incarnation as the human does this deity become personal. As in the beasts, animal, in the plants, vegetable, in metals, mineral… (227).

This constructive theology of becoming has repercussions for thinking about maternity too. Amidst a tradition of ‘appropriation and
annihilation’ (222) maternity has been idealized in service ‘to keep
women in their place […], designed to refresh men with a brief resort
to the origin’ (223). Feminists, in their resistance to this idealization,
have therefore contributed to ‘matriphobia’, to mother-hate:
In the guise of anti-essentialism, anti-biologism, anti-natalism, much
feminist discourse shares the impatience “to dry her up” (223).

Keller objects to this ‘feminist womb-annoyance and wombavoidance’ (223) and proposes to take the ‘topos of the deep’ as the
heart of a ‘deep-end feminism’, as it ‘de-essentializes any language of
sex and gender’ (223). Hence feminists and theologians should ‘bear
with a wide range of wombs’ (223) and see how replacing a male
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Godness with a maternal Godness is not enough. Rather, this ‘wide
range of wombs’ discloses how birth and creation are endlessly continuing. It is the
endless birth [that] reveals and conceals the creativity of a creator who
is also born […] a birth without origin or ends – a cosmographic natality
[…]. And indeed this divine birth, because it is “everlasting,” going on
continuously, cannot be appropriated by the religion of a single, exceptional incarnation’ (225).

Drawing upon mystical writings from Christian and Jewish origin
Keller constructs the mutual birth of divinity and self, ‘this birth of
the self from a maternal Godness inverts itself: the self gives birth
to God’ (Silesius, 224), or even ‘a startling triad: the everlasting birth
of God; the birth of the world; the birth of the soul’ (Rosenzweig, 224).
These ideas have consequences for thinking about maternity and
birth, as well as for theology. Maternity is not personalized, for mothers need to be born themselves (225). Maternity and femininity can
no longer be colonized, contained, or enclosed, as this would block
every becoming and ‘reinscribe the matriphobic nihil’ (223). If everything and everyone and every divinity is in ﬂux, is becoming; if birth,
creation and incarnation are endless; it seems hopeless to ‘try for an
impossible permanence and a deﬁning separation’, although ‘humans
can hardly avoid the attempt’ (227). Nevertheless, relationality is key
to all thinking, both in where we stand when we decide and in what
its ultimate effects will be:
If we begin ever again not from nothing but from it all, in media res, any
beginning partakes of the irreducible. Something may come of it. This
should not reassure us. […] The force of beginning ripples outward, sometimes with a great splash, sometimes a lighter energy, ever dissipating into
– it All. As beginnings disperse they imprint the waves of the future
(227).

In a way, Keller has broken down all traditional boundaries and
vocabulary. The skin no longer contains our being, but all boundaries
have become ﬂuid and ﬂexible in a continuous process of becoming,
like the permeable membrane between a fetus and a pregnant body.
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Time has become a wave instead of a line. Metaphysics and physics
are inseparably interwoven. Separations between the sexes, or
between human and non-human, have become utterly irrelevant.
Here lies an answer to the battle that Bourgeois has fought: against
stereotypes, against oppression, against violence. If we harm others/
anything, we harm ourselves, for the others are ourselves.13
The way in which Keller deconstructs the doctrine of ‘creatio ex
nihilo’ and the theological violence that resulted from the erasure of
the dark, deep, the waters, and the spirit, denigrating the elements,
the material, the relationality of our beginningless becoming, may
resonate with Bourgeois’ ‘unravelling’ of patriarchal power in Ste
Sébastienne. How Keller constructs a new idea of being as becoming,
as ﬂuid, permeable, mutual creation of both creature and creator,
brings to mind the powerful yet ﬂuid and transparent image of The
Maternal Man. Both Keller and Bourgeois challenge commonly shared
(western, Christian) patterns of power, maternity, sexuality, and
normativity. An alternative is offered by Keller: conceiving our
‘being’ as becoming. We now need to see how to include this in care
ethics.

Conclusion
Care ethics has rightfully looked at caring practice and emphasized its
non-essentialist character. There has, however, been a neglect of the
‘great inequalizer’ in these practices (e.g. in western capitalism in
the economic sense, and globally when looking at birth mortality): the
physical ability to become pregnant, give birth and breastfeed. Rich’s
and Ruddick’s writings on this have not received the attention they
deserved from a care ethical perspective. Spiritual traditions have
shown that these abilities have not always been suppressed or ignored,
but worshipped. Moreover, this has not exclusively been to the

13
The many ways in which the traditional western boundaries and patterns of
thought have worked to dominate and destroy have also been pointed out by thinkers on decolonization like Rose (2004), who also makes a strong case for the interconnectedness of harming others and self-harm.
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detriment of women, since they were not essentialized by motherhood, but positioned as self-asserting women who also took care.
With this contribution I have looked at spiritual and theological
traditions as well as at the development of care ethics. I have intended
to avoid the pitfalls of essentializing and of silencing the mother; of
idealizing and discarding maternity, and I have aimed to do justice to
a non-stereotypical view of humans and life. For this, Ruddick, Rich
and Keller have proved valuable. I consider Keller’s concept of
‘becoming’ as inviting to overcome boundaries of ontology, sexism,
anthropocentrism, humanism, colonialism. Care ethics can be
enriched by the concept of becoming in making its theory less anthropocentric as well as less agentistic. Taking ‘becoming’ seriously, it
might even be one more characteristic of care itself: in ‘letting
become’, in abstaining from intervention in development, in waiting
and acknowledging what is growing, transforming, developing in and
around us, and developing us, we might be doing exactly what may
help our world to become the place where we can live together with
all living and nonliving creatures. Hence I propose that we extend
Joan Tronto’s and Berenice Fisher’s deﬁnition of care to include the
idea of becoming. My proposition follows the example of Maria Puig
de la Bellacasa (2017), who amended the deﬁnition in order to
include posthumanist thought, to expand ‘“our” world’ and ‘to disrupt
the subjective-collective behind the “we”’:
care is everything that is done (rather than everything that “we” do) to
maintain, continue, and repair “the world” so that all (rather than “we”)
can live in it as well as possible. That world includes… all that we seek
to interweave in a complex, life-sustaining web (modiﬁed from Tronto
1993, 103) (Puig de la Bellacasa 2017, 161).

In conclusion, I propose to extend this version even further, by
including the notion of that what becomes and that we need to let
become and that seeks to be interwoven:
care is everything that is done to maintain, continue, letting become and
repair “the world” so that all can live in it as well as possible. That world
includes… all that seeks to be interwoven in a complex, life-sustaining web
(modiﬁed from Tronto 1993, 103 and Puig de la Bellacasa 2017, 161).
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This new proposal aims to express the idea of becoming and interwovenness as a core of our being. In care ethics, however, we need to
pay attention to power inequalities and the way in which ideas may
be misused. Hence we cannot accept this idea entirely unconditionally. The ﬁrst condition is that pregnancy can only be a process of
‘becoming’ if it is acceptable to the pregnant person. The process
of becoming of the fetus turns into an instrument of torture when the
pregnancy is forced upon the woman or person, and of oppression
when her life is organized in such a way that she neither physically
nor mentally can create the required life-sustaining conditions for
this becoming. Secondly, and in line with the previous condition,
pregnancy needs to be understood as a process of becoming of two
and more people. At the minimum, pregnancy involves the fetus and
the pregnant person. Often there are intimate others involved too,
who become parents (co-, grand-, step-, or adoptive parents), uncles
and aunts, brothers and sisters. Their lives go through a process of
becoming too, as through birth their identity changes. Thirdly, there
is always the larger relational web that needs to be involved as the
complex life-sustaining web, including the creation of safe and
respectful conditions for pregnancy, birth, and child-care. And ﬁnally,
any process of becoming can only take place in a world in which all
life can ﬁnd air to breathe, water to drink, food to eat.
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‘With Prayer from Your Loving Father’:
Men, Masculinity, Faith, and Care
Martin Robb

‘With Prayer from Your Loving Father Charles Edward. Love and Kisses
from all.’

So ends a letter written on 18 January 1916 by my great grandfather
Charles Edward Robb to his son, Arthur Robb, my grandfather,
a Private in the Royal Fusiliers stationed at Corunna Barracks in
Aldershot, England, awaiting embarkation to the Western Front
in France. The letter is one of a series of eight, written by Charles on
a more or less weekly basis between 6 January and 24 February 1916.
Sadly, only one side of the correspondence has survived, and any letters that my grandfather may have written home have been lost.
The letters came into my possession after my grandfather’s death,
and as I read and reﬂected on them, I came to see them as a potentially rich resource for my academic research on fatherhood and for
my continuing exploration of issues concerning men, masculinity and
care (Robb 2020). The letters presented a rare example of texts that
captured a man ‘doing’ fathering, albeit under the unusual conditions
created by war. Moreover, these letters were rare in another sense.
According to Michael Roper (2010), in his study of the emotional
struggles of young soldiers in the First World War, letters from home
to those serving in the conﬂict were overwhelmingly from mothers
to sons, with fathers only occasionally acting as correspondents.
Even more unusually, my great grandfather’s letters appeared
to demonstrate an affective fathering practice and an expressive
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masculinity, as exempliﬁed by the words quoted above, that seemed
out of keeping with conventional notions of how a sixty-ﬁve-year-old
Englishman, born and raised in the Victorian era, would have communicated with his nineteen-year-old son. Just as importantly, it was
impossible to overlook the fact that the letters were pervaded by
a powerful sense of my great grandfather’s Methodist Christian faith,
both in terms of their language and, more importantly, their moral
concerns. Indeed, the way that Charles performed his fathering identity and expressed his masculinity in these letters seemed inescapably
bound up with that faith.
In this chapter I want to suggest that an analysis of my great
grandfather’s letters might provide some insight into the potential of
religious faith as a resource for the development of caring masculinities, and more generally in support of an ethic of care. Moreover,
I will argue that this might contribute to a re-evaluation of the relationship between religion and care theory, and to understanding how
religious faith can help to supply what some have identiﬁed as a motivational or normative vacuum in care ethics (Hollway 2006; Vanlaere
and Gastmans 2011).
Fatherhoods past and present
Research on fathering has blossomed in recent years, growing out of
second-wave feminist research and a wider re-evaluation of gender
roles and identities, and coinciding with changes in the experience
and practice of fatherhood and the emergence of a new model of
engaged fathering. A number of landmark academic studies of fathering have appeared, including those by Doucet (2006), Dermott
(2008), Miller (2010), and Ranson (2015). This expansion of fatherhood research has run alongside a growth in the study of men and
masculinities more generally, again building on feminist research on
women’s lives and experiences (for general overviews, see Hearn and
Connell 2005; Kimmel and Messner 2010).
It could be argued that much recent writing on fatherhood, and
indeed a good deal of popular rhetoric surrounding the so-called ‘new
fatherhood,’ has deﬁned itself by contrast with an image of how
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fathering was supposedly done in the past, presenting a picture of
fathers in previous generations as emotionally distant disciplinarians,
unengaged in their children’s day-to-day care. Indeed, much research
with contemporary fathers appears to conﬁrm this stereotype, with
men often comparing themselves favourably with their own fathers
and grandfathers. As one participant in my own research on young
men’s attitudes to fatherhood said, ‘As long as I’m nothing like my
dad, I’m happy’ (Robb 2020).
However, recent scholarship has begun to undermine these stereotypes, providing a more nuanced picture of fathering in the past (see
for example, Strange 2015; King 2015). An emphasis on the plurality
and mutability of masculine identities (Connell 1995) has contributed to an understanding that, just as present-day masculinities and
fathering identities vary on the basis of class and culture, so men’s
identities and practices in the past were also complex and diverse. At
the same time, academic research has also begun to challenge simplistic associations between religious faith and hegemonic masculinity. The conventional assumption has been that Christianity, in particular, has served throughout its history as a bulwark of patriarchy,
acting to bolster societal strategies to keep women in their place and
to ﬁx conventional roles within the family (Hamington 1995). An
example of research that has challenged this received notion is the
work of the historian of masculinity, John Tosh (2005; 2007), whose
exploration of the inﬂuence of religious belief, and speciﬁcally
Methodism, on men in the nineteenth century has uncovered the
ways in which many men in this period were closely involved in the
care of their children and manifested a form of masculinity at variance with conventional images of men of that era. Moreover, Tosh
has shown that it was precisely these men’s Christian faith that was
the inspiration for their engaged fathering practice and expressive
masculinity.
Methodism and masculinity
Founded by John Wesley in the eighteenth century as a revivalist
sect that eventually broke away from the Church of England,
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nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century Methodism was distinguished by its overt emotionalism, and by an emphasis on the loving
Fatherhood of God and a personal relationship with a loving Jesus,
as well as by the involvement of lay people in both preaching and
self-government (Hempton 2006). Radical historians, such as Edward
Thompson (2013), have taken a generally negative view of Methodism’s social inﬂuence. However Tosh (2007) has argued, on the basis
of his own research, that ‘Methodism furnished the materials for
a feminine, as well as a masculine view of the world, and even
for a measure of challenge to patriarchal authority.’ The relevance
of Tosh’s argument, and his research ﬁndings, for understanding
my great grandfather’s wartime letters, will become clear in what
follows.
My great grandfather Charles Edward Robb was a devout Methodist and lifelong teetotaller. Born in 1851 in Soho, London, the son
of a law stationer’s clerk and of a mother who died shortly after giving birth to him, he was raised in the East End of London by his
father and stepmother, who were themselves practising Methodists.
He married Louisa, the daughter of an umbrella-maker, and they
lived initially in Whitechapel, where Charles worked as housekeeper
to the Wesleyan Methodist Mission. Charles and Louisa had eight
children who survived beyond infancy, of whom my grandfather,
Arthur, born in 1897, was the youngest. By the time of the 1901
census, the family had moved out to the expanding working-class
suburb of East Ham, on the London-Essex border. In 1902, Charles
suffered the ﬁrst of three bereavements, when his eldest son, also
named Charles, a Royal Marine, died on active service at the age of
23. Three years later, Charles experienced two more losses within
months of each other. In April 1905 his sixteen-year-old daughter
Marion died from heart failure, and a few months later his wife
Louisa died from typhoid fever at the age of 48, leaving Charles to
raise his surviving children alone. It might be argued that Charles’
experiences of loss and of being thrown into the role, unusually for
the period, of a single father, helped to shape his masculine identity
and fathering practice. However, I would suggest that the particular
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character of his Methodist Christian faith was of at least equal
importance in that process.
‘A True Christian Manliness’
An analysis of my great grandfather’s letters reveals the close connection between his religious faith, his fathering practice and his masculine identity. In terms of their subject matter, the letters are something of a mixed bag, as one might expect from family correspondence,
combining the serious with the trivial, the moralistic with the mundane. They include news from home and some practical business
about missing items of clothing and subscriptions that need to be
renewed. However, the letters also include more explicitly exhortatory sections, and there are long passages in which Charles confronts
the issue of Arthur’s moral and spiritual wellbeing. For example, in
a letter written on 6 February 1916, Charles’ concern about his son’s
spiritual welfare is initially framed in terms of surprise that he is not
planning to come home on weekend leave. The letter begins:
My Dear Arthur
I received your letter yesterday acknowledging the Undershirt but was rather
surprised to hear that you were not coming for the weekend. I do not know
under what rule or regulation the passes are given in your section but I do hear
that in most sections they are allowed by the Officer in Charge to a certain
number of the best behaved and most attentive to duty during the week.
If this is the case in your section it does not appear to be altogether as it should
be with you otherwise, I am sure that you would have been able to obtain leave
by this time.
I have been making enquiries from two or three who are able to inform me
about the Fusiliers, and they have made me almost to wish that you had not
joined in that Regiment.

There then follows a long paragraph (somewhat abbreviated below)
in which Charles employs explicitly religious language to warn against
the temptations presented by life in the army:
Dear Arthur do take some advice from me, before you left home I begged of
you not to associate yourself with bad companions. Remember you are an
abstainer from all alcoholic drinks. Stick to the Temperance whatever it may
cost you, likewise avoid in every way card playing or gambling, betting and
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every means of dishonesty… I beg of you Arthur do not be led into following
these awful Soul destroying habits. I am very much afraid that you have not at
all times enough courage to say No when you are surrounded by Temptation
You must Pray and Pray sincerely and earnestly and keep a Watchful eye wide
open so that you can clearly see there is Temptation and do not be in the least
afraid to meet it and Resist. Not alone in your own strength but keep your
memory clear that God is Omnipresent always near you, always ready to hear
your Prayer, always willing and anxious to Help you to persist. So I beg of you
Arthur not to be negligent with Prayerfulness and Watchfulness.

This is followed by a short paragraph in which Charles advises his
son to recall the words of a favourite hymn as a way of overcoming
temptation:
If you cannot think of words at the moment that you feel depressed try and call
to mind some Hymn verse that you know like this Shun evil companions. Bad
Language Disdain – God’s Name hold in Reverence. Nor take it in Vain. Be
thoughtful and earnest. Kind hearted and true Look ever to Jesus. He will carry
you through.

These passages are fairly typical of the letters as a whole. My analysis
of them leads me to conclude that they are driven by an inner struggle on Charles’ part, to resolve a conﬂict between his religious beliefs
on the one hand, and his son’s current situation as a soldier in the
British army about to go off to war. Another way of expressing this is
to say that the letters seek to reconcile two vocations, one secular, as
a soldier for King and country, and the other spiritual, as a warrior for
Christ, in both of which my conservative, patriotic Christian great
grandfather believed. However, we might also reframe this opposition
in terms of a tension between two very different ideals of manhood:
the masculinity of the army culture, in Charles’ view characterised by
drinking and gambling, and the Christian manliness of Arthur’s
Methodist upbringing. The letters are constructed in such a way that
they move towards an attempted resolution of this conﬂict. A clear
example of their attempts at resolution is offered by the way in which
a number of the letters close, with a ritual bringing together of the
two vocations. For example, the letter of February 1916 already cited
ends as follows:
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Now Arthur I beg you to read this letter and give it all the consideration you
can and Do your very best to make a True Soldier not only for your King and
Country but try and enrich your Loyalty by Faithfulness and whole Heartedness in your Service to God and His Son Jesus Christ who Loves you.

There are similar examples in other letters:
God Bless You and make you a good Soldier of Jesus Christ so that it may
Blend with your life as a Soldier for your King and Country.

The word ‘blend’ is signiﬁcant here, as it is precisely a blend between
two seemingly irreconcilable visions of manhood that the writer is
striving to achieve in these letters.
At the same time, however, I would suggest that my great grandfather’s Methodist Christian faith provided him with two very different registers for performing fatherhood and masculinity. One is certainly the register of moral exhortation that we see on display in the
long passage already quoted, with its insistence on courage, selfreliance and persistence. There are similar examples in other letters:
Try and do all and everything of your Best in all things and do not forget the
best way to conquer difficulties that seem almost impossible and are likely to
conquer you is to use your own energy, capability, goodwill and endeavour.
…
I hope that you are getting on well and endeavouring in every way to do your
very best. You are now placed in a position that everything you are told to do
must be done immediately without any excuse for not doing it so keep up your
courage and at every difficulty that comes in the way keep smiling and at all
risks persevere until you conquer it Be active Be prompt Be careful Be willing
Be diligent and then you will get on.

In these extracts we see one aspect of Nonconformist spirituality on
display: the Puritan emphasis on individual effort and self-mastery,
familiar from Bunyan’s Pilgrim’s Progress and Max Weber’s famous
analysis of the Protestant work ethic (Weber 2013). These particularly masculine virtues also found expression in what became known
as the ‘Christian manliness’ movement of the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, associated with the writings of Charles
Kingsley and others, and often aligned with patriotic expressions of

202

MARTIN ROBB

support for Britain’s imperial ambitions. Norman Vance (1985) writes
that this Victorian ideal of manliness ‘brings with it connotations of
physical and moral courage and strength and vigorous maturity…
The manly man may be patriotic, generous, broad-minded, decent,
chivalrous and free-spirited by turns’. According to James Mangan
and James Walvin (1987), for the early Victorians this ideal ‘represented a concern with a successful transition from Christian immaturity to maturity, demonstrated by earnestness, selﬂessness and integrity’, whereas ‘to the late Victorian it stood for neo-Spartan virility
as exempliﬁed by stoicism, hardiness and endurance – the pre-eminent
qualities of the famous English public school system’. However,
I would argue that a belief in these ideals was by no means conﬁned
to the public school educated upper classes. This vision of Christian
manliness was also inculcated in working-class young men through
organisations such as the Boys Scouts (to which my grandfather
Arthur belonged) and the more explicitly Christian Boys’ Brigade,
with the latter’s emphasis on ‘the promotion of habits of Obedience,
Reverence, Discipline, Self-respect and all that tends towards a true
Christian manliness’ (Meinhart 2006; Adonis 1995).
‘With Abundance of Love and Kisses’
However, it is evident from the letters that his Methodist Christian
faith also provided Charles with another, quite different register for
performing fatherhood and masculinity. John Tosh (2007) has written
about the ways in which Methodism provided a language that enabled
Victorian men to be emotionally expressive, with its emphasis on the
unconditional love of God and an intimate personal relationship
with a loving Jesus, often imagined in almost feminine terms. Tosh
writes about one of the men in his case studies, a Methodist farmer
from Lincolnshire, that his ‘fatherly involvement’ was ‘not what we
might expect of a Victorian father, much less a devout Methodist’ and
that fatherhood was integral to this man ‘sense of his divinely ordered
place in the world, and inseparable from his masculine self.’
This more expressive masculinity is evident in the way my great
grandfather signs off his letters, ending one with love from ‘your
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anxious and Loving Father’ and adding two kisses. Another letter
closes with the words quoted in the title of this chapter: ‘With prayer
from your Loving Father Charles Edward’ and ‘Love and Kisses from
all’. Other letters in the series sign off in a similar fashion, with references both to the divine love of Jesus Christ ‘who loves you so much’
(24 January), ‘Jesus Christ who loves you’ (6 February), and to paternal love ‘with abundance of Love and kisses from your father’ (10 February), ‘With love and kisses from your loving Father’ (18 February),
and so on. In these and other examples, Charles’ own affection for
his son is interwoven with a vision of a loving Jesus and the loving
Fatherhood of God.
These examples suggest that another kind of masculine identity
was available to men of this era via their religious faith, besides the
stereotype of the austere and self-reliant puritan or the exemplar of
robust Christian ‘manliness’. The Christian, and speciﬁcally Methodist, image of the loving fatherhood of God, and its emphasis on
a loving relationship with Jesus, provide Charles with a model for his
own fathering, and at the same time the emotional spirituality of
Methodism offers him a language in which to openly express his love
for his son. I would suggest that Charles’ Methodist Christian faith
was the key resource both for his appeal to a conventional Christian
‘manliness’ based on courage, persistence and effort, and to a perhaps
more surprising and expressive masculinity and caring fathering practice. These two ideals operate in tension with each other throughout
my great grandfather’s letters.
I had ﬁrst-hand experience of some of these same tensions, growing up in a Methodist family in southern England in the late 1960s.
My parents continued the family tradition of devout Methodist practice: my father was a lay preacher and my mother a Sunday School
teacher and church pianist. At the age of eleven I was enrolled in the
Boys’ Brigade company that had just been launched at our church.
We dressed in a pseudo-military uniform which was inspected on
weekly parade nights, when the ﬁrst activity of the evening was
always drill (marching in formation). We were also required to attend
a Sunday Bible class, led by ofﬁcers who had all experienced military
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service and whose preaching emphasised effort and self-reliance and
encouraged us in ‘all that tends towards a true Christian manliness’.
By contrast, in Sunday School we sang sunny choruses that presented
a softer, more affective version of Christian belief:
Wide, wide as the ocean
High as the heavens above
Deep, deep as the deepest sea
Is my Saviour’s love.

In church, we sang the hymns of Charles Wesley, with their emotionﬁlled words about God’s inﬁnite love and the sacriﬁce of Jesus:
Amazing love! How can it be
that thou, my God, shouldst die for me?

In other words, both of the ideals of Christian manliness on display
in my great grandfather’s wartime letters were also in evidence in my
own childhood half a century later. I’ve written elsewhere (Robb
2007) about the ways in which, for me, these versions of Christian masculinity increasingly came into conﬂict with the appeal of
the new identities that were becoming available for young men in the
late 1960s.
Of course my great grandfather’s letters reﬂect the experience of
only one man, but taken together with the research of Tosh and others, they suggest that even a hundred years ago certain forms of Christian spirituality were able to act as a powerful resource for the expression of a caring masculinity. Nor, I would argue, was this conﬁned to
Methodism: an argument could be made that Catholic devotion to
the Sacred Heart of Jesus, which was also at its zenith during this
period, as well as the maternal image of the Virgin Mary, also provided models of divine love and an emotional spirituality which
could provide a resource for care (see Hamington 1995). Based on my
analysis of my great grandfather’s letters, I want to argue that certain
forms of Christian faith are able to act as resource for an emotional
and expressive form of fathering and a caring masculinity. I would
suggest that this offers a challenge to care ethics, and to its general
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scepticism about the value of religious faith as the basis for an ethic
of care.
Faith, Imagination and Care Ethics
While a number of care ethicists have clearly been inﬂuenced
by a broadly religious perspective (see, for example, Leget 2017;
Groenhout 2004; Vanlaere and Gastmans 2011), the mainstream of
care ethics, and in particular the inﬂuential feminist branch of care
ethics, has remained mostly sceptical about the potential of religious
faith as a resource for an ethic of care. There are certainly occasional
acknowledgements of the positive role of religion in the writings of
feminist care ethicists. For example, Joan Tronto (1993) makes brief
reference to caring practices among black Americans, informed by
‘a deep commitment to caring that emerges out of the African American religious tradition’ (83). However, in general feminist care ethicists have tended to argue that religion, and in particular Christianity, is unable to provide a foundation for care ethics.
Virginia Held (2006) maintains that care ethics ‘need not invoke
religious beliefs that carry divisive baggage’ and should avoid basing
itself on ‘the moral claims of particular others.’ Instead, she seeks
a basis for care ethics in ‘moralities based on reason’ which can attract
universal support. Elsewhere she writes: ‘Valuing care is entirely independent of any religious foundation, and is the stronger for this, since
those not sharing a given religious tradition have few reasons to
attend to argument that appeal to that tradition.’ This scepticism
about the positive potential of religious belief as a resource for care
ethics is based on a general feminist hostility to the perceived patriarchal nature of established religion. Held argues that ‘the ethics of
care as a feminist ethic is wary of existing traditions and traditional
communities’ since ‘virtually all are patriarchal.’ Held’s wariness of
religion is shared by other prominent feminist care ethicists, with Nel
Noddings (2013), for example, arguing that ‘religious organisations
often tend to diminish the ethical ideal’ and that ‘the frequent insistence on obedience to rules and adherence to ritual contributes to
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the erosion of genuine caring,’ adding that women ‘should know what
the world’s great modern religions have done to them.’
However, by contrast with Held and some other feminist care ethicists, I would argue that religious faith, such as that exhibited by my
great grandfather in his wartime letters, can in fact supply something
to an ethic of care which is lacking in appeals to universal reason. In
her assessment of Joan Tronto’s care ethics from a psychoanalytic
perspective, Wendy Hollway (2006) draws a parallel with Andrew
Dobson’s (2006) critique of the principal weakness that he perceives
in the ideology of cosmopolitanism: in that ‘it is based on a “thin”
deﬁnition of what connects people together in a common humanity,’
leaving ‘a “motivational vacuum” in explaining how people might
meet universal political obligations’ or, Hollway adds, ‘in my terms,
a lack of a theory of subjectivity that accounts for people’s capacities
to care (or not).’ Hollway argues that Tronto fails to ‘problematise
the capacity to care,’ drawing instead on ‘a…simplistic model of
social learning to account for moral conduct, reinforced with the idea
that practice is a sufﬁcient conveyor of moral values.’ Concluding
that ‘the naturalisation of care is a blind-spot in the literature about
care ethics,’ Hollway suggests that Tronto ‘remains on the territory of
the enlightenment subject of moral rationality that was so inﬂuential,
through Kant, in traditional moral and ethical theory, a perspective
that she explicitly criticises,’ and on voluntaristic notions of the
‘intentional rational subject.’
Hollway’s criticisms of care ethics are echoed by Linus Vanlaere
and Chris Gastmans (2011), who cite Selma Sevenhuijsen’s (1998)
questioning of ‘the naturalness with which care ethicists assume that
positive care related conditions are evoked in a moral subject through
contact with a person who is in need of care’ and her doubt as to
whether ‘something like a “spontaneous” caring response really exists
when one sees someone in need of care.’ The authors conclude that
‘care in and of itself is not very normative’ and point to what they
regard as a ‘normative vacuum in care ethics,’ which has some parallels with Hollway’s perception of a ‘motivational vacuum.’
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In considering the potential of religious belief to supply this ‘motivational’ or ‘normative’ vacuum or absence in care ethics, it might
be helpful to have recourse to Maurice Hamington’s work on the role
of imagination in care. Hamington (2004) has argued that ‘imagination plays a crucial role in animating morality’ and that ‘one function
of imagination is creating the possibility for empathy.’ Writing about
care ethics and poetry, Hamington and Rosenow (2019) suggest that
‘caring is imbued with imaginative thought’ and that ‘imagination
plays a crucial role in understanding the one cared-for and the context they are in.’
I agree that there is a need for what we might describe as an imaginative superstructure in order to inform and motivate care, going
beyond appeals to universal reason. And I want to suggest that certain forms of religious faith might be able to supply this imaginative
dimension to care. While it is true, as care ethicists have argued, that
it is relationships that provide the initial motivation to care, the
particular character that care takes is determined by the imaginative
framework within which those relationships are viewed. For example,
while my great grandfather’s paternal relationship with his son was
certainly the basis of his fathering practice, it was his religious faith
that in large part determined the overtly affective and ‘caring’ nature
of that practice, as seen in these letters.
In the case of my great grandfather and his fatherly care for his
son, one gets the sense of a whole imaginative dimension of religious
belief animating and inspiring his care. Methodism, grounded in
a belief in a fatherly God of love and a loving, emotion-ﬁlled relationship with Christ, was able to create, for men of the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, an intellectual and emotional framework that motivated and infused their caring fatherhood and affective masculinity.

Conclusion
My great grandfather’s wartime letters to his son offer just one example of the positive impact of certain forms of religious faith on men’s
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capacity to care, and its role in nurturing a caring masculinity. More
work is needed to untangle the complex connections between particular forms of religious belief, gender identity and caring practice.
It is to be hoped that this might contribute to a re-evaluation of the
potential of faith for inspiring and motivating an ethic of care.
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Theologically Motivated Conversion Therapy
and Care Epistemology
Steven Steyl

1. Introduction
There is a general consensus amongst psychologists and psychotherapists regarding the ineffectuality and harmfulness of conversion therapy (also referred to as ‘reparative therapy’). The American Psychiatric Association (APA) writes for instance that:
Efforts to [change homosexual orientations] represent a signiﬁcant risk of
harm by subjecting individuals to forms of treatment which have not
been scientiﬁcally validated and by undermining self-esteem when sexual
orientation fails to change. No credible evidence exists that any mental
health intervention can reliably and safely change sexual orientation
(Scasta et al. 2013).

In spite of this consensus, the practice persists both legally and illegally across the globe (see, e.g., Bartlett, Smith, and King 2009;
Karten and Wade 2010; Jones and Yarhouse 2011; Clucas 2017; Ryan,
Toomey, Diaz, and Russell 2020). The United Nations Human Rights
Commission (UNHRC) reported in 2020 that conversion therapy is
practiced in at least 68 states, and that, in 2018, 698,000 LGBT
individuals in the United States alone had been subjected to conversion therapy at some point in their lives (UNHRC 2020). Caregivers
from myriad backgrounds continue to opt either themselves or others
into conversion therapy on an immense scale.
Many care theorists will oppose these practices outright, not simply because of its apparent ineffectuality, but also because it is in
some sense immoral. Yet it is unclear what sorts of ethical misdeed

212

STEVEN STEYL

caregivers perform when they volunteer themselves or others for conversion therapy. Why is it wrong to submit a care-recipient for conversion therapy? What sorts of mistakes are being made in the caregivers’ ethical reasoning? Which shortcomings, if any, does such
a caregiver exhibit? Suppose a child in my care approaches me and
asks to undergo conversion therapy – how do I wrong them in permitting this? Unlike ethicists in other camps, care ethicists have not
taken the provision of theories of right and wrong action or a decision-making procedure to be the (or even a) chief philosophical task
(Ben-Porath 2008; Tronto 2012; Collins 2015, cf. Slote 2007; Steyl
2021). Here, I help ﬁll this lacuna, not with a decision-making procedure through which right action is to be algorithmically calculated,
but with an explication of the epistemic dispositions good caregivers
possess. A caregiver’s lacking one or more of these is, I suggest, often
the reason why care-recipients are made to undergo conversion therapy – good care requires sensitivities to needs and relations, and these
dispositional shortcomings preclude those sensitivities. In exploring
these dispositions, this paper offers several contributions to the literature on applied care theory. The ﬁrst is to add to the growing discussion of care epistemology, whose momentum remains disproportionate to that of moral epistemology more generally, and to show why it
warrants greater attention. The second is to add to the sparse discussion of right and good action in care ethics by exploring one dimension thereof. The third is to proffer a care ethical analysis of theologically motivated conversion therapy, one of many morally concerning
phenomena which care ethicists have yet to examine in sufﬁcient
detail.
I begin in Section 2 with empirical data about conversion therapy,
the harms it inﬂicts, and the reasons on which caregivers act when
they opt for it. I argue that conversion therapy is far more likely to
harm than to beneﬁt, but I note that caregivers view the harms
inﬂicted by conversion therapy not as ends in themselves but as
means to less proximate ends which are not themselves objectionable. The fault thus lies not in the ends, but in the means thereto. In
Section 3, I unpack some of the epistemic dispositions necessary to
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avoid such erroneous means-ends reasoning, starting with an argument for preferring the language of dispositions over that of neighbouring epistemological concepts. Following this, I discuss attentive,
evaluative, and pragmatic dispositions which protect against failures
such as the inﬂiction of conversion therapy upon care-recipients. On
the account presented here, good caregivers require each set of dispositions if they are to reliably care successfully, and conversion therapy offers a case in point.

2. Conversion Therapy
Though several competing deﬁnitions are in circulation, conversion
therapy is understood here in perhaps its most familiar sense: as the
set of practices intended to sexually reorient individuals whose sexual
orientation is deemed in some way undesirable (see, e.g., Haldeman
1994; Miville and Ferguson 2004).1 Usually, the aim is to eradicate
homosexual tendencies and instil heterosexual ones, perhaps with the
goal of heterosexual marriage and/or procreation. On this deﬁnition,
there is no necessary connection between conversion therapy and
religious belief, and there is conceptual space for the variety of nontheological justiﬁcations offered for the practice (see, e.g., Beckstead
and Morrow 2004; Karten and Wade 2010; Meanley et al. 2019).
Some, for instance, opt themselves or others into conversion therapy
for fear of stigma or abuse, or because they feel alienated from the
speciﬁc sexual/gender group to which they belong (Shidlo and
Schroeder 2002). Among other things, individuals might seek or be
subjected to conversion therapy for the sake of ‘family honour’ or to
rectify ‘hormonal’ pathologies (UNHRC 2020). Conversion therapy
is a complex phenomenon driven by a variety of factors. Many
attempts to ‘cure’ non-heterosexual inclinations are theologically
1

I ought to note at the outset (and shall note later on) that I do not believe that
non-heterosexuality is either immoral or pathological. Commentators like Corvino
(2013) have convincingly argued, in my eyes, that neither claim is true. Even if the
arguments of heterosexists held water and non-heterosexuality was immoral/pathological, however, conversion therapy would remain impermissible for sheer ineffectuality (as the Kantian adage has it, “ought implies can”).

214

STEVEN STEYL

motivated, however (Spitzer 2003; American Psychological Association Task Force on Appropriate Therapeutic Responses to Sexual
Orientation 2009; Karten and Wade 2010; Drescher 2015), and it is
these on which I shall focus.
Conversion therapy is also methodologically diverse. Psychotherapists employ a variety of treatments, ranging from discussion sessions
which aim to convince the participant that their sexuality can and
should be ‘rectiﬁed,’ to exorcisms which aim to expel demonic forces,
to physical and mental harm bordering on torture. Here I wish to
address only those on which psychotherapeutic research has been
conducted (though I suspect those ﬁndings will also be reﬂective of
unresearched treatments). I do not limit this research to either selfimposed or paternalistically imposed conversion therapy, or to speciﬁc
age groups or legal status. The analysis here would include a case
where, say, an ‘autonomous’ adult surrenders herself for conversion
therapy, and also one where a child is volunteered for conversion
therapy by a guardian.
My overarching aim is to explain some of the epistemic missteps
which lead caregivers to conclude that conversion therapy is morally
good or permissible. Section 2.1 thus offers an account of the harms
conversion therapy inﬂicts, and Section 2.2 argues that these
harms are not inﬂicted in pursuit of the wrong ends, but merely
because of epistemic mistakes about the means thereto. Section 3
then goes on to explore the dispositions which correct our inclinations to make the missteps identiﬁed in this section.
2.1 The Harms of Conversion Therapy
Unsurprisingly, a set of practices as diverse as conversion therapy also
impacts its subjects in a variety of ways. This section presents an
overview of these effects, beginning with an account of the numerous
harms which conversion therapy is likely to engender. There are
many ways in which we might harm one another. Here I divide the
set of possible harms into two categories: physical harms and psychological harms. Philosophers have pondered the nature of harm
since antiquity, but the classiﬁcatory scheme adopted here seems
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particularly well-suited to the phenomena at hand because (a) it
accounts for the most common cases, and (b) it highlights and is
especially suitable for analysis of a general turn from physically harmful treatments (which have not of course disappeared altogether)
towards more psychologically harmful treatments. It also considers
some of the beneﬁts conversion therapy’s proponents cite in defence
of the practice, and explores the role these ought to play in caregivers’ moral deliberation. This lays a primarily empirical foundation for
the project undertaken in Section 3, a normative analysis of some of
the epistemological and dispositional shortcomings caregivers might
exhibit in submitting themselves or others for conversion therapy.
a. Physical Harms
The ﬁrst sort of harm is physical. Physical harm here includes the
inﬂiction of injury or physical pain on subjects of conversion therapy.
In a brief overview of the history of conversion therapy, Beckstead
writes that some:
Underwent surgical methods (e.g. spinal cord cauterizations, clitoridectomies, castration, ovary removal, and lobotomies) to eliminate their
unwanted sex drive. Some individuals hoped that convulsive methods
(e.g. epileptic seizures via electric shocks or drugs) would disrupt the
brain “traces” created by repetitive sexual thoughts and non-traditional
gender mannerisms. Some tried hormonal methods (e.g., radiation or
steroid treatments) to reduce homosexual urges brought on by a supposed
glandular hyperactivity or “balance out” non-traditional gender expression (2012, 122, see also Haldeman 1991; Meanley et al. 2019).

Aversion therapy was an especially prominent treatment in the last
century, involving “punishing homosexual desires through covert sensitization, electric shocks, nausea inducing liquids, shame, threats of
beatings, and rubber bands snapped around the wrist” (Beckstead
2012, 122-123). There is no genuine disagreement that these therapies are harmful in the sense used here – the treatment is the inﬂiction of harm, the kinds of harms are familiar, and these harms are
paradigmatic cases which any reasonable account of harm will leave
conceptual space for.
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b. Psychological Harms
The second sort of harm is psychological. It involves the inﬂiction of
non-physical injuries or pain, understood broadly to include, say,
depression, spiritual anguish, and loss of self-esteem. Conversion
therapy often involves among other things bringing about great distress, undermining identities, and laying blame for ‘deviance’ upon
the patient. The psychological harms of serious and sustained attempts
to sexually reorient non-heterosexuals are well-documented. In their
well-known study, Shidlo and Schroeder (2002) identify several distinct “pathways” along which subjects of conversion therapy might
progress. After an initial “honeymoon period” during which subjects
might feel hopeful about their prospects for reorientation, the vast
majority (87%) of participants indicated “self-perceived failure” and
a further 6% were classiﬁed as “successful and struggling.” All who
classiﬁed as failures underwent a “disillusionment period” characterised by “signiﬁcant conﬂict between cognitions, emotions, and behaviour” (2002, 253). The disillusionment period was followed by one of
two periods: the “dissatisﬁed asexual period” and the “conversionmodel-cracks period.” The former involved the transition from “disturbance about the lack of change to a state of numbness and dissociation, characterized by celibacy, compulsive work behaviors, anxiety,
and depression.” The latter, in Shidlo and Schroeder’s eyes the “most
troubling” phase, involved:
a resurgence of ego-dystonic same-sex desire [accompanied by] a signiﬁcant increase in guilt, depression, anxiety, confusion, and self-blame
because of the rebounding of same-sex desire or behaviour. Some participants in this group engaged in serious self-harmful behavior, including
suicidal gestures, unprotected anal intercourse with untested partners,
and heavy substance abuse (2002, 253).

Recounting their experiences, one subject in Shidlo and Schroeder’s
study reported that:
I felt dirty about [my homosexual orientation]. I felt like a cancer with
a boil that someone is trying to lance out. I felt and still feel like a failure
… The counseling helped for a while but after that it reinforced the
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self-loathing and internalized homophobia … It increased my self-loathing greatly (2002, 254).

Shidlo and Schroeder’s ﬁndings are borne out, moreover, by further
research on the subject. Quantitative and qualitative studies have
with remarkable consistency documented psychological sufferings of
various sorts resulting from conversion therapy (Phillips 2004; Horner
2010; Ryan, Toomey, Diaz, and Russell 2020).2 Given what we know
about human psychology, conversion therapy risks serious harms and
can be meaningfully compared to, for instance, feeding a new-born
solid foods, since we know in light of modern physiology that this too
risks very serious harms. Once again, it will not be controversial that
these are harms. If anything, these too are likely to fall into a set of
paradigmatic psychological harms, in which case any reasonable
account of harm will have to account for them.
c. Fecundity, Extent, and Purity
The import of these harms is magniﬁed by what Jeremy Bentham, the
father of modern utilitarianism, called ‘fecundity,’ ‘purity,’ and
‘extent.’ Here, I want to suggest that care ethicists borrow these terms
because they offer a useful classiﬁcatory schema for morally salient
modiﬁers of harm. Bentham described ‘fecundity’ as “the chance
[some sensation] has of being followed by sensations of the same
kind” (1907, 30). A fecund pain is one which is followed by other
pains, a fecund pleasure by other pleasures. One of Beckstead’s interviewees, a gay man in a heterosexual marriage, exempliﬁed this sort
of fecundity in explaining that:
I had to fantasize being with a man for 12 years of marriage. The ﬁrst
time I had sex with my wife the day after our wedding I was extremely
sick, vomiting nonstop for at least 2 hours afterwards, experiencing shaking and cold sweats (2001, 201).
2
Some effects of conversion therapy may not be universally recognisable as
harms – Robinson and Spivey (2007) write, for instance, that conversion therapists
often preach antifeminism. For some, myself included, this will represent a kind of
moral or epistemic harm, but this will surely be a contentious view.
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In this case, conversion therapy involved a particularly fecund pain
– it was followed by a variety of ongoing psychological and physical
pains. Similarly grim outcomes are documented by other studies.
Shidlo and Schroeder report that “for decades, many experienced
anger and grief at having lost time; they struggled with feelings of
betrayal by mental health professionals” (2002, 254 (emphasis
added)). In Bentham’s ethics, ‘extent’ is “the number of persons to
whom [the pleasure or pain] extends; or (in other words) who are
affected by it” (1907, 30). In addition to the enduring psychological
harms suffered by subjects of conversion therapy, other harms are
inﬂicted on those with whom they share or could potentially share
bonds. Most obviously, those affected will include romantic partners,
both ingenuous heterosexual partners and homosexual partners who
must be abandoned or kept in secret, whose emotional wellbeing is
also threatened by conversion therapy and the accompanying mental
health risks (suicide in particular). Parent-child relations may also be
strained or even severed by conversion therapy, and conversion therapy sometimes involves recommendations that patients abandon
friendships (Shidlo and Schroeder 2002, American Psychological
Association Task Force 2009, Human Rights Watch 2010).3 Suicide
attempts and other forms of self-harm are, of course, problems for
entire societies, and insofar as members have interests in the wellbeing of other members, conversion therapy threatens harm to entire
communities.
Bentham deﬁnes ‘purity’ as “the chance [some sensation] has of
not being followed by sensations of the opposite kind” (1907, 30). If
the pains of conversion therapy are impure, they are followed by pleasures. Several studies report that conversion therapy does not result
in (lasting) harm to all participants, or that it sometimes has beneﬁcial outcomes such as improved self-esteem, better social wellbeing,

3
Care ethicists will be especially sensitive to this given their normative commitments, but so too will religious groups, for whom ﬁlial relations are often of great
import. In this respect, conversion therapy is antithetical both to care ethical and
theological aims.
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respect for therapy-seekers’ autonomy, and greater self-acceptance
(Nicolosi et al., 2000; Beckstead 2012, cf. Clucas 2017), and it seems
platitudinous that it is possible for some beneﬁt to result from conversion therapy. Yet these beneﬁts may well be obtainable through less
risky means, and we remain unsure of their fecundity, extent, or
purity. What’s more, their likelihoods seem remote, and this ought
surely to be factored in when a caregiver is faced with a choice
between opting into conversion therapy and declining treatment. In
those cases, the caregiver is in a position of uncertainty, where they
must weigh the likelihood of harm and make predictions about the
outcomes of their choices. And in the case of conversion therapy,
the likelihood of harm seems overwhelming. Even if we grant for the
sake of argument the claim that the care-recipient stands to gain
some good here, the fact that some action has a remote chance of
bringing goods about does not ipso facto justify my placing someone
in harm’s way, particularly where the goods could yet be obtained
through other means. Typically, we think that dire risks are only justiﬁably run where (a) the reward is proportionately desirable, and
(b) no less risky means exist.4 As Walsh puts it:

4

The obvious reply here is that non-heterosexuality/non-procreative intercourse
condemns one to some sort of punishment in the afterlife (or some other form of
punishment or disapproval). I address this possibility in Section 3. Another possible
worry here stems from what Gilligan (1982) calls the ‘math problem’ – the reduction
by some ethical theories of moral dilemmas to equations. I am not suggesting here
that we ought to take anything like the approach Gilligan and other care ethicists
have expressed hostility towards; I am gesturing here towards considerations which
care ethicists will need to account for in order to present a plausible account of ethics. No care ethicist will admit that you ought to risk a care-recipient’s life for
a negligible beneﬁt. It is glaringly obvious that I act wrongly if I speed with my
partner in the car for the sake of getting to a dinner reservation on time, less wrong
if our severely injured child is in the rear and I am rushing to the hospital. The morally salient difference here is the severity of the risk (and note here that one need
not numericalise harms in order to recognise proportionality), and it seems to me
that any ethic which fails to recognise some account of proportionality (a) fails to
adequately deal with cases such as these, and (b) is therefore an inadequate moral
theory.
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Some goods are simply not worth attaining if one of the conditions of
doing so is the substantial overpowering (whether through physical or
mental means) of a cared-for. This will most clearly be the case when the
end in question would provide only a marginal beneﬁt to the cared-for.
It may also be true even for much greater goods, however, if these are
sufﬁciently difﬁcult for the caregiver to attain (2019, 8).

It therefore seems unjustiﬁable to risk the harms of conversion therapy for the sake of, say, greater self-acceptance. All of these concepts, disentangled from Bentham’s feliciﬁc calculus, are therefore
considerations which caregivers ought to consider in their moral
deliberations.
If this general picture of conversion therapy holds water, then it
becomes apparent that conversion therapy risks serious harm for little
to no reward. Since we have assumed that non-heterosexuality is not
pathological, the primary beneﬁt advanced in defence of conversion
therapy is not a factor. In most cases, ethicists of any stripe will regard
this as sufﬁcient reason not to take the sorts of risk discussed above.
Given their emphasis on meeting needs and maintaining caring relations, care ethicists are likely to agree (see Section 3). The harms
listed above threaten physical and psychological wellbeing, and
undermine basic goods such as healthy ﬁlial and romantic relationships by inﬂicting experiences which are potentially highly traumatic
or even physically injurious upon the care-recipient. Caregivers who
meet some (minimal) standard of moral decency, and are epistemically positioned to make judgements such as these, will therefore not
submit themselves or others for conversion therapy. In the next section, I argue that caregivers who opt into conversion therapy are
typically not morally wicked and indeed pursue ends which we ordinarily regard as morally good. The problem therefore often lies not
in the caregiver’s moral ends or intentions, but in the deliberative
process by which they select particular means thereto.
2.2 Religious and Caring Justifications for Conversion Therapy
With remarkable consistency, those who opt others or themselves
into conversion therapy cite as their reasons considerations which we
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would otherwise ﬁnd entirely reasonable. Most research explores the
justiﬁcations offered by members of the LGBTQI+ community for
efforts to alter their own sexual orientation. Though his results have
proven extremely controversial for other reasons, the vast majority
(79%) of Spitzer’s participants cited “conﬂict between their same sex
feelings and behavior and the tenets of their religion” (2003, 407) as
a reason for seeking out conversion therapy. Similarly, in an oft-cited
paper studying Mormons who underwent conversion therapy,
Beckstead and Morrow found that “overall, being LGB was seen as
an invalid option, given the extremely high stakes of losing identity,
family, friends, community, religious support, and eventually, ‘eternal
exaltation’” (2004, 664). Tozer and Hayes’ (2004) ﬁndings are consistent with this. They report both that religious views of participants
are associated with internalised homonegativity, and that internalised
homonegativity correlates with a “propensity to seek conversion
therapy” (2004, 729). Exploring this homonegativity, Tozer and
Hayes write that “participants desired to live in conformance with
the “ideal” of heterosexuality […] Participants also foresaw their lives
as limited if they were to live with a same-sex orientation” (2004,
719). While much of the literature, and many of the most widely
cited pieces, focus solely on Christian attitudes towards and attempts
at conversion therapy, there is also ample evidence that the practice
continues in non-Christian communities, both Abrahamic and nonAbrahamic across regions as religiously and culturally diverse as the
Middle East and Asia. Naomi Mark, for example, reports that “Orthodox [Jewish] gay persons are usually highly motivated to change so
they can remain in their home community comfortably and live
according to their understanding of tradition” (2008, 188), and
though data on non-Western regions and traditions is more sparse,
the sheer quantity of documented religiously-motivated instances of
conversion therapy is sufﬁcient effectively to guarantee that at least
a subset of these will be concordant (OutRight Action International
2019).
There is, of course, no single conﬂict here. Religious beliefs are
nuanced and diverse, and non-heterosexuality can conﬂict not only
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with one’s hopes about one’s life’s trajectory, but also with one’s attitudes and beliefs about one’s own mental states, spiritual health, deserts, place in the eschaton, and so forth. Accordingly, one participant
in Van Zyl, Nel, and Govender’s (2017) study reports that:
I didn’t know at that point whether it was a demon… I thought it is
a disease, it’s a demon. I started to realise back then that if I wasn’t going
to change my life, I was going to hell. I had to change the direction of
my life and become heterosexual so I could get forgiveness. I remembered
that as a child my pastor had condemned homosexuality. I still felt conﬂicted. I didn’t want to go to hell. Homosexuality was a huge sin;
I deserved to go to hell. I cried like a child because I was not who I was
supposed to be (2017, 192, see also Wolkomir 2006; American Psychological Association Task Force 2009).

Justiﬁcations for conversion therapy thus typically include one or
more aims from a set which includes, for instance, achieving coherence between one’s religious views and other facets of one’s life, or
the avoidance of some evil consequent upon failing to live up to one’s
(religious) ideals. This line of reasoning appears also to motivate
caregivers and guardians who volunteer others for conversion therapy; religious aims include such things as eternal salvation, living in
conformity with religious ideals, and so forth (American Psychological Association Task Force 2009).5
What is perhaps most ethically interesting about the empirical
work done in this area is that the reasons it unearths would, in other
contexts or when framed in abstraction, be perfectly understandable.
Aristotle famously begins the Nicomachean Ethics with the claim that
“every skill and every inquiry, and similarly every action and rational
choice, is thought to aim at some good” (2004, 1094a1-2). Goods on
Aristotle’s account are either ends in themselves or means to other
5

There are parallels to be drawn here with the much-discussed distinction
between ‘caring about’ and ‘caring for’ – part of what distinguishes the two is that
‘caring for’ involves a sort of ‘completion phase’ where caregivers receive and
respond/adapt to care-recipients’ feedback. Part of what good care involves is responsiveness to the worldviews of the care-recipient, and there is a strong case to be made
for the notion that religiously motivated conversion therapy often falls short here.
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ends. Aristotle argues in what follows that the ﬁnal good, which gives
value to subordinate goods, is eudaimonia (‘ﬂourishing’). This latter
claim is contentious. But that claim is not necessary here. All
the thought here requires is that ends can be ‘nested,’ and this is
a thought which care ethicists have shown some sympathy for. Tronto
writes, for example, that:
we can imagine caring practices as nested within one another, from more
speciﬁc to broader purposes. Thus, maintaining one’s medical equipment
is a caring practice nested within the broader practice of using that equipment, which is nested within the broader practice of medicine, which is
nested in the broader practice of pursuing health (2013, 21).

This notion allows us to make sense of the actions of caregivers who
volunteer themselves or others for conversion therapy. These caregivers do not do so because therapy is an end in itself – conversion
therapy is a means to an end, not choiceworthy in itself but only as
a means to an end. The end at which therapy aims admits of varying
descriptions. If the proximate aim is to heterosexualise oneself or
another, then the empirical evidence indicates that this is a means
to one of the more remote ends listed above, say eternal salvation or
conformity with one’s ideals. Conversion therapy is a means to heterosexuality, and heterosexuality is not usually spoken of as an end
in itself, but rather as a means to further ends. And those aims seem
perfectly adequate. The general end of living up to one’s religious
ideals is surely not objectionable per se. Yet if this is the case, then
the data suggests that conversion therapy is in large part a mistake
about means to ends, and not about (distant) ends in themselves.6
6

This is, of course, to let all such ends pass muster – my claim is simply that this
is often the case. I also leave open the question of whether any particular end is ‘true’
or an instance of ‘false consciousness.’ The matter is rendered signiﬁcantly more
complex in cases where I am adopting another’s ends, either because I ‘assent’ to
them or because they are imposed upon me in some way. It is also complicated in
cases where children are surrendered for conversion therapy – in these cases, it may
not even be sensical to speak of their having the same sorts of ends adults have. In
that respect, there may be an illuminating analogy to draw between conversion
therapy and genital surgery on intersex infants.
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Conversion therapy is nested within (though perhaps not immediately subordinate to) ostensibly acceptable, perhaps even noble, ends.
If this is the case, then diagnosing the problem of conversion therapy
is at least in part an epistemological matter.7

3. Care Epistemology
In this section, I synthesise care ethical insights into the epistemological dimensions of care and the insights gleaned from the literature
on conversion therapy into a normative account of moral deliberation in caregiving. The project is an epistemological one insofar as it
pertains to knowledge, judgements, or beliefs. That good care requires
excellences in these areas is uncontroversial. As Dalmiya puts it,
“whether knowers always need to care or not, carers always need to
know” (2016, 7). I begin in Section 3.1 by justifying this focus,
explaining what dispositions involve and why care ethicists working
on applied ethics ought to attend to them. I then offer over Sections
3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 a theory of epistemic dispositions necessary for good
caregiving. I split these into attentive, evaluative, and pragmatic
deliberative dispositions, devoting a section to each. Alongside these
discussions, I explain how failures in each area can lead a caregiver
to opt into conversion therapy. I thus show that care ethicists have
recourse to a robust account of the epistemic resources good caregivers utilise when they care for others.
3.1 Why Dispositions?
Moral deliberation involves mental states, knowledge, understanding,
dispositions, skills, capacities, emotions, and other related epistemological concepts. There are, however, six reasons to limit our discussion to epistemic dispositions. Firstly, we cannot do justice to all of
the concepts here – a comprehensive inquiry into even one will
7

It is noteworthy here that there are at least two sorts of mistakes one can make
about ends: there are conceptual errors, which involve mistakes about the ideas or
deﬁnitions of particular ends, or pragmatic errors, which involve mistakes about how
those ends are to be obtained. The boundary between these two categories is, unsurprisingly, particularly blurry.
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require a book-length treatment. Second, we are in search of those
traits which prevent moral deliberation from going awry. As such, we
require adaptable traits which render their possessor reliably and
cross-situationally averse to epistemic missteps. Because they do not
involve reliability of the right sort (except insofar as they overlap
with dispositions), the other available concepts do not sufﬁce.
A third, subordinate reason to focus on epistemic dispositions is that
we want an account of good caregiving to serve a predictive function.
To say that someone is a good caregiver (perhaps a wise or insightful
one) is usually to give some indication of the sort of person they are
– that they can be trusted to deliberate well about how best to care.
Fourth, as we shall see, many of these cases are not obviously cases
of incapacity, unskillfulness, or improper motivation. In the case of
conversion therapy, failures to care seem primarily to be matters
of disinclination to make proper use of available deliberative resources.
In most cases, I shall suggest, these resources are also not particularly
elusive, and this is a ﬁfth reason why dispositions ought to be focused
on. Not only would many cases be wrongly diagnosed as cases of
incapacity, but of those which are rightly diagnosed as such, the relevant capacities, knowledge, or skills are not particularly difﬁcult to
cultivate. Conversion therapy is therefore mostly a result of dispositional shortcomings, and of the epistemic necessities for good deliberation, these are among the most difﬁcult to acquire. Finally, there
is already momentum behind the notion that care involves epistemic
dispositions. Care ethicists like Tronto (1993, 1995), Dalmiya (2002,
2016), and Hamington and Rosenow (2019) have already laid much
of the groundwork for undertakings such as this, and leaning on that
literature enables us to look beyond some of the more foundational
matters to topics in applied ethics such as conversion therapy.
3.2 Attentive Dispositions
Care responds to states of affairs. When I care for someone, I actively
respond to the world around (or within) me. Responding appropriately
requires that one has an accurate understanding of the world one is
responding to. Sometimes one is fully informed about the relevant
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state(s) of affairs and need only deliberate about how to respond.
Other times, however, good care requires expertise which caregivers
themselves do not possess, so in order to care well, caregivers must
sometimes gather information. The ﬁrst set of dispositions necessary
for good care therefore includes dispositions to recognise when one
is not fully informed and to properly inform oneself as necessary.
Attentiveness is a central disposition in care ethics, among the
most popular formulations of which is Tronto’s concept of attentiveness as “recognizing the needs of those around us” (1993, 127), which
involves “a suspension of one’s self-interest, and a capacity genuinely
to look from the perspective of the one in need” (2013, 25, she also
acknowledges a kind of self-attentiveness which will be relevant
here). In these passages, Tronto touches upon a broader point which
unites virtually all of care ethics’ most prominent proponents: caring
for others involves varieties of empathy and of receptivity to the
worldview of others. For Noddings, the primary mechanism is one of
‘engrossment,’ “stepping out of one’s own personal frame of reference
into the other’s” (2013, 24). And Held, advancing a similar thought,
observes that “caring relations seem to require substantial capacities
on the part of those in them for being sensitive to the feelings of
others” (2006, 53).8 But the care ethical emphasis on empathy and
emotion is not mutually exclusive with dispositional sensitivities to
other morally salient particulars. Caring well requires certain emotional capacities and the dispositions to exercise them, but it also
requires a disposition to notice other relevant facts about the world,
for example, that a loved one is struggling ﬁnancially, that a prescription is incomplete, or that the beloved toy has gone missing. Attentiveness ought to be understood not only as a disposition governing
emotional sensitivity and empathy, but as a wider disposition to

8
This is a subspecies of a claim which is generally popular in feminist ethics.
Walker, for example, explicitly leaves room in her epistemology for “attention, contextual and narrative appreciation, and communication in the event of moral deliberation” (1989, 19, see also Sevenhuijsen 1998, 57).
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notice any morally salient particular.9 Baier rightly notes that “a reliable sign of real caring is the intolerance of ignorance about the
current state of what we care about” (1985, 274), and ignorance cannot be limited to the emotions or others’ inner worlds. Only with
a broad disposition such as this can caregivers properly gather all of
the information they need in order to reliably care successfully.
Attentiveness hinges on a degree of epistemic humility or modesty.
One cannot be a good caregiver if one is disposed to overestimate
one’s own epistemic standing to care. I shall not enter into the notoriously difﬁcult debates over competing deﬁnitions of humility and
modesty, or of the relation between the two. It is sufﬁcient to note
here that whatever else the epistemic standing to care well requires,
it surely requires that one not exaggerate one’s own knowledge or
understanding, particularly when it comes to care ethicists’ mostdiscussed subjects – healthcare, parenting, teaching, and so forth.
Proper attentiveness requires that one properly estimate one’s own
epistemic standing and, where necessary and possible, makes efforts
to improve it (Dalmiya 2016).10 In cases where mental or physical
health are concerned, caregivers often will not be sufﬁciently informed
to make sound judgements about how best to respond to needs, and
indeed a good caregiver will possess not only the humility necessary
to recognise this but a desire/willingness to learn what they must.
Thus, Baier writes that “a reliable sign of real caring is the intolerance of ignorance about the current state of what we care about”
(Baier 1982). Most caregivers are neither physicians nor psychiatrists.11 If I am to be ideally attentive, then I cannot assume that
I possess more knowledge than what I actually have – overconﬁdence
9
Such a disposition can, of course, be confounded. I might have a disposition to
notice that my loved one is in dire ﬁnancial straits, but I might nevertheless fail
to do so because they have made efforts to hide this from me.
10
Of course, it may well be the case that I cannot improve my epistemic standing.
In such cases, it is perhaps the best one can do to try one’s best and hope that moral
luck is on one’s side.
11
And even those who are could possibly be required by humility to seek second
opinions or do further research.
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such as this risks misjudging what good care requires of me. And in
the case of conversion therapy, humility will require most if not all
caregivers to gather information.
There are several subspecies of inattentiveness. Care ethicists like
Tronto (1993) and Randall (2018), for instance, have distinguished
deliberate inattentiveness from honestly mistaken inattentiveness,
and indeed there is a large constellation of familiar varieties of inattentiveness. Most obviously here, I might exhibit consequential inattentiveness by ignoring, downplaying, or inadequately informing
myself about the likely harms listed above (Gonsiorek 2004; Morrow
et al. 2004). I might also be insufﬁciently sensitive to the emotions
or worldview of my charge, perhaps by being dismissive of their emotions and expecting stoicism of them, or by denying emotional depth/
breadth in the case of children or those with intellectual disabilities
(see, e.g., Kittay 2009). I might be morally or politically inattentive
by failing to notice that my behaviour is unacceptably paternalistic,
that I am imposing my ethico-political views on another in a morally
objectionable way (how often, after all, do we think it ethically permissible to enlist others in programs designed to change fundamental
elements of their identity?) Feminist ethicists have had a great deal
to say about the sorts of political considerations good caregivers will
take into account. In some situations, particular behaviours or constructs may require that “those who bear [an identity] be epistemically
marginalized or unauthorized, so that the setup in which identities
are naturalized, privatized, and normalized cannot be contradicted or
contested by them” (Walker 2007, 177). This is particularly worrisome in cases where contradiction and contestation are taken to represent disobedience towards a deity or some other ultimate authority,
and where severe punishments and burdens attach to that disobedience. Attentiveness ought to include a subset of dispositions regarding awareness of or sensitivity to such power dynamics, hierarchies,
and coercive institutions.
There is perhaps even a kind of doxastic inattentiveness where
theology is involved. Debate persists over the positions of various
religious groups, authors, and texts on sexual orientation and
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non-procreative sexual behaviour. If, like myself, one believes the
arguments mounted by thinkers like Corvino (2013) in response to
various arguments against homosexuality to have settled the matter,
then it will be the case at least some of the time that caregivers who
opt for conversion therapy because it is in some sense blameworthy
or impermissible have failed to do their due diligence and inform
themselves properly about the belief system upon which they act.12
This includes, for example, carefully examining one’s interpretations
of scripture by considering standard hermeneutical features such as
genre and authorial intent, difﬁculties regarding translation, as well
as updating one’s belief set as new evidence comes to light. Take, for
example, Mark’s reports of her experiences with ‘outdated’ views in
Orthodox Jewish communities:
Because most Orthodox rabbis interpret the tradition as prohibiting
homosexual behaviors, they are inclined to want to view homosexuality
as “a choice”—and therefore changeable. Their thinking goes like this:
“If the Torah (law) prohibits homosexuality, then it must be within our
control to refrain from these behaviors otherwise the Torah would not
prohibit it” (2008, 189).

Proper attentiveness to one’s own beliefs, and to one’s epistemic position in relation to others (particularly as a believer in relation to
(a) a care-recipient, and (b) other believers), may well prevent these
sorts of inferences, or at least preclude the leap from the validity of
the argument to its soundness.13 Doxastic inattentiveness is not,
moreover, wholly separate from ethico-political inattentiveness
12
Not all failures to inform oneself are indicative of dispositional shortcomings,
however. Consider, for example, caregivers in remote parts of the world, for whom
the only source of information might be a heterosexist spiritual leader/elder or religious text. In such cases, a perfectly attentive caregiver might opt for conversion
therapy for lack of access to the necessary information. Attentiveness is thus relative
to one’s context. But for much of the developed and developing worlds, a wealth of
information is easily accessible through libraries, the internet, and healthcare professionals, and ignorance reveals inattentiveness.
13
Here again care epistemology will run up against accounts of epistemic justice
like that offered by Fricker (2007) – care-recipients who protest conversion therapy
may well be subject not only to an exploited power dynamic, but also to a credibility
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– religious beliefs are deeply interwoven with interpersonal, congregational, societal, national, and/or global politics and ethics. The
subspecies of inattentiveness overlap.
Even if one is agnostic about the theological/hermeneutical arguments, however, it does not follow that one ought to pursue conversion therapy for oneself or others. For one thing, as noted above, any
normative claim that we ought to eradicate non-heterosexuality is
premised on the capacity to do so. As we have seen, the evidence
suggests at minimum that such a capacity is absent in the vast majority
of cases. But for another, ceteris paribus, where the stakes are high,
conditions of uncertainty require one to either inform oneself or to
refrain from action until an answer comes to light. Many, perhaps
most cases are cases of non-urgency,14 where it is possible for those
with homosexual identities or experiencing homosexual feelings, or
their guardians, to refuse conversion therapy pending further research.
And in cases where a caregiver is given the impression of urgency
(perhaps by the therapist, a religious leader, or some other trusted
advisor), one has good reason to doubt the veracity of their statements. Presumably anyone who urges caregivers to volunteer themselves or others for conversion therapy understands the seriousness of
the recommendation and ought to urge them to think carefully about
their decision.15 Pressure to quickly and unthinkingly submit oneself
or others for conversion therapy is itself a datum which indicates that
the advisor is untrustworthy. Where an advisor – a religious leader,
for instance – pressures a caregiver to neglect their epistemic duties
and submit a care-recipient for potentially harmful treatments, this is
sufﬁcient reason to call their motives and advice into question. And
deﬁcit, where their testimony is taken as somehow less credible (whether that be
because of their age, their religious beliefs, or because they are ‘prodigal’).
14
And here I use this term broadly – it is difﬁcult to see a sense in which a need
for heterosexualisation might be urgent, particularly where young people are
concerned.
15
Regardless of the stance one takes on conversion therapy, the choice is a grave
one. Anyone who fails to grasp this gravity does not possess even a general idea of
what is involved and their testimony ought probably to be regarded with suspicion.
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this thought dovetails into another set of essential deliberative dispositions: evaluative dispositions.
3.3 Evaluative Dispositions
The information caregivers gather cannot always be accepted at face
value. Information comes in a variety of forms and from a variety
of sources, both of which might give a caregiver reason to doubt
a datum’s veracity. It is not always obvious, however, that a datum is
unreliable, nor is it always obvious why, and of course some information is reliable and ought to be factored into moral deliberation.
Caregiving must therefore involve malleable evaluative dispositions
if it is to be well-reasoned.
In order to properly evaluate information, one must ﬁrst possess
a disposition to notice when evaluation is necessary and appropriate.
As they are understood here, necessity and propriety come apart.
It may be unnecessary but appropriate to evaluate information, as
when I have two equally reliable means of meeting a need but must
choose one or the other, and it may be necessary in order for the need
to be met but inappropriate to evaluate information, as when the
evaluation itself precludes the need from being met (perhaps by suggesting that the caregiver is untrusting). Cases where risks are severe
are cases where, other things equal, the standards for non-necessity/
impropriety seem to become more stringent. Where fundamental
needs such as food and shelter are at risk, more must be done to show
that evaluation of information is unnecessary or that it is inappropriate.16 I cannot, for example, forego evaluation of information relevant
to the meeting of a need for shelter by assuming that things will turn
out alright, or that someone else might offer the necessary aid, though
in a case of certain non-urgent or nonfundamental needs I might
reasonably offer these excuses. In the case of conversion therapy,
where (a) a variety of harms are both likely and serious (or there
is evident and rigorous disagreement about the practice’s harmfulness), and (b) the deliberator is presumably a primary caregiver, the
16

For a discussion of these and adjacent concepts, see McMahan (forthcoming).
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overwhelming majority of cases (arguably all cases) will require both
as a matter of necessity and propriety evaluation of information prior
to volunteering the care-recipient for conversion therapy.
Evaluation of information is itself a complex matter, in part
because of the sheer variety of evaluative tools one might employ for
a single datum. There is also a major threat of elitism in attributing
evaluative dispositions to good care – the standard for good care cannot limit good care to logicians and statisticians.17 Simultaneously,
however, it seems commonsensical that one cannot be a good caregiver if one has no capacity or disposition whatsoever to evaluate
incoming data (Pettersen 2012). As one commentator on the antivaccination movement notes:
we have access to a vast world of semi-coherent Facebook threads, YouTube clips and assorted online quackery, in which anxious people seeking
reassurance can all too easily stumble across those who don’t have children’s best interests at heart (Hinsliff 2019).

The standard, then, must be somewhere in between these poles.
A reasonable baseline for good caregiving seems to me to be roughly
the features Aristotle (2004) attributes to ‘cleverness,’ which includes
the sorts of evaluative dispositions one cultivates in introductory
critical thinking and statistics courses. A typical syllabus for the
former will include, for example, learning how to distinguish validity from soundness, identifying fallacies, distinguishing premises
from conclusions, and so forth; one for the latter, sample size, basic
17
One might also think that the attentive dispositions attract a similar problem.
I leave that question unaddressed for two reasons: ﬁrst, a response will be much
lengthier than the one I offer here because the attentive dispositions appear to
a larger extent innate or natural. Second, there are already responses to such worries
in the literature. The attentive dispositions ﬁgure much more prominently in care
ethics and in the care ethical concept of care, which has faced related charges not
of elitism but of sexism. The response, that care is not sexist because anybody can
become a good caregiver, seems to entail also that anybody can develop the attentive
dispositions partly constitutive of good care. And if this is the case, then the attentive dispositions also cannot be elitist in the sense that they are accessible only to
a select few. For discussions of sexism and gender essentialism, see prefaces to the
later editions of Noddings’ Caring, Clement (1996), and Groenhout (2004).
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probability theory, and hypothesis testing. To Aristotle’s mind, and as
scholars like Pols (2014) have shown, these skills are perfectly attainable without tertiary education and thus avoid that speciﬁc sort of
elitism/classism, but they also seem sufﬁcient for most caregivers to
reliably meet the needs care-recipients present them with.18
The debate over conversion therapy both evinces the necessity of
such evaluative dispositions and reinforces roughly this standard.
There are, unsurprisingly, numerous defenders of conversion therapy,
and much of their work has been faulted for precisely the sorts of
shortcomings caregivers with these epistemic dispositions will reliably
detect (see, e.g., Jenkins and Johnston 2004). Take for instance
Spitzer’s (2003) oft-cited defence of conversion therapy. Spitzer interviewed 200 individuals whose “sexual orientation had been predominantly homosexual, but […] because of some kind of therapy they
have sustained for at least 5 years some change to a heterosexual
orientation” (2003, 405), in order to test the near-universal professional condemnation of conversion therapy. Spitzer’s participants,
93% of whom reported that “religion was ‘extremely’ or ‘very’ important in their lives” (2003, 406) and 79% of whom reported conﬂicting religious beliefs as their justiﬁcation for seeking treatment (2003,
407), were selected speciﬁcally using two criteria:
(1) predominantly homosexual attraction for many years, and in the year
before starting therapy, at least 60 on a scale of sexual attraction (where
0 = exclusively heterosexual and 100 = exclusively homosexual); (2) after
therapy, a change of at least 10 points, lasting at least 5 years, toward the
heterosexual end of the scale of sexual attraction (2003, 405).

After a lengthy analysis, Spitzer offers several conclusions, including
that, on the basis of participants’ reports, “real change in sexual orientation seems plausible […] as the participants used change strategies commonly effective in psychotherapy” (2003, 413).
Spitzer’s work came under ﬁre immediately upon publication. In
the very same issue of Archives of Sexual Behaviour, Beckstead offers
18

If these thinkers are ultimately mistaken, then the thesis does not collapse –
rather, it becomes (more) urgent that education be provided as freely as possible.

234

STEVEN STEYL

several critiques of Spitzer’s research, including that “a variety of
alternate reasons exist, besides the efﬁcacy of reorientation treatments, as to why and how such participants claim success” (2003,
422), that participants might distinguish between being heterosexual
and experiencing heterosexual attractions, that journal monitoring
revealed homosexual “longings” which were later disregarded or forgotten, that a reduction in homosexual attraction did not amount to
a change in the direction of heterosexuality, and that homosexual
attractions might be ignored or minimised by means of prioritising
other facets of life, that dissonance might lead to false reporting,
amongst others (2003). Carlson offers more critiques in the same
issue: that “individuals might not wish their true feelings to be known,
particularly when these feelings differ from socially accepted practices
in their community” (2003, 426), that interviews, especially those
conducted solely by the investigator, are prone to contamination by
interviewer bias, that Spitzer’s chosen concept of reparative therapy
was overpermissive, and that, because Spitzer failed to use a control
group, “causality cannot be demonstrated” (2003, 426). Religious
beliefs here can interact in complex ways with a participant’s views,
plausibly motivating them not only to seek out conversion therapy
but also to deﬁne success in particular terms, whether that be in
accordance with scripture or in such a way as to allow the participant
to adhere to doctrine. Spitzer later repudiated his own ﬁndings, writing that:
I offered several (unconvincing) reasons why it was reasonable to assume
that the participants’ reports of change were credible and not selfdeception or outright lying. But the simple fact is that there was no way
to determine if the participants’ accounts of change were valid (2012,
757, cf. Armelli et al. 2012).

These reasons for rejecting Spitzer’s study are not arcane – they are
the sorts of reasons a caregiver who possesses the evaluative dispositions and capacities outlined above will be inclined to identify. Practices of conversion therapy therefore offer useful insights into good
caregivers’ evaluative dispositions.
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3.4 Pragmatic Dispositions: Some Initial Thoughts
Caregivers also require a disposition to synthesise various inputs into
actions which further their ends. Pragmatic/practical dispositions
have occupied philosophers for millennia, and I cannot for spatial
constraints develop a comprehensive account thereof. Instead, this
section traces the contours of one basic theoretical structure for this
remaining step in moral deliberation. I want to suggest that this synthesis involves two steps: recognising particular facts about the world
as reasons for action, and then reconciling the set of reasons into
an all-things-considered judgement about what one ought to do.19
To begin with, practical deliberation involves not merely receptivity
to relevant facts about the world, but also registering those facts as
reasons for a particular course of action. Not all facts about the world
qualify as reasons for action, of course. Some facts may be wholly
irrelevant. But some might offer reasons for one action, several
actions, or indeed all actions up for consideration. Reasons for action
also admit of varying strengths relative to one another.20 I take it to
be platitudinous that some reasons are more forceful than others. The
classic moral dilemma where we are forced to choose between rescuing a drowning child or keeping a new suit unsullied is never regarded
as insoluble, as it would be were the child’s life and the immaculacy
of a new suit equally weighty reasons for action. This overarching
picture of practical deliberation strikes me as a plausible though not
unassailable one.
Many care ethicists and psychotherapists will no doubt want to go
further than this and morally prohibit the practice of conversion
therapy. Such assessments are exclusionary – one cannot be a good
caregiver and volunteer oneself or others for conversion therapy
simultaneously. Care ethicists might also include in this category prohibitions against rape, torturing children, and other practices which
we ought to prohibit tout court regardless of the goods which they
19
This account is inspired by the work of Aristotelians like McDowell (1979)
and Foot (2002).
20
Joan Tronto and I defend a theory of this in Tronto and Steyl (forthcoming).
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might hypothetically accrue. Care ethicists are generally hostile
towards such universal prohibitions, usually because (good) care is
sensitive and tailored to context (Ben-Porath 2008; Tronto 2012;
Collins 2015, Ch. 2). Even apparently universal imperatives to clothe
one’s children depend on such things as, say, the climate, the caregiver’s ﬁnances (“given my limited resources, is it better to clothe or
to feed the child?”), one’s relationship to the child, other caring relations in which the child participates (“my responsibility is not to
clothe the child, but to remind S of their responsibility to do so”),
and so forth. Care ethicists thus tend to describe themselves as moral
‘particularists’ (see, e.g., Held 2006; Engster and Hamington 2015).21
A prohibition against conversion therapy does not violate what
I shall call the ‘particularisability condition,’ the condition that caregiving be tailorable to particular individuals or states of affairs. The
particularisability condition is not violated by injunctions against
conversion therapy precisely because (a) the injunction is not preformulated prior to the consideration of evidence/context,22 and (b) such
injunctions offer virtually no action guidance beyond the prohibition
of one speciﬁc course of action. Once a caregiver has decided which
information is reliable and morally relevant, they must then decide
what to do with it. And though one might think, when faced with
a choice to send a care-recipient to conversion therapy or not, that
there are only two available courses of action, there are in fact a vast
(possibly inﬁnite) number of options facing the caregiver at that
point. Do I abandon a non-heterosexual relative or child? Do I harm
myself if my beliefs and sexual orientation are misaligned? Do I surrender or reform my religious beliefs, or live celibately? What aid can

21
The same point might also be made in response to blanket prohibitions against
particular sexual orientations some theists defend.
22
Here we return to injunctions against such actions as feeding a new-born solid
foods. Of course, only the most extreme utilitarians are likely to deny such an injunction, but we do not think that it violates the particularisability condition in part
because it is a judgement one only arrives at upon consideration of available evidence about human biology.
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I offer to this person/child, and how do I offer it? It is questions like
these which the pragmatic dispositions equip good caregivers to
navigate.

4. Conclusion
I have argued that theologically motivated conversion therapy offers
insights into care ethics and care epistemology. I began with an
empirical argument for the harmfulness of conversion therapy.
I maintained than in opting for conversion therapy, caregivers with
religious motivations err not in the pursuit of more remote ends, but
in their choice of harmful means thereto. This dovetailed into a discussion of care epistemology. My overarching argument has been that
caregivers who opt for conversion therapy exhibit a number of generalisable epistemic failings which map onto a tripartite account of
the epistemic dispositions involved in moral deliberation. If these
arguments hold water, it becomes clear how exactly theologically
motivated conversion therapy and behaviours like it can represent
a moral failing on the caregiver’s part. I have assumed that conversion
therapy represents a failure to care adequately, and the account presented here goes some way towards explaining why this is the case.
A comprehensive approach to conversion therapy will undoubtedly
require more than merely acknowledging and cultivating particular
epistemic excellences – it will likely require also reformation of religious teachings, dissemination of queer theology, and/or other correctives. Much more remains to be said on all of these topics, however,
and one hopes that care theorists will do more to develop care epistemology as a distinct subﬁeld of care ethics.
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To Shelter an Egyptian Firstborn:
The Revelatory Potential of Care Ethics
in Jewish Thought
Jason Rubenstein

At times, I have felt that one of the most important elements of human
experience, childrearing, has been all but invisible to normative religious
thought; a cavernous intellectual silence has reigned where centurieslong, voluble conversation ought to have been. But at other times, I have
suspected the opposite: that the rabbis, and their later readers and reinterpreters, intuited that the primal heart of Torah and mitzvot could only
be truly known through the relationships of care and obligation we experience daily. This intuition remains just below the surface, perhaps suppressed. But it lurks there nonetheless (Benjamin 2018, xx).

Introduction
The religious crisis of my adult life began in the summer of 2014
when, three months after the birth of my elder son, I returned to
teaching Talmud. I was 32 years old, and for the preceding fourteen
years had basked in an uncomplicated love for the rabbis. Studying
and teaching their words had been not merely fascinating and delightful, but an apprenticeship across millenia in their brilliant, quirky
scholastic spirituality. I harbored no reservations of any signiﬁcance
about the value of being their disciple, and of striving to become one
of them.
Six years prior, these same rabbis and their teachings had ushered
me across the threshold of marriage. As I entered into a previouslyunimaginable depth of love and commitment, I discovered a new
dimension of the rabbis’ wisdom: their laconic aphorisms and stories
sketched the rapture and challenges of marriage. The work of growing
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into living with and for another person made me more conﬁdent in
my rabbinic guides, who linked the private, religious, and communal
registers of their lives through covenanted love. I expected fatherhood to bind me into yet-deeper communion with my ancient
teachers.
But for a new father besotted with his infant son, the rabbis’ alienation from their adult sons was very nearly the opposite of the life I
aspired to. For the ﬁrst time I noticed—with something like horror—
how in the hour of death it was the rabbis’ students, not their children, who escorted them out of the world. Unlike for marriage, the
Talmud’s reﬂections on childrearing are meagre, haphazard, and
superﬁcial, never attaining the same sustained level of discernment
and reﬂection, on either practical or theoretical planes. Through my
struggle to discern a legible imprint of parenting on the minds and
souls of the rabbis, a previously invisible dimension of rabbinic life
came into focus: to follow our rabbis’ path means to live a life relatively unshaped by one’s children.
It was not in the Talmud, but in the contemporary philosopher
LA Paul that I found a resonant account of the (mostly) welcome
upheavals of coming to know one’s child—and this despite the fact
that, as a father, several critical dimensions of Paul’s experience are
unavailable to me:
Before someone becomes a parent, she has never experienced the unique
state of seeing and touching her newborn child. She has never experienced the full compendium of the extremely intense series of beliefs,
emotions, physical exhaustion and emotional intensity that attends the
carrying, birth, presentation, and care of her very own child… it is, for
many people, a life-changing experience. That is, the experience may…
radically [change] what it is like to be you (Paul 2015, 156).1

It wasn’t that I criticized our rabbis of blessed memory for preferring
their students over their children—rather I found myself incapable of
sharing their goals; their preference was one that I could not share.
Further, over those summer months, I found that my religious life was
1

With thanks to Raphael Magarik for sharing Paul’s article with me.
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completely remade by the responsibility and wonder of fatherhood—
and could not imagine how or why the rabbis were not more preoccupied, not more visibly marked, by the presence of their children in
their lives. On an evening walk pushing our young babies’ strollers,
my friend Yonatan Brafman suggested, “Hegel would have been
a better philosopher if he had changed more diapers”—and captured
what I was, for the ﬁrst time, thinking and feeling vis a vis the rabbis.
As a straight, cis-gendered, male-identifying student of Torah, I was
late to the party: after an easy run of it, I was now joining the ranks
of my friends, colleagues, teachers, and students who inhabited an
identity that set me apart from the rabbis, one that cast a critical light
illuminating areas beyond the horizons of their world. It feels just
right that in making the ﬁnal edits to these paragraphs, I stopped
several times to help this boy, now 6, fall back asleep.
This essay is the product of, and response to, this crisis: a search
for spiritual ancestors, for the murmurs of voluble conversations that
ought to have been. And it is also an attempt to write the next chapter of the very tradition I am analyzing, to realize some of the liberatory potential feminism offers to men who, like myself, are deﬁned by
our caring work, and to Torah itself.
One of the great blessings of living as a Jew today is the invitation
to join the tradition of Jewish feminists devoted to unknotting the
tangle of caring work, gender, and Torah. And one the great blessings
of my life has been to learn with and from Merle Feld, whose poem
“We All Stood Together” is perhaps the most evocative and enduring
articulation of my spiritual crisis—and thus a natural starting place
for this essay’s interpretive work. Then, with the framing of Nancy
Hartsock’s Marxian theory of a feminist standpoint, we will undertake
a close reading of a Talmudic narrative that both realizes the revelatory potential caring work holds for Jewish religious life and depicts
the tragic failure to make a thoroughgoing realization of that potential due to the systematic dichotomy between the most intensive
forms of caring work and full participation in rabbinic discourse.
From here the essay follows those rabbis who would have endorsed
a Jewish version of Nel Noddings’s formulation of care ethics, “Human
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caring and the memory of caring and being cared for… form the
foundation of ethical response” (Noddings 2013, 1): Human caring
and the memory of caring and being cared for form the foundation of
interpreting Torah. My purpose here is to summon the liberatory potential of caring work in rabbinic thought by collecting its most prominent moments. This section is divided into two parts: one centering
the less-intensive caring activities consistently endorsed by the rabbis, followed by a concluding discussion of the rare rabbinic passages
that thematize the experience of parents and children in their caring
relationships, straining to burst the bonds of dogma in the process.
Feld’s poem is not only a beginning—it is an account of the Jewish
beginning, Sinai—so let us begin there as well.
Standing on Merle Feld’s Shoulders
Something like Whitehead’s quip that the European philosophical
tradition “consists of a series of footnotes to Plato” is true of care
ethics and Jewish thought: it consists of a series of footnotes to Merle
Feld’s “We All Stood Together.” The poem, one of the most widely
reprinted writings to emerge from American Judaism, reads:
for Rachel Adler
My brother and I were at Sinai
He kept a journal
of what he saw
of what he heard
of what it all meant to him
I wish I had such a record
of what happened to me there
It seems like every time I want to write
I can’t
I’m always holding a baby
one of my own
or one for a friend
always holding a baby
so my hands are never free
to write things down
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And then
As time passes
The particulars
The hard data
The who what when where why
Slip away from me
And all I’m left with is
The feeling
But feelings are just sounds
The vowel barking of a mute
My brother is so sure of what he heard
After all he’s got a record of it
Consonant after consonant after consonant
If we remembered it together
We could recreate holy time
Sparks ﬂying (Feld 1984).

Feld speaks as a participant at Sinai whose memories of revelation
have been eroded by constant immersion in childrearing. The vastly
unequal (and, though not the poem’s theme, vastly unjust) burden of
childrearing has undergirded women’s exclusion from the life of Torah
after Sinai. Because this work is unceasing (“I’m always holding
a baby”) and embedded in networks of support (“one of my own/or
one for a friend”), it renders participation in the propagation of Judaism’s textual traditions impossible: “so my hands are never free/ to
write things down/ /And then/ As time passes/ The particulars/ The
hard data/ The who what when where why/ Slip away from me/ And
all I’m left with is/ The feeling/ But feelings are just sounds/ The
vowel barking of a mute.” This forgetting unfolds over many lines:
the loss of hard data is a gradual slipping away “then/ as time passes”,
occurring over years. We are confronted with a loss that cannot be
justiﬁed by metaphysical or even biological essentialism, but is rather
the product of years and generations consumed in childrearing, bifurcating the Jewish people into women who exclusively care for others
and men who only study.
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Part of the poem’s beauty and truth lies in its insistence that this
sexual division of labor is detrimental to Torah itself. Feld’s closing
image of “feelings/vowels” remembered together with “consonant
after consonant after consonant” is that of the Torah read in synagogue: the written scroll is a string of consonants, at once cacophonous, admitting of an inﬁnite variety of pronunciations, and mute,
lacking the vowels that would render it audible and meaningful.
Readers devote hours to memorizing these vowels (and accompanying
cantillation notes) to ready themselves to perform the Torah anew
each Sabbath morning. This ritual of reanimation recapitulates Sinai,
pyrotechnics and all: “If we remembered it together/ we could recreate holy time/ sparks ﬂying.”
Feld’s poem is the canonical statement of the paradox of Torah
and childrearing: Torah is impossible because of childrearing, and also
impossible without childrearing. And because of this, it is not only
a lament for women who have been excluded from the study of Torah,
but also for the Torah that has been rendered static and lifeless for
lack of feeling. The tradition Feld inherited contains this problem,
but not its resolution, which is found not in the past but in the subjunctive: “If we remembered it together/ we could recreate holy time.”
As a piece of Torah—a devoted commentary on Sinai—“We All
Stood Together” is the ﬁrst step of its own realization, a faithful recreation of the holy moment of Sinai.
Rereading Feld’s essay as a new father, and newly troubled student
and teacher of Talmud, I confronted the genderbending nature of
what I was attempting, and of who I had become. A reader and
author of Torah who also devotes hours and years to caring for their
children, and supporting friends who do the same—is a new type of
creature who holds, within themselves, aspects of the gendered
dichotomy Feld describes, and a product of feminism. This journey
and this essay consist of a series of footnotes, further realizations of
her vision of Sinai.
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Care’s Conflicts: Rabbinic Narrative and Feminist Theory
The Talmud conveys its paradoxes in miniature narratives rather
than poems.2 In the following story, which appears in the context of
a meditation on the religious signiﬁcance of visiting the sick, we hear
something like an anticipatory echo of Feld’s caring-Torah paradox—
in miniature and conﬂicted, but assonant nonetheless. It takes only
a few lines to convey the urgent religious vitality of caring work:
One of Rabbi Akiva’s students became ill and none of the sages went to
visit him.
Rabbi Akiva went in to visit the student, and in preparation for the visit
they cleaned and attended to his room. And he lived.
The student said, “My master, you brought me back to life.”
Rabbi Akiva went out and taught, ‘Anyone who does not visit the sick
is as if he has spilled blood’ (bNedarim 40a).3

The ‘moral’ of this story is the potential of caring work to create
Torah in ways that Torah study alone cannot. A new piece of Torah,
the equation between failing to visit the sick and murder, is learned
not through the analysis of a text—and not by the scholars who
continued studying within the rabbinic academy rather than leave it
to visit their ailing colleague—but through attending to, and listening to, those in need of medical care. No textual authority is cited
for Rabbi Akiva’s claim; the recovering student’s gratitude is sufﬁcient
authority for Rabbi Akiva’s pronouncement. Here the Talmud is precise in its use of prepositions: Rabbi Akiva goes in to visit the sick
student and then comes out from there to the academy—meaning is
centered on the dangerously ill student and his recovery, while those
who mistakenly see themselves to be at the center of religious life due
to their proximity to texts and teachers are revealed to be marginal.
The beating religious heart of the story, the place where Torah is created and in reference to which other places take on their signiﬁcance,
is not the house of study but the chambers of the sick. Feld’s promise
2
For a methodologically sound account of rabbinic narrative, see the introduction
to Jeffrey Rubenstein’s Talmudic Stories: Narrative Art, Composition, and Culture.
3
All translations of Biblical and Rabbinic passages are my own.
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is made good here in all-male miniature: the consonants of the tradition brought to life through a breath of caring work.
This story not only praises caring work, it also delivers a stinging
indictment of a certain type of intellectual and religious life. When
a student falls ill, he no longer matters here—the life of the institution moves on, and he is consigned to the ranks of irrelevant outsiders. Rather than seeing the Torah as a precious gift and an expression
of God’s love for the Jewish people (Rabbi Akiva’s formulation in
mAvot 3:14), here each student is valued only as a means to advancing the study of Torah. Such a morally perverse institution is also
intellectually and spiritually bankrupt: the deﬁnition of a rabbinic
academy lies in its ability to generate new Torah ideas (Rabbi
Yehoshua on bHagigah 3a). In a deep and bitter irony, a myopic focus
on the advancement of Torah to the exclusion of all else has undercut
this academy’s ability to achieve the only thing it values.
Here things take a tragic turn. The story of Rabbi Akiva visiting
his student appears in its original Talmudic context as a story within
a story:
Rav Helbo was sick.
Rav Kahana went out and announced, “Rav Helbo is ill!”
No one came.
Rav Kahana said to the sages, “Didn’t it happen that one of Rabbi Akiva’s
students became ill…”

Rav Kahana and Rav Helbo, living roughly a century after Rabbi
Akiva, inhabit an academy as callous as Rabbi Akiva’s. Rabbi Akiva’s
intervention in the culture of the academy evidently failed to take,
and Rav Kahana admonishes his colleagues for failing to learn from
their predecessors’ dangerous and soul-sapping mistakes. The tragedy
here is the obdurate nature of the academy, its apparent inability to
resist its own worst solipsistic impulses despite claims to revere the
man who rebuked them.
The rigidity of the all-male rabbinic academy, obsessed with studying and teaching unchanging consonantal texts, seems related to
the critical silence of this story. We hear a cry of gratitude from the
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recovering student, and we learn Rabbi Akiva’s pronouncement on
the paramount signiﬁcance of visiting the sick. But those who
“cleaned and attended” to the student—his actual primary caretakers—never speak, or at least their voices are not preserved in the
Talmud (nor is their silence noted).
Three personae, and the relationships between them, deﬁne this
story. There are those who do nothing but study Torah, even when
their fellow students of Torah fall ill—practitioners of an abstract
masculinity, disembodied and unencumbered by relationships of caring. At the other extreme are those whose occupation, paid or otherwise, is the care of people in a state of dependency. And in the
middle is Rabbi Akiva the protagonist, alive to the urgency of caring
for his students but free from the most insistent types of caring work.
Rav Kahana reveals that the conﬂict between Rabbi Akiva and the
disembodied students continues from one generation to the next, and
that Rabbi Akiva loses.
These personae and the relationships and conﬂicts between them
are precisely parallel to the framework developed by Nancy Hartsock
in her foundational essay “The Feminist Standpoint: Developing the
Ground for a Speciﬁcally Feminist Historical Marxism.” Hartsock’s
inﬂuence on care ethics is profound, if often hidden: Sara Ruddick
credits her with providing “both an epistemological and political
base” for her project of “maternal thinking.” (Ruddick 1989, 130).
The speciﬁc feature that makes Hartsock particularly suited to Jewish
thought is the way that she builds her account of the political and
ethical signiﬁcance of women’s caring work by extending a Marxian
account of male conﬂict—allowing a single framework to hold both
the conﬂict between Rabbi Akiva and the other rabbis, and the
silenced caring workers all at once.
Hartsock begins with a Marxian account of the all-male conﬂict
between workers and capitalists. This conﬂict is not only political
and economic; it is epistemic as well. The very point at which they
intersect—the labor market—is experienced and conceptualized by
each party in fundamentally incompatible terms. Quoting Marx,
Hartsock describes the scene from the employer’s perspective: “they
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exchange equivalent for equivalent… work[ing] together to their
mutual advantage” (Hartsock 1983, 38). Human labor is commoditized and exchanged, and to the employer it makes little difference
that this commodity is the expression of a full human being, rather
than widgets. This perspective is also—and not coincidentally—the
regnant perspective of economics.
But from the standpoint of the worker the interaction is fraught
and degrading. Continuing to quote Marx,
the money-owner, now strides in front as a capitalist; the possessor of
labor-power follows as his laborer. The one with an air of importance,
smirking, intent on his business; the other timid and holding back, like
one who is bringing his own hide to market and has nothing to expect
but—a hiding (Ibid.).

These two perspectives are not of equal value: “the vision available
to the rulers [is] both partial and perverse”, whereas “as an engaged
vision, the understanding of the oppressed, the adoption of a standpoint exposes the real relations among human beings as inhuman”
(Ibid., 37). And just as the capitalist’s perspective is reﬂected in
mainstream economic theory, the worker’s is expressed in Marxian
theory.
The contrast between workers’ and capitalists’ perspectives extends
to the goods they produce together and sell. For the capitalist,
exchange-value is primary, whereas “the proletarian and Marxian
valuation of use over exchange [is] on the basis of involvement in
production, in labor” (Ibid., 39). It is the immediate, sensuous relationship of a worker to his work—the skill, craft, effort, and care that
go into fashioning something—that guides his understanding of it.
And here, too, Hartsock argues that the worker’s standpoint is privileged: “the epistemology growing from exchange not only inverts that
present in the process of production but in addition is both partial
and fundamentally perverse” (Ibid.).
The preceding is Hartsock’s recapitulation of Marx’s account of
epistemologies in the conﬂict between capital and labor. Now Hartsock makes the critical observation that both parties to this conﬂict
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are men, and that women and/as care-takers are systematically
excluded from this account. Not only this, but the relationship
between a proletariat man and his wife in a patriarchal society recapitulates the relationship between that man and his employer and the
worker:
If, to paraphrase Marx, we follow the worker home from the factory, we
can once again perceive a change in the dramatis personae. He who before
followed behind as a worker, timid and holding back, with nothing to
expect but a hiding, now strides in front while a third person, not speciﬁcally present in Marx’s account of the transaction between capitalist and
worker (both of whom are male) follows timidly behind, carrying groceries, baby, and diapers (Ibid., 41).

Not only are the relationships of domination similar between the
pairs capitalist/worker and husband/wife, so too is the difference in
the directness of their respective labor. Contrasting a woman engaged
in caring work with a laborer, Hartsock says “Her immersion in the
world of use—in concrete, many-qualities, changing material processes—is more complete than his.” (42) Or, a bit later (43) she
contrasts the capitalist, “A life structured completely by commodity
exchange and not at all by production, and at the furthest distance
from contact with concrete material life” with a male worker, who
occupies “A way station on the path to the other extreme of the
constant contact with material necessity”—that other extreme being
a woman immersed in caring labor.
Like the proletariat perspective of which it is an extension and
radicalization, the feminist standpoint reveals the “partiality and perverseness” of “abstract masculinity” (44):
the female experience not only inverts that of the male, but forms a basis
on which to expose abstract masculinity as both partial and fundamentally perverse, as not only occupying only one side of the dualities it has
constructed, but reversing the proper valuation of human activity (46).

The parallels between the rabbinic beit midrash and Hartsock’s characterization of class conﬂict are numerous and signiﬁcant. First, each
is the scene of a conﬂict between more humane and abstract
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conceptions of the same production, be it Torah or economic. Second, both Hartsock and the Talmud see the abstract conceptions of
production and Torah respectively as perverse. And third, both the
classic capitalist economy and the rabbinic academy marginalize
those most deeply engaged in caring work.
Unlike the Marxian account, the positions in the intra-rabbinic
conﬂict do not derive from class conﬂict. To account for Rabbi
Akiva’s unique, and uniquely humane, conception of Torah study we
can refer to a tradition of roughly the same antiquity as our initial
story. This tradition remembers Rabbi Akiva’s beginnings as a shepherd. At age forty Akiva experienced a conversion based on an experience of Torah’s life-shaping power which led him to, along with his
son, begin the study ﬁrst of Hebrew and then of Torah. In keeping
with Hartsock’s manner of explanation, it may have been his decades
of sensuous labor that prejudiced Rabbi Akiva towards a practice of
Torah study as a fundamentally embodied undertaking.
Here Rabbi Akiva’s internalization of this conﬂict comes to the
fore. As an individual, he knew that he must visit his ill student. But
reﬂected through his students’ inaction, we see that he has failed to
incorporate this knowledge into his role as teacher. On this reading,
Rabbi Akiva’s labeling those who do not visit the sick as murderers
is not a realization of the urgency of caring work, but a breakthrough
in his ability to formulate this urgency in the language of Torah, and
to incorporate this awareness into his role as a teacher. And here
again, Hartsock clearly portrays Rabbi Akiva’s struggle against the
anti-caring ethos of the rabbinic academy, and the signiﬁcance of his
rupture with it:
the ruling group’s vision may be both perverse and made real by means of
that group’s power to deﬁne the terms for the community as a whole…
A standpoint… is achieved rather than obvious… [it] represents an
achievement both of science (analysis) and of political struggle (Ibid., 39).

Now we can imagine a rabbinic ﬁgure who, like Rabbi Akiva, engages
in caring work (visiting the ill student) but does not succeed in realizing the intellectual, religious, and political potential of this work.
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Such a man would remain in Rabbi Akiva’s conﬂicted status: studying
Torah and caring for others, including his own children, all the time
preserving the privileged status of abstract Torah and never transforming his caring labor into a standpoint.
This character is the ideal type of rabbi, and my crisis of summer
2014 was the realization that I could not be a student or teacher of
Torah in their mold, nor did I want to be.
On the one hand, the Talmud’s rabbis were, nearly without exception, fathers. And they understood themselves to be obligated to their
children in diverse ways: to circumcise him, to teach him Torah and
a trade, to help him ﬁnd a wife, Rabbi Akiva adds—to teach him to
swim (yKiddushin 19a). But they saw this paternal care, as intensive
and extensive as it may be, as insigniﬁcant compared to the teaching
of Torah.4 Considering a father who, like Rabbi Akiva’s father, could
not personally teach his son Torah, the Mishna offers a valuesclariﬁcation exercise that cements the supremacy of the teacher over
the father. In considering the case of a boy who ﬁnds two lost objects,
each of which he is obligated to return to its owner, the Mishna asks
which one takes temporal precedence. It answers this practical question by creating a metaphysical hierarchy:
If he found [an object belonging to] his father and [one belonging to] his
teacher, his teacher’s comes ﬁrst. For his father brought him into this
world, but his teacher who taught him wisdom brings him into the world
to come (mBava Metzia 2:11).

We could scarcely ask for a tighter ﬁt between theory and example
than that provided by Hartsock’s characterization of masculinity:
[T]he male experience is characterized by the duality of concrete versus
abstract. Material reality as experienced by the boy in the family provides
no model, and is unimportant in the attainment of masculinity. Nothing
of value to the boy occurs with the family, and masculinity becomes an
4
The absence of any of these sources or themes marks a major deﬁciency in
Daniel Boyarin’s characterization of rabbinic masculinity in Unheroic Conduct: The
Rise of Heterosexuality and the Invention of the Jewish Man. For his single, and unrepresentative, discussion of fatherhood, see p. 113.
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abstract ideal to be achieved over the opposition of daily life. Masculinity
must be attained by means of opposition to the concrete world of the
household into the masculine world of public life. This experience of two
worlds, one valuable, if abstract and deeply unattainable, the other useless and demeaning, if concrete and necessary, lies at the heart of a series
of dualisms (Ibid., 45).

The Mishna employs a set of correlated, hierarchical dualisms to
deﬁne masculinity: father/teacher; family/Torah; this concrete, necessary world/the valuable, abstract world to come. Hartsock’s last sentence, about the “experience of two worlds… at the heart of a series
of dualisms” is uncannily apt. Elsewhere the Mishna labels the view
that “there is only one world” as heresy (mBrachot 9:5): the belief in
two worlds is not one belief among many, but sits “at the heart” of
the rabbis’ life and worldview.
At stake here is not whether the rabbis performed childrearing
work, but how they appraised the value of childrearing work—both
theirs and, more broadly, that of their wives and their children’s other
caretakers. The elevation of students over sons is not conﬁned to this
Mishna; it is a widespread and stable feature of the rabbinic deathbed
scene, of the Talmud’s most prevalent type-scenes.
Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai, the founder of the Rabbinic movement, used his ﬁnal breaths to offer religious instruction to his closest
disciples; his children, present or absent, were invisible (bBrachot
28b). While Rabbi Yehuda ha-Nasi, author of the Mishna, suffered
from the disease that would kill him, his students fought with
a female servant over the course of his treatment, and were the ﬁrst
to learn of his death. Again, his children were completely absent
from the scene (bKetubbot 104a). Rav, the founder of the great Babylonian academies, was escorted to his ﬁnal resting place by a group
composed exclusively of his students, whose mourning is depicted
with great pathos; his children’s coming-to-terms with his death
receives no mention in the Talmud (bBrachot 42b).
The one deathbed scene featuring a son only conﬁrms this generalization: as Rabbi Eliezer ben Hyrcanos was dying, his son Hyrcanos
attempted to help his father remove his phylacteries. Rabbi Eliezer

REVELATORY POTENTIAL OF CARE ETHICS IN JEWISH THOUGHT

257

responded to this attempt at care by rebuking his son and accusing
him of erring in the evaluation of competing legal principles. Hyrcanos departs, and his father dies surrounded by his worthy students,
not the failed student who is embarrassingly also his son (bSanhedrin
68b, yShabbat 2:7).
It is irrelevant whether these Talmudic accounts reﬂect “what
really happened” in the last moments of these men’s lives. As religious literature, the message of these stories is a clear, consistent mirror image of the Mishna’s hierarchies. For the Mishna, students owe
their teachers more than their fathers; the deathbed scenes depict the
Talmud’s greatest teachers as desirous of the company of their students, rather than their sons, in the deﬁning moment of death.
To summarize, the Hartsock’s categories reveal the conﬂicted roles
of caring labor in the Talmud. The rabbinic academy itself is the
scene of a conﬂict between abstract masculinity and a masculinity
created, partially, through engagement in sensuous caring work. But
the academy excludes those most intensively engaged in caring work,
and denigrates the signiﬁcance of its members’ childrearing work. But
Hartsock’s project, like Feld’s, is not merely descriptive; it is also
liberatory:
Generalizing the activity of women to the social system as a whole would
raise, for the ﬁrst time in human history, the possibility of a fully human
community, a community structured by connection rather than separation and opposition (Ibid., 49).

With this framing in hand, the second half of the essay explores the
liberatory potential of the four rabbinic texts that most clearly place
human caring and the memory of caring and being cared for at the
foundation of interpreting Torah. The ﬁrst two of these are, like
the story of Rabbi Akiva, Talmudic, and they make strong claims
for the necessity of visiting the sick and other less-engrossing varieties
of caring work for proper interpretation of the Torah. As such, these
passages contain a partial liberatory potential similar to that of a male
proletarian standpoint. The latter two are later midrashim, and represent the most theological potent realization of the potential of
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childrearing in the classical Jewish canon. These are Judaism’s ﬁrst
hints “generalizing the activity of women to the social system as
a whole,” our tradition’s embryos of a community structured by
connection.

A Rabbinic Standpoint of Care
Though the Talmud occasionally employs the metaphor of father for
God, Benjamin’s report that “one of the most important elements of
human experience, childrearing, has been all but invisible to normative religious thought; a cavernous intellectual silence has reigned
where centuries-long, voluble conversation ought to have been” is
profoundly accurate. But other less intensive varieties of caring
work—and the liberatory possibilities of their associated standpoints—appear. The two most signiﬁcant are the decisive role of caring labor in Rabbi Hama’s characterization of God in the Torah (and
the attendant normative implications), and Rabbi Yohanan’s claim
that abstract interpretation of Torah is not only perverse, but the
cause of Judaism’s greatest calamity, the destruction of Jerusalem.
The Partiality of Care-Free Torah
The central eruption of caring work’s revelatory power in the Talmud
is a claim by Rabbi Hama son of Rabbi Hanina, audacious in its
interpretive methods and its theological content. It is perhaps the
earliest recognizable record of the sound of the Torah’s glistening
black consonants spoken in the breath of caring and being caredfor—and leaves us yearning for a more complete fulﬁllment of its
potential:
Rabbi Hama son of Rabbi Hanina said: … follow the Blessed Holy One’s
attributes. As God clothes the naked, as it is written, “The Lord God
made leather clothing for the earthling and his wife, and clothed them”
(Genesis 1:23)—so you, too, clothe the naked. The Blessed Holy One
visited the sick, as it is written, “God appeared to him near Mamre’s
grove” (Genesis 18:1)—so you, too, visit the sick. The Blessed Holy One
comforted mourners, as it is written, “And after Abraham’s death, God
blessed Isaac” (Genesis 25:1)—so you, too, comfort the mourners. The
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Blessed Holy One buried the dead, as it is written, “And [God] buried
[Moses] in the valley” (Deuteronomy 34:6)—so you, too, bury the dead
(bSotah 14a).

Rabbi Hama characterizes four varieties of caring work—clothing the
naked, visiting the sick, comforting mourners, and burying the dead—
as ‘attributes of the Holy Blessed One.’ The three we have not yet
encountered are similar to visiting the sick: each is less all-encompassing, less deﬁnitive of a social role, and less gendered than childrearing. Further, each state of vulnerability is one that could befall an
able-bodied man, and each remedy maintains his dignity and connection to a larger community during a time of potential isolation and
degradation. But none touch on the reproduction of humanity
through childrearing, nor do any address “caring for the severely
developmentally disabled… distinguishable from the model of maternal care necessary for an ‘intact’ ﬂourishing child” (Kittay 1999, 23).
The key to Rabbi Hama’s statement is its implausibility—but not
impossibility—as a reading of the text of the Torah. As depicted in
the Bible God creates the world, enters into covenants, grants fertility, delivers Israel from Egypt, sustains the Israelites in the desert, and
reacts jealously to idolatry. Rabbi Hama is not wrong per se in his
description of God, but he has moved God’s roling caring labor from
its (at best) marginal place in the Torah to the very center of theology. And in parallel, he moves God’s might and miracles far into the
background, denying them the status of a divine attribute demanding
human emulation.
For Rabbi Hama, caring labor does not displace Torah as the
means to describing God and the human response to God’s presence.
Rather, in the Noddings-esque formulation I have been using, human
caring and the memory of caring and being cared for provide for him
the foundation of interpreting Torah. And just as for Rabbi Akiva,
we should acknowledge Rabbi Hama’s innovative description of God,
and the Jewish response to God, as an interpretive achievement. His
achievement is not in the virtuosity of its linguistic play, but in its
audacious centering of caring labor in the face of textual evidence to
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the contrary—its insistence on both the incompleteness of the
Torah’s consonants and the power of its caring-infused vowels. Given
the now-canonical status of Rabbi Hama’s words, printed as glistening
black consonants in every copy of the Talmud for all time, it is nearly
impossible to appreciate the unprecedented nature of this caringcentered depiction of the God of Israel.5 Sparks ﬂying.
Rabbi Hama was not alone. His colleague, Rabbi Simlai, extended
his interpretation:
Rabbi Simlai taught: The Torah’s beginnings and ends are in gemilut
hasadim. Torah’s beginnings are in gemilut hasadim, as it says “The Lord
God made leather clothing for the earthling and his wife, and clothed
them.” And the Torah’s ends are in gemilut hasadim, as it says, “And God
buried Moses in the valley” (Ibid.).

Here we have an assertion that the fundamental nature of the Torah,
its alpha and omega, is a type of caring work. Rabbi Simlai turns
Rabbi Hama’s depiction of God into an open-ended interpretive program. The envelope of God’s caring actions means that even those
Biblical scenes most resistant to care-centered interpretations will,
when read correctly, yield up their meanings as templates of human
care. It is hard not to be moved by the humanity and courage of these
passages. We can only guess at the revelatory experiences of care that
Rabbi Hama and Rabbi Simlai carried so deeply in their hearts as to
supply the inspiration for their reimaginings of Torah. And it is
equally hard not to feel frustration at what could have been realized
had their caring labor gone further and deeper.
The Perversity of Uncaring Torah
Hartsock repeatedly labels abstract masculinity ‘partial and perverse.’
It is one thing to call a caring-deprived religious life partial, claiming
that it is blind to certain essential religious motifs. It is something
else entirely to criticize the pious practice of one’s own tradition as
5
Rabbi Hama is working from an earlier, similar passage in Sifrei Devarim 49.
This parallel, however, describes a series of Divine virtues—kindness, compassion,
grace—rather than concrete caring activities.
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destructive, as Rabbi Akiva did in likening the students of his academy to murderers. Rabbi Yohanan, in a complex and layered text,
does just this (bBava Metzia 30b).6
This Talmudic passage opens with Rav Yosef parsing Exodus 18:20,
where God instructs Moses on how to guide the Jewish people: “And
you shall warn them regarding the rules and instructions. And you
shall make known to them the way they should walk in, and the
deeds they are to do.” Verses such as these, replete with apparent
redundancies, are easy fodder for rabbinic interpreters. Rav Yosef suggests that each distinct phrase within God’s instruction contains
a different type of activity, beginning with the types of dependency
work enumerated by Rabbi Hama, and culminating in legal
judgment:
Rav Yosef taught:
“You shall make known to them”: learning a trade
“the way”: acts of lovingkindness
“they should walk”: visiting the sick
“in”: burial
“and the deeds”: the law
“they are to do”: beyond the letter of the law.7

Rav Yosef sees Exodus 18:20 as narrating the evolving responses to
the fact that “dependency is inescapable in the life history of each
individual” (Kittay 1999, 29). We are born without the means to
sustain ourselves and require teachers to attain those means; we fall
ill and ﬁnd ourselves in need of the care of those who are well and
skilled; we cannot arrange for our own digniﬁed burial. By embedding
the law within a litany of caring activities directed towards the
6
One other area of rabbinic practice is shaped by caring: the conception of the
work of a teacher. I have omitted these passages because they are presented differently (the paradigmatic act of caring is preparing and serving food)—but they are
worthy of attention, particularly as articulated by the inﬂuential 20th century orthodox rabbi Moses Feinstein. I hope to present this material in a future essay.
7
This phrase, literally “within the line of the law”, is famously difﬁcult. Its classic
treatment in English-language scholarship is Aharon Lichtenstein’s 1975 essay “Does
Judaism Recognize an Ethic Independent of Halakhah?”.
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various needs of human creatures, Rav Yosef ﬂatly denies any imperious claims the law might make as a program of obedience to be compelled on its subjects. Rather than presiding over individuals from the
perch of authority, the law-practitioner is tasked with attending to
the needs of vulnerable individuals who stand before him. And for
this reason, the law culminates in creative responses to individual
circumstances, going “beyond the letter of the law.”
The Talmud rightly sees the following statement of Rabbi Yohanan’s as an extension, radical as it may be, of Rav Yosef’s idea:
As Rabbi Yohanan said: “Jerusalem was destroyed only because the judges
there implemented the law of Torah.”
Should they have used Zoroastrian8 law instead?!
Rather: They enforced the law of the Torah, and did not go beyond the
letter of the law.9

Rabbi Yohanan’s statement is astonishing. Rejecting the ancient traditions that blame the destruction of Jerusalem on Israel’s sins, be
they idolatry (Deuteronomy) or injustice (Isaiah), Rabbi Yohanan
sees Israel’s downfall as the product of a strict, mechanical, and ultimately devastating application of God’s own law. The Talmud hastens
to add that the destructive effects of directly applying the Torah’s
norms are not the result of any particular deﬁciency in the Torah,
deﬁciencies which could be remedied by substituting a different body
of norms in its place. Rather, the problem is in judicial activity which
sees itself as a text-driven process of interpretation, rather than
a world-facing act of caring. Just as surgery, stripped of its therapeutic
aim, becomes vicious assault—enforcement of the law animated by

8
This is Michael Sokoloff’s translation in A Dictionary of Jewish Babylonian
Aramaic.
9
The reading offered here is of the Talmud as presented in its ﬁnal editorial
stage. Chronologically, Rabbi Yohanan preceded Rav Yosef, and the section from
“Should they have…” to the end of the passage is the voice of the Talmud’s anonymous editors rather than Rabbi Yohanan himself. Even if the position I have attributed was not that of Rabbi Yohanan himself, it is nonetheless the position attributed
to him by the Talmud’s editors.
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anything other than care for those affected is nothing other than
wanton destruction.
Like Rabbi Hama, Rav Yosef and Rabbi Yohanan are aware of the
possibility of interpreting the Torah based on purely internal, textual
grounds. And again, like him, they both reject this practice, insisting—for reasons as mysterious as ever—that care and the memory of
care form the foundation of Torah.
Rabbi Yohanan goes a step further, claiming that Torah unaffected
by care is not merely partial and incomplete, but perversely destructive. The determination of whether a given judicial decision fulﬁlls
God’s plans for the world cannot be made on terms internal to the
texts of the tradition themselves, but only from the perspective of
a person who has themselves been shaped by extensive care-giving
work. Caregiving occupies a critical hermeneutic function, insisting
that Torah be lived with, and as, care.10

The First Sounds of a Parental Standpoint
This essay began six years ago in a search for spiritual ancestors, and
it ends with notes of hope. Once or twice, sometime between the
Talmud and modernity, rabbis have authored new Torah from the
foundational role of caring and their memories of caring. These
haunting stories—both retellings of the Exodus, pregnant as it is with
the themes of upheaval and liberation—point the way to a more
humane and more Divine future, to the recreation of holy time.
Children’s Memory of Care as Theological Paradigm
One rabbinic text, a retelling of the Exodus story, develops the poignance of children’s memories of care as a theological paradigm
(Devarim Rabba, Parshat Devarim).11 Beginning with the Israelite
10

A related text (tSanhedrin 7:3) requires judges in capital cases to have fathered
their own children. It is unclear how much to make of this case: it may be a rare
example of rabbis understanding fatherhood to have far-reaching implications on
character and religious judgments, but it may also be a minor detail in the context
of the general aversion to actually ﬁnding any defendant guilty of a capital crime.
11
My thanks to Elie Kaunfer for introducing me to this midrash.
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mothers’ crushing inability to provide basic care to their infants during the most severe stages of Egyptian oppression, the midrash begins
by depicting God as intervening to arrange for, or directly provide,
the babies’ care:
“I made you grow like the grass of the ﬁeld.” How so? When Pharaoh
decreed that all newborn boys would be cast into the sea, what did the
women do? When a Jewish woman felt contractions beginning, she
would go out to give birth in a ﬁeld. Once she had given birth, she would
look upward and say, “You said ‘Be fruitful and multiply,’ and I’ve done
my part. Now You do Yours.”
What would the Egyptians do? When the Egyptians saw the Jewish
women going out to the ﬁelds to give birth there, they would watch them
from a distance. Once the Jewish women had given birth and returned
to the city, the Egyptians would pick up rocks and go to kill the babies.
But the infants would be swallowed up in the ﬁeld and would reappear
far away, only to be swallowed up again and appear again elsewhere—
again and again until the Egyptians got tired and went away.
And how did the children live in the ﬁelds? Rabbi Levi said that the
Holy Blessed One would assign two angels to each one, one to wash her
and one to clothe her, and He nursed and anointed them, as it says, “He
nursed you with honey from the rock” (Deut 32:13), and “I washed you
with water and clothed you in garments” (Ezek 16:10). Rabbi Hiyya the
Great said, “It wasn’t the angels who did that, rather the Holy Blessed
One Himself as it says, ‘I washed you.’ Had it said, ‘I caused you to be
washed’ (hifil—with the addition of a yod), I would have thought that
perhaps it was by an angel. But since it says, ‘I washed you,’ and not an
angel. May the Name of the Holy Blessed One be blessed, since He
Himself cared for them.

This is a story of an oppressive government’s policy of family separation. At this mid-stage of the story (the families will eventually be
reunited), Rabbi Levi and Rabbi Hiyya the Great enter into a theological debate about the directness of God’s involvement in caring
for the vulnerable Israelite babies. Rabbi Levi appears to believe that
it is in directing, rather than directly providing, the children’s care
that God takes on maximum dignity. Rabbi Hiyya the Great disagrees, seeing God’s direct engagement in caring work not as debasing
but as elevating.
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A foundational 1983 essay by Berenice Fisher and Joan Tronto
illuminates this dispute by distinguishing between caring about, caring
for, caregiving, and care-receiving (40-44). Caring about means that a
person’s affective state is opened to someone or something else, but
without necessarily taking any responsibility for or action on behalf
of that someone or something—one can care about an election in
a far-away country, the growth of a plant, or the winners of this year’s
Oscars. Caring for, on the other hand, means taking responsibility
for the wellbeing of someone or something—but not necessarily
doing the work of the cause. Fisher and Tronto’s examples include the
way that parents can care for a child by selecting a good school for
them and communicating with teachers, or that grown children care
for elderly parents by ensuring they receive proper medical care. We
are capable of caring for far fewer entities than we can care about.
Finally, caregiving is the actual, usually physical, work that addresses
the needs of others: the work of teachers, nursing assistants, daycare
workers, and of course parents directly involved in their children’s
lives.
With Fisher and Tronto’s categories in hand, Rabbi Hiyya the
Great’s critique of Levi comes into sharp focus. Both rabbis agree that
God cares about the infants’ welfare, and that God cares for them;
they differ on whether it is God or angels who are their caregivers.
Rabbi Levi describes God as caring for the Israelite babies, arranging
their care through angelic agents. God sits at the top of a managerial
hierarchy, and for Rabbi Levi this is a privileged position, beﬁtting
God’s dignity; perhaps infants’ unruliness is incompatible with divine
transcendence. But Rabbi Hiyya the Great inverts this hierarchy: it’s
critical that God is the babies’ caregiver, performing the concrete
dependency work necessitated by these children’s total vulnerability
and forced separation from their parents. The implications of these
views for the status of caring labor is stark: Rabbi Levi’s theology
reinforces the marginalization of caring work and care-workers; Rabbi
Hiyya the Great presents a theology that denies any metaphysical
grounding to a hierarchy that elevates those who coordinate care
over those who provide it.
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The story concludes with a poignant set of reunions:
The babies grew in the ﬁeld like grass, and after they grew, they returned
to their homes in ﬂocks—this is what Ezekiel said, ‘You grew like the
grass of the ﬁeld.’ How did they know which home was their family’s?
The Holy Blessed One accompanied them, pointed each and every one
to his parents’ home, and said, ‘Call your father this and your mother
that.’
The children would say to their mothers, “Don’t you remember when you
gave birth to me, on this day in that ﬁeld, ﬁve months (years?!—JR)12
ago?”
And she would ask him, “Who raised you?”
And he would say, “A special, handsome young man, unlike anyone else.
He brought me here, and he’s right outside.”
She would say to him, “Come and show him to me.”
And they would go outside and search all the alleyways and everywhere,
but they couldn’t ﬁnd him. When they came to the sea, they saw him,
and they pointed him out to their mothers with their ﬁngers and said to
them, “This is my God, and I will honor Him”—this is the one who
raised me.

God facilitates the families’ reunions, then vanishes. On the story’s
internal evidence, it is clear that Rabbi Hiyya the Great is right: the
intimacy established between God and the Israelite children through
God’s direct caring sets the stage for the poignant ﬁnal scenes of
search and reunion.
Here we have, for the ﬁrst time, a compelling depiction of “memories of being cared for.” In receiving attentive care from God, the
children form an attachment to the Holy Blessed One. These small
people’s touching mixture of love and wonderment towards their
mysterious caretaker offers a paradigm for the human search for God.
The connection between receipt of good-enough care and the capacity for trust in general, and faith in God in particular, is implicit in
the very language of Biblical Hebrew, where both are signiﬁed by the

12
The Lieberman edition reads “months.” I’ve suggested the alternative reading
“years” based on the developmental stage of the children at this point in the story:
walking, talking, able to remember instructions and participate in dialogue.
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Hebrew root aleph-mem-nun (Aranoff 2017). As far as I am aware,
this midrash is the Jewish text to use a child’s pursuit of her mysteriously missing mother as a model of the human quest for God.
Prior to this text, the tradition’s exclusive paradigm for such an
infatuated search was the lovers of the Song of Songs. By reusing
imagery from Song of Songs (‘handsome’ (5:2), ‘he brought me’ (2:4),
and ‘none like him’ (a paraphrase of 2:3)) the midrash signals that it
sees itself as traversing the same terrain as the Biblical love poem.
This shift from adult romantic preoccupation to a small child’s perspective invites the kaleidoscopic richness of their experiences of
their parents—the inexplicable departures, anxious anticipation, and
jubilant reunion—into the heart of religious life. Noddings’s formulation is unerring here: the memory of receiving care is placed at the
foundation of a life of Torah.
Parents, Neighbors, and Anti-(God’s) Militarism
A ﬁnal text makes audible the voices of mothers holding babies—
their own, and especially their neighbors’—in their desire to protect
innocent children against every threat, even God. I know of no other
classical Jewish text that harnesses the moral stance of devoted parents to such theological effect.
The scene is Egypt immediately after Moses’s declaration of the
tenth and ﬁnal plague: at midnight, God will strike down all the ﬁrstborn (Exodus 11:14), except those protected within the conﬁnes of
Israelite homes. A minor problem in the Exodus narrative provides
the opening for this piece of rabbinic storytelling: some Egyptians
reacted to Moses’s announcement of the eighth plague, hail, by moving their servants and cattle indoors (vv 9:20-21) to protect them.
Our later rabbis rightly wonder what efforts Egyptian parents, or ﬁrstborns themselves, would have gone to in those dreadful hours of
anticipation (Exodus Rabbah 15:2):
When Moses said: “I will smite all the ﬁrstborn” (Ex. 12:12), some of the
Egyptians were afraid and some weren’t. Those who were afraid brought
their ﬁrstborn to an Israelite and said: “Please, I beg you, take him in with
you for the night.”
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The image is devastating. Desperate Egyptian parents, fearing that
their beloved children have only a few hours to leave, knock on the
doors of their Israelite neighbors. Some of the Egyptian children are
infants, carried by their parents and placed in the arms of Israelite
mothers. Some are older, and walk alongside their fretting parents;
their Israelite neighbors had watched them grow up and perhaps
cared for them.
Like the Egyptian parents, we wait to ﬁnd out if the Israelite parents will offer refuge to these otherwise-doomed children:
When midnight struck, God killed all the [Egyptian] ﬁrstborn. As for
those who were in the houses of the Israelites, God passed between the
Israelites and the Egyptians, taking the life of the Egyptian and leaving
the Israelite alive. The Israelites woke up and found the Egyptian children dead amidst their families as it says, “I will pass over you, and there
will not be harm to you.”

The Israelite parents opened their homes in an effort to save the
children of their Egyptian neighbors. They failed: God nonetheless
struck down the Egyptian children taking shelter in their homes.
A cross-national network of Israelite and Egyptian parents cooperate to save their children; in Feld’s imagery we have here mothers—
Israelite—holding the babies of their Egyptian neighbors. The very
Israelite parents who, along with their children, stand to be liberated
through God’s decimation of Egypt, nonetheless work to frustrate
God’s plans.
It is hard to imagine a closer parallel than plate 6 of Käthe Kollwitz’s
1923 series War (Fig. 1). Kollwitz created the piece as a way of grieving for her son Peter, who was killed during the ﬁrst World War—the
type of loss the Israelite and Egyptian are endeavoring to prevent.
Sara Ruddick describes a similar sculpture of Kollwitz’s as “a circle of
deﬁant mothers, arms outstretched, joined to protect the children
massed behind them” (Ruddick 159). More generally, the bandingtogether of parents in opposition to the military planning of those
who claim to be acting in the interests of those very parents and
their children is the essence of the “maternal antimilitaris[m]” that
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Fig. 1: Käthe Kollwitz, The Mothers (plate 6)
from War (Krieg) (1923, woodcut).

Ruddick sees as the culmination of caring work (Ibid.). Rather than
assimilating God to a caring paradigm, as we saw in R’ Hama’s interpretation and Rabbi Hiyya the Great’s doting Divine caretaker, the
rabbis who wrote our midrash imagine a circle of caring parents linking arms in deﬁance of God.
The midrash does not end here, perhaps because ending poses
a threat to the religious commitments of its authors. A ﬁnal line
resolves this tension—unsatisfyingly—as it depicts the Israelites
expressing not anger or horror, but gratitude upon realizing that their
Egyptian neighbors had been killed:
The Israelites began to sing: “At midnight I arise to thank You”—which
is why it says, “for all Your righteous judgments” (Psalm 119:62).
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This last moment collapses the theological crisis by paying the price
of rendering the Israelite characters incoherent—why would they
thank God for an action they had tried to thwart? But perhaps this
is not their entire meaning. The Jewish liturgy’s name for the blessing
over devastating news, “asserting the righteousness of the decree,” is
close to the Israelite’s mention of “all Your righteous judgments.”13
The Israelites both thank God and mourn the death of the children
of their Egyptian neighbors. And so—just maybe—this story leaves
us with a capacious depiction of the irreducible ambivalence held by
parents whose children are the beneﬁciaries of injustice. But the protest against God’s injustice, while muted, is never fully quieted. The
sparks from reading the Torah with the vowels of feeling, once
ignited, are hard to contain.
My search—for spiritual ancestors, and for an account of their
relative lack among the Talmud’s rabbinic heroes—ends, for now,
here. Among the rabbis, I discovered some heroes scattered here and
there, the smoldering embers of the sparks they created by reading
the Torah with the heavy, conﬂicted breath of engaged parents. Feminist ethics of care showed not only how and why such voices were so
rare in the past—but also the unrealized redemptive potential in
reading, teaching, and writing from a standpoint of intensive caring
labor. I hope that these words have fulﬁlled some of the promise of
Feld and Hartsock, Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Hama, and the Israelite
parents and children of the Exodus—and contribute to a Torah that
is, for the ﬁrst time in history, grounded in connection and care.
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Care, the Sacred, and Sex Education
in Slovakia1
Adriana Jesenková

Introduction1
This chapter discusses sex education in Slovakia from the perspective
of feminist ethics of care in relation to sacredness as normative
dimension of life. Sexuality is an integral part of human life and
deserves respect and understanding in its complex diversity as essential for the maintenance and ﬂourishing of the well-being of all people. Hence, taking care of this human dimension has to be one of our
very important responsibilities to ourselves and to others with whom
we are creating our environment as a web of mutual relations and
interdependencies. Our environment and relationships are complex
and the fulﬁllment (not only) of this responsibility exceeds the possibilities of the individual. Good care therefore requires, to varying
degrees, the sharing and participation of all members of a particular
community. In democracies, the mechanisms for allocating caring
responsibilities are a key part of their political agenda (Tronto 2013).
Education is one of the ways and tools of this allocation, because it
allows us to understand, accept, and cultivate knowledge, values, attitudes, and skills as necessary prerequisites for caring for ourselves and
for others in different areas of life. In addition, if certain people
are subjected to oppression or violence because of their sexuality,
1
I am extremely grateful to Inge van Nistelrooij for her inspiring advice and
helpful recommendations in creating this text, as well as for her immense patience
and understanding.
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responsibilities for care need to become part of educational systems
in all democratic societies that aspire to create equal opportunities to
live a good life for all.
In the Slovak context, such ambitions are met with many challenges. Slovak society suffers from various forms of sexual violence,
sexual harassment, sexual abuse of minors, and threats to reproductive health (e.g., pregnancy of minor mothers, especially from socially
excluded Roma communities). However, the conservative groups supported by the Slovak Catholic Church caused postponing the ratiﬁcation of such important policy documents as the Council of Europe
Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women
and Domestic Violence (Istanbul Convention).2 This reality is
a threat to the personal and civic lives of many people. The most
vulnerable in this respect are children, young people, women, the
physically and mentally disadvantaged, members of ethnic, gender,
and sexual minorities, socially deprived groups, and the elderly. Their
vulnerability is conditioned by a combination of misinformation and
lack of information on sexuality and gender stereotyping, as well as
by a lack of willingness on the part of institutions to address related
problems such as discriminatory attitudes, as well as the overall insufﬁcient participation of all stakeholders.
These phenomena cannot be perceived as personal failures or as
consequences of bad individual decision-making. Instead, they should
be understood as the result of several factors, many of which are systemic and structural in nature. Therefore, the situation requires
a responsible approach not only on behalf of individuals (i.e., in the
private sphere), but also by communities, society and state and their
institutions in the public sphere.

2

Twenty-ﬁfth anniversary of the Fourth World Conference on Women and
adoption of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (1995) SLOVAK
REPUBLIC Report elaborated by the Department of Gender Equality and Equal
Opportunities of the Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family of the Slovak
Republic June 2019. Accessed March 1, 2021. https://unece.org/ﬁleadmin/DAM/
Gender/Beijing_20/Slovakia.pdf.
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I consider sex education to be one of the most helpful means for
achieving a responsible and caring approach to solve these problems.
I argue that education as a practice of caring for growth and development of the individual student in her/ his / their psycho-bio-ecosocial complexity must focus on all kinds of relationships of the
human being to her/ his/ their environment and to herself/ himself/
themselves. Then sex education as speciﬁc caring can be framed as
helping people to grow in their understanding of sexuality as a meaningful aspect of their relation to self and to others. Quality sex education could be a tool for cultivating the sexuality of children and
young people to contribute to their overall health, and to the comprehensive development of their personalities as relational social
beings. Such sex education would make it possible to prevent violence, suffering, abuse, and discrimination in a host of inter-personal
relations.3 The current way in which sex education is implemented
in Slovakia, however, has serious shortcomings and detrimental consequences —especially for women and gender minorities.
An important factor in these issues is the high degree of religiosity
in Slovak society and the strong inﬂuence of the Catholic Church in
public opinion and public policy. This leads to a deep division
between the religious and the secular parts of society concerning sex
education. Religious attitudes and partisanship inﬂuence not only
Slovak public educational policies regarding sex education, but especially the lives of people. The attitudes of the Church encourage
setting boundaries between the private and public spheres, where
the Church and families are both assigned to the private sphere.
From there, they can exercise dominant control over all questions
3
Research of John B. Jemmott III and his team shows that the use of theorybased, culturally adapted interventions through the specialized sex education program helps to reduce the prevalence of forced sexual intercourse perpetration. See
Jemmott J.B., O’Leary A., Jemmott L.S., et al. Effect of a Behavioral Intervention
on Perpetrating and Experiencing Forced Sex Among South African Adolescents:
A Secondary Analysis of a Cluster Randomized Trial. JAMA Netw Open. 2018;1(4):
e181213. doi:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2018.1213 Accessed 3 March 2021. https://
jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/2696870.

276

ADRIANA JESENKOV 

concerning sexual morality. The effect is that sex education is divided
into a religious (Christian, dominantly Catholic) sphere and a public
sphere. In the religious sphere the curriculum is focused on the sacredness of the family, inviolability of home and the protection of all its
members. In the public sphere the curriculum is focused upon human
rights and sexual health issues. The main problem is the idea that the
home and family are sacred, and that the sacred is the restricted and
privileged area of the Church and of religious belief. If the idea of the
sacred is exclusively claimed in such a way, nobody else can access it.
This keeps the detrimental and abusive effects of the Church’s sexual
ethics in place and out of reach of human rights claims.
Under the circumstances of such privatization of sex education it
is not possible to carry out collective responsibility for good care for
all children alike. But how is it possible to democratize the practice
of sex education through public education in a way that it is not
perceived as a profanation or sacriﬁce of the sacred values of home,
family, and privacy?
I consider as useful in this context the concept of sacred values or
protected values originated in cognitive psychology in the mid-1990s
and formulated by J. Baron (2000) and P. E. Tetlock (2000, 2003).
According to Tetlock the vital motivation of people to hold sacred
values is to preserve their identity as full-ﬂedged moral beings (Tetlock
2000, 293), and so as a member of the moral community. This argument makes it possible to think of the sacred as a universal spiritual
need of the individual which must be attended and addressed in caring practice. Tetlock (2003) deﬁnes sacred values as values to which
a moral community ascribes a transcendental meaning that precludes
comparisons, compromises, or any mixing with secular values. Regarding this view, I suggest applying a caring approach, in order to focus
on looking for the best way to care for what is sacred for us, and how
to care and protect everything that is contained in the sacred.
It could allow us to reframe the encounter between the secular value
of democracy and the sacred values of home, privacy, and family, and
to shift it from conﬂict to searching and dialogue about the best care
for what is most valuable in our lives.
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I also argue that to achieve this aim we need both to rethink the
public – private dichotomy as well as a different understanding of
what ‘the sacred’ involves and what it means to care for the sacred.
The care ethics approach offers one such alternative. Here, I draw
upon two care ethicists – Nel Noddings and Iris M. Young – who can
help us rethink the core concepts of the sacred and the care for home
as sacred and show how creation and critical interpretation can also
be conceptualized as a practice of care for the sacred.
I will ﬁrst analyze how Nel Noddings and Iris M. Young develop
a new perspective on the home and family with regards to the role of
sex education. I will then give an outline of the current state of sex
education in the educational system in Slovakia. I conclude by proposing a non-exclusive, non-religious sacredness concept of the home
which all human beings can share, and which can put an end to the
exclusive access of the Church to sex morality in the public and
private sphere. I argue for the democratization of sex education care
practice in Slovakia through a vision of shared responsibility for caring and protecting the vulnerable.

Noddings and home as starting point for care
Noddings argues for the necessity to overcome boundaries between
the home and the public domain. She claims that both schools and
homes should be central to any discussion of moral life and social
policy (Noddings 2002, 1). This is because the home is a space where
the origins of care lie and we experience, accept, adapt, reject, or
modify the ﬁrst patterns of care there. These patterns then inﬂuence
the way we form caring relationships in adulthood when building our
own home, but also our public space, community, and society. It
therefore depends on the home what kind of people we will become,
how we will be able to take care of ourselves and others and how we
will be able to receive and provide care. Noddings’ idea that good
people develop in the best homes (Ibid., 4) is closely associated with
her claim that a caring society should ensure that all children live in
at least adequate homes (Noddings 2002, 283). However, not all real
homes are the best and many are not conducive to the development
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of a fully human caring self. As sites of public education, schools not
only have the responsibility to care for children and young people,
but also to establish and maintain a home and strengthen their commitment and competence as homemakers.
The above implies that the knowledge and experience from the
best homes needs to be transposed into the public education system,
so it could become possible to teach to establish and develop them
(Noddings 2002, 283). Schools should educate in preparation not
only for public life but also for the private life of the home. A curriculum for such kind of education gives serious and pervasive attention
to the development of young adults who will be able of establishing
better homes (Noddings 2002, 283-289).
According to Noddings, the deﬁnition of “home” has some universal connotations, although no ideal is permanent. The best homes
can be characterized by a speciﬁc caring attitude and caring response.
Every member of such a home can count on the response “I am here”
when he or she calls. The best homes everywhere maintain relations
of care and trust, do something to control encounters, provide protection, promote growth, and shape their members in the direction
of acceptability (Noddings 2002, 123). Every act of coercion raises
a question. When coercion is used, it may be to prevent members
from doing harm to themselves, not merely to prevent harm being
done unto others. Similarly, the best homes seldomly invoke the concept of negative desert (one who does something bad deserves something bad in return) (Noddings 2002, 4-5, 227). The ideal home
recognizes and encourages a healthy attitude to the body and its pleasures, to places as extensions of the body, to living things and to our
natural surroundings, to material objects, buildings, and the like, and
to the reasons that all of these things are important to us (Noddings
2002, 227).
Noddings’ view on a caring response being sacred (Noddings 2002,
132-133) clariﬁes the idea of the best homes. She sees the capacity
for response to care as sacred. This understanding provides us with an
alternative care ethical concept of the sacred that is non-religious,
although potentially overlapping with religious understandings of the
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sacred. What we need to take care of as best we can, what we need
to protect as best we can, is hope and love in those we care about.
Therefore, Noddings points out that “right from the start the response
of the cared-for is central to the caregiver’s decisions and attitudes.”
(Noddings 2002, 132) We must make sure that they do not stop
believing in the good and expecting good from others. If we lost this,
we would lose what gives meaning and signiﬁcance to our actions,
our care. According to Noddings the expectation of the good is fragile and that is why we must be careful to preserve it. Love and hope
are not sacred qualities belonging somehow to the whole class of
humans that could be abstracted from all human beings. Noddings is
convinced that “the sacred expectation must be in each concrete individual, not in something abstracted from all human beings” (Ibid.,
133, emphasis added). Love and hope for the good in any human
being, while initially aroused in early childhood, however, can be
destroyed by cruelty and carelessness. So, if the sacred is related to
a particular person, as she argues, then the caring for the sacred needs
to be very attentive to the situation and life’s conditions of each
individual person. To paraphrase Noddings: the sacred has a concrete
home and the sacred is found in everyday life. This relationality of
the sacred means that actual events and real encounters inﬂuence the
expectation of good in us, and so also affect our response to care. This
understanding that every encounter between actual embodied beings
matters is precisely what we can learn at home – at the best homes.
Although Noddings’ concept can be characterized by a certain naturalistic element (caring response as a natural human disposition), the
situatedness of the sacred in everyday life and its localization in concrete home refers to forming inﬂuence of the cultural and social
context on the sacred, on the particular response to care. Noddings
claims that the sacredness of the particular response of a particular
Other lies not in its omission of the profane, absurd, cruel, or mistaken, but in providing us with the material by which we judge our
own acts and their effects, helping us to establish or maintain relations of care (Ibid.). Noddings also argues that our response to care is
sacred, “because it is the whole point of what we call our rationality”,

280

ADRIANA JESENKOV 

and through it we learn to correct our conceptualizations (Noddings
2002, 134). So, the sacredness of the response to care lies in its
importance for developing mature human selves, mature relational
human beings able to take care of others and themselves, and to
receive care.
Caring for the sacredness of the home then does not consist in
keeping it rigid and immutable. The stability of the sacredness of the
home is to lie in its persistent effort to respond carefully to everyone
we meet in it. However, this sacredness is fragile and needs to be
cared for because these caring responses present a normative pillar
that supports and orientates moral decisions and actions of the members of the home in question. The question then becomes how what
we learn about and care about at home can be creatively and proﬁtably extended to schools. Education must include (in addition to
abstract disciplines focused on academic literacy and public life) subjects focused on personal life with all its dimensions. Noddings
believes that themes central to private life should be incorporated
into all subjects and considering that all of us establish homes, and
most of us become parents, we need to be better informed and more
adequately prepared for this. She understands sex education as a necessary part of the school curriculum and as enabling a fulﬁlling personal life (Ibid., 297).
Noddings not only helps to understand that the various dimensions of lives in home and privacy should be part of the public school’s
curriculum. Her view shows that sex education should not encourage
students to accept abstract principles and rules but should instead
cultivate mature human beings capable of caring for themselves and
others. This requires abandoning isolation from those who are different, whether they are members of my family and home or people of
different sex, gender, religion or ethnicity in my school or community. On the contrary, it requires paying careful attention to them and
their needs. Only through developing and maintaining caring attitudes and responses in homes and schools is it possible to care and
protect from harm what is sacred for all of us.
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Young and the caring for a home
Young’s conceptualization of the care for home (2010) focuses on
caring about what we want to maintain and preserve. Her approach
shows how the care for home requires creativity and critical thinking.
She helps us to understand how the embodied and material living in
a home is connected to education.
According to Young (2010, 43-95), care for the home includes the
preservation of meanings through both the material and emotional
care for people, as well as through the care for things. Caring for
things allows for the preservation and protective actions of caring
persons. Young argues that many of these caring activities enable and
develop care for both our personal and our collective identities. They
also preserve the sense for historical continuity. When Young understands home as the material aspect of our identity, which anchors it
in its physical being, forming a continuity between the past and the
future (Young 2010, 70-72), she challenges us to take our bodies seriously when creating a home. Home is personal because it expresses
our self, our habits, our personal history—the events and values of
our lives. This means that developing and cultivating the ability to
establish and maintain a home is linked with developing the ability
to carefully reﬂect the corporeality of those who are part of it. Young
notices that this process is not just a question of responding to the
needs of the body, but of constantly forming an identity of which
the body is an integral part. Since both the living body and the environment are always changing, there is no ﬁxed permanent identity
(Ibid., 76).
In this regard, Young draws attention to the ambiguous nature of
care for the home as preservation that can be conservative as well as
re-interpretative (Young 2010, 78). Thus, preserving an identity in
a meaningful way does not consist in enclosing it into immutability
and rigidity. It means, on the contrary, opening it up for interpretation and for variability. According to Young the preservation of the
home as a place of formation of identities of its members is based on
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recollection and reconstruction of the connections between the past
and the future in the light of new events and relationships, too. The
preservation of this meaning of a home must therefore be attentive
to changing life situations (Ibid., 78). Young’s view underpins that
although members of the home may experience the past and present
events together and similarly together expect the future, the meaning
of what is experienced or expected is unique to each. Therefore,
a caring response to each member’s past, present, and future is necessary for a home to be a part of each member’s life. If we want to create
and maintain a home for everyone, we must create a space in which
everyone can tell her / his / their story and be listened to, and at the
same time a space in which is listened to the stories of others. It is
necessary to create a safe space where everyone’s story matters, and
an open space where each story can make a difference in each other’s
narratives and understandings. This means that every story can be
reinterpreted. As each reinterpretation changes context and perspective, it presents a challenge that requires a careful response. Sometimes it is necessary to create new, non-traditional ways of caring for
people and things as for this changed situation the usual ways of
caring are ill-equipped. However, to preserve homes as such safe and
open spaces, in which each of its inhabitants can be themselves
in their uniqueness, and at the same time be able to accept others in
their uniqueness in the process of constant reinterpretation, requires
creativity and imagination.
Young’s view so implies that caring for a home in which preservation is attentive to variability of context and open to interpretation
is a creative and moral task. However, this task requires a normative
standard – to have a tool for comparing reality or facticity with what
we want to achieve and what is desirable for us. According to Young,
there are at least four normative values represented by the home as
an ideal that she proposes to consider as a minimum that should be
accessible to all. Young sees the following regulatory ideals as helpful
tools of criticism of existing homes: security, individualization, privacy as autonomy and control over one’s personal space, and ﬁnally
preservation as the construction and reconstruction of oneself, one’s
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identity (Young 2010, 91-95). Care for the home therefore requires
the ability to distinguish what contributes to creating a home and
what does not. Critical thinking is a part of care for all that
matters.
Young helps us understand that education focused on caring for
the home and for personal life, and consequently also sex education,
needs to cultivate both creativity and critical thinking. Creativity
can help us to ﬁnd more adequate ways to give and receive care in
various life situations. Critical thinking and sensitivity to changing
living identities can also prevent the reiﬁcation (objectiﬁcation) of
those identities. Only then will the things and homes they co-create
not become a prison for us and for others. Only such form of care can
respond adequately to the needs and development of the vulnerable.
A society that has the ambition to educate caring people able to
establish homes that could be a secure place for developing individuality, respecting privacy as autonomy of every member, and preserving
open interpretation of their identity—should apply such way of sex
education. Young’s idea of the democratization of the values of the
home then will be more achievable. Then home will not be a privilege of some, but a given for all.

Sex education in Slovakia
To understand Slovak educational policies, which include sex education, it is necessary to situate it in its historical, political, and sociocultural context. The beginnings of sex education in the Slovak environment date back to the period of the ﬁrst Czechoslovak Republic.
The content and terminology in use has since changed because of
social and regime change, new scientiﬁc knowledge as well as discussions about who should teach it or what its content should be (Bosá
et al. 2015). Shortly after the Fall of Communism (1989), various
traditions of thought – the Christian tradition, medical, feminist,
liberal, human rights, or conservative discourse – began to promote
their own arguments concerning the form, content, and scope of sex
education (Lukšík, Marková 2010). The formation of the independent Slovak Republic (1993) has gradually strengthened political,
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religious, and cultural fundamentalism in various spheres of public
life. As a result, sex education has been transformed ﬁrst from gender
education to sex education and then ﬁnally to education about marriage and parenthood. In contemporary school-taught sex education,
the orientation towards preparation for family life has completely
prevailed.
After 1989, compulsory syllabuses entitled “Sex Education” were
introduced by the National Institute of Education (NIE)4. Later, in
1994, these were updated and issued as separate syllabuses for the
1st and 2nd levels of elementary school and high school. However, sex
education did not have the status of an individual course, so syllabuses for sex education are intended for teaching in other subjects
(ethics education, religious education, Biology, Physical training education, etc.) and they are marked as cross-sectional.5
From a political perspective, the signing of “the Vatican agreement
– a Fundamental Treaty between the Holy See and the Slovak Republic” in 2000 was a determining factor for the status and perceiving of
sex education in the country. In 2004, two amendments to the basic
treaty concerning Catholic education in state schools were adopted.
They stated that the Bishops’ Conference of Slovakia is the main
authority on the content and teaching and the educational process
cannot be controlled or monitored without the consent of the bishop,
or the bishop’s ofﬁcial ofﬁce. No visit by a school principal or state
school inspection member is allowed. Religious education is taught
in mutually exclusive alternatives with ethics education (the choice
of either of them is compulsory). Religious education is taught as

4

The National Institute for Education (NIE) is a national budgetary organization
directly managed by the Ministry of Education, Science, Research and Sport of the
Slovak Republic. It is responsible for providing the leadership, design and development of curricula, methodological and professional service for schools and preparing
basic documents of educational policy.
5
It is understood as a trans-subject teaching—individual parts of it deﬁned in
the syllabus should be taught according to suitability and need in several subjects. It
is in the competence of each teacher, when, to what extent and how she will implement its tasks and goals.
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a confessional education of the Catholic religion. In schools, ethics
education and religious education are taught as separate subjects.6
The gradual dominance of conservative discourse in matters of
education closed the door for numerous progressive reforms such as
gender-sensitive education, recognition of LGBTQI rights, reduction
of sexual harassment and domestic violence as educational topics.
The syllabuses were renamed “Education for Marriage and Parenthood for Elementary and High School” (EMP), but the content was
not changed, and they did not constitute a separate subject. In 2008,
several sex education-related areas were integrated into the syllabuses
of civics, ethics education, religious education, biology, and natural
sciences. At the same time, there have been attempts to update the
EMP syllabuses as a whole and make them a part of the State educational program, but it has become only an optional subject. In 2010,
the subject syllabuses were reclassiﬁed as non-compulsory, and teachers were given the added responsibility of discussing their planned
topics with parents. Teachers have a duty to consider parents’ comments and discuss their plans with the methodological board and
then submit them to the school head (principal) for approval.
Conservative moods peaked in February 2015 when a referendum
was held in Slovakia based on a civic initiative of the Alliance for
the Family (Aliancia za rodinu). The initiative was ofﬁcially supported by the Conference of Bishops and was entitled “Referendum
on the Family”. The Referendum carried the question of sex education in schools into the public sphere and the media. It stimulated
debates about how Slovak educational policies should be set up or

6

It is obligatory for students in primary and secondary schools in Slovakia to
attend either ethics or religious education. Parents and students must decide between
the two. Some students attend both subjects, but the possibilities to do so are limited
because these lessons are usually scheduled at the same time. Miškolci et al. (2019)
in their study examining young people’s attitudes toward sex education in the context of human rights in Slovakia present ﬁndings from quantitative research using a
representative sample of secondary school students. In the research sample, 391 students (38.5%) reported having attended ethics classes, 408 (40.2%) religious education, and 212 (20.9%) reported that they had attended both.
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who has the legitimate authority to provide sex education. Although
the referendum with a 21.41% participation was invalid, it inﬂuenced
narratives of public education policies, which were enforced and subsequently normalized thanks to media discourses. The initiators of the
referendum also contributed to the normalization and mainstreaming
of “anti-gender” rhetoric in the media, that they joined with a society-wide demand for “children’s protection” (Libáková, Valkovičová,
Jesenková 2019, 141-142).
So, in the present system, sex education is clearly delineated to
either the religious or public spheres. It is possible to identify basically
two isolated forms of sex education—the traditional or conservative
one based on sex ethics promoted by the Catholic Church and other
Christian churches, which emphasizes the restrictive approach to
sexuality, characterized by distraction from sexuality, emphasis on
sexual abstinence, control, the punishment of the child and of early
childhood sexuality and lastly, by not providing information. The
second one is a progressive (comprehensive) type of sex education
based on scientiﬁc knowledge, the concept of human rights and democratic values. Hence, debates about sex education are taking place
mostly in closed communities. The contact between scientiﬁc and
religious discourses is minimal, or rather non-existent. Whenever the
debate on sex education is framed in human rights terms (by either
actor), the arguments have a legal-formal, foundationalist and deductive character, disregarding the needs and interests of children and
young people and the dynamically changing context (Jesenková
and Minarovičová 2018).
It is a paradox that both parties express the need for informed and
professional sex education, but both directly or indirectly accuse each
other of an ideologically burdened approach and non-scientism. On
both sides it is possible to identify a strong degree of distrust towards
“those on the other side”, as well as towards institutions that are
formally or informally linked to them — be they churches, universities, research and scientiﬁc institutions, NGOs, or civic initiatives.
Caring for sexuality — and thus sex education — is a part and
instrument of political discourse and its agents. However, such an
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antagonistic setting prevents any meaningful and productive dialogue
— a dialogue that would be a necessary precondition for any changes
for the beneﬁt of those who are affected by the above-mentioned
discourses and those who need sex education the most. The current
situation is that of a stalemate, which prevents responsible actors –
teachers, parents, professionals – from identifying the vulnerable,
ignores urgent needs concerning sexual health and sex relations,
marginalizes the interests of children and young people, erases diversity and renders inequalities more difﬁcult to recognize and target.
These are the harmful consequences of sex education as it currently
exists.

Care ethics and education as a democratic practice of care
The body of knowledge known as care ethics is deﬁned by the belief
that care is a fundamental activity upon which human survival and
the quality of human life depend. If we start from the deﬁnition of
Tronto and Fisher (1990), according to which care is “a species activity that includes everything that we do to maintain, continue, and
repair our ‘world’ so that we can live in it as well as possible”,
and that “that world includes our bodies, ourselves, and our environment, all of which we seek to interweave in a complex, life-sustaining
web”, we can recognize sex education as such an activity. We generally educate people – whether children or adults – so that they can
live a good life and can become full-ﬂedged members of society.
The starting perspective of care ethics is a relational ontology and
the understanding of all persons as relational beings (Barnes 2012,
Tronto 2013). This means that the “world” is a complex network of
relationships and connections. From this perspective, we are always
necessarily tied to the context. Our interdependence with other people and the social and natural environment is a source of our vulnerability. But only we, human beings aware of our actions, are responsible for whether we hurt and harm others or, conversely, whether we
help protect everything that is vulnerable. Understanding the situatedness of everyone participating in care relations in their particularity
and uniqueness is key to good care. Care ethics’ focus on the moral
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sense of attention and on efforts to meet the needs requires us to be
sensitive to speciﬁc circumstances such as age, race, class, gender,
sexual orientation, ethnicity, religion, region, time, ideology, and
even personality as determining factors of the needs of care. What is
equally important is understanding how our own situation as care
providers limits our ability to understand others in their uniqueness,
and what the possible implications are for the quality of the care we
give. Careful education must therefore be sensitive to the speciﬁcities
of children, both not to hurt them and to meet their needs regarding
their growth and development. From an education perspective, ethics
of care raises important questions: How to consider relationality as
an aspect of the life of all involved in education? How can we, despite
the fundamentally limited educator’s possibilities to perceive, and to
understand the situatedness of children, create conditions for the protection of the vulnerable?
If we understand education as a set of care activities and hence as
a social practice (Sevenhuijsen 1998), then educational practice(s)
“can be seen as a mode of acting in which participants perceive and
interpret care needs and act upon these needs. Their interpretation
and acting varies according to the situation, social and institutional
context, and depends on a variety of factors, such as norms and rules
about good caring and the relational dynamics between actors concerned” (Sevenhuijsen 1998, 22). This means that education draws,
reproduces, and modiﬁes speciﬁc conceptual and conative patterns
concerning good educational practices in a speciﬁc context. These
patterns refer to who is responsible for (concrete) education, to whom
education is provided and who has access to it, and ﬁnally, what is
the content of (speciﬁc) education. Its implementation in practice
determines whether it is inclusive or exclusive, participatory, or based
on privileges and restrictions, and thus whether it is a democratic or
undemocratic education. With regards to sex education, speciﬁc models of sex education inﬂuence the extent to which a particular educational practice can distinguish and understand various aspects of
vulnerability and be sensitive to the various needs of speciﬁc children
and young people.
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The basic forms of practice of care in different aspects of our lives
are learnt primarily at home and in public schools. Joan Tronto
(2013) argues that a democratic form of care represents the best form
of care. Democratization of care involves more people in caring practices and so more perspectives can contribute to an adequate and
complex understanding of caring needs and how to meet them
(Tronto 2013, 156 – 157). Inclusive (equal) participation in care thus
contributes to a more comprehensive understanding of other people
and might reduce their vulnerability. According to Tronto, solidarity
as a moral value creates the conditions for care among people and
increases the sensitivity to democratic values (Ibid.). If we apply
Tronto’s view we can see that solidarity, equality and democracy are
mutually dependent. To achieve more caring and less injuring, society
needs to support inclusive collective responsibility for education
(children, parents, communities, and experts in different spheres of
life, society). With respect to sex education, this refers to the necessity to proceed it in non-segregational way, i.e., not to segregate sex
education in the home and in the school environment. Homes and
schools are situated in a common environment, in one world, so they
are connected and necessarily inﬂuence each other. Ignoring this
connectedness prevents mutual cooperation in educational care for
children. Isolation leads to one-sidedness, to the neglect of important
aspects of sex education. No one—neither individuals nor institutions—is immune to the threat of abuse of power associated with
reception, but in particular with the provision of care. Harmful
and hurtful care practices are as common in schools as in families and
homes. If public institutions such as schools apply their forms
and practices of care regardless of the speciﬁcs and context of individuals’ private and personal lives, they can increase the vulnerability
of those they wanted to protect, like in the case of sex education
where a diversity of genders and sexual orientations is denied, resulting in the oppression of groups of people. Similarly, even a home can
be dangerous and loved ones can easily become causes of harm and
suffering, for instance where families deny the possibility of a variety
of genders and/or sexual orientations. This is when it is important
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that the boundaries between the public and private spheres are not
ﬁxed and impenetrable, but, on the contrary, that they are permeable
and can shift. This allows us, as the inhabitants of a shared world/
environment—whether as individuals or as a member of relevant
institutions, to be attentive, to accept responsibility, and caring
action to prevent or reduce the harm of other human beings and to
initiate a change in those harmful and injuring practices of care.
If we want to care and educate better, we need to overcome
dichotomously conceived boundaries between private and public life,
but also between morality and politics (Tronto 1993). That is why
according to Tronto a care approach to education should stress the
need for individual development and developing the skills necessary
both to provide/receive care and to care about being a citizen in
a democratic society (Tronto 2013, 135). Regarding sex education,
the above implies a necessity to teach sex education as part of an
education focused on democratic values, enabling democratic care in
all domains of lives, not only in public but also in private.

Care for the Sacred - a starting point for the democratic practice
of sex education
Let us return to what presents the common motive and goal for both
sides of the disputes over sex education in the Slovak context – the
care and the protection of the vulnerable. Noddings advises us to take
care of the home as a place where we can – if it is a good home –
learn how not to hurt, how to carefully protect and develop everything vulnerable. We must therefore care for the sacred in a way that
it can become accessible to all.
However, serious obstacles concerning both equal access to the
sacred and the possibility to care for what is sacred remain. The conceptual framework that determines the thinking, decision-making
and action of people in Slovak society is the most relevant factor.
The framework is characterized by two gaps. The ﬁrst one is the gap
between the secular and religious understanding of life. The problem
is not their difference but the essentialist conceptualization of them,
which has a parallel in a similarly essentialist way of understanding
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the profane and the sacred. The result is their dichotomous relationship determining their statuses as valuably signiﬁcant and as sources
of values.
The second gap is a division between the public and private.
Again, the problem lies not in their differences, but in the conceptualization of their connection to morality and values. This connection follows the widening of the gap between the secular and the
religious, which is related to the secularization of modern societies,
in which the tendency to privatize religion as well as morality is
strengthening. The private sphere then appears to be the exclusive
normative source of values and morals for public life, while the public
sphere, as a sphere of politics and power, is understood as non-moral,
value-free, sometimes even amoral. Similarly, the secular and profane
thus appear to be without values or less valuable in that they are seen
as devoid of deeper (spiritual) meaning. The purposeful secularization
of society and its emphasis on a scientiﬁc approach (positivismoriented philosophy or ideology of Marxism-Leninism) in totalitarian
communist regimes also contributed to the displacement of religious
types of morality and values, but also of the “unscientiﬁc” concept of
sacred (sanctity) in the public space. The consequence is that the
interference of public institutions – such as schools or scientiﬁc institutions – in the private sector is not legitimate. On the other hand,
institutions with the authority over private morality, such as the
family and church, have the exclusive entitlement to shape, inﬂuence, and regulate private lives, including intimate relations and
sexuality.
However, if religious understanding is the only way to achieve
values, then those values cannot be available to anyone. Nonreligious people are often excluded from discussions about values and
principles concerning areas like sex ethics and sex education. A much
more hurtful consequence of this exclusion can be the loss of home,
as it ceases to be a safe place for the development of individuality,
control of one’s privacy and intimacy. If access to values that are
perceived as sacred is restricted to the privileged few, protection and
care for all who are vulnerable are impossible. If it is not possible to
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meaningfully discuss the equality of the vulnerable in the context of
the home and family, then just treatment is not achievable for
everyone.
If we try to think about the sacred from a relational perspective as
Noddings does, we can rid ourselves of the idea of the sacred as absolutely other and thus inaccessible and incomprehensible. Then the
sacred matters because it fundamentally affects the quality of our
lives. Its sacredness lies in its normativity that all human beings can
share as it contributes to the good life of each of us. Although access
to the sacred is not a privilege, it has certain preconditions. Sacredness consisting in human capacity of response to care requires a caring approach, because it is inherently fragile. Recklessness and carelessness result in its destruction. That is why a home as a place where
we are encountered with caring activities and where caring relations
are the ﬁrst creative moment of our development as human beings,
is one of the most important values in our life. For many of us the
home has a sacred value. And because it has its weight and signiﬁcance in the lives of us all, we all have a responsibility to protect and
preserve it. Consequently, we all have the responsibility to care for
the development of the ability to establish and maintain the best
homes for all human beings through education in schools as well as
in homes and families. However, I argue that only sex education
based on a caring approach in which care for the vulnerable is not
reduced to isolation from everything and everybody different, in
which care for sacred values of home and family is understood as
open, creative, critical, and interpretative dialogue and interaction
between caregivers and care-receivers, can be the best way to care for
sacred values. This kind of education can develop and cultivate abilities to establish concrete homes as a place where everyone can experience safety, where everyone can be unique along with others, where
everyone can control her/ his/ their privacy and where all voices can
participate in narratives forming and expressing collective identities.
Such homes may or may not differ from (the religious views of) their
caregivers. Its sacredness will stem from the fact that care will be
a value and a practice at the same time in that home. If we accept
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that care for the home as a sacred space requires such kind of sex
education, then the caring for the sacred can be a starting point also
for understanding the necessity of the democratization of sex
education.

Conclusion
Noddings and Young turn our attention to the home as a place from
which care stems and which has the potential to provide crucial
(moral) goods and resources for the individual. In doing so, they also
show the home as a place where inappropriate or failing care harms
speciﬁc individuals in fundamental ways. Thus, they help us understand what needs to be protected via a democratic practice of sex
education and under which circumstances this can be achieved.
Noddings clariﬁes just how, in the best of homes, it is possible to
cultivate, support and keep the belief of everyone in the fact that
others truly care about them and will care for them in accordance
with their needs to live the best possible life. Noddings shows us that
what we need to cultivate and protect via care (and therefore also via
sex education) is trust: trust in the good by others. This trust is
a prerequisite for the ability to give and receive care also in the realm
of sexuality, so to love and to be loved as a mature human being.
Young allows us to understand that developing and ﬂourishing the
ability to love and trust is contingent on a home providing each
member safety, a space for individual growth, autonomy in the sense
of personal integrity and space for cultivating social and collective
identities. Young then clariﬁes that creating and maintaining such
a home requires creativity and openness in the interpretation of a constantly changing environment, and therefore also sexuality.
Our mutual dependency not only implies that we are all vulnerable, but also that each one of us can injure and harm others, or even
ourselves. Our sexuality presents particularly vulnerable aspects of our
lives that protection needs to be focused on accordingly, especially in
the case of individuals and groups who are most vulnerable. It is
necessary to stop thinking about the home and about school as places
of conﬂicting interests and goals. The protection and care for
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vulnerable persons is only possible when homes and schools take
a joint responsibility towards creating and maintaining the best possible homes via sex education. Truly caring homes and schools have
a common goal: to protect those most vulnerable from harm and
suffering and to make sure that children grow to become mature
human beings capable of giving and receiving care and love. To
achieve this goal, it is necessary to democratize sex education. Only
a democratic, inclusive practice of care in sex education that is
responsive to pluralism and diversity of all those concerned and that
takes into account the speciﬁc dynamic of power in relations of care
can make our homes better places where we would be capable of truly
protecting everyone.
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Section III :
Justice, Community Building,
and Preservation

In the Belly of the Whale: Theorizing
Disability through a De-Colonial
and Islamic Ethic of Care
Sarah Munawar

Introduction
“The time for miracles and faith is over, the time to make a decision
is now.” With these words, a white man in a white lab coat looked
my grieving mother in the eyes and advised her to “pull the plug” on
my father. My mother replied with, “we are in full code.” To this day,
I still do not understand the meaning of this utterance, but I know it
was what we as a family had to declare to keep my father alive. In
the summer of August 2012, I began the ﬁnal year of my undergraduate degree when my father suffered a severe double stroke and cardiac
arrest. My father had gone to a place “outside of time” and for the
doctors the only return destination from this zone of non-being was
another zone of non-being: a “meaningless” life imprisoned within
a severely disabled body dependent on others (Maldonado-Torres
2007). Even if his body returned to its senses, his person would
remain “out of this world” (Mbembé 2001, 173). As a student of
political theory I was learning about the Arendtian subject and the
miracle of natality; I wondered about my father who in this state
could no longer speak and therefore, did not meet the anthropological minimum for the miracle we needed (Mehta 1999).
On one hand, Islamic epistemologies and practices of care such as
making dua (supplication), giving sadaqah (charity), and salat (prayer),
were as inconsequential and irrational in the “waiting room of History” as they were in that hospital waiting room (Chakrabarty 2009,
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65). The doctors stared at my mother’s lament with the same eyes
that colonialist writers perceived my ancestors as strange ﬂecks at the
edge of their maps (Garland-Thomson 2009). On the other hand,
Muslims in our community and medical professionals both read my
family’s story as a great tragedy. Islamic-medical discourses on disability cast my mother as the invincible and sacriﬁcial carer and read
my father’s disabled body as a mark of human frailty and the inevitability of death; both of their bodies were thrown into the “netherworld of dependency care” (Kittay 1999). My family’s situatedness in
a complex relation of care continues to be marked as a boundary, an
edge of the world, “God forbid,” any Muslim ever has to cross. Just as
there was no space for my family to practice care Islamically in the
hospital, there was no dwelling-place in the Muslim ummah as we
knew it for disabled Muslims like my father, young carers like my
sisters and primary care-givers and providers like my mother.
What helped us make a decision were not the Islamic-medical
discourses on disability and dependency care, but rather, the reception of Revelation through care-based modes of knowing Islam by
which we held in place a future for my father to live meaningfully1.
In this chapter, I introduce Islamic care ethics as a decolonizing intervention2 that helps us not only re-deﬁne disability and dependency
care but also valorize care-based epistemologies of Islam. While
many care ethicists centre the mother-child relationship (Fernandes,
1

In our darkest hour, my mother shared with us the story of Prophet Yunus who
recited Ayat al Kareema when he was swallowed by a whale. I remember tenderly the
“emergency response care web” of community members who would visit our home
to attend Qul ka Khatama and Khatam Sharif (prayer circles) and recite this dua for
my father’s return (Piepzna-Samarasinha 2018).
2
My journey to develop a de-colonial and Islamic ethic of care originally began
as a criticism of Eva Kittay’s notion of “some mother’s child” and the colonial politics
of recognition that drives ethics of care scholarship. However, as I searched between
the lines to ﬁnd traces of the Great White Mother, I found myself falling in love,
again, unable to let go of the “loving eyes” with which I ﬁrst read Kittay (Jacobs
2009; Oliver 2001). Love’s Labour helped me ﬁnd words to write and speak about my
father as a person, to demand worlds in which my mother as a primary care-giver
living with chronic illness, too, is cared for, and to build relations in which my sisters
as young carers are not left behind (Munawar 2014).
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Robertson, and Robertson 2018; Hollway 2007; Kittay 1998) and the
event of birth as points of departure for theorizing dependency care
and the neglect of mother-work and other mothers (Collins 1995,
117; Okano 2016, 88; Ruddick 1995), I begin with the transition of
becoming my parents’ care-giver as a young carer. My point of departure is not the transition from the womb into the world, but rather,
exile from the world into the desert with Hajar3, and into the belly
of the whale with Yunus4. The de-colonial potential of a care-based
and Islamic approach to disability justice is that it enables Muslims
to “read disability differently”(Titchkosky 2007) and read against how
we are read by colonial systems of recognition. Medical frames of
disability direct our attention to the event of illness as the deﬁning
feature of my father’s entire biography inscribing onto his body
a chronology of illness that takes the shape of a tragedy. Such narratives read my father’s disabled body as wounded, damaged, or almost
gone and my mother’s body as the invisible and invincible carer.
Unlike the Islamic-medical model of disability that asks us to consider
3

In the Islamic tradition, Hajar was a poor and enslaved Black single mother
who was both “rejected on the grounds of race, sex and class yet at the same time”
and was a “recipient of divine Revelation” (Rahemtulla 2017, 152). Although she
was “given to Abraham as a concubine spouse” (Wadud 2006, 122), she becomes the
“heir of a household ruled by Abraham and Sarah” because in the case of “any offspring resulting from the liaison of the master with the slave woman…” the “descendants of a slave were full and legitimate heirs to the inheritance legacy of their
father-master” (Wadud 2006, 124).The point here is not that it is proximity or relation to the master that entitles Hajar to an inheritance. But rather, although she is
abandoned by society in the desert to ﬁnd sustenance for her newborn child, her
unmet needs remain visible to the Creator and are accounted for in the miracle of
the zamzam groundswell.
4
In the Islamic tradition, Prophet Yunus (Jonah) is swallowed by a whale and is
returned to land through the Creator’s care and mercy. The story of his delivery from
darkness ends with an image of him enveloped in a gourd plant that Allah has
evoked to heal his wounds. As Yunus was exiled from the land and into the sea,
Hajar and her newborn Ishmael are also abandoned by Abraham in the desert to
fend for themselves. The image of her desperately running between two hills in
search of water for her child is evoked by Islamic-Feminist Amina Wadud in her
demands to recognize the secondary dependency of single mothers and their Islamic
rights to be cared-for as they care for their children.
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the legibility of the disabled subject as a “Muslim” or as a living person capable of autonomy, an Islamic and care-based theory of disability justice obliges us to attend to my mother and father as situated
within nested interdependencies.

Code Blue: An Islamic-Medical Model of Disability
In the state of code blue5, one is thrown into a place outside of time,
absolved of their place in the world; yet, they continue to hold space
with their body in the hospital and must rely on others to hold
space for their personhood, for their right to return and live a digniﬁed life. Various care ethicists and critical disability scholars have
exposed how the ableist, racialized and gendered discourse of eugenics
underpins neo-liberal support for right-to-die policies. Here, I extend
existing care ethics scholarship on the myth of the autonomous and
rational subject to account for how systems of white supremacy, racial
capitalism and anti-Muslim racism mark the racialized, disabled and
Muslim body as a “defective body” that is unproductive and undesirable. In turn, caring for, and being cared for, as Muslim and disabled
is inscribed as inconvenient, burdensome and lacking ethical and
epistemological value (Whatcott 2019, 30).
The Disabled Body as Dead or Dying
“Multiple colonialisms” inﬂuence not only the treatment of disabled
Muslims situated within the medical-industrial complex but also,
representations of care and disability within Islamic legal scholarship
(fiqh) on illness and care (Da Costa and Da Costa 2019). In both
arenas, medical professionals and medical-scientiﬁc knowledge are
empowered as the sole interpretive authorities of reading and translating the meaning of disability and dependency care. The “imperial
5

In the case of emergent treatment where an individual is hospitalized due to
a critical event of illness, individuals or their family members must declare a code
status in case the patient’s heart or breathing stops. An individual’s body is literally
coded and marked to be resuscitated (or not). In cases where one has not previously
declared DNR status, his moral (and legal) personhood, as well as narrative fate, are
seized and displaced by medical imaging.
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attitude” with which medical professionals located my father in a place
outside of time, as a body without a being, also permeates Islamic
legal scholarship on illness and disability (Maldonado-Torres 2007;
Mignolo 2018).
In my father’s story, the “coloniality of power” is a complicated
matrix of ableism, anti-Muslim racism and the religious/secular binary
that not only marks my father as an abnormal, dispensable body, but
also writes off the authority of Islamic epistemologies as a way to read
disability and dependency care. The violation here is that within an
imperial setting, in which medical professionals are granted an inscrutable and secular interpretive authority, my family was refused the
capacity to respond to and address such moral injury in an Islamic
moral vocabulary. In conversations in which my father’s life was at
stake, the doctors attempted to sterilize our Islamic sensibilities (Asad
2018, 119). We could not speak and interpret in a “religious” manner
because the hospital was a public space and my father’s body could
only be read as a “secular body” (Asad 2011). As Eva Kittay observes,
such neo-liberal secularism erases the relationality of the subject, as
a “self in relation to God” (474, 2007). Building upon the scholarship
of Tanya Titchkosky (2017), disability is an interactive scene, or as
an intertextual relationship, in which the shape and texture of individual and collective narratives are co-authored. We work together
to co-create “the type of world that grounds the possibility of having
the meaning that it does” (20).
To counter the violence of such Islamic-medical discourses and
build a world in which my father could live meaningfully, my family
and I searched tirelessly for knowledge on the Islamic ethics of “pulling the plug.” Charting the ethical terrain of such a decision lead us
through the murky waters of deﬁning what constitutes a “statistically
foreseeable disability”6 in the case of severe brain injury and ﬁguring

6
I am pulling the exact words of the doctors which are buried in memories of
the trauma. The phrase “statistically foreseeable disability” is itself deeply triggering
and ableist and should be interrogated within an Islamic model of disability justice
and care-ethical decision-making.
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out the relational orders of caring responsibility within Muslim networks of kinship. Interpretations of Islamic hadiths and fiqh on disability were just as violent as the medical discourse in demarcating
a distinction between a normal life and a non-life, comparing those
categorized as the latter as incapable of input (awareness of oneself)
and output (the purposeful manifestation of one’s will through action)
(Sultan 2017, 11–12). Deferring interpretive authority to the medical
discourse, the writings of Islamic legal scholars were laden with ontological imperialism (Corker 2001). Islamic fiqh mostly provided
insight into the ethics of guardianship in contexts of “disorders of
consciousness” (Ibid.); yet because of its reliance on the medical discourse it could not be extended to our uniquely contextual and relational situation and offered very little conceptual space to imagine
the possibility of living a digniﬁed, “normal” and intelligent life as a
person with disability after such an event of illness. There is also very
little information readily available on the distribution of care-work
in Islamic networks of kin, possibilities for sentient and relational
modes of selfhood after suffering from “disorders of consciousness”
and the duties of building communities that support care-givers and
our “nested dependencies” (Kittay 2011, 56).
Although the Quran calls for empowering the disabled, and marginalized members of society, as full and equal participants of society,
the social and cultural textures that shape what disability and care
have come to mean in Muslim communities and Islamic legal scholarship remain deeply ableist and disempowering (Rahemtulla 2017).
Islamic approaches of reading disability and care defer to the authority of the medical model (Arneil and Hirschmann 2016; Ghaly
2010). A religious-medical model of disability renders my father’s
disability and our situatedness in a relation of dependency care as a test
for our moral character (Schuelka 2013); a burden to bear in this life
to advance to Paradise in the Hereafter; as a tragedy or a punishment
intended by Allah (Al-Aouﬁ, Al-Zyoud, and Shahminan 2012; Ghaly
2010; Larsson 2011); or interpreted as noble pain that makes us more
proximate to Allah (Olsen 2016). In addition, our relationship to the
Divine is read to be rooted in non-consensual care in which Allah as
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carer can choose to inﬂict harm in the form of illness or disability for
our well-being (Ghaly 2010, 30).
During my father’s stay in intensive care, many family and community members came to visit from near and far. The emergencyresponse care web (Piepzna-Samarasinha 2018, 98) that gathered
around my father for the most part had dissipated by the end of hospitalization. When family friends do visit, they come anticipating my
father’s return to able-bodiedness, a return to familiar ways of relating
to and identifying with him. They ask my father questions like: are
you walking yet? Eating? Talking? Or worse, they ask my mother these
questions about my father while he is sitting next to them in the
room. Invites to social gatherings, especially dinners, and the phone
calls have stopped as friends and family realize that there are no more
miraculous health updates, stories of recovery or “return” of the man
they once held close as one of their own. And just as my mother
remains beyond the reader’s reach in this text, the daily pilgrimage
she makes to meet my father’s care and access needs also remains
illegible and unattended to by the Canadian settler-colonial state and
within Islamic kin-based networks of care. The banality of homecare,
the multiple hospitalizations for aspiration afterwards, the loss of relationships and the enduring medical trauma we have experienced
together as a family are de-centered in the narrative sequencing of
events as long as the scene in the intensive care unit is signiﬁed as
a descent into the netherworld of dependency.
Secondary dependency as Divinely Ordained Misfortune
If, “Allah does not burden a soul beyond that it can bear…” (2:286),
then why did He have to choose my mother to be the testament of
strength for us all? Why is my family’s plight a sign of his miracle and
rahma (mercy) and not a demand for others to assume responsibilities
to care for my mother and father? Our bodies are not signs, or signiﬁers, but ever-changing shapes that carry stories (Bynum 1991). As
our bodies have changed shapes with age, illness, or disability, the
shape of my family’s story, how we ﬁt together in a care web, has also
transformed. Today, in our narrative sequencing of events, my father’s
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stroke no longer represents a rupture or interruption but as an experience (like many others) that has ontologically, materially, relationally
and affectively transformed our sense of place, embodiment and connectedness with one another7. Lack of support for my mother and
sisters as primary care-givers, but also as neurodiverse persons living
with severe chronic illness, has led to their health deteriorating. Yet,
how we inhabit and live our shared story, and the shapes it takes,
and how we move together runs up against how our story is told,
whose and which needs are focused on and how “we are told” by the
medical model of disability (Trinh 1989).
In some corners of classical Quranic scholarship, disabled peoples
were seen as those who have been fated to suffer “mus. ı̄ba (afﬂiction/
calamity) and sayyi᾿a (misfortune)” as a test of their faith in Allah
(Ghaly 163). Disability is read as a divinely ordained ailment, abnormality or void; and the moral obligation to care is draped in language
of sacriﬁce, suffering and punishment. Such narratives of pity, tragedy
and fear not only undermine my father’s agency as a moral person,
but also discredit my mother’s moral choices and unique struggles as
a dependency worker (Kittay 1999). Through this ableist lens, my
mother’s story is written as the tragedy of a young wife doomed to be
a care-giver for her sick husband. The emotional plots that underpin
the Islamic-medical model serve to “engage the listener’s attention”
by appropriating the sick and disabled body to stir feelings of
7

Although the event was indeed traumatic and shattering, it no longer makes
sense to describe it as a singular event, or moment in time, by which my family was
transformed into a care web. Rather, the cosmology of our care web has always been
shaped by various chronic illnesses, types of neurodiversity and disabilities that my
siblings, parents and I live with. There are multiple chronologies of this event of
illness, from multiple perspectives. Just like my sisters, my mother too was a young
carer for her father. And, after my father witnessed his father die from a lack of access
to affordable care in Pakistan, he made the difﬁcult decision to migrate with us to
Canada so his children would not have to face a similar struggle. And so, another
layer within the ableist undergird of the medical model of disability is composed of
the intergenerational and global barriers to accessible, consensual and affordable care
caused by the impact of colonial violence on the Global South, as well as, settlercolonial violence against Indigenous peoples.
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sympathy and threat about the reader’s “own potential fate” and the
care-giver’s body to signify self-sacriﬁce, promise and moral triumph
(Bauer 2017, 17). The “arc of feelings” evoked by the text function
as a “straightening device” for the believer who bears witness to
return to a state of God-fearingness and return to face the prayer mat.
In the trajectory of this emotional plot, illness and disability are
sequenced in the narrative as a premature departure from this world.
Such plots are driven by a matricidal impulse because they uphold
subject formation as predicated upon the death of the mother. Here,
one’s life trajectory from birth to death is a linear ascent from the
darkness of the womb into the world as an independent and selfsustaining subject. Dependency, in any sense, is marked as a disruptive or decaying force that returns one to the state of darkness and
chains them to the home/domestic sphere. Here, caring for disabled
kin, and to be disabled, entails the righteous endurance of disability
as a trial. There is no space to even consider cross-disability support,
collective access, disability as socially constructed or dismantling
interlocking structures of oppression that endanger the lives of disabled persons. The power to make meaning of disability is also
deferred to the carer, the one burdened with being charged with the
care of disabled kin.
In a study of the perspectives of Arab-Muslim mothers on raising
children with autism, Pamela Olsen (2016) argues that disability in
the form of autism was interpreted as a challenge and a blessing from
Allah. The Muslim mothers who participated in the study noted that
their children’s disability often “disrupted” collective prayer spaces
and prevented those with caring responsibilities from participating in
key religious rituals such as hajj (78). Many mothers made reference
to the Islamic concept of agir (Allah’s recognition of good deeds) as
a measure of one’s capacities and aptitude as a good mother (Ibid).
In this context, failing such a test, by not practicing sabr (patience)
or embodying agir places one among the ahl al-balā (the people of
afﬂiction), and not the ahl al-῾aˉfiya (people of wellness) on the Day
of Judgment (155). Similarly, Islamic scholars also read disability as
an opportunity to develop one’s capacities for sabr (patience) and
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shukr (gratitude) in addressing the difﬁcult question of: how can
blindness, deafness, and other types of disabilities in the world be
compatible with the belief in a perfectly good Allah who is compassionate, merciful, just and omnipotent (155)? In this paradigm, Muslims afﬂicted with disability must practice “thinking of the good
reward that lies ahead”, “hoping for a time of ease”, “thinking of
Allah’s countless blessings” (57). Not only is the ability to “read disability” deferred to the carer, but the ability of the Muslim carer to
read, or to care competently, is cast as suspect.
What is concerning about this study on the “perspectives” of
Muslim-mothers on disability is that the authors argue that religious
and cultural beliefs shape the mother’s perceptions of disability as
a test, burden, or punishment. The care-based epistemologies of Muslim care-givers are captured and framed to tell the tragic story of
unﬁt, incapable and burdened mothers who are stuck in a religious
and backwards mode of reading disability. There is little space to
consider the agency of individuals in shaping, interpreting and (re-)
writing cultural dimensions of the Islamic or how the interlocking
forces of US imperialism, settler-colonialism and colonialism threaten
Muslims situated within relations of dependency care (Ahmed 2016;
Tungohan 2019, 237). The authors not only rely on a homogenous
and ﬁxed interpretation of “Arabic-Muslim culture” as necessarily
ableist (Nahal et al. 2017, 228) but also reduce the (settler)colonial
violence against Palestinian-Muslim communities as merely a setting
where such stories of disability take place but are not shaped by (Puar
2017). In addition, the mothers in the study speak of feeling as if
having a child with disability is a result of negligence during pregnancy or personal moral failures (236). Such feelings are not signs of
personal neglect or personal beliefs constitutive of a culture but rather
impressions of heteropatriarchal and ableist readings of maternity by
medical professionals onto the Muslim mothers’ bodies. Such medical
professionals who claim authority as knowers of the Islamic, and
guardians of women’s bodies, place the cause of miscarriage, disability
and stillbirths “not in the hands of Allah, but deep within the
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maternal body” (Kueny 2013, 70).8 What remains beyond their orientalist horizon is that the same mothers they speak of as being broken, but hopeful, are also living and re-writing anti-ableist modes of
reading Islam through their experiences as care-givers and as interpretive authorities of knowing and making the Islamic.
Dependency as Narrative Foreclosure
Within Islamic legal discourses on disability, medical professionals are
authorized as time-keepers and only their tools can hold hope for
“a distant horizon of impressionable possibilities” or a “therapeutic
plot” that is focused on preventing “deterioration” and not cure or
improvement for the patient (Antelius 325). For example, through
CT scans of his brainstem, countless blood tests, and various diagnostics, the only future inscribed for my father through the medical discourse was death or a living death—both in which the story of my
father’s life, his life’s work, had ended. Such a narrative foreclosure
signiﬁed that for my father it was “simply too late to live meaningfully” (Freeman 2010, 125). All there was left for us to do was “play
out the prescripted ending” (125–126) and reconcile ourselves with
my father’s “narrative fate” (126). A critical feature, or turning point,
within the chronology of tragedy is a sequence of medical events that
disrupt one’s life trajectory and entrap one within a form of time
where death may not be near but their narrative horizons, due to
severe disability, are closed off or foreshortened (Antelius 2007, 333).
The sequence of medical events that disrupts one’s life trajectory with
8
“To keep hazards at bay, medieval physicians assert knowledge of, or control
over, every stage of the reproductive act by surveying and circumscribing the female
body, and by working to cure any problem within it that might interfere with man’s
desire to replicate himself. As a result of their efforts, physicians privilege the
Qur’aˉ n’s more traditional reproductive roles for men and women over and against its
more ambiguous and open-ended treatment of sex and gender in the procreative act.
Assuming the role of custodian and surveillant of women’s bodies, male medical
scholars and physicians, like the Qur’aˉ nic Allah, claim both the knowledge and
power to generate life. By gaining access to what the Qur’aˉ n holds to be the exclusive preserve” (Kueny 2013, 53).
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disability, illness or trauma, not only foreclose one’s narrative horizons, but also, dislodges one’s self as a knowing self.
The chronology of care in the medical discourse is aporetic in
which the only intention and aim of caring for a person with severe
disability is to delay the death of the body of a person. The timespan,
as well as the living body, of the disabled person is read as vulnerable
and fragile. Such a frame of analysis de-limits the narrative possibilities available to a person; it ﬁxes the meaning of care-work as a string
of repetitive tasks with no speciﬁc end other than maintaining the
upkeep of a body that has reached its half-life. In this chronology,
the course of necrosis consumes with it not only the body of the
disabled person, but also the bodies and labour of her care-givers, as
well as the resources of the Canadian “welfare” state. In reading my
father’s body as dead, dying, or already gone, the doctors gestured to
us a world in which our father as “homebound” would no longer be
capable of intelligently and meaningfully inhabiting his relations.
The doctors framed dependency care as a narrative foreclosure,
a future in which my father would no longer “have a world”, for
without the capacities of hearing, speaking, eating, or walking, he
would cease to exist as a person. Framing severe disability as a death
sentence, the doctor then asked us to speak in our father’s name as
his guardians, to ground our decision in rationality, not faith, to wonder if our father would desire for himself such a meaningless and
miserable life of depending on others. What was placed on trial was
not the statistical foreseeability of brain death (which for the most
part remained uncertain) but rather, the intrinsic worth of life with
disability, a life of caring for a disabled loved one (Titchkosky 2007,
91), of my father as a disabled Muslim and of Islamic sensibilities of
caring. The discursive violence of the medical model of disability is
not just limited to narrative foreclosure but also what Sarah Bracke
identiﬁes as narrative encapsulation: when “the cultural story of one
people” is “subordinated to and reframed by the terms of another”
(Bracke and Fadil 2008, 53). As theorized by various care ethicists,
in this scene, medical professionals assumed the dominant subjectposition of the Eurocentric subject over my father’s Muslim body and

IN THE BELLY OF THE WHALE

311

my mother’s Islamic interpretive and decision-making authority as his
next of kin (Braidotti, 2003). Reading my father’s hospitalization
through the Islamic-medical model of disability offers little space for
plot speculation beyond the medical narrativization and reads Islamic
rendering of the situations as subversive acts of resistance (Bracke
2008).
A Maternalist Paradigm of Colonial Guardianship
From this relational positionality, as my father’s daughter, as a Muslim, I worry whether a care ethics approach to disability justice, that
relies heavily on the mother-child paradigm, also runs the risk of
naturalizing the kind of colonial guardianship upheld by Islamicmedical discourses on personhood (Engster 2015, 177). The care provider, theorized as a guardian, is empowered as the sole interpretive
authority in our relations who is charged with the work of reading
and making sense of disability and the experiences of disabled Muslims. Whether it’s presenting the doctor as all-knowing or the Muslim
mother with a disabled child as not-knowing, both Islamic-medical
and orientalist discourses rely on a capacities-based approach to personhood. Here, the capacity of the disabled Muslim to be recognized
as a human teeters on how they are perceived by (in)competent
guardians while the personhood of the carer, the mother or the doctor, remains unchangeable.
Care-knowing (Dalmiya 2016), for example, engages attentive
love, “a kind of knowing that takes truthfulness as its aim but makes
truth serve lovingly the person known” (Johnston 2016, 19). Inspired
by Sarah Ruddick’s work on maternal thinking, Johnston notes that
attentive love requires the mother to hold close the child while letting
her grow into herself by “knowing when an afﬁrmative feedback loop
needs to be altered to better respond” to the child’s changing care
and access needs (Ibid.). Johnston’s interpretation of Ruddick, as well
as Hilde Lindemann’s notion of holding and letting go, rely on the
recognition and response model in which the care-giver must both
hold in place the “narrative sense” of another person as well as let go
of “stories that no longer ﬁt” (25). It is only through the intricacies
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of care-work we can seize the forces that strive to foreclose and
encapsulate the narrative agency of disabled Muslims.
For the child to transcend into personhood through the parents’
care, the child must illustrate “sufﬁcient mental activity to constitute
a personality”, express this personality bodily, be recognizable by others as an expression of personality and be capable of responding “to
what they see” (24). I worry whether such a capacities-based approach
relies on a “misopedic” representation of childhood and the child in
which the parent is responsible for translating and reading the child’s
personality (Rollo 2016). It is equally troubling (and triggering) to
use Islamic-legal vocabulary as it is to use a care ethics approach
to disability to make sense of my father’s hospitalization. The motherchild paradigm empowers care-providers, care-givers and doctors in
this case, with an undue authority of deciding which (in)actions constitute a personality, and therefore sufﬁce as personhood that is worth
holding onto. Johnston observes that during critical transitions such
attentive love plays a critical role in identity formation. In the few
months after my father awoke from the coma, doctors ﬁxated on his
inability to move his eyes to track movements. His hand movements,
his tears, his heartbeat were all read as rudimentary, reactionary,
spontaneous, but never intended by him, as a conﬁrmation of personhood. For medical professionals, these movements were results of their
decision to continue his body’s breath with life support, and not the
breathwork of Ar-Rahman.9 This model forecloses the possibility of
imagining children as “simply human beings with different ways
of interacting with the world and others”; instead, “they are a lesser,
deﬁcient, or otherwise incomplete form of human being” deﬁned by
the “absence of distinctly human agency” (Rollo 2016, 62). Here,
only the care-provider meets the anthropological minimum (Mehta
1999); this power differential in the relation of care means that the
care recipient’s self is not relationally held in place, but rather is
displaced, seized or captured, for the sake of her “well-being.”

9

Allah as a merciful and compassionate carer.
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What may seem like a matter of semantics in the written word
unfolds into serious abuses of care against persons with disability and
Black, Indigenous and racialized peoples in situations of colonial
guardianship. Here, using whiteness as a “straightening device,” space
is given to the charge only as the care-provider sees ﬁt based on her
evaluation of the extent to which the charge has “developed” (Ahmed
2006). In the transition by which we became primary care-givers for
my father, it was not that my mother as my father’s guardian took my
father’s place, or afﬁrmed my father as a person, but rather for our
family, my father had never ceased to exist as a person; my mother
held a place for him in our world in response to the doctor’s foreclosure. She held out a light for his return that he could sense us from
within the belly of the whale. My father was, is, and remained fully
capable of possessing personhood. As his bodymind changed with
illness, we assumed responsibility for changing the shape of our home,
our world, our life, to create for my father a world (just relations) in
which he continues to ﬁt and live meaningfully within. This is more
than just afﬁrmation or recognizing the worth of another sentient
being. Attentive love entails sustaining access intimacy and collective accessibility (Mingus 2011, 2017). Relational selfhood goes
beyond afﬁrming or misrecognizing one another. It means remaining
responsive, and response-able, to the moving puzzle pieces, how our
bodies ﬁt together, and continually adjusting to ensure that no one is
left behind.
Failing to hold someone in place, does not mean failing to honour
another’s “proper identity”, but rather, complicity in building inaccessible worlds that enslave, colonize and displace. We must remain
responsive to how we care as the care and access needs of others are
always in ﬂux. Here, a consensual relation of care also means we must
hold space in our care relations for the care-giver and charge’s respective “autonomy to exit socially sanctioned, yet abusive relations” that
have “turned oppressive” (Dalmiya 2016, 47–48). An Islamic vision
of disability justice, and of care ethics, must call into account the
moral, ontological and epistemic inscrutability of the carer and
whether her care is competent and consensual.
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Of Hajar’s Plight: Caring for the Carer and Colonial Economies of
Attention
An Islamic and “care-based theory of disability justice” asks us not to
consider the legibility of the disabled subject as a “Muslim” or as
a living person capable of autonomy, but rather, our responsibility to
care for and attend to my mother’s and father’s needs as situated in
nested dependencies (Engster 2015, 177). If we follow the maternalist
paradigm that underpins a care-based approach to disability to argue
that the birth of the political subject is induced when the child disidentiﬁes from the mother, we assume mutual identiﬁcation as a natural and unchanging condition of maternity. Stories of pain, trauma,
disability and illness teach us that identiﬁcation between a carer and
her charge waxes and wanes, can be disrupted and can cease to exist.
Whether it’s estrangement from one’s identity as a child that comes
with being a young carer, or the carceral state’s policing of affection
between migrant mothers in detention camps or the removal of
Indigenous children through residential schools, narratives that ﬁx
maternity as a trajectory of linear dis-identiﬁcation, from the womb
into the world, sideline the ways in which colonial “economies of
attention” force us to turn away from our mothers (Ahmed 2006,
2010).
In witness of my mother’s extremely precarious position as a dependency worker, in the daily pilgrimage she makes to keep a roof over
our heads, as well as for my father to “have a world” (Solomon and
Lawlor 2018), she is differentially forced to make many compromises
to her well-being in order for others to survive. Whereas Kittay’s
paradigm of doulia is grounded in the notion that care-givers are also
“some mother’s child”, I ﬁnd more resonance in Amina Wadud’s
Islamic-feminist paradigm of maternity that centres the plight of
Hajar. For Wadud, the issue is not a lack of empathy or identiﬁcation
with the mother but rather that motherhood “has never been purely
natural, it has always been shaped by religious systems, power relationships and material structures” (Wadud 2006, 129). Reﬂecting on
her experiences as a single, Black, Muslim mother in the US, Wadud
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calls to open up maternity as a category of analysis within feminist
and Islamic (con)texts (Abugideiri 2001; Rahemtulla 2017; Wadud
2006). She asks:
How does a saying about “paradise at the feet of the mother” ﬁt the
struggles of poor and single mothers?” or “women with disabled or unable fathers, husbands brothers in a Muslim community that pretends
such an expression is a statement of fact and therefore ignores the agony
of these women, making them invisible (Wadud 2006, 126)?

Modelling intersectional analysis, Wadud extends the story of Hajar
to wonder about the rights and reparations owed to enslaved Muslim
(m)others who were forced to care for the master and his children
through the institution of slavery, as well as what is owed to Muslim
women who differentially carry the brunt of care-work in Islamic kin
networks.10
She has a hard time reconciling Hajar’s narrative with her own
experiences as a single, Black-Muslim mother alienated within her
kin networks. There is no doubt an Islamic cosmology of doulia and
maternal rights exist. Yet, why is it that we only care about the
mother in so far as it concerns our position in the afterlife? Why do
we disregard our complicity in the oppression of other mothers and
the denigration of mother-work and maternal subjectivities in Muslim communities? Like Wadud, I too have a “painful response” to the
saying “Paradise lies at the feet of the mother” as if “unconditional
honor belongs to the one whose biology was created with the capacity to hold life under her breast and then in due time release it”
(125).
The story of Hajar teaches us that the ideal of the Muslim mother
makes an impossible demand of Muslim women: to be both the
“bearer of the child” and also, to “make a way for that child to survive
in a harsh world—like our beloved Hajar in the desert” and how she
“was forced to make a way where there was none, for herself and her
10
lil-rijaali nasiban min-maa-ktasabu wa lil-nisaa’ nasibum min-maa- ktasabna, for
men shall have a share of what they earn and women shall have a share of what they
earn … truly Allah has knowledge of all things” (Wadud 2006, 141, 161).
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son” (Wadud 2006, 147). I read in Hajar’s movements between the
mountains of Safa and Marwah how material precarity (as signiﬁed
in the harshness of the desert) and micro-banishment compel her to
run in search of water (Sassen 2018). How do these movements shape
her relationship with her son as she is forced to turn away and
estrange herself from him in order to ﬁnd sustenance for him to survive? I wonder about how she feels about having to turn away from
her baby. How do such stretches of separation shape how the baby
relates to his mother? What estranges Hajar from her child is the lack
of structural and community care that denies her access to resources
and support as she cares for her child. Similarly, how does this daily
pilgrimage shape my mother’s body, or my parents’ marriage, or the
shape of our family home, or our friendships as we must all turn away
from the world into the home to care for one another?
What a care-based approach to disability justice offers is connection-based modes of knowing one another. Yet, when we unravel the
colonial maternalist paradigm of recognition from our conception of
attentive love, love becomes a complex site within which encounters
between mother and child are experienced differently and involve
healing wounds to our sense of maternity created by multiple colonialisms. For example, post-colonial scholar Kadiatu Kanneh (1994)
wonders what disidentiﬁcation feels like for Black mothers and whitepassing mixed-race children, “when the racial story suffers a radical
break between one’s mother and oneself”, when “color and culture do
not coincide” (33). She argues that the formation of “Black feminist
cultural traditions have largely relied on notions of community or
heritage; on oral communications between mother and daughter;
or on mourning and imaginatively reconnecting links broken through
historical violence” (Ibid.). Instead of framing love as a “form of
natural communication between mother and child”, Kanneh explores
how our capacity to love and the practice of loving are “perverted”
when one is denied the ability to identify with her mother or her
child, or when colonial or racist violence forces you to dis-identify
from your mother(land) (33–34). Here, the issue is not a failure of
recognition or empathy, but rather the structural conditions that
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inhibit or delimit “reading the self in reference to the mother’s history” and embodiment which results in a sense of self that is “fraught
with contradictions” (Ibid.).
Instead of romanticizing the event of birth, naturalizing identiﬁcation as a static inscrutable and uncontested feature of the motherchild relation, or glorifying stories of the mother as a saint that sacriﬁces her body to care-for others, we should explore the “historicity
of motherhood” (Wadud 2006, 129) as “an unnatural and socially
constructed institution” experienced in different ways. Taking for
granted “the sanctity of motherhood” makes us ignore “the burdens
of care-work for all mothers” and constrains us from mapping how
this myth has “failed to protect those who gave birth and raised children in urban poverty or rural slavery (Wadud 2006, 129). What
wadud invites investigation into is the multiple ways in which Hajar’s
plight are (re)produced:
Such women were assaulted by their status and still expected to be paragons of the virtues of selﬂessness and sacriﬁce useless for their and their
children’s plight – survival in a contemptible margin of invisibility” (Ibid.).

We must assume responsibility “for the character of its reconstruction…to incorporate critically the paradigmatic implications in the
life of Hajar as relieved in various ways by Muslim mothers today”
(Ibid). How, and who, do we silence, erase and harm in interpretations of Fatima and Zaynab as loyal, obedient and caring daughters,
or Maryam’s womb as a vessel for Allah’s plan, or Khadija as a generous and giving maternal ﬁgure to the prophet, or Asiyah as a sacriﬁcial and devoted surrogate mother to Moses? The maternal body in
all of these interpretations is read only as a vessel, an instrument, or
resource meant to nourish the formation of man as prophet or a site
upon which the signs of Allah are marked. In contrast, the womb also
is used as a signiﬁer that marks the political boundaries of the ummah,
or as an invocation of beginnings, in “bi smi Allah ar-Rahman arRahim” as “In the name of Allah the Compassionate Caring” and
more literally, a tie between Ar-Rahman (care) and rahm (which
means the womb in Arabic, Urdu, Farsi and Pashtun).
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What is ignored is Muslim women’s pivotal role as witnesses,
judges, and receivers of Revelation within Islamic (con)texts and the
persecution they faced in their societies for laying claim to interpretive authority. As argued by Ash Geissinger (2008), the “Mothers of
the Believers”, the wives of the Prophet, played a pivotal role as witnesses of his reception of Revelation. Their homes were not only loci
for “exegetical debates” but also “place[s] where Revelation descended”
(59). Because the Mothers of all Believers carried care-based and
“intimate knowledge of Muhammad’s personality, along with the possibility of an affective bond with him”, they were direct eye- and
ear-witnesses to the reception of Revelation, as well as the embodiment of sunnah (158). It is through such proximity, that their emulation and description of sunnah and hadith bears interpretive leverage
(157). Yet, Muslim women continue to be seen as “intellectually deﬁcient and unﬁt” to embody interpretive authority and if they do intervene through the written word, they are perceived as inciting social
unrest (fitna) and are marked as a sign of the apocalypse (Geissinger
2008, 35, 210; Saleh 1999, 136). Suspicions about women’s epistemic
and ontological capacity as knowers of Revelation fold into either
the absence or erasure of tafsir and hadiths by women or a “blighted”
location within the isnad (Richardson 2012). It is through such
b/ordering of interpretive authority that “the Home” is territorialized as a place for care-work and not epistemic or political activity
(Geissinger 61). Just as the patrilineal b/ordering of kinship excludes
women as inheritors of property, heteropatriarchal and ableist conceptions of personhood deny Muslim women from inheriting interpretive authority as knowers and keepers of Islam.
In colonial narratives of disability and dependency within Islamic
and European-Christian contexts, dependency continues to be institutionalized as the master-slave relationship of domination in which
the mastery of the Self is co-constituted through the subjection of an
enslaved and dependent Other. Muslim women cast as carers and
disabled Muslims are cast into the domesticity of able-bodied Man—
marking them as “constitutive outsiders” who are anthropologically
incapable of intelligent embodiment (Bracke and Fadil 2008, 58–59).
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With their bodies, care-based epistemologies of Islam are also rendered unﬁt accounts of Islamic historiography.
Colonial economies of attention orient us to read maternity and
dependency care as sites of sacriﬁce and rupture; in turn, such ableist
narratives underpin the Islamic-medical model of reading disability
and disrupt our ability to pay attention ,and attend to, the needs of
Hajar’s plight.11 The same force that makes legible my father’s stroke
as a site of concern but remain not-knowing of my mother’s needs as
a dependency worker also compels us to focus on the event of birth
as a point of origin for personhood and not the birth-work with
which we are delivered into the world and held in place in our relations. Just as the myth of the rational and autonomous individual
relies on signifying birth as a child’s separation from her mother, my
father’s stroke as an event of illness is also highly visible in the subject formation process as a site for gathering; like birth, the stroke
and cardiac arrest were legible as events of illness that could be witnessed, seen and heard, and spoken about as something to gather
around through medical discourses and the ethics of visiting the sick
in Islam. However, whereas birth is rendered and celebrated as
a breaking-free, acquired disability is read as an imprisonment
—a return to the darkness of the womb. The Islamic-medical model
of disability shapes how (and if) communities of care arise around the
care and access needs of Muslims situated within relations of dependency care.

11
Joan Tronto names attentiveness as a constitutive sensibility of care by which
we are able to recognize the needs that arise from dependency through a “suspension
of one’s self-interest and a capacity to genuinely look from the perspective of the one
in need” (Tronto 2013,23). In my mother tongue, Urdu, the words for care and
attention are closely tied. Attention is not something we pay, lend, or make but
rather, it is something we must repeatedly do as a mode of caring about someone or
something. The words for care (parwa, tawaja, khayal) and attention entail watchfulness, vigilance and focus.
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Conclusion
A de-colonial and Islamic ethic of care requires us to disinherit the
imagined secular/religious binary that deﬁnes care ethics as a tradition and as a mode of theorizing (Kittay 2007). Guided by the stories
of Hajar and Yunus in the Islamic tradition, and feminist ethics of
care, an Islamic and care-based approach to disability justice holds
multiple possibilities of returning my father’s person to his body, of
resisting and healing from anti-Muslim and ableist forms of medical
trauma and addressing the denigration of care-work in Islamic cosmologies. A care-based epistemology of Islam is inherently relational
and helps us understand how multiple colonialisms, in this case, ableism, anti-Muslim and heteropatriarchy, interlock to disenfranchise
disabled Muslims and Muslim caregivers (Da Costa and Da Costa
2019; Dhamoon et al. 2013). Care is a critical sensibility by which
Muslims can re-orient how we read, write and think about what is
“Islamic”, whose bodies we identify as interpretive authorities, and
which types of knowledge we authorize as “Islam.”
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Mother Eberly’s Coin: Care Ethics,
Democratic Politics, and North American
Mennonite Women’s Movements
Jamie Pitts

Introduction
Veronica Ulrich Eberly and her six children migrated in 1727 from
the Palatinate area in the German Rhineland to Pennsylvania. Born
in Switzerland in 1685, Eberly and her husband Heinrich planned
a new life for their family free from the persecution that they experienced as Mennonites in Switzerland and southwest Germany. But
after changing ships in Rotterdam, Heinrich claimed to need to go
back for something onshore. He never returned. Mother Eberly, as
she came to be known, was left to tend to her family during the
Atlantic crossing and later in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania.
Mother Eberly’s son Jacob, married and dedicated to farming his
mother’s land, occasionally visited the village of Lancaster for supplies. One day Mother Eberly drew from her few funds and gave Jacob
a small coin to purchase molasses for her at the village store. He took
the coin but used it instead to purchase a cowbell, which he “rang…
exuberantly as he approached home”. His mother, though, “was so
disappointed that she wept bitterly” (Rich 1983, 30–31).
This story, passed down orally for generations and included in
a twentieth-century history book on Mennonite women, illuminates
central claims made by care ethicists over the past forty years.
Although care ethicists have at times disagreed about the gendered
character of care—is care an essentially “feminine” ethics, as Nel
Noddings argued early on (2003 [1984])?—there is widespread
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consensus that the moral interests and perspectives of women, arising
at least in part out of their involvement in socially mandated care
work, have been ignored. To use Carol Gilligan’s famous terms, the
different moral voice that arises out of attention to concrete needs
for care, and so typically out of women’s experience, has repeatedly
been silenced (1982).
The fate of Mother Eberly’s coin represents the devaluing of her
interests, of what she saw as valuable for her work of caring for herself
and her family. Instead of the molasses she asked for, Jacob purchased
something that was valuable for himself and his own work. That
purchase may of course have contributed to his caring for his family—a cowbell is useful for farm work. But in overriding his mother’s
expressed request, he participated in the exploitation of value generated by women’s care work and in the silencing of women’s expression of their desires. While not morally equivalent to his father’s
likely abandonment of his family, Jacob’s decision follows a similar
logic of devaluing women, their caring labor, and their voices.
Elaine Sommers Rich tells the story of Mother Eberly and her coin
in one of the ﬁrst books dedicated to North American Mennonite
women’s history, Mennonite Women: A Story of God’s Faithfulness,
1683–1983 (1983). The book was commissioned by the Women’s
Mission and Service Committee of the (Old) Mennonite Church,
one of the two primary Mennonite denominations in North America
during the twentieth century. In 1980 Gladys V. Goering had already
published Women in Search of Mission: A History of the General Conference Mennonite Women’s Organization (1980). As indicated by the
title, Goering’s book told the story of women’s organizations in
the other main North American Mennonite denomination, the General Conference Mennonite Church.
Both Mennonite Women and Women in Search of Mission narrate
the development of “sewing circles” and other women’s organizations
by nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century Mennonite
women interested in using their abilities to sew, cook, can, fundraise,
and pray, among other forms of support, to meet needs beyond their
own homes. The sewing circles were an integral part of Mennonite
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mission work in North America and abroad, and they provided
women opportunities to gain leadership skills that they later leveraged for denominational power. Though the narrative is not linear—
they faced opposition from some Mennonite men and feminists—the
women’s organizations were training grounds for leadership in denominational institutions, congregations, and social movements. Rich’s
and Goering’s books give voice to Mennonite women’s struggle for
their voices to be heard, for what mattered to them to count in determining the direction of their lives and communities (see Laugier
2009 on care ethics and value).
The present essay utilizes care ethics to interpret this struggle, as
told by Rich, Goering, and by now, many other historians. In doing
so I show how care ethics can function as a theoretical framework
for making sense of religious movements and, moreover, how religious discourse can express concerns central to care ethics. In particular, I am interested in how religious movements and discourses
can contribute to and expand our understanding of the democratic
work of care ethics. Whereas leading advocates of justice ethics, such
as Rawls and Habermas, see religious discourse as inimical to democratic ﬂourishing, or at least as needing to be restricted in some way
from the “public sphere”, I will suggest that caring religious discourse
can have a democratizing effect within and beyond religious
communities.
After sketching out my approach to care ethics, democratic politics, and religion, I turn to the main subject of my essay: North
American Mennonite women’s movements. I ﬁrst provide a brief
introduction to Mennonites and the larger Anabaptist tradition,
and then tell a story of the growth and development of Mennonite
women’s movements in three overlapping stages. These stages are
(1) domestic and congregational caring, (2) women’s service organizations and mission activity, and (3) the turn to social activism and
academia. Given the essay’s focus on care ethics, I necessarily provide
highly condensed summaries of activity in each stage, attending
throughout, and especially in the conclusion, to interpretive questions raised by care ethics.
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Care Ethics, Democratic Politics, and Religion
Over the past forty years, there have been various attempts to deﬁne
“care ethics”. Prominent early offerings envisioned care as arising
from the “dyadic” mother-child relationship, and so including responsibilities for “the one caring” and “the one cared-for” (Noddings
2003; cf. Ruddick 1980). In Noddings’s formulation, a “categorical
imperative” emerges within our close relationships, directing us to
tend to one another’s needs (2003, 86). Yet this caring imperative is
experienced, according to Noddings, not as a duty, but as an “ethical
ideal” guiding our conduct within caring relationships (chap. 5).
Carol Gilligan’s In a Different Voice took a somewhat different
approach, linking women’s expressions of care not to maternal experience or instinct but to socialization (1982). Nevertheless, Gilligan
employed a similar vocabulary for her construction of care ethics,
emphasizing its relational character, focus on responsibility for the
concrete needs of self and other, and difference from modes of ethics
that insist on the priority of principle (justice, utility) over context.
Whereas Noddings’s articulation of “caring” largely employed
a philosophical idiom, Gilligan’s psychological analysis rested on her
empirical studies of girls and women considering moral dilemmas.
The empirical basis of Gilligan’s work was its strength and liability:
discussion of responses to “the Heinz dilemma” became staples in
care ethics and other ﬁelds, but Gilligan’s ﬁndings were challenged
by many other empirical researchers (see summary in Tronto 1993,
82–5). Joan Tronto added a far-reaching political critique of Gilligan,
charging her with an elitist commitment to linear moral progress and
with reinforcing the boundary between a private feminine sphere,
oriented by care, and a public male sphere, oriented by justice (1993,
80–1, 85–91). Tronto, Virginia Held, Daniel Engster, and others
have subsequently sought to integrate a conception of justice within
their care ethics, construing the latter as a public, democratic political ethics for all citizens, regardless of gender (Tronto 1992 and
2013; Held 1995 and 2006; Engster 2007; Engster and Hamington
2015).
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The similarities and differences among these proposals are instructive, and lead to a consideration of connections among care ethics,
democratic politics, and religion. Within liberal political theory, the
relationship between religion and democracy is often ﬁgured negatively: since democratic politics thrives on public deliberation—on
an exchange of reasons that, in theory, are available to and comprehensible by other citizens—religious discourse, based as it is on convictions that are not universally held by other citizens, must be
restricted from the public sphere. For philosophers John Rawls and
Jürgen Habermas, religious persons may participate in public deliberation only insofar as they ﬁnd ways to render their discourse intelligible to other citizens, for instance, by “translating” it into secular
terms (Morgen-Olsen 2012).
Although care ethicists have not investigated the question of religion and public reason—or for the most part religion at all—what
they have said points to general agreement with the standard liberal
perspective. For example, Noddings repeatedly contrasts care ethics
with religious ethics, locating the superiority of the former in its basis
in the universal experience of maternal love (2003, 29, 43–44, 90,
97–98, 99–101, 116, 125, 130–131, 184). Religious communities,
according to Noddings, can be judged according to external criteria
of care—but a genuinely caring religious community “becomes a collection of persons who share an attitude and a commitment but not
necessarily a set of beliefs” (117).1 Virginia Held similarly distinguishes care ethics from any form of religious ethics. “When a morality depends on a given religion”, she contends, “it has little persuasiveness for those who do not share that faith” (2006, 21). Since care
1
While other care ethicists do not go as far as Noddings in suggesting that care
ethics should replace religion, Daniel Engster (2007, 95–109) does see his construals
of care ethics as sanctioning government intervention into religious and other cultural communities when these fail to guarantee care for their members. Cf. also Held
2006, 122. My argument against such a view is not that religious communities should
be unaccountable to standards of care, but that such standards should be developed
through engagement with the communities themselves, and especially with their
most vulnerable members.
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ethics “appeals to the universal experience of caring”, its potential for
transcultural reception is far greater. Like the liberal theorists, Noddings and Held view religious ethics as having little public utility.
The proposition that there is or can be a neutral, universal form
of ethics has been sharply challenged by “postmodern” philosophical
and sociological currents that highlight the situated character of all
knowledge (e.g., Gadamer 2004; MacIntyre 1989; Foucault 2002).
Feminist philosophy has taken part in the challenge, for instance,
through claims that “standpoint” is an intrinsic feature of knowledge
production (Harding 2004). Care ethics, with its broad argument that
caring praxis makes a legitimate contribution to moral knowledge,
may also be viewed as part of this general move toward situated reason. As Held puts it, the validity of the inherently partial moral
claims arising out of concrete caring relations deﬁes the liberal presumption that impartial rational deliberation is the only or the superior grounds for ethics (2006, 100). Held, moreover, suggests that
identifying care relationships as the basis of civil society facilitates
the acknowledgment of both equality and difference within any political order (152–153). A democratic politics rooted in care ethics, on
this view, does not seek to prevent the sharing of particular, partial
reasons in public, but rather welcomes such sharing as sustaining the
pluralism endemic to democracy.
This endorsement of cultural pluralism within democracies, which
is strongly echoed by Daniel Engster (2007, 95–109), should have
implications for how care ethicists approach culturally-speciﬁc discourse, including religious discourse. Whereas liberal political theorists have sought to control such discourse in the name of public
reason, care ethicists have disputed the use of the public-private distinction to depoliticize concerns about power and politics that emerge
from the experience of caring and being cared for (Tronto 1992; Held
2006, 148–149). Moving beyond such a distinction, philosopher Sandra Laugier argues that democracy is created and sustained as members of a political community come to understand their personal
needs and desires—including, especially, needs and desires for care—
and give them voice (Ogien and Laugier 2014, chap. 6). Deﬁning
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democratic discourse in terms of claims to care means denying a priori
delimitation of what counts as “public”. That claims to care are
couched in explicitly religious terms should not inherently invalidate
them as contributions to democracy, and claimants should not necessarily be forced to translate their claims into purportedly neutral
terms as the price of admission to the public sphere. Rather, members
of “caring democracies” (Tronto 2013) ought to be prepared to learn
to listen and care well for a variety of culturally- and religiouslydifferent others, through and in spite of translation difﬁculties.
These points could be drawn out further theoretically, but perhaps
the most convincing approach will be to show the democratic nature
of care as embodied within a speciﬁc religious community. By “democratic nature” I mean both that caring relations within that community display democratic features—they enact and are the basis of
struggles for liberty, equality, justice, and so on within the community—and that these relations draw on and contribute to compatible
democratic aspects of their wider societies. The point is not that all
religious communities always and everywhere exhibit democratic
forms of caring. The point, rather, is to show that a religious community can facilitate democratizing care, and so to undermine generalizing claims about religion, care, and democracy.

North American Mennonite Women’s Movements, Democratic
Politics, and Care Ethics
Introduction to North American Mennonites2
The religious community I will focus on to make this case is North
American Mennonites. Mennonites are a branch of the Anabaptist
tradition, which began during the sixteenth-century Protestant and
Catholic reformations in Central Europe. Anabaptists drew on currents within Catholic humanism and mysticism, as well as on Protestant anticlericalism, to contend that Christian community should
be reserved for those who, following the guidance of the Holy Spirit,

2

Standard sources include Snyder 1994, Dyck 1993, Loewen and Nolt 2012.
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explicitly requested to join it. A successful request was followed by
water baptism as an initiation into a community life dedicated to
following Jesus (“discipleship”). Since each community member, at
least in theory, could interpret the Scriptures under the direction of
the Spirit, each had the opportunity and responsibility to share with
the others their understanding of discipleship. This conception of
community roles meant that space was to be given in worship services
for each member to speak, and that women, as well as men, could
share their views openly. A relatively high degree of gender equality
was especially notable in those Anabaptist communities that welcomed “prophetic” speech thought to come directly from the Spirit.
There was thus a strongly “democratic” character to early Anabaptism, both in its egalitarianism and in its rejection of the state church
concept through the insistence on believer’s baptism.
Anabaptists were accused by Catholics and Protestants of heresy,
and particularly of the capital crime of “re-baptism”, which is the
literal translation of “Anabaptism”. Under conditions of heavy persecution and after various debacles, Anabaptist leaders quickly downplayed both charismatic phenomena, such as prophecy, that might
attract public attention, and any ambitions they had to broader public inﬂuence. They withdrew into increasingly isolated, patriarchal
communities. Menno Simons, a second-generation Dutch leader of
the northern Anabaptist movements, was so successful in describing
his congregations as peaceful and nonthreatening that Anabaptists in
Switzerland, eastern France, and southern Germany eventually began
to use his name to defend themselves against further persecution. His
name had already been taken by some of his own followers after his
death, and when the northern and southern groups began to migrate
to North America in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, they
both took the name “Mennonite”.3
3

Technically they took a variety of names derived from “Menno,” settling on
“Mennonite” in the nineteenth century. See Bender and Sawatsky 1989. Another
group of Anabaptists, the Hutterites, developed in Moravia and did not take on the
Mennonite name. Disputes among the Swiss-German Anabaptists in the 1690s led
to the Amish Division. The Amish were known as “Amish Mennonites” upon
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Although conditions improved for Mennonites in the Netherlands
during the seventeenth century, some refugees had already relocated
to Danzig (Gdansk) in Polish Prussia where their hardworking communities were eventually tolerated and exempted from military service.4 When Danzig became part of the Kingdom of Prussia in the
late eighteenth century, Mennonites came under increasing pressure
to conform to Prussian militarism. By the end of the century many
Mennonites had left Prussia for South Russia, where Catherine the
Great had offered an exchange of toleration and autonomy for productive farm work. Thousands of Mennonites left Russia for the
Americas in the 1870s when the imperial government began to curtail their autonomy, and thousands more made the same journey after
experiencing persecution during the Bolshevik Revolution and under
Stalin, and then after the destruction of their communities during
World War II.
Mennonites in North America who are descended from the European Anabaptist communities therefore tend to identify either as
“Swiss-German” or as “Russian”. Due to the differences in their historic experiences and migration patterns, these two groups of Mennonites have different theological emphases and initially organized
into two distinct bodies: the (Old) Mennonite Church (MC), made
up largely of Swiss-German Mennonites, and the General Conference Mennonite Church (GC), made up largely of Russian Mennonites. Increasing collaboration over the twentieth century eventually
led to the composition of a shared confession of faith and an institutional merger. The merger, however, was also the occasion for a division on national lines, and Mennonite Church Canada (MC Canada)

landing in America. The (Old) Mennonite Church that I discuss below was initially
comprised of both Amish Mennonites and non-Amish Mennonites, but during the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the Amish either withdrew into their own
organizations or assimilated. I do not focus on the Amish in this chapter.
4
Although the earliest Anabaptists differed in their ethics of violence, prominent leaders thought discipleship entailed the refusal to bear arms or perform military
service. This became the default view from roughly the second generation onward.
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and Mennonite Church USA (MCUSA) were born in 2002. In what
follows I tell and interpret some of the story of women’s movements
in the MC, the GC, and their successor denominations.
Stage 1: Domestic and Congregational Caring
Mother Eberly’s story illustrates some persistent features of Mennonite women’s experiences in North America. Mother Eberly was
a migrant, a land owner and head of her household, and a woman
whose goods and desires were vulnerable to the whims of men. Migration has deﬁned Mennonite life in North America for generations,
and Mother Eberly was, in the early eighteenth century, among the
ﬁrst waves of Swiss-German migrants. A later wave of Mennonite
migration, this time from Russia after World War II, would see an
entire generation of women who, like Mother Eberly, migrated without husbands or fathers or other adult men, as many had been killed
in Stalin’s gulags or during the war (Epp 2000). These women were
responsible for the survival of their families as they crossed the ocean
and created homesteads in difﬁcult conditions. Their responsibility,
in turn, gave them signiﬁcant authority in day-to-day decision making and in the education of their children, including in spiritual
education.
Historian Marlene Epp observes this pattern—in which Mennonite women take religious leadership in migrant communities that are
dependent on families for social reproduction—repeated in communities with or without men, including in late twentieth-century Canada among refugees from Central America and Southeast Asia (Epp
2008, 172–3). However, she contends, the centrality of family in
North American Mennonite history has been both empowering and
limiting for women (61–62, 174). Mennonite families, whether in
rural villages or urban neighborhoods, have typically been patriarchal, resulting in gendered divisions of labor and the susceptibility of
women’s authority to male prerogative. Elaine Sommers Rich further
describes how a historic Mennonite ideal of marriage as a partnership
between equals with different roles developed into a gendered separation of spheres during the early twentieth century, as pressures of
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urban assimilation and fundamentalist theology took hold (Rich
1983, 41, 43).5
If the authority Mennonite women have gained in and through
the home should accordingly be viewed with some ambivalence, the
nature and shape of that authority should not be overlooked either
for its immediate or later contributions to the story of women’s movements. Rich suggests that a Mennonite women’s “heritage” has been
passed down from the early homesteading experience, a heritage of
working with one’s hands, offering hospitality, frugality, and community service (35). The next section will show how women leveraged
that heritage to create a variety of service organizations in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as well as to take leading
roles in the burgeoning Mennonite missionary movement. At this
point it is sufﬁcient to note some of the concrete forms taken by that
heritage, especially as they shaped Mennonite congregational life.
For Mennonite women on rural homesteads, working with one’s
hands has involved, among other activities, sewing, quilting, gardening, cooking, and canning, and of course bearing and raising children
(77). By taking on—and being made to take on—these basic responsibilities of care, Mennonite women have sustained and reproduced
Mennonite life. Though twentieth-century sociological transformations would lead many Mennonite women and their families off of
farms and into cities, the importance of domestic handiwork continues to be afﬁrmed, for instance, by popular cookbooks written by and
for Mennonite women (Longacre 2003; Schellenberg et al. 2011).
Mennonite women past and present have, moreover, taken central
roles in their congregations through their work of cooking and sewing
for events and charity auctions.

5

This conception of marriage can be seen as an effect of rural life, in which “the
Mennonite family, either nuclear or extended, was a central institution for organizing
community life and transmitting beliefs. A family functioned as an economic unit,
and was the building block for village and settlement formation” (Epp 2008, 61).
It also has roots in the Anabaptist theological conviction that marriage is a partnership between two committed disciples of Christ. See Snyder 1995, chap. 19.
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Mennonite women’s hospitality and home management has taken
a variety of notable forms. Elaine Sommers Rich tells the story of two
Pennsylvania women who harbored Native Americans ﬂeeing settler
violence in 1767 (32). Another woman calmed tensions between her
nonresistant husband and the soldiers who showed up unannounced
at their farm by inviting the men to dinner (34–5). In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Susan Ressler Good Hostetler
wrote a regular column in the Mennonite press advising women on
housekeeping; one column counseled ministers’ wives on gentle ways
of guiding their husbands’ theology (47–8). The related impulse and
effort to foster social connections among rural homesteads led not
only to the women’s organizations described below, but in several
cases to the establishment of congregations (180). Congregations
were also birthed out of some urban boarding homes for Mennonite
girls working as domestic servants, homes that were largely led by
women (Epp 2008, 45–8).
The patriarchal character of most Mennonite congregations meant
that, even if women founded and sustained them, they typically did
not have formal roles in congregational decision-making or leadership until the mid-to-late twentieth century.6 As Epp details with
respect to Canadian congregations, women’s quest for participation
in decision-making processes was long and often arduous (132–44).
Women’s formal participation only became widespread in the 1960s,
partially in response to sociological changes in North American culture toward more horizontal and inclusive organizational structures,
and toward the involvement of women in the waged labor force.
6

It is, again, important to note that I am limiting my discussion to those Mennonites that would later form Mennonite Church Canada and Mennonite Church
USA. Many conservative Mennonite congregations and conferences do not recognize women pastors, including Lancaster Mennonite Conference (now LMC), which
was a founding member of MCUSA but left in 2018 due to disagreements over the
denomination’s response to pastors who performed same-sex wedding ceremonies and
regional conferences that ordained gay and lesbian pastors. It is also worth noting
that by focusing on women’s movements within Mennonite communities, I am not
discussing women who left those communities altogether. Their lives, including their
relations to Mennonite women’s movements, are an important topic for further study.
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When women began ﬁnancially supporting the church out of their
own incomes, it became difﬁcult to justify excluding them from decision-making (141). Women, moreover, had gained leadership experience in women’s and missionary organizations, and were prepared to
agitate for their own inclusion.
Epp and Anita Hooley Yoder further describe the inﬂuence, in
both Canada and the United States, of feminism on these debates.
Women, and some men, began to contest the patriarchal character
of the church itself, arguing on biblical and theological grounds for
gender egalitarianism (Epp 2008, 123; Yoder 2017, 57–70). The goals
of this contest were not only the right to participate in congregationwide votes and committees, but also to serve in ofﬁcial pastoral roles.
Explicitly feminist theological arguments to this end overlapped with
personal testimonies from women who felt they had been called by
God to serve as pastors. In Epp’s view, this attempt to root women’s
access to pastoral ministry in divine vocation enabled women to
advance toward formal equality with men while perpetuating the
image of women as submissive and obedient (Epp 2008, 127). Furthermore, Epp notes that the opening of ordination to women at the
end of the 1970s coincided with the devaluation of ordination, as
theologians argued for a more horizontal conception of church leadership (123–4).
Stage 2: Women’s Service Organizations and Mission Activity
A signiﬁcant strand in the argument for women’s participation in
congregational decision-making and leadership drew on women’s
experience in mission and service organizations. The nineteenth century has been called the “Great Century” of Protestant missionary
activity, and during this period North American Mennonites began
to shift their orientation from rural isolation to vigorous public
engagement. Here “mission” meant not only issuing evangelistic calls
to conversion to Christian faith, but also attempts to address hunger,
poverty, illiteracy, and other modern social issues. Both major Mennonite denominations created mission agencies in the mid-to-late
nineteenth century, and in 1920 these and related denominations

338

JAMIE PITTS

formed Mennonite Central Committee to focus on relief, development, and refugee resettlement. Mennonite women, shut out at this
point from ofﬁcial leadership, founded their own organizations to
promote mission and meet concrete needs.
Many of these organizations began as “sewing circles”, groups of
women meeting regularly to sew bed sheets and clothing, make quilts,
can food, and otherwise prepare materials for people in need. Some
of these materials were for local needs—a family whose house burned
down, a nearby community destroyed by natural disaster—and some
of it was for Mennonite mission projects in North America and
abroad. In Gladys Goering’s terms, for many women, participating in
such activities was an extension of their ordinary, domestic care
work—they were “just being neighborly” (1980, 23). The circles also
served the women’s own social and spiritual needs, as described by
Anita Hooley Yoder: “In their organizations, women came together
to work, to meet the needs of others, often with amazing dedication.
But they also came together to work—to meet their own needs of fellowship and community” (2017, 28).
The developing circles often collaborated, and eventually, organizations emerged in each denomination to coordinate their work.
These organizations raised considerable funds for their activities and
were able to hire staff, support missionaries, and issue publications.
As such, they were crucial institutions for generating solidarity and
training women for organizational leadership (Redekop 1996, 61;
Yoder 2017, 42, 58, 86). Writing about (Old) Mennonite Church
sewing circles, Sharon Klingelsmith suggests that, while sewing and
related activities were “the foundation upon which the work could
be built”, ultimately the circles’ leaders viewed them as “a stepping
stone to more signiﬁcant work” (1980, 189). That work was full participation in their churches’ mission.7

7
Cf. Goering 1980, 105, writing on the GC women’s organizations: “Not all
groups sewed. The term ‘our mission and sewing societies’ in the ﬁrst year indicated
a difference of approach”.
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Men, and some conservative women, resisted the women’s organizations. The most extreme act of resistance occurred during the
1920s, when the MC mission board unilaterally dissolved the Woman’s Missionary Society and created new leadership and funding
structures for the denomination’s sewing circles (Klingelsmith 1980,
199–201; Rich 1983, 201). Later organizational struggles have
included the challenge of incorporating Black, Latina, and Indigenous women as participants and leaders (Hinojosa 2014, 149–73;
Yoder 2017, 99–118); criticisms from feminists that the organizations
were too conservative (90–8); and a general decline in participation
after the 1970s (Redekop 1996, 103–110; Yoder 2017, 143–55).
A paradoxical contribution to the organizations’ decline was their
own success. Although feminist critique of patriarchal church structures stood in some tension with the traditional women’s organizations, as will be explored below, the combination of both resulted in
the opening of denominational boards and committees to women’s
participation (Epp 2008, 169). In many cases, the ﬁrst women to
serve in the churchwide structures were in fact the leaders of the
women’s organizations (Yoder 2017, 119–22).
Anita Hooley Yoder suggests that, although the women’s organizations have declined, they remain important sources of social and
especially spiritual connection for their members (135–42). The spiritual character of the organizations is also highlighted by Gloria
Neufeld Redekop, who contends that the Canadian organizations
historically “functioned as a parallel church for Mennonite women”
(1996, 73, 98–99; Epp 2008, 161). As evidence, Redekop points to
the structural similarities between typical Mennonite worship services and the schedules of the conferences and other gatherings
hosted by the women’s organizations. Yet in doing so women were
not merely imitating services designed by men, they were contesting
the normative shape of Mennonite worship—Redekop reports that
one woman wrote publicly that the women’s gatherings were more
likely to model the New Testament pattern for worship than were
male-led congregations (1996, 73). Similarly, Felipe Hinojosa tells
the story of how two women, Gracie Torres and Seferina de León,
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introduced music inﬂuenced by the Civil Rights Movement and popular styles from South Texas into Latina Mennonite conferences during the 1970s. This music was eventually taken up by many Latino
Mennonite churches, becoming an identity marker for Latinos within
the white-dominated church (2014, 168–71).
Even as priorities have shifted during the past several decades of
decline, Redekop and Yoder both argue that mission and service
remains an important feature of Mennonite women’s organizations
(Redekop 1996, 129; Yoder 2017, 174, 207). Yet, their understanding
of mission began to change in the 1970s, when it became increasingly
common to criticize traditional mission work as culturally imperialistic (138). Prior to that decade, it was common for women’s organizations to support many women missionaries. Since the beginning of
the mission movement in the nineteenth century, becoming a missionary was “a way in which [women] could effectively function as
religious leaders but far away from the watchful eye of church authorities” (Epp 2008, 145). Missionary women were some of the ﬁrst
women to be ordained and to preach in North American congregations (147–8). Male leaders gave women some leeway in missionary
roles because they saw traditional feminine virtues, such as nurture
and self-denial, as beneﬁcial on the mission ﬁeld (149–50). Once
again, women found ways to leverage their identiﬁcation with care
work into space for the development of their interests and capacities.
It therefore came as a surprise when, in the late 1970s, they began to
ﬁnd that their sponsoring women’s organizations were losing interest
in their work (Yoder 2017, 138).
Stage 3: The Turn to Social Activism and Academia
As Anita Hooley Yoder points out, it is possible to see the Mennonite
women’s organizations as shifting their focus from traditional mission
and service work to issues they had previously neglected, such as
domestic violence and sexual abuse (138–9). When the women’s
organizations began addressing those issues in the 1980s, they were
catching up to feminists who had been busy writing and organizing
around them for over a decade.
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The primary institutional vehicle for Mennonite feminists was the
Committee on Women’s Concerns, formed in 1973 under the auspices
of Mennonite Central Committee’s Peace Section. In Yoder’s analysis,
the Committee served needs that were not being met by the traditional women’s organizations (67–68). A major part of the Committee’s work was the publication of a Report, which over thirty-one years
featured regular articles criticizing the exclusion of rape, child abuse,
domestic violence, and related topics from typical Mennonite peace
theology. The articles, however, were not merely critical. Carol Penner
describes how Report authors developed a distinctive interpretation of
Jesus based on their understanding of their Anabaptist tradition, their
personal stories, and their feminist commitments (Penner 2020a,
38–47). In place of the Jesus of male Mennonite theology—a Jesus
who emphasized redemptive suffering and nonresistance—this Jesus
was dedicated to radical equality and nonviolent resistance to patriarchy and other forms of oppression. In summary, “writers asked vital
questions and wrestled with God. They had suggestions about how
followers of Jesus could work for change in church and society” (35).
This shift to consider how the historic Anabaptist-Mennonite
peace witness might extend beyond the church to counter violence
in “society” participates in a wider movement among Mennonites
after World War II. As the story is usually told, many North American Mennonite men, after being mocked and humiliated by their fellow citizens for refusing military service, felt a sense of “restlessness”
and responsibility to get involved in social change (Loewen 2015,
66–69). Since World War II was quickly followed by the Cold War
arms race, the Civil Rights Movement, and the Vietnam War, Mennonite men had plenty of opportunities for nonviolent activism in the
coming decades. However, as historian Rachel Waltner Goossen has
detailed (1997), many Mennonite women also lived and worked in
alternative service camps during the war, also experienced abuse from
their militaristic neighbors, and also were motivated by their experience to engage in social service and peace activism after the war.
Likewise, the story of Mennonite peace theology typically tracks
the post-war shift from traditional theologies of nonresistance toward
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theological justiﬁcations of active nonviolence—all as written by
men. The publications of the traditional women’s organizations and
the feminist Committee on Women’s Concerns represent an alternative tradition, one focused on the concrete needs of women, children,
and communities around the world. This tradition is perhaps most
clearly seen in the ongoing series of Women Doing Theology (WDT)
conferences, which began in 1992. Carol Penner (2020b, 59–64)
describes how these conferences have integrated worship, academic
and ordinary women’s theological reﬂection, and creative dialogue
among an increasingly diverse set of participants. Penner suggests
that this format is rooted in Mennonite women’s feminist reclamation of their Anabaptist heritage, yet shares signiﬁcant features with
the Catholic Women-Church gatherings that began in the early
1990s (64–75). This interpretation strikingly places the WDT conferences in continuity with earlier gatherings of Mennonite women’s
organizations which, as discussed above, have been viewed as creating
a parallel church structure.
The presence of women academics at the WDT conferences
reﬂects the growing number of Mennonite women who have obtained
advanced theological degrees and academic positions since the
1980s. Mennonite women have made signiﬁcant contributions to
a variety of theological disciplines, including biblical studies, church
history, ethics, practical and pastoral theology, and systematic theology. The numerous academic publications by Mennonite women
include studies of power in communal biblical interpretation
(Neufeld Harder 1998 and 2018); suffering, forgiveness, and Christ’s
death on the cross in light of violence against women (Gerber
Koontz 2015; Guenther Loewen 2016); and the central role of
women in Anabaptist-Mennonite history (Snyder and Hecht 1996;
Schmidt, Umble, and Reschley 2002). After the public exposure of
the most famous twentieth-century Mennonite peace theologian,
John Howard Yoder, as a serial sexual abuser (Krall 2013; Waltner
Goossen 2015), Mennonite women theologians have engaged in
a full-scale reevaluation of what it means to follow Jesus (Soto
Albrecht and Stephens 2020).
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North American Mennonite Women’s Movements, Care Ethics,
and Democratic Politics
To return to the language of care ethics, the history of North American Mennonite women’s movements can be viewed as a history of
women bringing to voice their experience as carers so that the full
scope of their interests and values might be taken seriously within
their communities. In doing so, they help us comprehend the tears of
Mother Eberly and other women like her, tears shed over misuse
of their “coins,” taking that term metaphorically as well as literally—
their desires have been silenced, their value has been exploited.
Mennonite women, like most women, have belonged to patriarchal cultures in which men assigned them caring roles and deﬁned
them as carers. The leaders of the ﬁrst Mennonite women’s organizations, the sewing circles, embraced these roles and identities, in order
to simultaneously show the value of caring work in their communities—of feeding, clothing, and educating—and as a means of empowering women for leadership and social service. Some of the participants in the women’s organizations have resisted a feminist politics
aimed at abolishing traditional gender roles and identities. At the
same time, the organizations facilitated the participation of women
in congregational decision-making, pastoral and denominational leadership, and mission work. Those women who did embrace feminism
often looked elsewhere than the women’s organizations, starting new
organizations and joining new social and theological movements.
Care ethicists should have little trouble describing this history as
driven in large part by women politicizing their care work in a way
that, through much struggle, is resulting in the democratization of
their communities. In the present case, the primary communities in
question are Mennonite church communities, but through mission
work and social activism these women have also been involved in
democratic social change beyond the boundaries of their churches.
Although there has been tension between members of the traditional,
mission- and service-oriented women’s organizations and the feminist
activists and academics, both have drawn attention to the ordinary
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experiences of women caring and being made to care, and otherwise
being violated in interpersonal, communal, and socio-political relations. In other words, North American Mennonite women can be
understood as engaged in a practical project of care ethics, of insisting
on the ethical priority of concrete relationships in which mutual care
can be nurtured or refused. This insistence on care has brought about
justice, it has expanded the distribution of power within and without
Mennonite communities. North American Mennonite women have
enacted a democratic politics of care.
Accepting this analysis requires grappling with the explicitly religious and theological dimensions of North American Mennonite
women’s movements. These movements, in both their traditional and
feminist forms, have prioritized Christian worship, biblical interpretation, and theology. Reinterpreting and claiming their identities as
Anabaptist-Mennonite Christians, expanding the “moral boundaries”
(Tronto 1993) of their religious communities, has been their central
organizing strategy. North American Mennonite women’s democratic
politics of care has been enacted through claims about the nature and
identity of God; about the shape of Jesus’ ministry, especially vis-à-vis
women; about what the Bible says or does not say; about the church’s
mission and ministry and the gifts of the Holy Spirit. What is visible
in these movements, in this politics, is not a drift toward a secularized, universal version of care ethics, but rather a particular, religious
version of the same. It is care ethics in a religious voice.8
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Reimagining Justice as Preservative Care
for Sustained Peace: Learning from Ethics
of Care and Indigenous Philosophies
Robert Michael Ruehl

In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls offers a unique conception of justice as other philosophers have before him, such as Plato, Thomas
Hobbes, and David Hume (Pomerleau n.d.). From a different angle,
ethics of care philosophers have addressed justice too (Bubeck 1995;
Engster 2007; Held 2006; Tronto 2013). For Western ethical and
political thought in general, justice has been important, and existing
political orders have made justice a signiﬁcant, genuine virtue. In the
United States, the Preamble of the Constitution includes establishing
justice as one of its goals; respect for justice molds American youth
as they pledge allegiance to the ﬂag, a recitation ending with the
phrase “with liberty and justice for all” (Okin 1989, 3). Furthermore,
James Madison believed that “justice is the end of government”, and
the principles of justice help the majority to unite despite many parties and various interests (2003, 254-255). Arguably, Western society
has failed to realize justice, whether this relates to race and police
brutality, economic inequality and exploitation, oppression of women
or people with different gender identities, or colonization and genocidal practices against Indigenous nations and peoples; some may
claim Western societies have done more to promote injustice. In this
essay, I will reimagine justice and offer an alternative interpretation:
justice as preservative care for sustained peace.
First, the traditionally accepted interpretation of justice will be
explained, which focuses on humans getting what they deserve.
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Second, Book I of Plato’s Republic and Cicero’s On Duties provide
reasons for rethinking the concept of justice as a necessary component for being an excellent, thriving person. Plato and Cicero create
space for partiality and care when considering justice, so the relevance of ethic-of-care approaches for reimagining justice becomes
obvious. An ethic of care foregrounds partiality and urges people to
remember how necessary care is in daily relationships, institutions,
and societies, but it also provides a normative component that spurs
people to make caring relationships more just. With some exceptions
(Engster 2006; Puig de la Bellacasa 2017), care philosophies tend to
be human-centered and underdeveloped regarding responsibilities
to nonhuman relatives, speciﬁc localities, and ecosystems. Consideration of Indigenous philosophies helps to broaden understandings of
justice and care (Whyte and Cuomo 2017); they cultivate greater
concern for nonhuman relatives, respect for place, religio-spiritual
framings of creation, and a positive peace that moves beyond the
mere absence of violence. They foreground giftedness and advocate
cultivating balance, harmony, and a lasting peace in all relations.
From this exploration, justice as preservative care for sustained peace
emerges.
This essay’s orientation is inﬂuenced by the philosophy of Gilles
Deleuze, a thinker who has shaped assemblage theory, cinema studies,
moral philosophy, and more (Bogue 2003; Buchanan 2021; Jun
and Smith 2011; Rajchman 2000). Deleuze emphasizes the creation
of concepts in philosophy, an afﬁrmative process that generates
new concepts, connects concepts in novel ways, and gives voice
to new problems or reframes old ones (Conway 2010; Deleuze and
Guattari 1994). Concerning criteria for new philosophical texts,
Deleuze wrote the following words in a 1986 letter to Arnaud Villani:
I believe that a worthwhile book can be represented in three quick ways.
A worthy book is written only if (1) you think that the books on the
same or a related subject fall into a sort of general error (polemical function of a book); (2) you think that something essential about the subject
has been forgotten (inventive function); (3) you consider that you are
capable of creating a new concept (creative function). Of course, that’s
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the quantitative minimum: an error, an oversight, a concept…. Henceforth, for each of my books, abandoning necessary modesty, I will ask
myself (1) which error it claims to correct, (2) which oversight it wants
to repair, and (3) what new concept it has created (Dosse 2010, 112).

The error I seek to correct is an overemphasis on merit in the “long
tradition” of justice, an error that continues to shape contemporary
societies and political structures (such as those found in the United
States) leading to the “tyranny of merit” and its harmful consequences
(Sandel 2020). An oversight in Western philosophy, and in most
writings on care ethics, relates to the natural world and our nonhuman relatives; in this essay, I want to reorient justice and care by
connecting them more to the natural world and nonhuman beings.
The new concept I put forward is one that unites some of the best
elements in Western philosophy from Plato and Cicero, care ethics,
and Indigenous philosophy. In the end, I hope this essay will help us
to rethink relationships and the socio-political contexts we inhabit,
so we can live better lives and make the world a better place for all
sentient beings and for future generations.

A Commonplace Understanding of Justice
Some believe egalitarian conceptions of justice conceal the traditionally accepted concept of justice, which is discernible in the work of
Simonides (c. 548-468 B.C.E.). In Republic Book I, Polemarchus
clariﬁes Simonides’s view of what is just: “[Simonides] stated that it
is just to give to each what is owed to him. And it’s a ﬁne saying, in
my view” (1992, 331e). In The Four Cardinal Virtues, Josef Pieper
foregrounds this “long tradition” of justice as what one deserves:
Nevertheless there is a notion of the utmost simplicity to which that
bewildering variety [of conceptions of justice] can be reduced. Indeed,
Plato already mentions it as if it were handed down by long tradition.
It is the notion that each man is to be given what is his due (1965,
43-44).

From this, a clear understanding of injustice emerges for Pieper:
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All just order in the world is based on this: that man give man what is
his due. On the other hand, everything unjust implies that what belongs
to a man is withheld or taken away from him—and, once more, not by
misfortune, failure of crops, ﬁre or earthquake, but by man (1965, 44).

Justice concerns the ways humans interact and how societies ought
to treat people; the concern is with what each person should or
should not receive based on who they are, what they have done, and
the consequences of their actions. Emphasis is on merit, and this
generates the idea of justice as desert.
Philosophers have challenged this understanding; John Rawls
emphasizes luck’s role in people’s talents and genetic inheritances:
what people think they deserve is often based on a “natural lottery”
that does not originate in merit (1971, 64-65). John Kekes, however,
criticizes views that attempt to isolate justice from desert. He asks
readers to contemplate two societies; the ﬁrst distributes beneﬁts and
burdens randomly, and the second distributes beneﬁts and burdens
according to people’s actions and the characters that produce those
actions: good people get beneﬁts, bad people get burdens (2006,
88-89). Unlike the random society, the ordered society enables people to have reasonable expectations about outcomes based on their
characters, choices, and actions. Kekes has asked people, “Which
pattern would you impose?” He claims, “I have yet to meet one who
would not impose the ordered pattern” (2006, 88). The ordered society allows people to get what they deserve; people can predict that if
they perform speciﬁc good actions, they can expect certain good outcomes. In a random society, however, people would know that “hard
work, intelligent choice, and self-discipline, for instance, have exactly
the same chance of success as sloth, stupidity, and self-indulgence”
(2006, 89). The ordered society allows people to meet their needs, to
cultivate the life they want to live, and to have reasonable expectations about beneﬁts. People prefer the ordered society because they
will get what they deserve.
Kekes emphasizes an important point; he claims “justice is essentially inegalitarian” (2006, 106). Alluding to Aristotle, Kekes claims
justice as desert is compatible with treating “equals equally and
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unequals unequally” (2006, 106); people interact with others in dissimilar ways, they meet or fail to meet their obligations differently,
and what they have done (along with the associated consequences)
will warrant disparate advantages or disadvantages. People acting in
beneﬁcial ways should be treated equally and receive similar beneﬁts;
people acting in deleterious ways should be treated equally and
receive similar harms. The two classes ought to be treated unequally.
This is why egalitarian views of justice are misguided: egalitarians
overlook the centrality of characters, actions, consequences, and the
cultivation of merit based on how well people have lived in society;
according to Kekes, egalitarianism may be argued for based on other
concepts or values, but it is not grounded in justice. In the end, justice as desert is hierarchical, it reinforces inequalities concerning who
receives beneﬁts and burdens, and it exploits a prima facie consensus
for order over randomness by focusing principally on the link between
character, actions and their consequences, and related earned beneﬁts
or harms.
Some doubts exist, however. First, merit and desert are based on
a society’s values and norms; descriptively, certain characters and
actions may be valued, but that does not mean they ought to be valued. What is thought to be just in one society may later be seen to
be unjust by future generations; simply because a society is wellordered and facilitates people getting what they are due does not
mean that justice exists. Oppressed people have often lived in wellordered societies and have gotten exactly what they deserved according to established standards, so desert alone is insufﬁcient. Second,
justice as desert fails to address whether the conferred beneﬁts and
burdens improve individuals, their communities, and the common
good; justice as desert is partly decontextualized and offers little to no
guidance concerning whether what people deserve will actually work
toward the good of the recipient or those in a relationship with the
recipient. Winners of lotteries, for example, have deserved their winnings, but the ﬁnancial windfall in some cases has led to worse lives
through deleterious extravagance. Third, by simply focusing on merit
and individuals, it is unclear whether justice as desert will move
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beyond negative peace (as the mere absence of violence) to cultivate
a positive peace in society. Plato and Cicero were aware of similar
deﬁciencies.

Revising Justice: Plato and Cicero
In Book I of Plato’s Republic, Polemarchus amends the idea of justice:
“friends owe it to their friends to do good for them, never harm”,
and “in my view what enemies owe to each other is appropriately and
precisely—something bad” (1992, 332a-b). Socrates is uncomfortable
with this; justice is a “human virtue” (335b), and a human virtue
makes people better or excellent. For this reason, Socrates resists
injury-causing descriptions of justice as desert because they support
harming people. Instead of improving people, giving others what they
are due by harming them will lead those who are injured to be worse
off (335a-e). Socrates claims,
If anyone tells us, then, that it is just to give to each what he’s owed and
understands by this that a just man should harm his enemies and beneﬁt
his friends, he isn’t wise to say it, since what he says isn’t true, for it has
become clear to us that it is never just to harm anyone (Plato 1992,
335e).

What has been identiﬁed by Pieper, Kekes, and others as the “long
tradition” of justice is misguided: justice as desert supports harming
others.
Cicero foregrounds the beneﬁcial nature of justice in On Duties;
his Latin title (De officiis) was meant to allude to the Greek Stoic
emphasis on cultivating “appropriate behaviour directed towards virtue” (Walsh 2000, xvii). Justice is one of the four virtues that make
a person a moral human being; the other attributes are wisdom, courage or a lofty spirit, and temperance or moderation. From these four
attributes, human obligations or duties emerge. Cicero indicates justice is primarily concerned with social obligations:
Of justice, the ﬁrst ofﬁce is that no man should harm another unless he
has been provoked by injustice…. We are not born for ourselves alone,
to use Plato’s splendid words, but our country claims for itself one part of
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our birth, and our friends another. Moreover, as the Stoics believe, everything produced on the earth is created for the use of mankind, and men
are born for the sake of men, so that they may be able to assist one
another (1991, 9-10).

Cicero emphasizes the negative and positive aspects of justice: do no
harm (unless to protect oneself from harm), and support the welfare
of others and the common good. He connects the positive dimension
with beneﬁcence, generosity, or kindness. In being beneﬁcent, the
person must be sure to not harm the recipient or others in the process; such actions should not exceed one’s capabilities or resources,
and they must be appropriate to the recipient’s character. For Cicero,
beneﬁcence has its roots in love, fondness, and obligation to others,
and he writes that we ought to “enrich above all the person who is
most in need of riches” (1991, 21). Such assistance is embedded in
various spheres of human social relationships: our connection with
the entire human race, one’s country, and one’s family and friends.
Cicero’s cosmopolitan outlook shapes his view of justice with beneﬁcence, an outlook emphasizing respect for humanity and the belief
that human beings should be treated as ends in themselves, never
merely as a means (Nussbaum 2019, 27).
The juxtaposition of justice as desert with Plato’s and Cicero’s
amendments is relevant to Reinhold Niebuhr’s insight:
The most perfect justice cannot be established if the moral imagination
of the individual does not seek to comprehend the needs and interests of
his fellows… Any justice which is only justice soon degenerates into
something less than justice. It must be saved by something which is more
than justice (1960, 257-258).

Justice as desert is too thin because the effects on individuals and the
common good remain unaddressed; it overlooks how desert may
diverge from improving the recipient of a beneﬁt or how a burden
may cause unneeded suffering. Socrates raises this issue: suppose
a friend has lent you a weapon, and that friend comes back for it, but
is furiously insane; Socrates makes it clear that to give back the
weapon would be unjust, even though the friend deserves it (Plato
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1992, 331c-d). Justice as desert must be supplemented with a concern
for the person’s well-being, which should limit the criterion of desert.
Cicero embraces the good of the individual person and argues that
justice should support the common good and bind people together as
a society and as one large human community. The implications of
Plato’s and Cicero’s views are signiﬁcant; they challenge the enduring
belief that impartiality should guide the distribution of desert. Justice
cannot be impartial because concern with bettering individuals, the
common good, and humanity as a whole cannot be realized through
abstract, disinterested, and delocalized ways of distributing beneﬁts
and burdens. Concern for individuals embedded in context-dependent
relational networks should be included as an essential part of the concept of justice, and such concerns move us closer to a positive peace.

Justice and the Ethics of Care
Ethic-of-care history is grounded in feminist oppositions to abstractions, universality, impartiality, delocalized justice, and principlebased moral philosophy, which have been nurtured historically by
a “male” voice that excludes, underrepresents, or misrepresents
women (Collins 2015; Nye 1990; Rachels 2012, 147-58; SanderStaudt; Shafer-Landau 2018, 276-90). For example, Lawrence
Kohlberg posited a six-stage ethical framework of development, and
women supposedly occupy a lower level of development because they
concentrate more on social roles, relationships, and interpersonal
expectations. The highest stage, however, is associated with abstract
reasoning, universal ethical principles, rights, justice, and a Kantianinﬂuenced orientation. As Carol Gilligan observes,
Prominent among those who thus appear to be deﬁcient in moral development when measured by Kohlberg’s scale are women, whose judgments
seem to exemplify the third stage of his six-stage sequence. At this stage
morality is conceived in interpersonal terms and goodness is equated with
helping and pleasing others (1993, 18).

To move beyond this level, women would have to enter the realm of
traditional male activity:
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Kohlberg and Kramer imply that only if women enter the traditional
arena of male activity will they recognize the inadequacy of this moral
perspective and progress like men toward higher stages where relationships are subordinated to rules (stage four) and rules to universal principles of justice (stages ﬁve and six) (1993, 18).

Devaluing women is consistent with traditional Western philosophical biases: Aristotle believed men are superior to women by nature,
Aquinas evaluated women as defective, and Kant thought that laborious education weakened women’s charms (Shafer-Landau 2018, 276).
Resisting this, feminist care ethicists have argued not only for equality between men and women, but they have challenged traditional
moral philosophy by foregrounding care, partiality, and localized relationships; the role of parenting gained signiﬁcance as a way to think
ethically.
In the early stages of development, conﬂict existed between care
ethics and justice; in The Ethics of Care, Virginia Held asserts,
As thinking about [how] care developed, care and justice were often seen
as alternative native values. “Care” and “justice” were taken to name
different approaches to moral problems and characteristically different
recommendations concerning them. Care valued relationships between
persons and empathetic understanding; justice valued rational action in
accord with abstract principles (2006, 62).

Nel Noddings agrees: “The language of the mother concentrates on
relationships, needs, care, response, and connection rather than principles, justice, rights, and hierarchy” (2013, xiv). This shift supports
particular concerns about individuals and accepts emotions, caring,
and partiality in moral philosophy and ethical decision-making.
Noddings claims,
Caring preserves both the group and the individual and… it limits our
obligation so that it may realistically be met. It will not allow us to be
distracted by visions of universal love, perfect justice, or a world uniﬁed
under principle (2013, 100-101).

Early care ethicists and those who embraced justice as desert could
agree with one another: care and justice diverge.
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The ground between ethics, justice, and the personal caring realm
has shifted over the years. Susan Moller Okin supports including justice in the sphere of the family:
the family… must be just if we are to have a just society, since it is
within the family that we ﬁrst come to have that sense of ourselves and
our relations with others that is at the root of moral development
(1989, 14).

Annette C. Baier values sentiments, gentleness, and sympathy, but
she speciﬁcally values trust, which she argues is a fundamental component in human relationships; yet she also believes that justice and
care should not remain antagonistic, but must be harmonized (1995,
18-32, 95-202). Daniel Engster’s project is that “of developing care
ethics into a theory of justice”, and he claims that “the principles of
care theory are central to any adequate theory of justice” (2007, 5);
Engster argues that through care theory, justice can be improved making sure all people get the care and support they need (2007, 7).
Finally, Held embraces this stronger association between justice and
care; she indicates care ethics is in its infancy compared to justice’s
long history in Western thought, and she advocates that “the ethics
of care can and should include the concerns of justice, the general
welfare, and the virtues” (2015, 34). Ethic-of-care approaches have
become more inclusive: justice and care do not have a predetermined,
enduring hostile relationship; they can work together.
Joan Tronto supports this view: “We need to demand that caring
responsibilities be reallocated in a way that is consistent with our
other values, such as equality, justice, and freedom” (2015, 38).
Tronto reimagines democratic societies; they ought to be based on
care and should care more about caring practices. She deﬁnes care in
the following way:
in the most general sense, care is a species activity that includes everything we do to maintain, continue, and repair our world so that we may
live in it as well as possible. That world includes our bodies, our selves,
and our environment, all of which we seek to interweave in a complex,
life-sustaining web (as quoted in 2015, 3).
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Care includes ﬁve dimensions: (1) being more attentive, (2) being
more responsible for others, (3) being more competent in caring,
(4) being more responsive to those cared for, and (5) being a citizen
who cares with other citizens (2015, 5-16). People have needs, which
are supported through the work of others. Others care for us, and we
care for others; this occurs on a spectrum from receiving to giving
care. To care, however, is to be more discerning and attentive of
those in need (caring about); it is to identify who is responsible for
another’s care (caring for); it is to identify who should competently
give care to another (care giving); and it is about being responsive to
those we have cared for, listening and responding to their feedback
(care receiving). Caring is a two-way relational process supportive of
communication between care giver and care receiver, and some who
give care today will receive care tomorrow. A level of reciprocity is
often present as we give back to those who have cared for us, or we
care for others based on the care we previously received. Tronto
weaves this into the democratic political structure: we want a democracy that is attentive, responsible, competent, and responsive to its
citizens and helps them to live in the world as well as possible, while
supporting them in caring for each other. A just democratic political
system will cultivate a more caring society.
Eva Feder Kittay agrees based on her philosophical expertise and
her experience as a mother with a daughter who has a severe intellectual disability; U.S. society needs to provide more support for caregivers, care-receivers, and families with loved ones in need (2001,
566). While society can support the ﬂourishing of some with disabilities, Kittay argues other disabilities resist well-intentioned reforms:
Someone such as my daughter could not survive, much less thrive, without constant and vigilant attention, without someone performing for
her nearly all the tasks of daily living, as well as providing for her—
and her caregiver—the material resources required for her existence and
ﬂourishing (2001, 566).

Her daughter is a person, however, no matter how different she may
seem when viewed through a liberal conception of personhood. In
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different ways, Aristotle, Locke, and Rawls have focused on rationality, reasonableness, and being a productive member of society; her
daughter, Sesha, will never meet the criteria established by their marginalizing standards. Through compassionate, attentive interactions
with Sesha, Kittay is clear that her daughter is an active member in
forming her own world:
The shaping of one’s world is a gift that each individual possesses and
that some make more use of than others. Sesha, in spite of all her limitations, makes ample use of this gift. To be with Sesha is to enter her orbit,
to gain a glimpse of the world as she constructs it. Even those who are
still more limited than Sesha have this capacity. It requires an openness
to experience it (2001, 568).

All humans exist in relationships with various levels of dependence
and independence; through more receptive, attentive interactions
caregivers and care-receivers can learn from one another. Kittay
reminds readers how the boundaries of justice should expand to value
various levels of dependency and the importance of care:
Justice that is caring begins with an acknowledgment of our dependency
and seeks to organize society so that our well-being is not inversely
related to our need for care or to care; such justice makes caring itself
a mode of just action (2001, 576).

In harmony with Kittay, Barbara J. Lowe offers a relationally-based
moral philosophy that weaves together justice and care; she avoids
including care as a supplement. Care is a component of justice: we
cannot have “a comprehensive notion of justice” without special
attention to the role of care (2007, 96-97). The concept of justice
includes care, and contextualized ways of bringing justice into the
world should emphasize ways of caring and relating. Unlike Rawls,
Lowe embeds justice in a relational ontology: human beings enter the
world within a network of relationships, and they live their lives
within networks of relationships. Lowe, however, divides the concept
of justice in two; there is an abstract realm that respects basic human
needs and rights, and it is oriented around nonmaleﬁcence. The particularized realm, however, takes shape within the space of speciﬁc
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relationships that, ideally, cultivate beneﬁcence and ﬂourishing lives;
this honors localized relationships, roles, and obligations that constitute unique human lives. Both realms are grounded in, and seek to
cultivate, a deep respect for persons, but to focus solely on abstract
justice would lead to shallow relationships.
Lowe makes it clear that the vibrancy of life emerges from relationships that allow people to enter reciprocally into each other’s
lived reality, to come to understand the other person intimately for
who they are, and to mutually make each other’s life better and more
fulﬁlling; this receptive relationship is based on loving perception and
actions. This is juxtaposed with arrogant and sterile perceptions
and actions; the ﬁrst is based on conquering others, non-mutuality,
and an instrumental use of others. The second involves detachment
from others, a rigid way of interacting, and a lack of emotional connection. These approaches are non-receptive. Because the world
involves non-receptive interactions, which means particularized justice is not realized, a second receptive mode of perceiving and interacting is necessary. The sympathetic approach is cautious in nature
with all new relationships and with those who perceive and relate in
an arrogant or sterile way, but it is always ready to move to the intimate, reciprocal mode of loving perception and actions when trust
and reciprocity emerge. Lowe’s relationally-based moral philosophy
brings justice and care together as one: justice ought to be grounded
in care, and care ought to lead to justice at the abstract and particular
levels. With supportive social conditions in place, it is through loving
perception and interactions that justice can be realized most fully in
the world; through loving relationships, people ideally become their
best self and promote more just relationships, communities, and
international associations.

Justice and Indigenous Philosophies
Doing philosophy in North America means being mindful of the
colonizing past and present and the conﬂuences of intellectual inﬂuences (Pratt 2002); minimally, this should involve considering what
non-Western wisdom can contribute to conversations about justice
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and being committed to using that wisdom to improve society. Indigenous nations and peoples embrace and embody different sets of attitudes, beliefs, and values; the resulting philosophical orientations and
insights that emerge are distinct from those in the Western lineage
(Whyte and Cuomo 2017). Pieper believes that justice concerns how
humans treat one another; Kekes follows this line of thought when
discussing ordered societies and how they meet human needs. Similarly, Plato and Cicero think of justice as aiding only fellow human
beings. The consistent concern in ethics of care is how human beings
care for one another; while Tronto’s deﬁnition of care includes the
environment as part of the sphere of human caring activities, care
ethics tends to include the environment in a supplemental way. In
fact, most writings on care ethics are delocalized; they may be focused
on the United States or Western societies, but the absence of caring
for a speciﬁc geographical place is obvious; place-based concerns are
largely absent. With some exceptions (Engster 2006; Puig de la Bellacasa 2017), dominant emphases on nonhuman relatives is lacking,
as is the spiritual dimension and how it can shape reﬂections on care.
Nussbaum argues that justice needs to be more inclusive; it should be
more attentive to people with mental and physical impairments,
should focus on international relations and inequities between
wealthy and poor nations, and should broaden its concern for nonhuman species (2007, 1-8). Indigenous wisdom can expand our understanding of justice.
Creation is important. From the Haudenosaunee in North America to the Maori in New Zealand, a common belief is that creation is
not owned, but has been given to all beings for their use, so all beings
can ﬂourish; there is a sense of belonging to Earth and place (Mohawk
2010, 242; Whitt et al. 2001, 4-12). The Maori make this clear;
instead of thinking about owning Earth and its resources, they speak
of being owned by Earth: “One did not own land. One belonged to
the land” (as quoted in Whitt et al. 2001, 7). The Haudenosaunee
have a similar orientation:
The world does not belong to humans—it is the rightful property of the
Great Creator. The gifts and beneﬁts of the world, therefore, belong to
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all equally. The things that humans need for survival—food, clothing,
shelter, protection—are things to which all are entitled because they are
gifts of the creator. Nothing belongs to humans, not even their labor or
their skills, for ambition and ability are also the gifts of the Great Creator…. all people have a right to the things they need for survival, even
those who do not or cannot work, and no person or people has a right to
deprive others of the fruits of those gifts (Mohawk 2010, 242).

This orientation opposes a common view extending from John Locke
and Karl Marx to today’s capitalist-socialist debates, namely, the idea
that we own ourselves and our labor; instead, everything is a gift from
the creator, even our bodies and the labor we engage in.
As gifts, they are not our property but part of a larger network of
relations, embedded in the same understanding that creation exists
for the betterment of all beings, human and nonhuman alike. Indigenous philosophies resist uses of justice to buttress merit and ownership of property as one’s desert; such deployments of justice may allow
some to ﬂourish at the expense of others. We have been given the
gift of life within fragile networks of relationships that sustain life,
communities, and well-being; we did nothing to deserve this, and
part of being a good human being is to be grateful for the gifts we
have and to remember that we belong to creation and place, not the
other way around. Within our roles on Earth, we are urged to be
mindful of how we live, so we can coexist in ways that allow all
aspects of creation to ﬂourish, while not taking part in exploitative,
zero-sum interactions; Glen Sean Coulthard highlights this
reciprocity:
Within this system of relations human beings are not the only constituent believed to embody spirit or agency. Ethically, this meant that
humans held certain obligations to the land, animals, plants, and lakes
in much the same way that we hold obligations to other people. And if
these obligations were met, then the land, animals, plants, and lakes
would reciprocate and meet their obligations to humans, thus ensuring
the survival and well-being of all over time (2014, 61).

Along similar lines concerning “mutual relatedness” and “mutual
responsibility”, Winona LaDuke makes an important observation:
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what people normally call religion or spirituality is identiﬁed by
her and the Anishinaabeg peoples as “a way of life”, which means
attempting “to live a good life in the best way we can” (LaDuke and
Smith 2006, 40-43). Unlike some common ideas about religion or
spirituality that focus on the individual or institutional nature of worship, ritual, or honoring a transcendent creator, LaDuke asserts that
spirituality grounds her political activities; it regenerates her and prepares her to engage in long-term struggles for change. This struggle
comes at the intersection between the past, present, and future;
her work is grounded in remembrance of the Creator who placed her
people in a speciﬁc woodland territory, and it is mindful of her relatives who have helped her people to ﬂourish for thousands of years,
both two-legged and four-legged relatives. This remembrance is never
separated from the Creator who has given her people the gifts needed
for ceremony and physical sustenance, which is indicated in the
name for the Creator, Gichee Manitou (from the Ojibway/Anishinabe
language); this term means “a gift from the creator”, and these gifts
are intended to support not only the body but the mind and spirit as
well (LaDuke and Smith 2006, 44). This giftedness extends to nonhuman relatives, plant life, and water systems; by observing these
various dimensions of creation, Anishinaabeg peoples learn how to
be more human. Being more human is dependent on knowing our
relationships with nonhuman beings and what they can teach us
about life, reciprocity, and balanced living.
As part of the sturgeon clan, LaDuke reﬂects on the relatedness of
life and learning from nonhuman relatives, such as the sturgeon:
They are amazing ﬁsh who teach you about your humbleness in the big
picture of things. They can go so far, live so long, and have so many
descendants. They teach us through their existence. Over time our whole
clan system, our government system, is related to them. That way of
life… is related to our whole ecosystem and to our land (LaDuke and
Smith 2006, 46).

This mindfulness allows them to live according to the Creator’s law
(what they also call the natural law). For LaDuke and other Indigenous peoples, ceremonies celebrating the natural law, all human and
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non-human relatives, and creation are intimately connected to place
and manifestations of the sacred (hierophanies) that emerge only in
that place, bringing a medicine for the soul. Hierophanies make the
world habitable, orient Indigenous peoples, and become an axis mundi
(or center of the world); this location orients activities, ways of being,
and ways of relating, but it is largely about habitation, which means
it is better to speak of religion or spirituality from an Indigenous
perspective as being about habitation (Arnold 2012, 17-19). To
degrade the land, to decimate nonhuman populations, and to separate Indigenous peoples from their land and ecosystems is to threaten
or to undermine their connection to the Creator and to threaten
their identities and traditional ways of life; their identity, their personhood, and the relational web of life are inseparable from place.
Religion or spirituality as habitation (linked to hierophanies and
axis mundi) is often absent in discourses about justice and care, but
another overlooked topic is sustained peace; very little is said about
nurturing and sustaining positive peace when discussing desert or the
proper division of resources. Indigenous philosophies address this
oversight. For example, peace is an important value for the Haudenosaunee; the signiﬁcance of peace is grounded in the story of their
origins (Arnold 2008). Over 1,000 years ago in what is now New
York State, ﬁve Indigenous nations were locked in a cycle of violence;
Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, Cayuga, and Seneca were spilling
blood over minor offences. A person called the Peacemaker crossed
what is now Lake Ontario, landing on its southern shore (Lyons
1991). This person slowly persuaded people to throw down and bury
their weapons of war, but one person resisted; Thadodá·ho’ was
twisted in physical form, had snakes in his hair, and was a frightening
person (Gonyea 2014, 9-10; Lyons 1991). In some versions of the
story, he consumed human ﬂesh. The Peacemaker and others united
with words and songs of peace, and they gently transformed
Thadodá·ho’ into a peaceful person. Interestingly, his name is now
the title for one of the highest positions within the Haudenosaunee
Confederacy; it reminds people of the violent past and how peaceful
means were used to cultivate a sustained peace, but this peace is more
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than the cessation of violence (negative peace). It is a long-term
positive peace that should be maintained throughout society and in
all relationships by each generation for seven generations into the
future (Lyons 2010, 42); this peace is focused on the ﬂourishing of all
beings, human and nonhuman alike, and it is concerned with protecting balance and harmony, so all creation can thrive. Furthermore,
this is not an abstract peace, but one localized through a deep connection with place and the unique attributes of the beings living in
that region. In other words, the cultivation and maintenance of peace
does not exist in an abstract realm, but is grounded in relationships
in a speciﬁc place with a unique history.
Vine Deloria, Jr. has been clear that one of the most important
dimensions of Indigenous thinking is a relational outlook: “We are
all relatives” (Deloria 1999, 33-34). Not only are humans related, but
they are related to nonhuman beings. Furthermore, these relationships exist only because of the place that supports them. In other
words, this is a shift in thinking that foregrounds the importance of
place and the relationships that emerge and are nurtured by that
place and the power of spirit manifested there: meaning, life, and
identity are grounded in geographical places with their spiritual energies. But the uniqueness of every being should be honored, and this
is clearest in Haudenosaunee stories about the origins of lacrosse and
the game played by nonhuman animals. The land animals and the
animals of the air had picked their teams. The land animals had
the agile, quick deer and the strong bear; the animals of the air
had the strong eagle and the vision of the owl (Calder and Fletcher
2011, 31). However, the bat was left over, and neither side wanted
him. Eventually, the animals of the air accepted the bat, and in the
end, the bat scored the winning goal for the animals of the air. The
lesson is clear: “This particular story teaches us that everyone is
important, everyone has a particular talent, and these talents can
make a difference in the ﬁnal outcome of events” (Calder and
Fletcher 2011, 31). When we graft this insight onto the story about
Thadodá·ho’, we understand that even the most violent people can
be transformed; people’s gifts can enhance the community; societies
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can transform themselves to be more inclusive and receptive to those
with unique gifts. In this way, the relational dimension is grounded
in the exchange of gifts: each person shares their own gifts and cares
for others to nurture their unique gifts; this reciprocity creates mutually enriching relationships allowing all to ﬂourish, both individuals
and communities. Inclusion, diversity, and the sharing of gifts beneﬁt
all (Arnold 2012, 1-2).
Indigenous philosophies provide a unique lens for reimagining justice. First, reﬂections on justice must be grounded in place; each
unique place with its unique ecosystems and nonhuman relatives cannot be thought of on an abstract, impartial level. Instead, justice
needs attunement to one’s local environs, all beings living in the
region, and how each contributes in a unique way to the ﬂourishing
of life through balance and harmony. Second, justice is not only
about human beings; from the Osage Nation to the Haudenosaunee,
nonhuman beings (from rocks and rivers to birds and trees) are part
of a larger familial network (Stokes et al. 1993; Tinker 2010). Humans
are one line of descent in a much larger family tree, so justice concerns the cultivation and maintenance of balance and harmony in all
relationships and between all beings. Third, based on Haudenosaunee
insights, justice must be thought of in terms of peace; this is not
a negative peace (the absence of violence) but a positive peace that
seeks to cultivate and sustain thriving relationships and lives for
seven generations to come (Lyons 2010). Justice through this lens
creates an extensive obligation network that urges people to think
about actions and relationships with a long-term emphasis that honors the many dimensions of creation; justice foregrounds the distant
future, interdependence, and an inclusive relational ontology that
embraces ecosystems, nonhuman relatives, and those human beings
who live there. Finally, justice cannot cause harm; those struggling
for justice should not be using violent, hate-ﬁlled, or derogatory
means. To bring justice is to use words, songs, actions, attitudes, and
values that are peaceful; peaceful means must be used for bringing
about an enduring justice that nurtures beneﬁcial relations with
all beings. This must be done in a spirit of humility and gratitude
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grounded in the realization that our personal existence is a gift from
the Creator, our ancestors, and the cultivation of life in our mother’s
womb and on Mother Earth—not based on merit but on giftedness.

Justice as an Ethic of Preservative Care for Sustained Peace
The long tradition of justice is grounded in desert; this is based on
merit generated through one’s character, actions, and the consequences of those actions, especially whether they beneﬁt or harm
society. Those who beneﬁt society according to the established traditions, values, and other evaluative criteria deserve beneﬁts; those who
harm society according to the established traditions, values, and
other evaluative criteria deserve harms, with little to no indication
that harms must lead to the improvement of offenders. This is problematic because justice, in this sense, normalizes harming others
without the idea of betterment. Justice is classiﬁed as a virtue, however, so if somebody is to be harmed, the harm must—in some way—
improve that person. Human improvement is a central concern of
justice, so justice as desert has to be tempered by how what people
deserve beneﬁts recipients and those around them. In other words,
well-being, improvement, and human excellence ought to be considered for all humans affected; harms can only be justiﬁed to the extent
that they cultivate human excellence for all people affected. Kekes,
Pieper, and others like Polemarchus who envision the concept of
justice in narrow terms are misguided. The ﬁrst component of the
broadening of the concept of justice and the development of
the conception of justice as preservative care for sustained peace is
this: Justice is concerned with human beneﬁt and the cultivation of
better human beings, so desert is not a sufﬁcient criterion.
Some revision is needed: People, whether we classify them as
“good” or “bad”, should get what they need to make themselves better. Returning to Thadodá·ho’, it is clear that his brutality would lead
many in the justice-as-desert camp to say that he deserved to be
harmed, but the story shows something different: what Thadodá·ho’
deserved (needed to become a better human being) was people
approaching him in a peaceful way to help him overcome his own

REIMAGINING JUSTICE AS PRESERVATIVE CARE

367

wounded nature, so he could be in healthy, reciprocal relationships
with others. This points to something that not many who support
justice as desert are willing to accept: sometimes “good” people who
live well with others deserve less attention and resources because they
are already “good” people; in other words, often those people who are
seen as “bad” deserve more of a society’s peaceful attention and
resources to transform them for the better through consensus, unity,
and peaceful perseverance. It took time, energy, and love from the
ﬁve nations’ inhabitants to transform Thadodá·ho’, bringing him to
a position of peace and love. Instead of turning away from those who
have harmed others and injuring them as punishment (justice as retribution), the Haudenosaunee story reveals that sustained peaceful
attempts are needed to transform, heal, and reintegrate those who
have caused harm. While such sustained peaceful, caring interactions
and support will look different in different contexts, the goal is to
bring a lasting peace that honors people’s unique gifts and the wellbeing of the environment they live in; while there may be resistance,
that resistance will be met by all in a courageous, compassionate way
guided by an enduring commitment to sustained peace.
Behind this expanded view of justice is the relational dimension:
“We are all relatives” (Deloria 1999, 33-34); this interconnectedness
is present in ethic-of-care philosophies with the emphasis on a relational ontology sustaining life (Lowe 2007, 86). The traditional interpretation of justice conceals this relational ontology and undermines
the interdependent nature of human beings with one another and
with all creation. Justice should not concentrate on what individual
people deserve in isolation; doing so will separate them from their
relational context and conceal how the treatment of one impacts
others. While we may be angry and hurt because of a person’s actions,
to harm that person may bring about more serious injuries within the
relational web, cultivating greater imbalance and disharmony.
Nussbaum reminds readers of the dangers of pursuing justice through
anger; she examines movements for peace and justice, and leaders
such as Martin Luther King, Jr. have approached social change
through nonviolence and non-anger (2016, 211-246). For example,
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while in a Birmingham jail, King’s anger transitioned from focusing
on harms (and the possible desire for payback or status correction) to
the idea that something must be done to improve society for all members, so everybody could live in peace: “a substantive and positive
peace, in which all men will respect the dignity and worth of human
personality” (2015, 410). Agreeing with Gandhi and King, Nussbaum
claims “that anger is not only not necessary for the pursuit of justice,
but also a large impediment to the generosity and empathy that help
to construct a future of justice” (2016, 8). Non-anger, caring relations, nonviolence, justice, and peace go together.
It is important, however, to think about how justice extends to
nonhuman relatives and all creation. Even if we accept the concept
of justice as a human virtue, human beings are intimately connected
with nonhuman relatives, and these extended relationships play an
important part in allowing us to exist: to destroy nonhuman relatives
brings harm to ecosystems, and the effects of that harm often impact
other ecosystems. Justice needs to be conscious of this. As a human
virtue, justice ought to bring betterment to all human beings in a way
that reinforces the delicate web of relations that sustain us. Justice
needs to expand and become more inclusive: this interpretation of
the human virtue now embraces, at least minimally in a consequentialist way, the reality that humans cannot exist and ﬂourish without
nonhuman relatives, so justice must protect and cultivate the wellbeing and ﬂourishing of our nonhuman relatives.
This emphasis on the relational dimension and the improvement
of human beings so they become their best self has serious implications for ethical and political thought: It is no longer acceptable to
remain at an abstract, universal, impartial level. Part of the process
of cultivating justice must be to turn to the concrete, particular, partial level and actually engage ﬂesh-and-blood human beings and our
nonhuman relatives and their needs and gifts. Following Tronto, this
means becoming more attentive to the needs of particular human
beings and their communities, becoming more responsible for the
well-being of others, and this means doing things in a competent way
to help others become better and being receptive and responsive to
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them through their feedback. It is unwise to believe that every being
can be beneﬁted in the same way; to help beings thrive and to move
them beyond suffering, discontentment, or a sense of not belonging
cannot be done on an abstract, universal, impartial level. Helping
others is a process grounded in direct contact: being present, receptive, listening carefully, and actually caring about their well-being
and betterment. Merging ethic-of-care and Indigenous philosophies
on this point, the idea of gifts returns: an important aim of caring is
to preserve the unique gifts in others to allow them to ﬂourish and to
help those gifts beneﬁt society in a reciprocal way. This is the preservative care component of justice: to better others and society, justice
urges us to care for others in a way that will mutually better the
recipient and society through preserving the unique gifts each person
has (Groves 2009).
This must be grounded in long-term thinking. In today’s world of
new markets and products, rapidly-changing technologies, and the
unconstrained generation of new information, short-term interests
and instant gratiﬁcation dominate. A lack of long-range thinking
exists; from failures to look decades into the future concerning the
environment to economic imprudence in a debt society, globally
many nations and their citizens fail to grasp the big picture as geographical interdependence and future generations are overlooked.
Indigenous philosophies help to undermine this myopia; temporal
re-orientation is given clear articulation through the words of Oren
Lyons: “In our way of life, in our government, with every decision we
make, we always keep in mind the seventh generation to come”
(quoted in Lyons 2010, 42). This provides a long-range focus; understanding a generation as 20 to 30 years in length, the Haudenosaunee
are urging people to think 140 to 210 years into the future for every
signiﬁcant decision. This is not simply a temporal declaration, however, for those making the decisions must consider the interconnected
nature of their decisions to make sure that the effects do not move
outward to impact others in a negative way. Each decision cannot be
contained in the place the decision was made. From an Indigenous
philosophical outlook, long-term thinking is necessarily complemented
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by a deep appreciation for lateral geographical and ecological effects
that respects interconnections and responsibilities arising because of
those connections. Caring justice is not a short-term, transactional,
one-time event but a long-term commitment to others that demonstrates that others are worthy of our time and trust (Groves 2009).
An example of this long-term, reciprocal thinking can be found in
Robin Wall Kimmerer’s Braiding Sweetgrass: Indigenous Wisdom,
Scientific Knowledge, and the Teachings of Plants (2013). Kimmerer,
a biologist of Anishinaabe ancestry, unites science with Indigenous
wisdom in a way that helps readers to understand the close, mutuallybeneﬁcial relationships humans can have with nonhumans, especially
plant life. While explaining traditional ecological wisdom, known as
the Honorable Harvest, which cultivates respect for the gifts of creation and an attitude of self-restraint instead of greed and overconsumption, Kimmerer writes,
Collectively, the Indigenous canon of principles and practices that govern the exchange of life for life is known as the Honorable Harvest. They
are rules of sorts that govern our taking, shape our relationships with the
natural world, and rein in our tendency to consume—that the world
might be as rich for the seventh generation as it is for our own. The
details are highly speciﬁc to different cultures and ecosystems, but the
fundamental principles are nearly universal among peoples who live close
to the land (180).

The principles help to preserve the various species on the land and
their relationships with other species, and through the maintenance
of this balanced preservation, future generations will be able to thrive.
As previous generations preserved creation for today’s generations,
today’s generations have an obligation to protect creation for future
persons, human and nonhuman. Kimmerer lists some of the principles that guide daily actions and how people are to nourish themselves through agriculture, gathering, and hunting: “Take only what
you need”, “Never take more than half. Leave some for others”, “Harvest in a way that minimizes harm”, “Use it respectfully. Never waste
what you have taken”, “Share”, “Give thanks for what you have been
given”, and “Sustain the ones who sustain you and the earth will last
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forever” (183). When thinking about the seventh generation, then,
this wisdom orients people to cultivate a speciﬁc attitude toward life
and all creation, an attitude valuing respect, reciprocity, gratitude,
balance, harmony, self-restraint, and the fragile interdependent web
of creation that extends from the past through the present to the
future. To be guided by seventh-generation considerations is to
embody this attitude and to leave the world in a thriving condition,
which will allow others in the future to thrive because of our selfrestraint and reverence for all of our relationships.
All of this generates an apparent paradox, however: ethical particularity leading to greater ethical universalism. Care ethics and
Indigenous philosophies focus on the speciﬁc, whether particular
people to whom we offer preferential support or speciﬁc geographical
places and their surrounding ecosystems. However, each locus of concern, care, and direct support is connected to another person, another
place, or another link in the chain of successive generations. A caringjust approach becomes a way of sustaining peace through long-range
decisions that are grounded in the realization that all places and
beings are interconnected with other beings and other locales (no
matter how tenuously), so the peace that is being advocated is one
in which the spatio-temporal dimensions of preserving the gifts of all
human and nonhuman beings takes on new signiﬁcance: Not only
should justice be sustained across generations, but also in everexpanding circles to other regions and ecosystems. Justice needs
to move beyond individuals and their communities and nations to
become more inclusive by focusing on the relational networks sustaining every living being. In other words, justice must become more
inclusive, must be more attentive to all human and nonhuman
beings, their interdependence, and how present decisions and actions
may drastically beneﬁt or harm future beings. Unlike Kohlberg’s
abstract universalism, this approach is one of expanding ripples of
care leading from caring-for obligations (“encounters characterized by
direct attention and response”) to caring-about postures toward the
world and future generations (which includes “concern but does not
guarantee a response to one who needs care”) (Noddings 2013, xiv).
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Because of limits placed on us by time, space, and other resources, we
can only offer so much direct caring for others (Noddings 2013, xiv);
however, this does not mean that we cannot care about, and dedicate
some of our attention to, the welfare of others around the world or
in future generations. In our caring for some human and nonhuman
animals or place-based ecosystems, we can do so with a caring, compassionate eye for those outside our direct sphere of inﬂuence.
A caring attitude and a commitment to justice as preservative care
for sustained peace can guide all we do and all of our interactions.

Recapitulation
Two texts in the Western philosophical tradition, Plato’s Republic
and John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice, bracket approximately 2,400
years of philosophy. During that time, justice has maintained a level
of signiﬁcance and gained intellectual texture: in writings from Plato
and Aristotle to Augustine and Thomas Aquinas to Thomas Hobbes
and David Hume, justice has resurfaced. While early feminist theorists distrusted justice, whether they rejected it because of its paternalistic associations or wanted to downgrade its signiﬁcance, considerations of justice have been unavoidable. As care ethics developed,
scholars such as Engster and Tronto have emphasized the need to
weave care and justice together; Lowe has endorsed a shift that harkens back to Plato and Cicero: justice, benevolence, and care are not
separate. To have justice, whether at an abstract or particular level,
is to have care; in other words, justice does not exist without care.
Whereas justice as desert tends to be abstract and focus on individuals, ethic-of-care philosophies have helped to reorient justice in
a better direction. Some limitations affect care ethicists’ outlooks on
justice; nonhuman beings tend to be absent, there is little to no focus
on religious or spiritual foundations for justice, and Indigenous inclusion is largely absent. For philosophers writing in territories with
a legacy of past and present acts of colonization, this is problematic.
This essay offers a correction: its aim is to act as a philosophical intervention (Bartky 1990, 4-5). The important dimensions of
Indigenous thought in this essay are the giftedness of creation and
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belonging to Earth, the fact that we truly own nothing, honoring
each being’s unique gifts, and the signiﬁcance of long-term peace
grounded in a relational worldview that seeks to preserve and nurture
balance and harmony.
In the end, the traditional concept of justice as desert is clearly
problematic; minimally, it is too narrow and needs to be broadened,
but what is worse is that in some contexts this understanding actually
supports injustice. This traditional concept did not come down to the
present without challenges; Plato and Cicero made it clear that
beneﬁcence, human improvement, and unique individual needs had
to be part of the consideration. Being mindful of this inclusion of
beneﬁcence broadens the concept of justice to include care for those
who are taking part in the relational cultivation of justice, and this
opens the space for the obvious inclusion of care ethics for considerations of justice. Justice and care unite.
Indigenous philosophies help to ﬂesh out what care can look like.
They offer a long-term approach for decision-making and how actions
will affect others; this does not focus solely on human beings but
expands to consider how our actions will harm or beneﬁt nonhuman
relatives, from rocks and trees to birds, bears, and Earth. This concern
is guided by the assumption that each being has special gifts (unique
attributes and skills or ways of being) that are crucial to thriving;
consideration of these gifts is important, and this transforms an ethic
of care into an ethic of preservative care: the focus is on how to preserve and sustain all the conditions that will allow the unique gifts of
all beings to grow and ﬂourish. Grounded in the Indigenous relational
outlook, the cultivation and preservation of these unique gifts reciprocally enhance the larger community; as the larger community
thrives, this in turn preserves and nurtures the unique gifts of those
who make up the community. This includes a long-range concern
that focuses on seven generations to come and a religious or spiritual
recognition of place that urges us to mindfully inhabit the land on
which we live.
Justice is no longer simply about the here and now, but it is
grounded in a long temporal chain; today’s beings exist because of the
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preservative care of beings in the past, and future beings will exist
because of long-range thinking today. In this way, justice as desert
and egalitarian distributive justice face a third alternative; justice as
preservative care for sustained peace provides a new way to think
about what justice can mean.

Coda
An initial possible concern may emerge relating to cultural appropriation. This focuses on how information, wisdom, and ideas from
an oppressed group or culture are used, whether they are used peacefully or in a violent, unjust way (Ruehl 2019). Minimally, instead of
contributing to direct behavioral violence, cultural violence, and
structural violence (Galtung 1990), the incorporation of Indigenous
information, wisdom, and ideas should contribute to sustained direct
behavioral peace, cultural peace, and structural peace. Scholars
should approach such inclusions as an ally to Indigenous nations and
peoples and attempt to generate dialogues across cultures to make the
world a better place for all sentient beings, their ecosystems, and
Mother Earth. To avoid cultural appropriation and further harms,
scholarly work should embody—to the best of its ability—the idea
of justice as preservative care for sustained peace. As I concluded
elsewhere:
It is important to structure research and publications in a way that
includes an ethic of preservative care, making sure that all research, publications, and teaching are not grounded in exclusionary, non-reciprocal
practices, but also grounded in inclusive practices intent on nurturing the
unique gifts of others for the mutual well-being of all those we encounter
and for the betterment of future generations (Ruehl 2019).

A secondary concern may emerge relating to the peaceful approach
supported throughout this essay, which has guided my response to the
concern about cultural appropriation: violence in the world will not
end with completely nonviolent means and aims; those who are violent and unjust will use violent and unjust means to maintain power,
wealth, and privilege. However, one simply has to look to the great
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leaders who have cultivated courageous nonviolent, non-angry, and
caring responses to injustice and violence. The Haudenosaunee,
Gandhi, King, and Mandela offer counterexamples that show how
nonviolent, non-angry, or caring responses are quite powerful, unifying, effective, and supportive of long-term positive peace. We need
more of these examples—and many more supporters—to make sustained peace a reality.
The above issues are important, but the limits of space do not
allow for a full philosophical exposition; however, this much can be
said: engagement with and use of another culture’s ideas can be done
with preservative care with long-term peace in mind, and if this is
not done, scholars should respectfully hold each other accountable
for violations. The struggle to change the world for the better through
peace, nonviolence, non-anger, and care take courage; this just may
be one reason why so few are able to be as brave as those who have
embodied these character traits as they have struggled against domination and oppression around the world. We need more of this courage in our personal lives, but we also need it in our academic, professional, and civic lives. May we encourage one another to be better
and to work for justice as preservative care for sustained peace in all
we do.
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Nature’s Hospitality, Human Prodigality:
From Environmental Consumption
to a Care Ethical Devotional Ecology
Kimberley D. Parzuchowski

Touch the earth lightly, use the earth gently, nourish the life of the world
in our care: Gift of great wonder, ours to surrender, trust for the children
tomorrow will bear.
New Century Hymnal, United Church of Christ

The natural world is suffering. Humans are suffering and will suffer
more as a result of the blind and abusive disregard for our natural
home by technologically advanced countries. We have fouled our
nest, as they say. But, while we are ﬂooded with data for imminent
doom, many people remain unpersuaded of our need to press for corporate ecological changes or to make many changes themselves. The
demands for change come from experts who see the danger to our
ecosystems and ourselves, but these experts do not seem to sufﬁciently
investigate the psychological and philosophical roots of the attitudes
and behaviors that underlie our consumptive behavior. Their data,
rationale, and arguments too often fall on deaf ears. Innumerable
practices, corporate and private, have brought us to this crisis, but, if
we ignore the philosophical and psychological underpinnings of climate
change denial and indifference, the conscious and unconscious beliefs
that ordinary people hold, we will not achieve the real cultural and
political changes necessary for long term sustainability.
The problem, in my view, is twofold: 1) We need to see the
need, 2) We need to actively care. Nel Noddings (1984/2013) calls
the moral motivation of ethical caring “I must” as in, “I must do
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something” (82). The urgency of this feeling demands action; it is
what psychologists call a prosocial urge (Hoffman 2000). And it helps
us to act for the good of others. But, if we do not recognize the moral
subjectivity of the other, we may not feel the “I must” urge. Care
ethics, which centers ethics in caring relations, is the most apt moral
theory for thinking about environmental ethics because it provides
a paradigm through which we can learn to see Earth and all her
inhabitants as moral subjects on whom we depend for our lives and
thus owe a response of care. But, while I will argue for care ethics as
a moral paradigm for ecological values and practices, such a shift in
academic theorizing will not be sufﬁcient to change broad-scale
practices.
In order to persuade more of us to change our ways, we must
change our hearts. The ancient Stoics understood that humans need
practices to reinforce beliefs and develop character, so they established communities of practice to help practitioners cultivate their
lives. Nature1 was a primary teacher and due reverential regard. Stoics
taught disciples to observe and contemplate Nature to understand
themselves, their world, the path of wisdom, and God (Hadot 2002,
139; Kenny 2004, 282). Stoic communal practices indicate something important for us today. Humans are ultrasocial creatures (Haidt
2006, 48). Community practices inculcate, activate, cooperate, and
keep us accountable. The spiritual dimension of communal engagement can deepen our sense of Earthly dependence and humility if our
anthropology is understood as fundamentally ecological. Our centuries of arrogance have numbed us to this sensibility, however. According to Douglas E. Christie (2013) and Jeremy Yunt (2017), our ecological crisis needs to be understood as a spiritual crisis (Christie 3;
Yunt xi). Consideration of the spiritual aspect of our ecological crisis
1

I will, in this piece, be capitalizing both Nature and Earth in recognition of the
spiritual reverence that I think is essential to the work of changing our behavior and
to acknowledge my own bearing toward the gift of life that I receive every day, by
the grace of Nature. Whether we view the natural world as having agency (divine
or otherwise) or not, we are nevertheless daily recipients of its gifts of food, air, and
water—gifts which we have not merited, but simply received.
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leads us to consider the role of religion in working to heal our climate. Religions are pervasive and powerful communities and thus are
apt for facilitating moral growth. Religion, from the root to-bind, has
a way of getting to our hearts, for good or for ill, that reasoned discourse often does not. Care ethics and most religions share the view
that we are embedded in webs of relation and that this is morally
binding upon us. Together, care ethics and a religious sensibility can
lend themselves to the development of green virtues.
Thus, in this chapter, I argue that in order to create genuine and
lasting change in human hearts and practices (both private and corporate), to instigate conviction and guide broad-scale cooperation, we
will need the help of the moral theory of care ethics to reconceive
ourselves in our moral relationality, and the support from faith traditions for the moral motivation and means of cultivating the necessary
habits of perception, thought, and practice to enact care for Earth.
I will show how the Care Ethical anthropology whose two important
descriptors, dependence and relationality, is essential for our moral
imagination in understanding our intersubjective dependence upon
and our moral obligation to Earth. Theory, whether philosophical or
scientiﬁc, tends to be less effective in creating convictions, however
(Haidt 2006), thus, we need spiritual and faith traditions to help inspire
and nourish the caring moral imagination. Reaching beyond the halls
of the universities into the communities in which they dwell, an ethos
of caring for Nature can take root, germinate, and perhaps thrive in
ways that can help us step by step toward ecological balance.
It must be noted that religions have been culpable in the harms
done to Earth, however. Writing over 50 years ago, Lynn White, Jr.
(1967) exposes a problem in traditional Christian theology, noting
that Christianity has conceptualized nature as inert, and humans as
separate from and above nature, with the right to dominate “creation” (1205).2 Unfortunately, our ecological situation has worsened,
2
Note that this problem predates Christianity however, as Greek thought
(Aeschylus’ Oresteia) and even Babylonian (Epic of Gilgamesh) celebrate human
power over nature.
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but White also contends that healing our ecology cannot be accomplished by science and technology alone: “Since the roots of our
trouble are so largely religious, the remedy must also be essentially
religious, whether we call it that or not. We must rethink and refeel
[sic] our nature and destiny” (1207). White mentions that lovers of
animals like St. Francis of Assisi may point the way. Where theory
alone does not convict us, devotional regard for Nature might be
what is needed for a Care Ethical Ecology.

In Dependence, Care is the Primal Virtue
We are not our own. Earth forms us. Human leaves on nature’s growing vine.
Fruit of many generations, seeds of love divine.
New Century Hymnal, United Church of Christ

The ﬁrst step toward correcting our view of nature is acknowledgement that we are in a dependent relation to Nature. Western thought
is entrenched in an ontology of individualism that prevents us from
fully comprehending our social, biological, ecologically-dependent
reality. By contrast, Petra Tschakert and Nancy Tuana (2013) claim
that a relational ontology more accurately characterizes the fundamental realities of the human condition both socially and existentially
(75). Contrary to historical Western thought, humans are neither
radical individuals, nor immune to extinction. Care ethics thus provides the moral and conceptual framework for a relational ontology
in shifting the moral focus from a rational subject choosing the good
to a web of intersubjective relationality embedded in care.
For decades, Care Ethicists have argued for the need of our recognition of our profound relationality and dependence upon one
another for existence in contrast to our national myths of independence (Gilligan 1982; Noddings 1984; Kittay 1999). Even our
notions of independence rely on dependence, as Kelly Oliver (2002)
argues:
It is not just that the notions of independence and dependence are fundamentally dependent upon each other—which in itself makes dependence the primary relationship—but also that the notion of
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independence itself is based on the acknowledgement of the primacy of
our dependence on others, (emphasis mine, 324).

So, the independence that we feel is still embedded in dependence.
As Eva Kittay (1999) states, “[T]here are identiﬁable states of our life
history in which dependency is unavoidable, either for survival or for
ﬂourishing” (29). This is our human condition.
Our cultural idealization of independence in the West, especially
in the U.S., is based on delusions made possible by technologies,
wealth, and privilege that have enabled Anglo and Euro-descended
Westerners to colonize, dominate, marry, and/or hire others to provide for our caring needs. We are profoundly socially dependent, but,
we are even more fundamentally dependent upon Earth for our very
ability to strive, philosophize, and create (Mann 2002; Johns-Putra
2013; Whyte & Cuomo 2016). Care ethics offers a moral vision and
narrative that counters this delusion:
Ethics of care understand moral agents as deeply and inextricably embedded in networks of ethically signiﬁcant connections and conceive of caring as exercising responsibilities and virtues that maintain and positively
inﬂuence relationships and general ﬂourishing within those overlapping
networks (Whyte & Cuomo 2016, 3).

Coming to understand the human condition properly requires that
we see more honestly how dependency deﬁnes moral life and
obligation.
Nel Noddings’ (1984/2013) analysis of the mother-child relation
reveals the foundation of our ethical orientation as we mature from
childhood. This analysis provides an apt analogy for our relation and
duty toward Nature. Noddings names the moral agent in caring relations, one-caring (41). The one-caring (agent) provides care to the
cared-for (patient/recipient). Family relations compel us, out of love,
to care. This Noddings calls natural caring. We have each been provided care which allowed us to become adults. Ethical caring extends
natural care toward non-kin others. This extension of natural caring
is motivated by the compelling urge to care which Nodding names
“I must” (80). Ethical caring is more effortful and requires moral
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commitment, activated by the moral impetus of the “I must”. We
choose to act on the urge to offer ethical caring because we as humans
value care. “The source of my obligation is the value I place on the
relatedness of caring” (84). Our shared humanity calls upon us to
respond to the needs of another with care.
This human to human extension of care from kith and kin to
strangers is rooted in our biological urge for belonging in social
groups, according to social psychology (Haidt 2006, 47). By extending our care from family to neighbors to strangers, we stretch human
connections and community, thus increasing wellbeing and security.
But the inclination must be cultivated in order to become a virtue. As
Noddings (1984/2013) said, caring is hard work (126-127). Any good
parent will remonstrate, chide, and encourage her child hundreds of
times a week to “Think of whether you would like that”, or query
“How do you think that makes him feel?” This moral induction, as
Martin Hoffman (2000) terms it, pushes our empathic regard to
stretch beyond self to ever larger inclusion (143, 150). Without such
training, children can be cruel and insensitive to the suffering of others. Care is a virtue that requires work to move it from natural inclination to ethical action.
Care is not only an obligation, however, it is “a mark of our
humanity” (Kittay 1999), one that we have hidden from ourselves.
Our denial of this fact of our condition “dismisses the importance of
interconnectedness, not only for purposes of survival, but for the
development of culture itself” (Kittay 1999, 29). So, our dependence
and relationality deﬁne the meaning of human life and thriving. Caring is how we ensure that our web of interdependence is strong. But,
what exactly is care? Can it include Nature? According to Berenice
Fisher and Joan Tronto (1990), it does:
Care is a species of activity that includes everything that we do to maintain, continue, and repair our ‘world’ so that we can live in it as well as
possible. That world includes our bodies, our selves, and our environment, all of which we seek to interweave in a complex, life-sustaining
web” (40).
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Our ethics must include the Earth and our fellow creatures to accurately represent the depth and breadth of our web of interdependence.3 Our blindness to both our human and natural relations has
left us isolated, bereft, and in profound alienation. Kittay hopes, “that
once we understand the implications of the clearest cases of dependency, we will appreciate the full range of human interconnection,
and see how all moral and political concepts need to reﬂect these
connections” (1999, 30). Care ethics provides an apt conceptual and
moral framework for understanding the complexity of our sociobiological dependence to help us see ourselves and our situation
more honestly, but getting beyond non-conscious biases still poses
a challenge.

Attentive Care: Moral Perception & Caring About
We are not alone. Earth names us.
New Century Hymnal, United Church of Christ

We suffer from a spiritual amnesia of who we are, from a denial that
we, as animals, need Earth’s bounty to live. We have forgotten
that we are just “one of the myriad creatures” as the ancient Chinese
sage Laozi says, (D.C. Lau 1976, 6). In our naïve arrogance, we have
deluded ourselves that we as a species are capable of somehow existing without Earth and our fellow creatures. This has left us alienated
and endangered. Our humanistic and scientiﬁc attitudes have made
us wary of viewing the Earth and her inhabitants as moral subjects to
whom we owe a duty. But, rather than exhibiting the virtue of epistemological responsibility, this wariness reﬂects our arrogance and
blindness, according to Native American theorist George Tinker
(2004).
3
References to “creatures” is a term of convenience and is not meant to include
or exclude a view of their origins. This author values the evolutionary biologists’
accounts of the development of all Earthly species and believes that these accounts
need not preclude a variety of religious ideas about the natural world or various
theistic perspectives.
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Our theoretical and moral failure here follow from our belief that
only humans have consciousness or that ours is superior to all other
beings. Tinker (2004) claims that our narrow conceptualization of
consciousness is rooted not in scientiﬁc evidence, but in our EuroWestern scientiﬁc worldview which does not recognize the world as
ALIVE. Tinker claims that Euro-Western scientiﬁc conceptualizations are rooted in unfounded presumptions about the preeminence
of human subjectivity. Not only do the ﬂora and fauna of Earth have
consciousness, “but [they] also have qualities that are either poorly
developed or entirely lacking in humans” (106). American Indians
by contrast, view humans as lower in status than their “elders” who
have been on Earth longer.
The primary focus of creation stories of many tribes placed human beings
as among the last creatures who were created and as the youngest of the
living families…our job was to learn from other older beings and to pattern ourselves after their behavior…to gather knowledge, not dispense it
(Tinker 2004, 108; Deloria, Jr. 1999, 131).

We are subordinates in Earthly relations.
Awareness of our absolute dependence and relatedness evokes reverence in Native American rituals and songs, but also knowledge. In
his article, “Relativity, Relatedness, and Reality”, Vine Deloria, Jr.
(1973) claims of Earth’s inhabitants, “We are all relatives” (34). But,
more than this, Deloria asserts that this empirical and moral description can be used to acquire knowledge. Seeing through the lens of
the claim we are all relatives can provide a “methodological tool for
obtaining knowledge”.
[This concept of relatedness] means that we observe the natural world by
looking for relationships between various things in it… This concept is
simply the relativity concept as applied to a universe that people experience as alive and not as dead or inert (34).

Some Care Ethical theorists have extended caring responsibilities to
environmental concerns (Held 2006, 30; Palade 2019) but most do
not follow Tinker in seeing non-humans as subjects. Fiona Robinson
(2011) shares the traditional suspicion of viewing nature in terms of
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a relation of moral obligation out of concern for “anthropocentrism”
in a kind of projection of human experience onto nature. She claims
that “moral relations of care cannot be established with inanimate
things or features of the natural environment, such as rocks, trees, or
lakes” (144). Native American theorists disagree since our caring
relations are themselves embedded in nature. It is our anthropocentrism that blinds us to the reality of nature’s agency, according to
Tinker (2004, 107). Kyle Powys Whyte and Chris Cuomo (2016)
view the lack of recognition of care in nature as a problem of rationalism, originating in the liberal philosophical worldview.
In spite of the lurking inﬂuence of actual care in the world, in the canon
of environmental philosophy ethical caring is rarely taken seriously as a
framework for guiding decision making, and perhaps this is linked to
colonialism, sexism, and racism (4),

and arguably speciesism. Care Ethical theorist Josephine Donovan
(2006), agrees and argues for a dialogic mode of engagement with
other creatures, taking their perspectives into account for our ethical
reasoning (306). The concern against anthropocentrism is valid however, particularly when it enables a kind of human paternalism that
overrides creatures’ own experiences and feelings. Donovan argues
that genuine care must take into account how the animal seems to
feel or what they would likely want in a given situation: “Caring must
therefore be extended to mean not just “caring about their welfare”
but “caring about what they are telling us” (310). A Native American
worldview of a living Earth of embedded relationships together with
a caring dialogic ethos might offer nourishment to the Euro-Western
moral imagination.
Douglas E. Christie (2013) and Jeremy Yunt (2017) agree. As
I mentioned above, they claim that our ecological crisis needs to be
understood as a spiritual crisis (Christie 3; Yunt xi). Christie argues
that we have been blind to Nature and that in order to see properly,
we need practices in attunement. “[T]here is a growing desire to ﬁnd
a language and sensibility that can help ground our efforts to respond
to and preserve an increasingly degraded natural world in more than
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simple, utilitarian terms” (10). Spiritual attentiveness is contemplation, practicing openness to Nature, and can attune us to Nature’s
needs. Contemplative ecology is “an expression of the diverse and
wide-ranging desire emerging within contemporary culture to identify
our deepest feeling for the natural world as a part of a spiritual longing” (3). Thomas Merton claims that communing thus can enable us
to overcome our alienation from nature,
by being attentive, by learning to listen… we can ﬁnd ourselves engulfed
in such happiness that it cannot be explained… the happiness of being
at one with everything in that hidden ground of Love for which there
can be no explanation (Merton 1985, 115).

Many of us have felt such moments of joy, if we allow.
Contemplative ecology is rooted in a recognition of the moral
subjectivity of all of nature, according to Yunt (2017, xii). He echoes
White’s critique (1967) of traditional Christian theology as dangerously anthropocentric and sees a way to overcome this in a philosophy/theology which centers around Nature. This he ﬁnds in the Existential Christian theology of Paul Tillich. Since the Western view of
Christianity has so profoundly inﬂuenced Western thought generally
(White 1967), reimagining the Christian perspective might help correct some Western misconceptions of our relationship to Nature.
Tillich describes Nature as a “direct expression of God’s ongoing creativity—since nature is part of Being-Itself”, and that as such, our
sensing “the presence of God in nature is to see and feel the direct
harm we inﬂict upon it” (Yunt 2017, xii). Ancient Stoic philosophers, likewise, felt keenly that the only way to live the ﬂourishing
life was to do so with recognition of our relation to nature, with
proper humility before that which is beyond our control (Hadot
2002, 128). Proper self-understanding requires that we see our lives
as absolutely contingent on Nature.
Not seeing is one of our greatest moral challenges, however: White
people not seeing the difﬁculties of People of Color, middle class folks
not seeing the hardships of the houseless, and Western cultures not
seeing that the packaging we buy becomes trash in the oceans.
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Martha Nussbaum (1990) refers to this problem of blindness as moral
obtuseness. In her book, Love’s Knowledge, she describes the power of
cultivating moral perception to correct it. Love’s knowledge is the
understanding of how to see, and how to act in love and care (164).
The ancient Greek term is phronesis which is the ability to do the
right thing, at the right time, and in the right measure (Aristotle NE,
Book VI). But, like any aptitude, moral perception must be developed. Many of us in the West do not see the immorality of our treatment of Nature because we have not been taught to see Nature as
a moral subject. How can we penetrate such refusal of vision? According to Nussbaum (1990), ﬁne-tuning is required (155). In the same
way that an art appreciation class teaches students how to see the
meaning of paintings and sculpture, so the cultivation of our moral
perception enables us to see a fuller picture of moral meaning. We
need to attune our perception to include more subjects as worthy of
our concern.
Recognizing the subjectivity of (and moral obligation to) the other
requires the skill to interpret the moral salience of a situation:
In seeing and hearing, we are, I believe, seeing the world not as it is in
itself, apart from human beings and human conceptual schemes, but
a world already interpreted and humanized by our faculties and our concepts (Nussbaum 1990, 164).

We cannot escape our anthropic perception, but we can learn to see
our point of view in perspective, to humble our view of how we ﬁt into
the world’s scheme. Seeing, for Nussbaum is loving, and such care creates connection, “[F]ine attention to another can make two separate
people inhabit the same created world” (153). As Clifford Geertz
(1973) said, humans are “suspended in webs of signiﬁcance [we ourselves have] spun” (5). Our imaginations create our experience and
perception of the world. If taught to see more fully, our imaginations
and empathic regard can bring us back into relation with the morethan-human world. Tillich also saw love as the means for reconnecting
what has been alienated, according to Yunt (2017). “Tillich deﬁned
love as the ‘reunion of the separated’” (xiii). Yunt goes on to say,
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For those who’ve developed a deep love for nature and/or all of life…the
corollaries in experience between loving nature, God, or another human
are unmistakable: often coming as an upwelling of emotion, ecstasy…
humility and gratitude…In the midst of all these emotions, one can
intuit the interconnectedness of all life and one’s unity with it…This
forms the basis of faith experience or as Tillich expresses it, ‘being grasped
by an Ultimate Concern’ (xiii-xiv).

Overcoming alienation requires recognition of our intersubjectivity
as the ground of our deepest concerns, so our moral perception
needs to expand to include non-humans. David Abram (1996)
describes the way in which he himself was stretched to perceive the
alive and interacting world in his book, The Spell of the Sensuous.
Following the models of his indigenous shamanic teachers, Abram
strove to attend to his bodily awareness: “By…‘perception’ we mean
the concerted activity of all the body’s senses as they function and
ﬂourish together” (59). Such attentiveness to the body can facilitate
better reception of Nature’s solicitations. Paul Ricoeur (1996)
describes this sensitive moral attentiveness as solicitude. In agreement with care ethics and contemplative ecology, Ricoeur claims
that solicitude is rooted in recognition of our profound existential
interdependence and need for connection with others. “To selfesteem, understood as a reﬂexive moment of the wish for the ‘good
life,’ solicitude adds essentially the dimension of lack, the fact that
we need friends…” (Ricoeur 1996, 193). We need connection with
the more-than-human world (Abram 1996, 63; de la Bellacasa
2017). Consider how many of us have canine and feline companions, how many of us thrill when sighting a new bird species, and
how we feel the “I must” urge toward an injured animal. Solicitude
is the receptivity guiding us in understanding how to attend to that
relationship, in how to care.
How we care matters. Berenice Fisher and Joan Tronto (1990)
agree that attentiveness is vital. It is the ﬁrst phase of caring, which
they call caring about (40). Attentiveness needs to be cultivated so
that we see our moral relations. As mentioned above, Fisher and
Tronto deﬁne caring as including the more-than-human world,
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including “our bodies, our selves, and our environment, all of which
we seek to interweave in a complex, life-sustaining web” (40). The
four phases of care can be applied to both human and more-thanhuman relations. Caring about is practicing receptivity to potential
caring situations, while caring for is taking responsibility for the necessary care. Caregiving is actively performing the care, and Care receiving is the response to that care (Tronto 1998, 16-17). This ﬁnal aspect
of caring also requires attentiveness, as I have noted. Being empathic
is not sufﬁcient to ensure accurately and aptly reading and responding
to the needs of the moral target (Parzuchowski 2015). We must
attend to the cared-for, solicit feedback, and adapt accordingly. Care
is a cycle of strenuous moral work.
If Yunt, Christie, Nussbaum, Abram, Ricoeur, Fisher, and Tronto
are right, then what is lacking is not Nature’s subjectivity, but our
moral attention. We have not cared about our Natural home. Because
Nature does not speak in human language, most of us are too dulled
by our self-involvement to understand her expressions. But, the natural disasters of this decade should be heard as an outcry.
By expanding our perception to include the more-than-human
world, understanding our relational dependency on Nature, we can
work on caring about Nature in private and corporate action. One
might ask, however, why such attentive care needs to have a religious
ﬂavor; could not a secular orientation also attend to nature? Yes, of
course it can. The spiritual dimension does not “speak” to everyone.
But for those for whom life does suggest an element of mystery or
presence, in the next section, I hope to show how the sense of the
sacred imbues caring with a devotional and communal quality that
might help spread these practices of care more broadly and with
greater commitment.

Human Nature: Entangled Hummus
For dust thou art and unto dust shalt thou return (Genesis 3.19).

The Judeo-Christian scriptures describe humans as being part of
a cycle of enlivened earth. We Westerners, even those for whom

392

KIMBERLEY D . PARZUCHOWSKI

these scriptures have value, have hidden this existential truth from
ourselves. We ARE dust. We cannot live without Earth. The name
of our species “human” shares the root “hum” of “hummus,” the dust
of Earth. This truth should ground us not only to Earth, but to the
particular places where we dwell, the soil beneath our feet, our houses,
our roadways. What comportment should such understanding elicit?
According to Bonnie Mann (2002), human dependence is “…a kind
of relationship to place, one that properly faced, evokes both wonder
and reverence” (349). But, we have forgotten. Ceasing to revere
Nature or gods, we have instead revered ourselves. Our self-absorption
reveals our “miscarriage of reverence” for our own creativity, alienating
us from land. We are muddled by
the… confusion about our relationship to Earth (which we replace with
‘world’), that constantly positions subjects as ‘world-makers,’ ‘authors,’ or
‘stewards,’ while never acknowledging our absolute and utter dependence
in this relation (350).

Caught up in the self-referentiality of our texts (Mann 2002, 352),
we think ourselves into a void. “The entire world becomes a collective and textualized interiority, which is both made from and makes
the performativity of each subject…a kind of ‘epistemological jouissance’” (353). Mann contrasts this ﬂight from our animalic life against
the bearing of a deep, reverential recognition of dependence.
For Mann (2002), being human means dependence upon Earth,
and she notes the spiritual implications of dependency relations in
Eva Kittay’s theory as applicable to our relationship with Earth. For
Kittay (1999), “dependency relations are the paradigmatic moral relations” (68). They are the foundations upon which we become. Thus,
“the dependency relation in which all others are nested must be
the paradigm of paradigms.” This is Earth. Only by recognizing
our “unfathomable moral and epistemological failure” in denying our
dependence, can correction be possible (Mann, 358). The sustaining
nurturance of Nature is all around us, in clouds, sun, soil, trees, rivers,
gardens, bees, birds, wind. Only by living in recognition of dependence can we see our living world.
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Like Care Ethicists, Martin Buber (1923/1970) holds that life is
relational. He describes the encounter between subjects as the phenomenon of “meeting” or “seeing” the other as a full and sacred subject. Like Care theorists, Buber claims that there is no “I” without
a “you” or an “it”. Whether we say “I-You” or “I-It”, we “establish a
mode of existence” (53). The I-It is subject to object, while the I-You
is subject to subject. Only in the “I-You” can we encounter the other
in themselves (59). Noddings (1984/2013) builds on Buber’s view as
the “I must” urge may extend to non-human animals (73). Reciprocity is possible in non-human relations, expressing itself as “happy
growth”, according to Noddings (86), what physicians, vets, and
botanists call thriving. As we care for our pets, plants, or farm animals,
they respond to us. Our gardens feed us when we tend to them. Thus,
the one-caring and cared-for cycle in roles of caregiving and receiving. We are part and parcel of Nature: “One’s true self [includes] one’s
biological nature…[our] membership in Earth’s Community of life”
(Taylor 1986, 44-45). This anthropology teaches us to think against
our anthropocentrism in favor of biocentrism making the whole ecosystem the center of our life’s concern (Yunt 2017, 28). Biocentrism,
in contrast to anthropocentrism, views “Nature…as a good-in-itself
requiring our reverence…[and] all living beings [as] ends-in-themselves
with their own inner, inviolable purpose” (xix). If we take our
Earthly interdependence seriously, this value must guide our ethical
concerns.
Adding the adjective value of “biocentric” to caring about, or practicing receptivity to potential caring situations (Fisher & Tronto
1990, 40), makes one available for encounters with non-human living beings like trees. This is not spiritual or magical fantasy, but is
rather, as Buber (1923/1970) states, contingent upon speaking “I-You”
with our whole being. This is the heart of the dialogic way of being
in relation for Buber (See also Donovan 2006). The metaphor of
“speaking” here is the moral comportment of attunement. Attunement moves from the objective “I-It” stance toward encounter. “[I]f
will and grace are joined…as I contemplate the tree I am drawn into
relation, and the tree ceases to be an It. The power of exclusiveness
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has seized me” (62). The tree’s uniqueness makes a claim, evoking
from me the I-You sensibility. I see the “youness” of the tree and feel
a caring-for response. Contemplation allows me to see and hear the
tree’s solicitation. Turning away from such moral possibilities seems
mistaken, what Peter Singer (1975) called speciesist, and what Tinker
(2004) calls anthropocentric. Tinker (2004) further argues contra his
Buddhist colleagues that sentience is not exclusive to animate creatures. Thus, ahimsa, or non-harm, protecting animals from killing or
harm (Keown 2005, 42), is an insufﬁcient ethic (Tinker 2004, 114).
Caring-for (Fisher and Tronto 1990) must include our rooted fellow
creatures, the plants and trees, as well as the rootless ones of atmosphere, rivers, and oceans. Yunt (2017) articulates a potentially harmonious way to put such caring-for and caregiving into practice
through a simple rule of thumb:
Human life and interests should be brought into alignment with all of
nature so that non-vital human interests do not override vital nonhuman
needs (boldface mine, xi).

Like the Golden Rule, this maxim can help us assess both private and
public practices. Adding a dimension of sacred obligation could
increase how seriously we take such a maxim. Jonathan Haidt (2006,
2012) argues that humans tend to sacralize. If secular Post-Modernity
refuses to let us sacralize invisible and visible forces, we are left with
only ourselves (Mann 2002). Perhaps, we ought to accept our sacralizing tendency, but turn it to that which we know to be necessary and
good for life, like Indians do with corn and buffalo.
Not only do Indian people ﬁnd that corn is a living and perforce sentient
being, but virtually every tribal community has ceremonies dedicated to
maintaining relationships of reciprocity between themselves and the corn
they plant and harvest (Tinker 2004, 114).

This reciprocity is a subject to subject relation; the plants communicate. Indian medicinal recipes come from “knowledge communicated
to them by the plants themselves” (Tinker 2004, 114). Practicing
receptivity makes encounter possible, opening ourselves to the
ways creation speaks. If a biocentric perspective, as Yunt (2017, 93)
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contends, is concerned with individuals and whole species, and promotes the wellbeing of interdependent interspecies relations, then it
might facilitate an Ecological Turn away from the human self toward
that which makes our lives and all of life possible. An ecological turn
reﬂects a necessary humility in our perspective, perhaps even reverence, expressing our recognition of our profoundly dependent relationality in nature and motivating development of an ethos of caring
for and maintaining right relations with the fellow creatures of our
particular regions, our neighbors.

Care and Caritas: Reforming Human Prodigality through
Devotional Care
That which is hateful to you, do not do to your fellow; this in a few
words, is the entire Torah; all the rest is but an elaboration of this one,
central point.
Rabbi Hillel, 1st century, BCE

This injunction, echoed by Jesus of Nazareth in the positive form, is
the Golden Rule which we Westerners have traditionally consigned
to human relations. We have been proﬂigate with our fellow creatures, wasting their lives and damaging our ecosystems. Jeremy
Bentham (1781/1996) expanded our ethical regard to all who suffer,
including most animals (282). And while most of us would shudder
to cause unnecessary suffering to an animal, we have yet to raise our
regard for animal and ecological welfare to the level of changing
our grocery shopping or gas pump habits. To more fully afﬁrm our
acceptance of our relational ontology, we need to recreate our ethos.
Aristotle wrote that a good person, is a good citizen (NE Book 1).
We now see that we are not just citizens of our countries, but also
creatures of Earth, so our ethics will need to cultivate good Earthlings.
The idea of human dependence deﬁnes the religious orientation of
the Abrahamic faiths, primarily dependence on God. And while the
emphasis became more abstracted from Nature, as they embraced
the Greek and European ethos, it was not always so. Such abstraction
is not essential to these faiths which are steeped in liturgies of care.

396

KIMBERLEY D . PARZUCHOWSKI

The Judeo-Christian scriptures show God’s care as coming through the
Natural world as ﬁery cloud and manna (Exodus), food provided by
birds (I Kings 17), and the land’s own bounty (Psalm 65). God’s followers are expected to reciprocate (Micah 6.8). The early Christians
shared their food in common which was the early practice of the
Eucharist (Acts 10). Generous love is at the heart of the Abrahamic
faiths (love of God and neighbor) and is a point of intersection with
care ethics. In the Christian tradition, St. Paul describes the fruit of
the spiritually infused life (faith, hope, and love) and claims that
“The greatest of these is love” (I Cor 13.13). Love is the Greek word
agape which was translated into Latin as caritas.
The word caritas provides a linguistic connection between the
religious virtue and the theory, value, and practice of care ethics. And
caritas as a virtue folds the practical labor of caring (Held 2006) into
the reverential regard for the relation of the one-caring and the
cared-for. Care ethics provides a necessary corrective to the selfsacriﬁce of the religious virtue of caritas however, because the wellbeing of the one-caring, also needs attention (Noddings 1984/2013,
100). Women have historically carried too much of the caring burden
among humans, as has Nature; she is overdue for some reciprocal
care. Conceiving of care for Nature through virtues like caritas
in which focus on the needs of the other is central can guide us in
thought, practice, and dissemination of other green virtues.
Religious rituals and liturgies artfully shape our hearts and minds
for the cultivation of virtues. Cultivating our moral perception to see
Nature as a kind of moral subject is essential to eliciting our willingness to forego present conveniences of, e.g., buying plastic encased
prepared foods, for the long-term value of reducing our landﬁlls and
plastic in our water, and instead pressing corporations to create truly
sustainable packaging. Without the ongoing stimulus to our imagination that religious services and practices provide, we fall into old,
easy, self-involved habits. “It is impossible…to engage in beautiful
actions if one is not equipped for them…happiness [comes to one] by
means of virtue and learning or training…[it is nevertheless] one of
the most divine things…” (Aristotle NE Bk I.8, 9, 1099b). Humans
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are stubborn creatures requiring regular prodding and intensive guidance to facilitate their growth and particularly their willingness to
make personal sacriﬁces for a higher good. Psychology shows that we
do better when we have external pressures to keep us accountable
(Haidt 2006; Seligman 2012; Kahneman 2011). While non-religious
communities can also promote such motivations, they may lack the
deeper emotional connections that can glue people together and
motivate them over the long term.4
Religions activate and motivate care through what Martin
Hoffman (2000) calls “hot” cognitions. “Cold” cognition is intellectual assent, usually insufﬁcient to e.g., make us buy costly humanely
raised beef. We need what Hoffman (2000) calls “hot” cognitions
which emotionally activate care and action (160). Religious stories,
songs, prayers, and calls to action impress the moral imagination and
activate hot cognitions which can overcome obtuseness that our reason alone cannot. Inconvenient truths lead reason to side with the
bias in favor of our ease (Haidt 2006, 22). To alter our bad metaphysics which privilege human convenience over ecological wellbeing, we
will need something stronger than data. Our current crises reveal the
insufﬁciency of our epistemological responsibility.
Ecologically considered, it is not primarily our verbal statements that are
‘true’ or ‘false,’ but rather the kind of relations that we sustain with the
rest of nature. A human community that lives in a mutually beneﬁcial
relation with the surrounding earth is a community we might say, that
lives in truth (Abram 2006, 264).

Biocentric measures might provide a litmus test against which to
measure the moral worth of an idea, ethic, institution, or body of
practices. How well does it afﬁrm and enable healthy relations among
the region’s diverse peoples and Natural community? Our intersubjective world is the best test of our theories, of our self and world
4
Although, I think that the academic life can create a similar ethos if the academic community coheres with higher ideals in our treatment of one another and
our Earth. But, most people are not in academic communities, so religious communities can provide the necessary cultural reinforcements.
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coherence. Right relation more existentially justiﬁes our lives than
right teaching or right thinking. If religions are willing to incorporate
such values, then academia ought to invite collaboration. And if
religions are not willing, they should be challenged on those moral
grounds in meaningful dialogue. Philosophical discussions of how to
live need to meet with the practices and communities who can
bring those virtues to life. At present, are we living only in what
Buber (1923/1970) called the I-It relation? This relation is not
wrong in and of itself; expedience requires the I-it relation. But
according to Buber, if we live only in the I-It relation, we are not
fully human (emphasis mine, 65). “Relation is reciprocity” (58, 67).
Relation is human-nature. Learning to see our humanity as rooted
in webs of Earthly kinship and learning how to practice caringabout, we can make ourselves available for moments of encounter
so that when we are solicited by the I-Thou relation, we can attend
to the meaning of the other, listening in compassion as we might
to a neighbor.

Conclusion: Earthing Humanity
Love thy neighbor as thyself.
Leviticus, Deuteronomy, Matthew, Mark, Luke
Therefore, let us make thanksgiving… give to Earth and all things living, liturgies of care.
New Century Hymnal, United Church of Christ

We have paid a profound price for our fantasy of independence these
last few hundred years in Western life. It is difﬁcult for us to see this
loss given our secular industrialized worldview—a worldview spawned
in and transmitted by Eurocentric imperialist arrogance. We have
wasted many parts of Earth. Like the arrogant youth in Jesus’ parable
of the Prodigal Son (Luke 15.11-32), who asks for his inheritance
only to squander it, end up starving, and feeding pigs for a living, so
we have squandered the bounty of our home. And in so doing, we
have alienated ourselves, like a child from her mother. But, like the
arrogant youth who saw his humiliating foolishness and returned in
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repentance to his home, we can, through reﬂection and conviction,
“come to ourselves” and seek reunion.
We can return to relation; it is available all around us. “The holy
is a dimension of reality that shines through the bearers of the holy,
be it stars and trees, ocean and earth…or persons…” (Paul Tillich
1977, 152). Religious communities already have practices and services that require care and faithful labor from practitioners. It is not
a far stretch to invite these communities to share concern and spiritual regard for our Natural world. Universities should be building
bridges of dialogue and engagement in the towns and cities where
they dwell. Through joyful rituals (e.g., festivals like Holi and Easter
in spring, or Harvest in autumn), we can rekindle our childlike sense
of wonder, and highlight the ways that Nature has provided for us
(whether understood as by the design of a deity or not), we surely can
see that Nature offers us a place of soulful connection. John Muir
certainly thought so, “Everybody needs beauty as well as bread, places
to play in and pray in, where Nature may heal and cheer and give
strength to body and soul alike” (1912). Such experiences of communion and the providence of Nature ought to evoke gratitude and
a reciprocity of care. Practices of contemplation and caring about
(Fisher & Tronto 1990), create the spirit of receptivity to Nature’s
expressions. Bringing Care Ethical theory into collaboration with
religious sensibilities, practiced as caritas, we can aid ourselves in seeing more deeply who we are, just one of many in our biotic community. It is time for us to repent of our ongoing abuses, and actively
work together, privately and publicly, to make the Ecological turn
away from our deluded self-absorption and toward healing with Earth.
As I write this from Eugene, Oregon, large areas of the state are
engulfed in ﬂames and smoke. Experts claim that the excesses and
intensity of these ﬁres are the result of climate change which will
only increase with our current practices. If those of us convinced by
climate science can ﬁnd ways to bring religious believers into the
concerns for our shared ecological wellbeing, by appealing to the parts
of religion that resonate with a Care Ethical orientation to Earth,
we might be able to expand our caring communities. Biocentrism can
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enable us to see not only the sacredness of life, but also the meaning
of kinship with living beings. Such recognition inspired ancient practices of offerings, libations, tending sacred ﬁres, protecting sacred
groves, and making personal sacriﬁces. We, in our current era, might
also learn how to turn our attention to the needs of our natural home
again. Traditions like Christmas, Yule, Solstices, Rosh Hashanah,
New Years, and Easter can be reimagined to attend to Earth’s cycles,
to contemplating and celebrating trees, forests, spring, harvest, and
the returning of light. Of course, this will require religions to lean
into their Earthly tendencies and nurture their re-vision to more fully
honor Earthly dependence in language, ritual, story, and moral practice. But, the fruit of such an altered vision might ameliorate our
Post-Modern sense of alienation and loneliness by seeing ourselves as
part of an Earthly community. Nourishing our moral imagination
toward our socio-natural relations could inspire more acts of caritas
in our daily lives, by gardening, planting trees, buying less plastic,
feeding birds, watching birds, providing homes for bees, voting for
sustainable legislation, walking, riding bicycles more, and breathing
in the fragrances of ocean, forest, and rain. If we humans tend to
sacralize, what better use to make of such an urge than to sacralize
care for Earth.
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